白蓮佛敎論集

The Hermeneutical Problem Of Truth Claims and…

The Hermeneutical Probllem Of Truth Claims and Scriptural Plurality in the M□dhyamika Buddhism and its Implication for Religious Pluralism

金容彪 (Kim, Yong Pyo)*

	* 東國大學校 佛敎文化硏究院 硏究員

The Hermeneutical Problem Of Truth Claims and Scriptural Plurality in the M□dhyamika Buddhism and its Implication for Religious Pluralism*

* This paper was presented at the First Annual Conference of the International Association for Asian Philosophy of Relgion on May 27, 1994, at Ewa Woman's University in Seoul.

金容彪

Contents

Ⅰ. The Problem of conflicting Truth Claims

Ⅱ. Scriptural Words and Contextual Truth

Ⅲ. The M□dhyamika Interpretation on Scriptural Plurality

Ⅳ. Critique of Ontological Inclusivism and Unitive Pluralism

Ⅴ. Non-Acquisition of the Middle Way as Openendlessness

Ⅰ. The Problem of Conflicting Truth Claims

The present paper is concerned with the hermeneutical issues of truth and scriptural plurality in M□dhyamika Buddhism, and its implication for the contemporary discourses on religious pluralism.

Can the M□dhyamika hermeneutics solve the problem of the conflict of truth based on scriptural plurality in Buddhism? Have they succeeded in establishing that all the scriptures point toward one y□na? With these questions, we encounter the problem of scriptural plurality and various interpretations within Buddhist traditions. In fact, the great Tripitakas show that Buddhism is not a simple religion. Historically and philosophically, all Buddhist traditions can not be said to be the same. On the other hand, there is a view that each Buddhist tradition and set of scriptures are different responses to the enlightenment of the same person, namely, the Tath□gata.

The Praj□□-M□dhyamika hermeneutics of the middle way in the scriptural word has a good point for solving the problem of scriptural plurality and associated conflicts. As seen in the She-ling notion of the scriptural word, all teachings of the Tath□gata are tactical devices. In the m□dhyamika interpretation, the scriptural word consisted in the twofold structure, i.e., conventional and ultimate, which does not present the ultimate truth itself. Also the two truths are not two fixed sets of reality, but are conducive teachings only. In this respect, the words of the Buddha are said to be practically true. The two truths serve as a hermeneutical tool which make the apparently conflicting words of the Buddha intelligible. However, it does not mean that the words of the Buddha are ultimately true. They are true only in their contexts.

In the m□dhyamika Buddhist context, there is no absolute teaching (n□t□rtha) in Buddhist scriptures. However, the history of Buddhism shows that scholars have claimed the superiority of their own scriptures and doctrines over others. This is especially the case in the far Eastern Mah□y□na traditions, where hierarchical classification of doctrine has become a popular way of explaining scriptural discrepancies. The expedient teachings of the Buddha cannot be explained from one point of view, for they are taught in various ways to be suitable for the differing needs of people. An awareness of the Buddha's intention is an important factor.

There is no one criterion to determine the truth claims that the various schools appropriate to their scriptural texts. Kogen Mizuno points out : □From the standpoint of science of formal logic, both of which are given to single-perspective judgments based on a single criterion, this multidimensional view could be regarded as an extremely complicated system of non-order or non-logic. yet such a multidimensional view is necessary in order to fully comprehended a mental state as something dynamic and mutable.□ The scriptural texts have to be understood in the context in which they were taught. Contextual understanding is required to be aware of both the Buddha's intention and listener's situations. And the teachings of the Buddha cannot be differentiated between the shallow and the profound as they are designed to meet the needs of people's varying capacities.

) Kogen Mizuno, Buddhist S□tras(Tokyo : Kosei publishing Co., 1982), p. 141.

) See, Chi-i, the Fa-hua-hsuan-i, T. 33. p. 800.

Ⅱ. Scriptural Words and Contextual Truth

According to Korean Monk Chegwan(?-971, C.E.) in the late tenth century, the Buddha's expedient teachings can be classified into the fourfold methods of conversion, namely, the Sudden, the Gradual, the Secret, and the Variable.

) Korean T'ien-t'ai scholar Chegwan(Taikwan, Japanese) was invited to China, and became the disciple of Lo-ch'i hsi-chi, the twelfth Patriarch of the T'ien-t'ai school. Chegwan's T'ien-t'al ssu-chiao-i is distinctive treatise of T'ien-t'ai thought which deals with the hermeneutical probliems in the scriptures. The treatise has been regarded as one of main texts in the T'ien-t'al tradition in China, Korea, and Japan. More than two hundred commentaries on Chegwan's T'ien't'ai ssu-chiao-i have been written. For an introduction and translation on the Chegwan's work and commentaries, see David W. Chapple, ed., T'ien-t'ai Buddhism : An Outline of the Fourfold Teachings(Tokyo : Daiich-Shobo, 1983).

Also see Sekiguchi shindai, Showa kotei Tendai shikyogi(Takyo : Sankibo Busshorin Busshorin, 1935), and Sekiguchi, □Goji hakkyo kyohan no kigen.□ Taisho daigaku kenkyu kiyo 61(1971), pp. 1∼16.

He also suggests the fourfold doctrine of conversion, namely, the Tripitaka, the Shared, the Distinctive, and the Complete. These are called the eight teachings which are correlated with the five periods, namely, the Avamtasaka, the Deer park, the Expanded, the Praj□□, the Lotus, and the Nirv□□a, Chegwan points out that the fourfold teachings beginning with the sudden are the methods of conversion, which are like medical prescriptions in the world. The four Teachings beginning with the Tripitaka are the doctrine of conversion, which are like the flavors of various medicines. These ideas are scattered through a wide range of the scriptures.

) Chegwan, T'ien-t'ai ssu-chaio-i, (T. 46. No. 1931. pp. 773∼780), as ed. and tr. by David W. Chappel, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism : An Outline of the Fourfold Teachings(Tokyo : Daiich-Shobo, 1983), p. 54.

Chegwan identifies the sudden method with the Avatamsaka-s□tra, and the three periods of Deer Park, Expanded (vaipulya) teaching, and praj□□ are all identified as the gradual method. This interpretation represents the T'ien-t'ai hermeneutical stance. The M□dhyamika will not agree with chegwan, for chegwan considers the Lotus s□tra and Nirv□□a s□tras as the complete teaching as the complete teaching as n□t□rtha, while the Praj□□-s□tras are merely preliminary (ney□rtha).

) Modern scholars such as Sekiguchi Shindai points out that Chegwan's work does not represent deas of Chi-i(538-597, C.E) exactly, because Chi-i only says the three methods of conversion, namely, the sudden, the gradual, and the variable. (T.33, p. 806a) Chegwan follows Chan-jan's(711-782, C.E), the Sixth Patriarch of T'ien-t'ai, use of term □five period and eight teachings□ to systematize T'ien-t'ai classification of scriptures.

The secret method refers to that within the previous four periods, the Tath□gata's activities(bodily, verbal, and mental) were beyond ordinary people's comprehension. For the sake of some he expounded the sudden method, and for the sake of others he expounded gradual method. However, there was no mutual awareness between the two groups, the sudden and gradual, that the others were enabled to receive benefits.

) Chegwan, op. cit., p. 61.

The variable method can be considered as an important character of the Tath□gata's teaching, especially for the M□dhyamika Buddhists. Chegwan reflects this essential point of the scripture.

The variable method means that within the previous four flavors, although the Buddha expounded the Dharma with a single voice, yet every sentient being gained comprehension each in his own way. This means the Tath□gata while expounding the gradual method with his incomprehensible power could cause sentient beings to obtain the benefits of the sudden method and while expounding the sudden method could have them obtain the benefits of the gradual method. Because the benefits which are obtained in this way differ.

) loc. cit.

It is said the Buddha proclaims Dharma by a single voice (eka'sabda). But hearers comprehend the voice according to their capacity. This idea of a single voice of the Buddha leads to the one vehicle. The Tath□gata teaches one Dharma, but listeners understand it from their perspective. Certain teachings in the scriptures are delivered from many perspectives intended for different levels of understanding, yet the Tath□gata teaches the Dharma in a consistent way in sequential order.

The Mah□samghikas, the mother school of the M□dhyamika, also asserts that the Buddha speaks the Dharma with a single voice. The M□dhyamika may follows this view, for no language has priority over any other. This one voice signifies that the Tath□gata simply speaks to people in their everyday languages. The Vimalak□rti-nide□a- s□tra says, everyone says that the Buddha's language is identical to his own language. This is a special characteristic of the Tath□gata's power. The Tath□gata will not empower hegemony to any linguistic group. However, this one voice can be translated into any public languages.

) The Vimalakir-nide'sa-sutr□, T. 14. p. 538a.

The Mah□vastu states : □Though the Buddha's voice speaks in one language, this utterance becomes current everywhere, even in the barbaric assemblies of the scythians, the Greeks, the Chinese, the Ramathas, the Persians, and the Dorodas.□ In this context the Mahasmghikas asserts that the Buddha's teachings are all n□t□rtha, meaning the Buddha spoke only the definitive truth. But we have interpreted it differently, i.e., all teachings of the Buddha are ney□rtha, There are difference within Buddhism, but they all are contextual. The M□hasamghika's assertion, i.e., all of the Buddha's teachings are ultimately true, is interpreted by the M□dhyamika as provisionally true.

) The Mahav□sutu is the Mahas□mghika's literature which describes the Buddha's biography. See J.J.Jones, tr. The Mahavasutu(London : PTS, 1949), vol. l, p. 135.

Ⅲ. The M□dhyamika Interpretation on Scriptural Plurality

The M□dhyamika interprets that the Buddha teaches nothing, not speaking is the Buddha's speaking(av□canam Buddhavacanam), for there is no Dharma to speak. Che- gwan's position regarding the various method gets to the point, for he reflects precisely the nature of a single voie of the Buddha and its different transformation as it is. The single voice of the Buddha signifies that the Buddha did not teach many yan□s. Each doctrine the Buddha taught is meaningful. He teaches only the ekay□na, Thus, for the M□dhyamika tradition, only ekay□na is meaningful. The three vehicles are merely up□ya. We cannot say that a single scripture represents the n□t□rtha, i.e., perfect doctrine or complete teaching. For this reason the She-ling masters are opposed to the doctrinal classification (p'an-chiao), and argue that the ekay□na is the saddharma, However, Chi- tsang has tried to make scriptural classification, as other doctrinal schools have done. Each school promotes its scripture to be the status of n□t□rtha in order to claim its own testimony to be the final word of Tath□gata. However, it is questionable whether Chi-tsang as a She-ling M□dhyamika needs to establish such a system, for hierarchical placing of scriptures is not called for in M□dhyamika Buddhism. In this respect, we see Chi-tsang's digestion from the fundamental point of the M□dhyamika.

) The classification of s□tras and doctrines is seen in the Samdhinirmocana sutra(Wuliang-i-ching)(T. 16. pp. 673c∼674a), and the Akshayamati-s□tra(Shen-

mi-chieh-t'o-ching)(T. 9. pp. 386ab). In China, since the Northern and southern dynasties period p'an-chiao system for classifying the scriptures has become popular intellectual exercise among the Buddhist schools. They try to determine the proper historical place of each s□tra and doctrine in the whole teachings of the Buddha. The P'an-chiao system primarily aims at establishing a hierarchy of own school. They failed to find the historical order of the scriptures, because their approach were not historical and textual.

Chi-tsang examines the scriptures from broad perspectives, and classifies them into the two Pitakas and the three Dharmacakras. The two Pitakas are : (a) □r□vaka, repre- senting H□nay□na scriptures; (b) Bodhisattva, representing Mah□y□na scriptures. The three Dharmacakras(Wheel of Dharma) are : (a) the root, (b) the branches, and (c) the truck. The root wheel of Dharma refers to the Avatamsaka- s□tra which is delivered soon after the enlightenment of the Buddha for only superior Bodhisattvas. This teaching is regarded as n□t□rtha, the complete teaching. The branches wheel of Dharma consists of all the □gamas and Mah□y□na scriptures, including the vimalakirti-nirde'sa-s□tra and the Praj□□p□ramit□-s□tras which deal with preparatory teachings for the highest teaching. The branches wheel of Dharma consists of all the □gamas and Mah□y□na scriptures, including the Vimalakirti-nide□a-s□tra and the Praj□□p□ramit□- s□tras which deal with preparatory teachings for the highest teaching. The trunk wheel of Dharma refers to the Lotus-s□tra which is delivered for those who already have understood teachings of the branches wheel of Dharma.

) This theory appears in Chi-tsang's Chung-kuan-lun-shu, T. 45. pp. 87b∼88b, Ching-ming-hsuan-lun, T. 38, p. 900c, and Fa-hua-hsuan-lun, T. 34, pp. 382bc, Ta-p'ing-ching-yu-i, T. 33, p. 66c, Pai-lun-su, T. 42, p. 239b, Ehr-ti-i, T. 45, pp. 115a, San-lun-hsuan-i, T. 45, p. 5bc, and Ta-ch'eng-hsuan-lun, T. 45, p. 24c, 63b, etc.

This teaching leads the branches to the root wheel. By the trunk wheel of Dhrama, the three yan□s, i.e., the □r□vaka- y□na pratyekabuddhay□na, and Bodhisattvay□na are all led to the ekay□na of the middle way.

In this presentation of the three wheels of Dharma, Chi-tsang seems to be confused, for he misunderstood the M□dhyamika stance of the scriptures. Seungrang may not agree with such exercise of scriptural classification. The above classification by Chi-tsang represents the Lotus scholar's position. In fact, he was influenced by the Lotus s□tra and the Nirv□na-s□tra. Chi-tsang also failed to find out a chronological explanation of the teachings of Buddha.

) Chi-tsang wrote many commentaries on the Lotus-sutra (Fa-hua-ching; Saddharmapundarika-s□tra) such as Fa-hua-hs□an-lun(T. 34, no. 1720), Fa-hua-ching-i-su(T. 34, no. 1721), Fa-hua-ching-tung-lueh(Zoku 1 43 1), Fa-hua-ching-yu-i(T. 34, no. 1722), and Fa-hua-lun-su(T. 40, no. 1818). It is said that Chi-tsang lectured on the Lotus sutra over three hundred times in his life time.

No modern scholarship will agree that the Avatamsaka- s□tra was delivered soon after the Buddha's attainment of enlightement. Also we cannot agree with Chi-tsang's claim that the Avatamsaka-s□tra is n□t□rtha identified with the Buddha's ultimate enlightenment.

However, Chi-tsang has a point when he says that there are no fundamental differences in the Mah□y□na s□tras :

The purpose of the Mah□y□na s□tras is to show the path. The path is not two at all. The various scriptural teachings are required for there are various Dharma gates to enter.

) Chi-tsang, Ta-ch'eng-hs□an-lun (hereafer abbreviated as TCHL), p. 57a, and the Fa-hua-hsuan-lun, T. 34, p. 378c.

This statement corresponds to the following Ta-chih-tu- lun's assertion : □In the teaching of the Tath□gata, the paths that lead to the ultimate liberation are all equally one pointed. There are no divergent paths.□ Chi-tsang might not intend to insist on a ranking view of the Mah□y□na scriptures, for if so it is contradictory to his basic assertion. Instead, he wants to show that the various scriptural texts are embraced within the ekay□na of the middle way, the enlightenment of the Buddha.

) The Ta-chih-tu-lun (abbreviated TCTL), T. 25, p. 254a, The Ta-chih-tu-lun is a comprehensive encyclopedic work on the Praj□□p□ramia literatures. Kumarajiva translated it into Chinese between 402 and 405, C.E. It is found in T. 25, no. 1509, pp. 57∼756 and in K. 549, and exists only in Chinese translation, 100 ch□an. Concerning the authorship of the TCTL, there is some doubt, but it is traditionally attributed to N□g□rjuna. Hui-ying wrote a sub-commentary on the TCTL in the 6th century, but it is available only in fragments in HTC, 74 and 87. Venkata Ramanan translated the TCTL into English partially as N□g□rjuna's philosophy as presented in the Mah□-Praj□□p□ramit□-Sastra(abbreviated as MPS)(Rutland, Vermont : Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1966), The references to the TCTL are taken from Ramanan's translation with modifications. Etienne Lamottee translated into French the first 18 chapters of the TCTL in the La traite de lagrande vertue de sagesse, Vols, 1-4, (Louvain : 1944∼49).

Hence, we suggest that the two Pitakas and the three Dharmacakras theories cannot represent the She-ling's official P'an-chiao system as Fatsang indicated it. For the She-ling M□dhyamika tradition, the classification of the s□tras is not important. All scriptures are merely expedient teachings. As it is said that □in entering the path of non-duality, there are several gates.□ The value of each s□tra will lie in its functional efficacy for people.

) Fa-tsang insisted that the three Dharmacakra theory is the San-lun p'an-chiao system. Fa-tsang misunderstood the San-lun view of the scritures. He only wants to take the root Dharmacakra, i.e., the Hua-yen sutra, for the Hua-yen school's hierarchy. for a detail on the Fa-tsang's theory scriptural classification, see Fa-tsang's Hua-yen-ching-tam-hs□an-chi, T. 35, pp. 111b.

) TCHL, p. 57a.

For the She-ling M□dhyamika, the middle way is a synonym for the ekay□na, the underlying argument being that there is a fundamental non-duality between the yan□s. The Ta-ch'eng-hs□an-lun explains the reason why the theme of non-duality is identical with the ekay□na : □Because the principle of non-duality is the root of the all vehicles. Comprehension of the non-duality gives rise to the insight into non-duality, and one reaches the non-dual ekay□na.□ From this insight, the She-ling school asserts that all doctrines contained in the scriptures are essentially up□ya, therefore, ultimately have to be abandoned. If one attaches to a specific doctrine, it becomes lower truth. The truth has to be without self essence, and non-clining is the nature of higher truth. Thus, the middle way of the scriptures means emptiness of the two truths. They have no fixed nature, but they are □□nya and only effective means for enlightenment.

) TCHL, p. 57a.

) Chi-tsang, Erh-ti-i(abbreviated as ETI), T. 45, no 1854, p. 95.

The extension of □□nyat□ to scripture is of special interest to the Madhyamikas. It promotes openness on scriptural grounds. In this regard. The Ta-chih-tu-lun quotes from the Arthavargiya-s□tr□ following stanzas :

Everyone takes his stand on his own view and by his own constructions gives rise to disputes : □To know this to know the truth□, he holds, □and not to know this to be condemned.□ Truly one who does not accept the view of another is devoid of wisdom. He that clings to his own construction is devoid of wisdom. To stand on one's own view of truth and give rise to false constructions, if this is pure wisdom, then there is none who does not have it.

) TCTL, pp. 60c∼61a, MPS, pp. 128∼129.

The □□stra comments that common people take their stand on their points of view, on their own doctrines and on their own thoughts. Thus, there arise all the contentions and refutations. Such conceptual fixations are the root of all dogmatic claims and counter claims. for these reasons, ultimately the Madhyamika wants to abandon all sorts of exclusivity in the name of doctrines. This position is called positionless position. Nagarjuna suggests :

) TCTL, p. 61a, MPS, p. 129.

From clinging to things there arise disputes; but if there is no cling what dispute will there be? He who understands that all d□□□□s, cling or non-cling, are in truth of the same nature, has already become free from all these. ……In the Dharma of the Buddha one abandons all passion, all wrong views, all pride of self ; one puts an end to all these and does not cling at any- thing.

) TCTL, pp. 61a and 63c, MPS, pp. 129 and 131.

In the M□dhyamika thought, the exclusive truth claim that one particular scripture and school only teach the authentic truth is considered as an egological fantasy. All passion, wrong views, and pride of superiority are the basis of exclusivism. With the egocentric attachment to doctrines, the goal of Buddhism cannot be reached. This egological malady will end when one does not cling to the exclusivism of ideology or religion. The doctrine of □□nyat□ is taught precisely to remove such a malady. The absolute truth claims cannot stand in a Buddhist way of thinking. As noted, Seungrang's middle way of the scriptural word shows that even the Buddha's highest doctrines are denied if one is attached to them as something absolute.

The scriptural plurality and doctrinal diversity in M□dhyamika Buddhism are understood as there are many paths to enlightenment. As long as they do not claim that their position is not absolute, the M□dhyamika will accept their position provisionally. However, various schools in Buddhism, (it is said that there are eighteen schools in Hinay□na and eight schools in Mah□y□na), depend on specific scriptures for their doctrinal basis. Such scriptural plurality in Buddhism represents philosophical evolution of doctrine for historical and cultural reasons.

The Therav□da view of scripture cannot explain the plurality of truth claims in Buddhism. They take the scriptures literally. They cannot overcome the belief that there was a historical Buddha who spoke truly and spoke once and for all. They insist that P□li scriptures represent the oldest recording of the Buddha's words. Therefore, they claim that they are the authentic word of the Buddha. On the other hand, the M□dhyamika school along with the Praj□□p□ramit□ scriptures finds that it is necessary to deconstruct the Therav□da notion of Buddha, Dharma, and scripture. For the M□dhyamika, the various scriptures do not mean there are many truths, but simply many paths. The Buddha does not teach different Dharmas according to different yan□s, he teaches the same Dharma differently. The turning vehicle(yan□) controversy in Buddhism is not a serious problem, for it is very close to a methodological device as a pedagogic means.

The one vehicle signifies that all discrepancies with regard to the yan□s and scriptures pertain to the forms of speech. beneath them all is a unity of message, the ekay□na, that can be realized only on the highest stage of praj□□. That is why the Buddha says, □Only a Buddha together with a Buddha can fathom the highest Dharma as things as they are, that is to say, all dharmas have such a form, such a nature, such an embodiment, such a potency, such a function, such a primary cause, such a secondary cause, such an effect, such a recompense, and such a complete foundational whole.□

) The Saddharma-pundarika-s□tra chapter 2, tr. by Bunno Kato, (slightly modified), The sutra of the Lotus flower of the Wonderful Law(tokyo : Rissho Kosei-kai, 1971), p. 33. Bunno Kato's translated from a Chinese version Miao-fa-lien-hua-ching translated by Kumarajiva in 406.

The scriptural plurality in Buddhism is a natural result of the primacy of contexts. The doctrine of expedient means (up□ya) allows such a pluralistic development of scripture. According to the context in which each scriptural word is taught, the truth of the word has to understood. In this respect, the M□dhyamika does not say that there is inferior or superior in Buddhist scriptures. Buddhist truths are contextual, and they all are contextual to the same degree.

Ⅳ. Critique of Ontological Inclusivism and Unitive Pluralism

The M□dhyamika attitude toward the world religions might not be basically different from is attitudes toward other Buddhist schools. All scriptures, along with the associated claims, are relative and contextual. There are different paths to salvation. The M□dhyamika stands for inclusivity. But its inclusivity is not metaphysical or theological; it does not elevate the uniqueness of a truth or its contexts to universal proportions. There are those who say that the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real or the Ultimate, and that within each of them independently the transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness is taking place. This view pre- supposes that there is one ultimate reality behind the world religions. It asserts that one ultimate reality, whether it is divine reality or not, manifests itself in various forms.

) See □Religious pluralism□, in Encycloedia of Religion ed. Mercia Eliade, Vol. 12, p. 331.

There is a fundamental difference between such inclusivism and the M□dhyamika view on religious pluralism. The M□dhyamika will not accept a fundamental unity of the world religions as well as Buddhist religion. In fact, as we have explored throughout the present study, such an absolute reality is metaphysical and must be deconstructed. The inclusivist theologian John Hick says : □One then sees the great world religions as different human responses to the one divine reality, embodying different perceptions which have been formed in different historical and cultural circumstances.□ John Hick's view does not cover all religions, especially Buddhism where there is no such notion of the divine reality or the absolute reality.

) John Hick, God Has Many Names(London : Macmillan, 1980), p. 18. He has changed the term □one divine reality□ to □the Real□ or □reality□ to consider nontheistic religions in □On Grading Religions□, Religious Studies 17(1981), p. 453.

Raimundo Panikkar also says : □The reality has many names, each name is a new aspect, a new manifestation and revelation of it. Yet each name teaches or expresses, as it were, the undivided Mystery.□ He further points out that the mystery as the ultimate religious fact does not liein the realm of doctrine or even of individual self-consciousness. It is present everywhere and in every religion. Raimundo Panikkar's point is different from Hick's, emphasizing the mystical religious experience. But both presuppose that there is a common reality in the world religions, and that the reality is of a metaphysical sort.

) Raimundo Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism(Maryknoll, NY : Orbis Books, 1981), p. 24.

) Raimundo Panikkar, The Intrareligious dialogue(New York : Paulist Press, 1978), p. 57.

The M□dhyamika rejects such views of the one absolute reality in religions. Because the scriptural plurality in Buddhism does not mean that there is only one ultimate reality or Dharma, religious plurality may be understood as many paths to salvation, not one common reality. In this respect, the M□dhyamika view is a sort of relativism. As each religion has a different cultural-historical origin and background, they cannot be compared with a single principle. Instead, the M□dhyamika will accept the situation of religious pluralism as it is. They exist differently as religious truths are relative.

Modern religious thinkers observe the relative nature of religious truth :

Whereas our Western notion of truth was largely absolute, static, and monologic or exclusive up to the past century, it has since become deabsolutized, dynamic and dialogic……in a word, □relational(Already two millennia and more ago some Hindu and Buddhist thinkers held a nonabsolutisic epistemology, but that fact had no significant impact on the West.)□……All statements about reality, especially about the meaning of things, are to be understood as historical, intentional, perspectival, partial interpretive and dialogic.

) Leonard Swidler, After Absolute : The Dialogical future of Religious Reflection(Minneapolis : Fortress, 1990), pp. 6∼7, Swidler points out a new view of truth new to the West, i.e., deabsolutizing truth, in six epistemological dimensions as : (a) historicity of truth, (b) intentionality, (c) sociology of knowledge, (d) limit of language, (e) hermeneutics, and (f) dialogue. For details, see ibid, pp. 5∼18.

For Buddhists, however, this view is not something new. As we have discussed, all scriptural statements about Dharma and dharmas are relative and interpretive (neyartha). There is no absolute statement concerning truth in Buddhism. Since the scriptural truths are merely methodological (m□rga), no truth is ultimately true. No truth is true by itself, but only in a specific context in which it is perceived, heard or understood.

From the M□dhyamika perspective, it can be said that there are two kinds of relativity, namely, doctrinal relativity and functional relativity. The doctrinal relativity accepts the relativity of truth in the conventional world, but it still looks for new truth, new ultimate truth. The Western view of relative truth, such as the notion of deabsolutizing of truth, seems to be in this category. On the other hand, the functional relativity of truth does not commit to any concept of truth. Truth is just functional by nature, a pedagogical device as it were.

The M□dhyamika thinkers advise people to give up any closed perspective or view of truth or Dharma. Seungrang and his followers emphasize that all absolute views of the truth have to be abandoned for no truth is ultimately true. For the M□dhyamika Buddhist, non-attachment to any concept of truth is a basic attitude toward truth. Even the Tath□gata's statements on the Dharma are not considered as the absolute truth, but they are functional in character and eventually have no absolute meanings to hold.

) ETI, p. 95 and 98.

In the situation of religious pluralism, the M□dhyamika view on the truth is unique. Notions such as the relativity of truth, scriptures as expedient means, and non-attachment to truth, are of enormous significance in today's world. It opens the boundless horizon for the dialogical discourse. In this respect, Abe Masao proposes the Buddhist concept of truth-body(Dharma-k□ya) as formless and boundless reality of □unyata is the ultimate ground for Buddhism and other religions.□ For Abe □boundless openness□ embraces various forms of gods and Lords as their ultimate grounds.

) See Masao Abe, □A Dynamic Unity in Religious Pluralism : A Proposal from the buddhist Point View,□ ed. John Hick, et al., The Experience of Religious Dicersity(Vermont : Gower Publishing, 1985), pp. 163∼190.

Concerning Abe's assertion, Thomas Dean comments that □given the assumption of a □positionless position□ that relativizes the absolute truth claims of all other positions□, but he □does not consider its own doctrine of □absolute Nothingness□ as a □position□ in its own right (for Abe it is viewed rather as a Zen □deconstruction□ of all other temptations to absolute claims of truth, including Buddhist ones as well-here he refers to the example of N□g□rjuna).□ In fact, the term □absolute nothingness□ seems to be far from the M□dhyamika stance. The M□dhyamikas will reject the understanding of □□□nyat□ □ as the ultimate reality as absolute nothingness. That smells of metaphysics and theology. However, Abe has a point when he says □□□nyat□ □ is boundless openness. Abe has a point when he says □□□nyat□□  is boundless openness. □□□nyat□ □ is not a metaphysical concept. As Dean indicates, Abe has a position of absolute nothingness. But the M□dhyamika will not hold any position in this sense. □□□nyat□ □ is not a metaphysical view; it does not signify an ultimate reality. Rather, □□nyat□  is the process of deconstructing the concept of ultimate reality either as being or non-being.

) Thomas Dean, □Masao Abe on Zen and Western Thought,□ The Eastern Buddhist 22(1989), p. 62.

Ⅴ. Non-Acquisition of the Middle Way as Open-endlessness

Then, what is the ultimate in the M□dhyamika school? We have said that the M□dhyamika negates the ultimate perpetually. The ultimate is said to be that which is not a knowable entity, or cognitive referent. It is beyond all conceptual realms, far away and separated from all entative singes and signifiers. N□g□rjuna expresses it this way : All is real (tathy□m), not real, both real not real, and neither real nor not real. This is called the Buddha-Dharma. Sen-jui demonstrates the same point in terms of ten negations; □not within and not without, not men and not dharmas, not object and not subject, not ral and not false, and not gained and not lost,□ The ultimate is said to be non-acquisition.

) Ibid, p. 65.

) Chi-tsang. Shih-erh-men-lin-shu, T. 42, p. 171ab.

In sum, the M□dhyamika notion of non-attachment of truth and scripture as an expedient means leads to the middle way of the scripture. It makes the apparently conflicting scriptures intelligible. In the discourse of the Tath□gata, worldly truths function as provisional statues. The so-called ultimate truth is the same as the conventional discourse. They are both neither ultimate nor conventional in the sense that they are only provisional by nature. However, it affirms their provisional functions, then establishes the interdependency (pratitya-samutp□da) of the middle and provisional.

The middle way becomes the foundation of the scriptural discourse in the M□dhyamika school. Whatever is dependent origination is □□nyat□; it is a provisional designation, and is the middle way. In the M□dhyamika system, thus, the dependent origination, emptiness and the middle way have interchangeable meaning. The Ta-ch'eng-hs□an-lun says:

) N□gaIrjuna, M□la-m□dhyamka-kaka(abbreviated as MMK), 24:18. For Sanskrit text and English translations of the MMK see K.K.Inada, N□g□rjuna : A Translation of his M□la-madhyamaka-kaka with an Introductory Essay(Tokyo : Hokuseido, 1970), and David J. Kalupahana, N□g□rjuna: The Philosophy of Middle Way(Albany : SUNY Press, 1986). The references to the MMK are taken from Inada's translation with slight modification. chinese translations : T. 30, no. 1564; K. 549. Tibetan translations : To, 3824, p. 5224. For Sanskrit text of Vigrahavyavartani, see K.P.Jayaswal and R. Sankityayana, Appendix to JBORS 23(1937), and E.H.Johnston and A.Kunst, MCB9(Brussels : 1951), pp. 99∼152 English translation : K.Bhattacharya, The dialectical Method of N□g□rjuna(Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1978). Chinese translations : T. 30, no. 1631; k. 630. Tibetan translation : to. 3828, p.5228.

Whatever arises by dependent origination is the worldly truth; it is □□nyat□. So it is the ultimate meaning; it is also the middle way, which is the foundation of the two truths.

) TCHL, pp. 19b, 20a, The TCHL offers the fourfold middle as: (a) middle prior to the provisional, (b) provisional prior to the middle, (c) provisional after middle, and (d) middle after the pro visional. The four middles correspond (a) empty by nature, (b) provisional, (c) essential middle, and (d) functional middle respectively.

One may say if the middle way is the essence of the scriptural discourse, it is against the doctrine of □□nyat□. Even the She-ling school uses the term □essential middle□ of non-duality, its nature cannot be ontological by definition. Our concern here is to point out the meaning of the functional middle in which the self-essence of the middle is negated endlessly. All scriptural discourses function from beginning to end as merely conducive teachings. Thus, the M□dhyamika establishes the inseparability of the scriptures and the middle way. The equation of the middle with the ekay□na offers a solution to the problems of conflicting truth claims and scriptural plurality. It also opens the boundless horizon for the dialogical discourse in religious pluralism.

經典多元主義와 眞理主張 問題에 관한 中觀解釋學

- 現代 宗敎多元論을 위한 含意와 관련하여 -

김용표

Ⅰ.

본 논문은 반야·중관학에서 제기하고 있는 진리주장과 경전다원성에 대한 해석학적 문제와 그 해답이 현대 종교다원주의 논의를 위해 함축하고 있는 의미를 밝혀보려는 연구이다.

불교내의 여러 전총에서 주장하고 있는 특정 경전이나 법설(Dharma-de□an□)에 대한 진리주장의 문제에 대한 중관 해석학적 해결방법은 매우 독특한 점이 있다. 그것은 중관학파의 소의경전인 반야경의 성립사가 말해주고 있는 바와 같이, 대승경전은 한계가 있는 닫혀지고 얼어 붙은 텍스트(apratisthita)가 아닌 열린 길이라는 것이다. 중관학파는 경전언어에 있어서의 眞理와 方法의 不可分性을 강조한다. 붓다가 설하는 法은 그가 어떻게 그 진리에 도달하게 되었는가 하는데 의거했다. 다른 말로 붓다의 설법은 단지 方法(m□rga)이라는 것이다. 그 설법은 처음부터 끝까지 방편적인 것으로 성격지어졌으므로 경전에서의 방법은 그 내용을 결정짓게 된 것이다. 모든 경전적 진리는 따라서 방편적이며 예비적인(neyartha) 진리로 이해해야 한다.

붓다의 깨달음과 그것의 언설적 표현은 경전의 내적 구조를 이루고 있으며, 이를 궁극적 의미(param□rtha)와 그것의 일상 언어로의 표현(sa□v□ti)이라는 두 가지 진리로도 구분한다. 그러나 중관학의 입장에서 볼 때, 궁극적 의미를 설했다는 了義經도 그것이 궁극적 진리라고 집착하게 되면 不了義經이 되게 된다. 二諦說은 두 종류의 고정된 실재에 관한 진리설이 아니라 방법적인 설법의 양태일 뿐이기 때문이다.

두 가지 진리설은 이와 같이 붓다의 법설간의 모순점을 해결해주는 해석학적인 적절한 도구의 역할을 하고 있다. 경전 언어에 있어서 □窮極□과 □世俗□의 진리는 상호 연관적이며, 어떤 絶對的 窮極性도 궁극적이 아니며 어떤 世俗의 진리도 絶對 世俗이 아니다. 모든 경전적 법설은 그것이 설한 맥락 안에서만 진실하다. 여기에서 맥락적 이해(Contextual Understanding)라는 해석학적 방법이 필요하게 되는 것이다.

Ⅱ.

중관학파의 이러한 中道 一乘 敎說은 종파간의 眞理主張과 經典의 多元性에 대해 열린 해결책을 제시한다. 또한 이러한 중관학파의 태도는 세계종교에 대해서도 근본적으로 동일하게 적용된다고 본다. 중관학은 모든 종교의 교설이나 경전도 상대적이며 방법적인 것으로 본다.

불교는 전통적으로 타 종교에 대해 관용적이며 포괄주의(inclusivism)적인 태도를 갖고 있다. 불교의 포괄주의는 서로 다른 진리 주장으로 생기는 갈등에 대해 포용하는 방법으로 해결을 모색한다. 즉 모든 종교 진리를 궁극적 진리에 이르는 하나의 길로 이해하려 하며, 궁극적으로는 붓다의 깨달음 속에 있다고 본다. 그러므로 불교만이 진리를 설한다고 집착하지 않는다. 불교의 긴 역사를 통해 불교는 여러 형태의 종교와 조우했으나 그들과 심각한 충돌을 일으키지 않고 동화하며 공존해 온 것은 불교의 이러한 포용성을 입증하는 것이다. 이는 □바가바드기타(Bhagavadagita)에 □궁극자를 찾아오는 그 어떤 사람도 나는 받아들인다. 어느 길을 택했든지 그들은 결국 나를 택한 것이다□라 한 것과 같은 정신적 맥락이다. 구원에는 다양한 길이 있기 때문이다.

현대의 종교사상가중 자기 중심적 포괄주의에서 벗어난 종교 사상가로 존힉(John Hick)이 있다. 그는 □God Has Many Names□에서 □세계의 위대한 종교들은 하나의 궁극적 실재(the one ultimate reality)의 다양한 나타남□이라고 보았다. 즉 위대한 신앙은 궁극적 실재에 대한 인간의 각기 다른 반응이며, 종교의 차이점은 인간의 개념과 의식이 각기 다양한 역사적 문화적 맥락 속에서 형성되었기 때문이라는 것이다. 이 입장은 모든 종교가 근본적으로 하나의 뿌리에서 나온 것으로 보는 것으로 □하나의 종교□를 지향하고 있다 할 것이다. 존 힉의 종교사상은 기독교의 배타주의와 동양적 포괄주의까지 모두 비판하며, 종교간의 대화와 협력의 중요성을 강조한다.

레이문도 파니카(Raimundo Panikkar)도 □Intrareligious Dialogue□에서 □서로 다른 종교 전통은 신적 실재(divine reality)라는 순백의 광선이 인간의경험이라는 프리즘에 투과되어 나타나는 무수한 색깔과 같다□고 하였다. 그 광선은 많은 종교, 전통, 교리 등을 통해 굴절되어 그 빛깔의 경계는 잘 알 수 없으나, 어떤 특수한 빛깔을 통해서도 우리는 그 白光이라는 근원에 도달할 수 있다는 것이다. 또 □實在는 많은 이름이 있으며, 각 이름은 새로운 모습으로 不二의 神秘 자체를 가르친다□고 하였다. 이 신비는 궁극적 종교의 요소로서 교리의 영역에 속하지 않으며 어느 곳, 어떤 종교에도 나타난다는 것이다. 파니카의 관점은 존 힉과 다른 점이 있다. 즉 그는 신비적인 종교 체험을 강조한다. 그러나 이들의 주장의 근저에는 모두 존재론적인 공통된 신적 실재가 존재한다고 보는 가정이 있다.

Ⅲ.

그렇다면 이 주장과 불교의 관점과는 어떻게 다른 것일까? 존 힉의 견해는 세계 종교의 배후에 하나의 궁극적인 실재가 있다는 가정에서 출발한다. 그것은 하나의 궁극적 실재가 神的 存在이든 아니든 다양한 모습으로 그 스스로를 나타낸다는 것이다.

이러한 유형의 존재론적 포괄주의 혹은 통합적 다원주의(Unitive Pluralism)와 불교, 특히 중관학파의 중교 다원주의에 대한 관점은 근본적으로 다른 점이 있다. 중관학파는 세계 종교안에 근본적인 단일성(unity)이 있다는 데 동의하지 않는다. 그러한 가정 자체가 하나의 형이상학적인 절대 실재를 인정하는 것으로, 마땅히 논파되어야 할 대상인 때문이다. 이러한 관점에서 존 힉의 종교다원주의 사상은 세계종교를 다 포함시키지 못한다. 특히 불교에는 존 힉이 주장하는 그러한 절대 실재라는 개념조차 없을 뿐만 아니라, 그러한 종교철학이나 신학에 대한 집착을 마음의 병이라고 하는 것이다.

불교의 종교 다원주의 이해는 구원에는 여러 가지 길이 있다는 점에 있지 하나의 공통된 실재가 있다는 주장이 아니라는 것에 주의할 필요가 있다. 이러한 관점에서 불교는 하나의 상대주의적 입장을 취한다. 여러 종교가 서로 다른 문화적, 역사적 기원과 배경을 갖고 있음은 그들을 하나의 원리로 비교할 수 없음을 말하는 것이다. 종교 다원현상을 그대로 인정하며, 진리가 상대적인 것과같이 여서 종교도 다르게 존재한다. 모든 진리는 역사적이며 상대적이다. 이러한 진리의 본성은 인간 언어의 한계성과 그 해석의 문제, 그리고 종교현상의 역사적 성격을 이해하므로서 해명될 수 있을 것이다. 서양에서 진리의 개념은 전통적으로 절대적, 정적, 단일 논리적이었으나, 현대의 진리관은 점차 비절대화, 역동적, 상대적인 개념으로 바뀌고 있다. 이러한 진리관은 이미 이 천여년 전 불교나 힌두교 사상가들이 비절대적 인식론에서 주장했던 것은 주지의 사실이다.

불교도에 있어서 진리의 非絶對化論은 새로운 사실이 아닐 것이다. 법(Dharma)과 만물의 제 현상(dharmas)에 대한 불교의 모든 경전적 진술은 다 상대적이며 해석적(neyartha)인 것이다. 불교는 절대 진리가 존재한다는 주장을 하지 않는다. 경전적 진리도 단지 방법론적인(marga) 것에 불과하며 어떤 진리도 궁극적으로는 참일 수 없다. 그것은 진리가 그 자체로서 참된 것이 아니라, 그것이 지각되고 이해되는 특정한 맥락 안에서만 진실하다는 것을 의미하는 것이다.

서양의 상대적 진리관은 항상 새로운 진리를 찾고 있으나, 불교는 진리의 어떤 개념에도 집착하지 않는다. 진리는 본성상 단지 기능적 방편일 뿐이다. 용수(N□g□rjuna), 월칭(Candrak□rti), 승랑(僧郞)같은 중관 사상가들은 어떤 진리, 어떤 실재의 관념도 버릴 것을 가르쳤다. 진리에 대한 무집착이야말로 참된 진리를 향한 태도이기 때문이다. 여래가 설한 법설까지도 절대 진리로 집착하지 말아야 하는 것이다. 종교 다원화 상황에 대처하는 불교의 입장은 이와 같이 독특한 점이 있다.

이러한 의미에서 반야경에서 설하는 테두리 없는 空(□□nyat□)은 무한한 열림의 세계로 불교뿐만 아니라 모든 종교를 포괄하는 궁극적 바탕이 될 수 있을 것이다. 이는 종교다원주의를 하나의 공감대로 이해케 할 수 있는 역동적인 힘이라고도 할 수 있다. 이러한 無得正觀의 空觀을 바탕으로 한 불교는 진리 주장이나 종교간의 대화에서 □어떠한 입장도 없는 입장□에 서게 된다. 이는 다른 모든 종교의 절대적 진리 주장을 상대화시키게 되는데, 여기에서 다음과 같은 질문이 제기될 수 있다. 즉 자신은 아무런 진리도 주장하지 않는다고 하는 것도 또한 하나의 강한 주장이 아닌가 하는 점이다. 반야경이 가르치는 一切法空의 교설도 하나의 입장과 견해인데 이것을 진리 주장이 아니라고 하는 것은 모순이라는 것이다. 반야, 중관학파의 대답은 □공 또한 공하다(□□nyat□ of □□nyat□)□는 것이다. 공의 교설은 공에 대한 어떠한 집착도 허용치 않는다. 공은 절대 진리나 실재에 대한 영원한 부정의 과정 그 자체이기 때문이다.

종교적 절대주의의 거부는 이제 현대 종교학의 보편적 추세이며 인류 종교문화사의 진행 방향으로 이해되어야 한다. 어느 종교나 역사적 사회적 환경에 관련되면서 그 본래의 정신이 퇴색되고, 배타적인 종교기관화 되거나 교리적 신조에 얽매이게 되는 현상이 있다. 여기에서 닫힌 종교가 나타나는 것이다. 불교의 무한한 열림의 교설은 이러한 형태의 폐쇄된 교리나 전통을 깨뜨려 줄 수 있는 역동성이 있다. 불교는 진리의 상대성, 경전언어의 방편성, 진리에 대한 무집착을 가르친다. 이러한 입장은 오늘날 종교 다원화 세계에 대단히 주요한 시사를 던져준다 할 것이다. 그것은 종교간의 대화와 타 종교에 대한 태도에 테두리 없는 無限 地平을 열어주는 것이다.