CHAPTER FIVE

Sanghadisesa

~~~~~~~~~~~~

This term means "involving the Community in the initial (//adi//)

and subsequent (//sesa//) acts." It refers to the fact that the

Community is the agent that initially calls on the bhikkhu who

breaks any of the rules in this category to undergo the penalty (of

//manatta//, penance, and //parivasa//, probation), subsequently

reimposes the penalty if he does not properly carry it out, and

finally lifts the penalty when he does. There are thirteen training

rules here, the first nine entailing a sanghadisesa immediately on

transgression, the last four only after the offender has been

rebuked three times as a formal act of the Community.

1.Intentional discharge of semen, except while dreaming,

entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

The origin story to this rule is as follows:

"Now at that time Ven. Seyyasaka was leading the celibate

life dissatisfied. Because of this, he was thin, wretched,

unattractive, and jaundiced, his body covered with veins.

Ven. Udayin saw that Ven. Seyyasaka was thin...his body

covered with veins; and seeing him, said to him, 'Seyyasaka,

my friend, why are you thin...your body covered with veins?

Could it be that you're leading the celibate life

dissatisfied?'

"'Yes, friend.'

"'In that case, eat as you like and sleep as you like and

bathe as you like; and having eaten, slept, and bathed as

you like, when dissatisfaction arises and lust assails the

mind, emit semen making do with your hand.'

"'But is it okay to do that?'

"'Of course. I do it myself.'

"So then Ven. Seyyasaka ate as he liked and slept as he

liked...and when dissatisfaction arose and lust assailed his

mind, he would emit semen making do with his hand. Then it

wasn't long before he became attractive, with rounded

features, a clear complexion, and very bright skin. So the

bhikkhus who were his friends said to him, 'Before, friend

Seyyasaka, you were thin...your body covered with veins. But

now you are attractive, with rounded features, a clear

complexion, and very bright skin. Could it be that you're

taking medicine?'

"'No, I'm not taking medicine, my friends. I just eat as

like and sleep as I like...and when dissatisfaction arises

and lust assails my mind, I emit semen making do with my

hand.'

"'But do you emit semen making do with the same hand you use

to eat the gifts of the faithful?'

"'Yes, my friends.'

"So the bhikkhus...were offended and annoyed and spread it

about, 'How can this Ven. Seyyasaka emit semen making do

with the same hand he uses to eat the gifts of the

faithful?'"

This rule, in its outline form, is one of the simplest to explain.

In its details, though, it is one of the most complex, not only

because the subject is a sensitive matter, but also because the

Commentary deviates somewhat from the Vibhanga in its explanations

of two of the three factors that constitute the full offense.

The three factors are result, intention, and effort: Emission of

semen caused by an intentional effort. When all three factors are

present, the offense is a sanghadisesa. If the last two -- intention

and effort -- are present, the offense is a thullaccaya. Any single

factor or any other combination of two factors -- i.e., intention

and result without making a physical effort, or effort and result

without intention -- is not grounds for an offense.

It may seem strange to list the factor of result first, but I want

to explain it first partly because, in understanding the types of

intention and effort covered by this rule, it is necessary to know

what they are aimed at, and also because result is the one factor

where the Vibhanga and Commentary are in basic agreement.

Result. The Commentary discusses the physiology of semen as it was

understood at the time, and in passing touches on the question of

whether the word //semen// refers to the clear liquid produced in

small quantities by the prostrate and Cooper's glands prior to

ejaculation, or to the seminal fluid released at orgasm (in its

words, "having made the whole body shake, it is released and

descends into the urinary tract.") It concludes that the latter is

what is meant here.

As for the Vibhanga, it devotes long passages to the various

colors and qualities that semen can come in, only to conclude that

the color and quality are irrelevant to the offense. This suggests

that a bhikkhu who has had a vasectomy can still commit an offense

under this rule, since he can still discharge the various components

that go into seminal fluid -- minus only the sperm -- at orgasm.

//Discharge//, according to the Vibhanga, refers to the point in

time when the semen "falls from its base." The Commentary explains

this as the point when the semen enters the urinary tract, because

from that point on the process is irreversible. Thus if the process

of sexual stimulation has reached this point, the factor of result

has been fulfilled, even if one tries to prevent the semen from

leaving the body by pinching the end of one's penis.

Intention. The Vibhanga defines //intentionally// as "having made

the decision knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." According to

the Commentary, "having made the decision" refers to the moment when

one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act. (These are the

same terms it uses to explain the same phrase under Parajika 3 and

several other rules. The meaning is that one has definitely made up

one's mind to start with the act and is not simply toying with the

idea.) //Knowingly// means that one knows that, "I am making an

exertion." //Consciously// means that one is aware that one's

efforts are bringing about an emission of semen. //Purposefully//

means that one's purpose is to enjoy the bringing about of an

emission.

This last point is where the Commentary deviates from the

Vibhanga's discussion of the factor of intention. The Vibhanga,

throughout its analysis, expresses the factor of purpose simply as

"aiming at causing an emission," and it lists ten possible reasons

for wanting to bring the emission about:

for the sake of health,

for the sake of pleasure,

for the sake of a medicine,

for the sake of a gift (to insects, says the Commentary),

for the sake of merit,

for the sake of sacrifice,

for the sake of heaven,

for the sake of seed (to produce a child -- a bhikkhu who gave

semen to be used in artificial insemination would fit in this

category),

for the sake of investigating (to see what color it will be --

ancient medicine sometimes used this as a way of diagnosing

disease), or

for the sake of fun.

Each of these reasons, the Vibhanga says, fulfills the factor of

intention here. Thus for the Commentary to limit the question of

"purpose" strictly to the enjoyment of the act of bringing about an

emission (numbers 2 and 10 in the Vibhanga's list) has no basis in

the Canon. And so the factor of intention under this rule is

fulfilled when one wants to cause an emission of semen, for no

matter what reason.

Given the way //intention// is defined, there is no offense for a

bhikkhu who brings on an emission of semen --

//accidentally// -- e.g., toying with his penis simply for the

pleasure of the contact, when it suddenly and unexpectedly goes

off;

//not knowing that he is making an effort// -- e.g., when he is

dreaming or in a semi-conscious state before fully waking up from

sleep;

//not conscious that his efforts are bringing about an emission of

semen// -- e.g., when he is so engrossed in applying medicine to

a sore on his penis that he doesn't realize that he is bringing

on an ejaculation;

or when his efforts are //motivated by a purpose other than that

of causing an emission// -- e.g., when he wakes up, finds that he

is about to have a spontaneous ejaculation, and grabs hold of his

penis to keep the semen from soiling his robes or bedding.

Effort. The Vibhanga defines four types of effort that fulfill

this factor: A bhikkhu causes an emission making an effort (1) at an

internal object, (2) at an external object, (3) at both an internal

and an external object, or (4) by shaking his pelvis in the air. It

then goes on to explain these terms: The internal object is one's

own living body. External objects can either be animate or inanimate

objects. The third type of effort involves a combination of the

first two, and the fourth covers cases when one makes one's penis

erect ("workable") by making an effort in the air.

The extremely general nature of these definitions gives the

impression that the compilers of the Vibhanga wanted them to cover

every imaginable type of bodily effort aimed at arousing oneself

sexually, and this impression is borne out by the wide variety of

cases covered in the Vinita Vatthu. They include, among others, a

bhikkhu who squeezes his penis with his fist, one who rubs his penis

with his thumb, one who rubs his penis against his bed, one who

inserts his penis into sand, one who bathes against the current in a

stream, one who rubs his preceptor's back in the bathing room, one

who gets an erection from the friction of his thighs and robes while

walking along, one who has his belly heated in the bathing room, and

one who stretches his body. In each of these cases, if the bhikkhu

aims at and succeeds in causing an emission, he incurs a

sanghadisesa.

The Vinita Vatthu also includes a case in which a bhikkhu,

desiring to cause an emission, orders a novice to take hold of his

(the bhikkhu's) penis. He gets his emission and a sanghadisesa to

boot, which shows that getting someone else to make the effort for

one fulfills the factor of effort here.

In discussing the factor of effort, though, the Commentary makes a

slight change in the Vibhanga's definition -- that one makes an

effort //with// or //upon// one's own body, etc., rather than //at//

one's own body, etc. -- and adds an additional factor: that the

effort must be directed at one's own penis. If this is so, then a

bhikkhu who succeeds in causing an emission by stimulating any of

the erogenous zones of his body aside from his penis would incur no

penalty. The Commentary itself actually makes this point, and the

Sub-commentary seconds it, although the V/Sub-commentary says that

such a bhikkhu would incur a dukkata -- what it bases this opinion

on, it doesn't say: perhaps a misreading of the Case of the Sleeping

Novice, which we will discuss below.

At any rate, the Commentary in adding this last factor runs up

against a number of cases in the Vinita Vatthu in which the effort

does not involve the penis: the bhikkhu warming his belly, the

bhikkhu rubbing his preceptor's back, a bhikkhu having his thighs

massaged, and others. The Commentary deals with these cases by

rewriting them, stating in most cases that the effort somehow had to

involve the penis. This in itself is questionable, but when the

Commentary actually contradicts the Vinita Vatthu in the case of the

bhikkhu who warms his belly, saying that this sort of effort could

not involve an offense at all, even if one aims at and succeeds in

causing an emission, the commentators have moved beyond the realm of

commenting into the realm of rewriting the rule.

As stated in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption

that the compilers of the Vibhanga knew the crucial factors well

enough to know what is and is not an offense, and were careful

enough to include all the relevant facts when describing the

precedents in the Vinita Vatthu in order to show how the Buddha

arrived at his judgments. Since the Commentary's position -- adding

the extra factor that the physical effort has to involve one's own

penis -- directly contradicts the Vibhanga on this point, the extra

factor cannot stand.

The question then is why the commentators added the extra factor

in the first place. An answer may be found in one of the cases in

the Vinita Vatthu: the Case of the Sleeping Novice.

"On that occasion a certain bhikkhu grabbed hold of the

penis of a sleeping novice. His semen was emitted. He felt

remorseful....'Bhikkhu, there is no sanghadisesa offense.

There is a dukkata offense.'"

The issue here is whose semen was emitted. Pali syntax, unlike

English, doesn't give us a clue, for there is no rule that the

pronoun in one sentence should refer to the subject of the preceding

sentence. There are many cases under Parajika 3 that follow the

form, "A stone badly held by the bhikkhu standing above hit the

bhikkhu standing below on the head. The bhikkhu died. He felt

remorseful." In these cases it is obvious from the context within

the story which bhikkhu died and which one felt remorseful, while

with the sleeping novice we have to look for the context in terms of

the other parts of the Vibhanga.

If the bhikkhu was the one who emitted semen, then perhaps there

is a contradiction in the Vibhanga, and the Commentary is justified

in saying that the effort must involve one's penis, for otherwise

the case would seem to fulfill the Vibhanga's general definition for

the factor of effort: The bhikkhu is making an effort at an outside

body and has an emission. Following the general pattern of the rule,

he would incur a sanghadisesa if he intended emission, and no

penalty at all if he didn't. Yet the question of intention is not

mentioned at all, and the bhikkhu is given a dukkata, which suggests

an inconsistency.

If, however, the novice was the one who emitted, there is no

inconsistency at all: The bhikkhu gets his dukkata for making

lustful bodily contact with another man (see the discussion under

Sanghadisesa 2, below), and the case is included here to show that

the full offense under this rule concerns instances where one makes

//oneself// emit semen, and not where one makes others emit. (Other

than this case, there is nothing in the rule or the Vibhanga that

expressly makes this point. The rule simply mentions bringing about

the emission of semen, without explicitly mentioning whose. This

would explain the bhikkhu's uncertainty as to whether or not he had

committed a sanghadisesa.) And the reason there is no mention of

whether or not the bhikkhu intended to emit semen is because -- as

it comes under another rule -- it is irrelevant to the case.

Thus, since the second reading -- the novice was the one who had

an emission -- does no violence to the rest of the Vibhanga, it

seems to be the preferable one. So if this was the case that led the

commentators to add their extra factor, we can see that they misread

it, and that the Vibhanga's original definition for the factor of

effort still stands: Any bodily effort made at one's own body, at

another body or physical object, at both, or any effort made in the

air -- like shaking one's pelvis or stretching one's body --

fulfills the factor of effort here.

One case that does //not// fulfill the factor of effort is when

one is filled with lust and stares at the private parts of a woman

or girl. In the case dealing with this contingency, the bhikkhu

emits semen, but again no mention is made of whether he intended to.

In any event, the Buddha lays down a separate rule, imposing a

dukkata for staring lustfully at a women's private parts. This

suggests that efforts with one's eyes do not count as bodily efforts

under this sanghadisesa, for otherwise the penalty would have been a

sanghadisesa if the bhikkhu had intended emission, and no offense if

he hadn't. And this also suggests that the dukkata under this

separate rule holds regardless of intention or result. The

Commentary adds that this dukkata applies also to staring lustfully

at the genitals of a female animal or at the area of a fully-clothed

woman's body where her sexual organ is, thinking, "Her sexual organ

is there." At present we would impose the penalty on a bhikkhu who

stares lustfully at a woman's private parts in a pornographic

photograph.

Consent. A special contingency covered by this rule is mentioned

twice in the Vinita Vatthu for Parajika 1: A woman approaches a

bhikkhu and offers to make him emit semen by making do with her hand

(%). The bhikkhu lets her go ahead, and the Buddha says that he

incurs a sanghadisesa in doing so. The commentaries treat the case

as self-evident and offer no extra details. Thus, given the facts as

we have them, it would seem that consent under this rule can be

expressed physically simply by letting the act happen. A bhikkhu who

acquiesces mentally when someone tries and succeeds in making him

emit semen is not absolved from the full offense here even if he

otherwise lies perfectly still throughout the event.

Derived offenses. As stated above, a bhikkhu who fulfills all

three factors -- result, intention, and effort -- incurs a

sanghadisesa. One who fulfills only the last two -- intention and

effort -- incurs a thullaccaya.

People have sometimes asked how much of an effort is necessary to

incur a thullaccaya and, in particular, whether the thullaccaya is

only for cases where a bhikkhu tries to go all the way to an

emission but cannot have one for physical reasons beyond his control

-- e.g., he is unable to have an erection or to produce semen -- or

whether it also covers cases where a bhikkhu starts out trying to

cause an emission but stops short and changes his mind before the

emission can come.

The Vibhanga suggests indirectly that the penalty covers both

cases when it says simply that the thullaccaya is for one who

intends, makes the effort, but does not emit. If it had meant to

limit the penalty to those who //cannot// emit, it would have said

so and would have set some kind of standard for determining when the

bhikkhu passed the threshold from //does not// to //cannot// so that

there would be no doubt as to where the realm of non-offense ends

and thullaccaya begins. But it doesn't.

The Commentary is even clearer on this topic when it discusses the

case of a bhikkhu who, filled with his lust, grabs his penis with

the purpose of causing an emission but drifts off to sleep before an

emission occurs. The emission does occur while he is asleep, though,

and he incurs a sanghadisesa. Since efforts made during sleep do not

count (see below), this shows that the factor of effort does not

need to go all the way to ejaculation in order to count.

In discussing the case of a bhikkhu with fat thighs who develops

an erection simply by walking along, the Commentary mentions that if

one finds sensual "fever" arising in such a case, one must

immediately stop walking and start contemplating the foulness of the

body so as to purify the mind before continuing on one's way.

Otherwise, one would incur a thullaccaya simply for moving one's

legs. //Sensual fever//, here, probably refers to the desire to

cause an emission, for there are several spots where the Commentary

discusses bhikkhus who stimulate an erection simply for the

enjoyment of the contact rather than to cause an emission, and the

judgment is that they incur no penalty, even if an emission does

inadvertently result.

Aside from the thullaccaya, there are no other derived offenses

under this rule. A bhikkhu who has an ejaculation while thinking

sensual thoughts but without making any physical effort to cause it,

incurs no penalty regardless of whether or not the idea crosses his

mind that he would like to have an emission, and whether or not he

enjoys it when it occurs. However, the Commentary notes here that

even though there is no offense involved, one should not let oneself

be overcome by sensual thoughts in this way. This point is borne out

by the famous simile that occurred to Prince Siddhattha before his

Awakening and that later, as Buddha, he related to a number of

listeners:

"'Suppose there were a wet sappy piece of timber lying on

dry ground far from water, and a man were to come along with

an upper fire-stick, thinking, "I'll light a fire. I'll

produce heat." Now what do you think? Would he be able to

light a fire and produce heat by rubbing the upper

fire-stick in the wet sappy timber...?'

"'No, Master Gotama. And why not? Because the wood is wet

and sappy, even though it is lying on dry ground far from

water. The man would reap nothing but weariness and

disappointment.'

"'So it is with any priest or contemplative who lives

withdrawn from sensuality only in body, but whose desire,

infatuation, urge, thirst, and fever for sensuality is not

relinquished and stilled within him: Whether or not he feels

painful, racking, piercing feelings due to his striving (for

Awakening), he is incapable of knowledge, vision, and

unexcelled self-awakening.'" (M.36)

Non-offenses. In addition to the cases already mentioned -- the

bhikkhus who bring about emissions accidentally, not knowing that

they are making an effort, not conscious that their efforts are

bringing about an emission, whose efforts are motivated by a purpose

other than that of causing an emission, or who without making any

physical effort have an ejaculation while overcome by sensual

thoughts -- there is no offense for a bhikkhu who has an ejaculation

during a dream.

In the wording of the rule, the phrase "except while dreaming" is

expressed by an idiom that could also mean "at the end of a dream."

This second possibility, though, is ruled out by the Commentary,

which states that what happens in the mind while one is sleeping

falls in the bounds of the Abhidhamma, but what happens after one

awakens falls within the bounds of the Vinaya; and that there is no

such thing as a misdeed performed when one is in a "non-negligible"

state of mind that does not count as an offense. ("Non-negligible,"

according to the Sub-commentary, means "normal.")

In making the exception for what happens while asleep, the Buddha

states that even though there may be the intention to cause an

emission, it doesn't count. The Commentary goes on to say, however,

that if a bhikkhu fully awakens in the course of a wet dream, he

should lie still and be extremely careful not to make a move that

would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. If the process

has reached the point where it is irreversible, and the ejaculation

occurs spontaneously, he incurs no penalty regardless of whether or

not he enjoys it. And as the Commentary quotes from the Kurundi, one

of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which it is based, if he

wakes up in the course of a wet dream and grabs hold of his penis so

that the ejaculation will not soil his robes or bedding, there is no

offense.

However, the case from the Commentary mentioned above -- the

bhikkhu who had the desire and made the effort towards an emission

before falling off to sleep -- suggests that the exemption for

emissions during a dream does not extend to cases where both the

intention and the effort occur while one is fully conscious, for all

three factors under this rule are fully present: One makes the

conscious decision to cause an emission, makes a conscious effort

aimed at causing the emission, and the emission occurs. Whether or

not one is conscious that it is occurring is of no account.

Summary: Intentionally causing oneself to emit semen, or

getting someone else to cause one to emit semen -- except

during a dream -- is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

2.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind,

engage in bodily contact with a woman, or in holding her

hand, holding a lock of her hair, or caressing any of her

limbs, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

This rule has sometimes been viewed as a sign of prejudice against

women. But, as the origin story makes clear, the Buddha formulated

the rule not because women are bad, but because bhikkhus sometimes

can be.

"Now at that time, Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. His

dwelling was beautiful, attractive, and appealing. The inner

chamber was in the middle, entirely surrounded by the outer

rooms. The bed and chair, the pillows and bolsters were well

arranged, the water for washing and drinking well placed,

the surrounding area well swept. Many people came to admire

it. Even a certain Brahmin together with his wife went to

where Ven. Udayin was staying and on arrival said, 'We would

like to admire your dwelling.'

"'Very well then, Brahmin, have a look.' Taking the key,

unfastening the lock, and opening the door, he entered the

dwelling. The Brahmin entered after Ven. Udayin; the Brahmin

lady after the Brahmin. Then Ven. Udayin, opening some of

the windows and closing others, walking around the inner

room and coming up from behind, rubbed up against the

Brahmin lady limb by limb.

"After a while the Brahmin exchanged pleasantries with Ven.

Udayin and left. Delighted, he burst out with an exclamation

of joy: 'How splendid are are these Sakyan contemplatives

who live in the forest like this! And how splendid is Ven.

Udayin who lives in the forest like this!'

"When he had said this, his wife said to him, 'What's so

splendid about him? He rubbed up against me limb by limb

just the way you do!'

"So the Brahmin was offended and annoyed and spread it

about: 'How shameless these bhikkhus are, how immoral and

hypocritical!...How can this contemplative Udayin rub up

against my wife limb by limb? It isn't possible to go with

your women-folk to a monastery or dwelling. If you go to a

monastery or dwelling with your womenfolk, the Sakyan

contemplatives will molest them!'"

There are two ways in which a bhikkhu can come into contact with a

woman: either actively (the bhikkhu makes the contact) or passively

(the woman does). Since the Vibhanga uses different terms to analyse

these two possibilities, we will discuss them separately.

//Active contact//. The full offense for active contact here is

composed of four factors:

1) //Object//: a living woman -- "even one born on that very day,

all the more an older one." Whether or not she is awake to

realize what is going on is irrelevant to the offense.

2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu correctly perceives her to be a

woman.

3) //Intention//: He is acting under the influence of lust.

4) //Effort//: He comes into physical contact with her.

Since the system of derived offenses based on the various

permutations of these factors is one of the most complex in the

Vibhanga, we will limit our discussion first to the full offense

before going into the permutations.

Of the four factors listed above, only two -- intention and effort

-- require detailed explanation.

Intention. The Vibhanga explains the term //overcome with lust//

as meaning "impassioned, desiring, a mind bound by attraction."

//Altered//, it says, can refer in general to one of three states of

mind -- passion, aversion, or delusion -- but here it refers

specifically to passion.

The Commentary adds a piece of Abhidhamma analysis at this point,

saying that //altered// refers to the moment when the mind leaves

its state of pure neutrality in the //bhavanga// under the influence

of desire. Thus the factor of intention here can be fulfilled not

only by a prolonged or intense feeling of desire, but also by a

momentary infatuation.

The Commentary also tries to limit the range of passion to which

this rule applies, saying that it covers only desire for the

enjoyment of contact. As we noted under Parajika 1, the ancient

commentators formulated a list of eleven types of lust, each

mutually exclusive, and the question of which rule applies to a

particular case depends on which type of lust provokes the bhikkhu's

actions. Thus if a bhikkhu lusting for intercourse touches a woman,

it says, he incurs only a dukkata as a preliminary to sexual

intercourse under Parajika 1. If he touches her from his lust for an

ejaculation, he incurs a thullaccaya as a preliminary to causing an

emission under Sanghadisesa 1. Only if he touches her with the

simple desire to enjoy the sensation of contact does he incur a

sanghadisesa under this rule.

This system, though very neat and orderly, flies in the face of

common sense and, as we noted under Parajika 1, contradicts the

Vibhanga as well, so there is no need to adopt it. We can stick with

the Vibhanga to this rule and say that //any// state of passion

fulfills the factor of intention here. The Commentary's discussion,

though, is useful in showing that the passion needn't be full-scale

sexual lust. Even a momentary desire to enjoy the sensation of

physical contact -- overwhelming enough that one acts on it -- is

enough to fulfill this factor.

Effort. The Vibhanga illustrates the effort of making physical

contact with a list of activities: rubbing, rubbing up against,

rubbing downwards, rubbing upwards, bending down, pulling up,

drawing to, pushing away, seizing hold (or pinning down --

//abhinigganhana//), squeezing, grasping, or touching. The Vinita

Vatthu includes a case of a bhikkhu giving a woman a blow with his

shoulder: He too incurs a sanghadisesa, which shows that the

Vibhanga's list is meant to cover all similar actions as well. If a

bhikkhu with lustful mind does anything of this sort to a living

woman's body, perceiving that she is a woman, he incurs the full

penalty under this rule.

Derived offenses. Each of the factors of an offense allows a

number of permutations that admit for different classes of offenses.

Taken together, they form a complex system. Here we will consider

each factor in turn.

//Object//. Assuming that the bhikkhu is acting with lustful

intentions and is perceiving his object correctly, he incurs a

thullaccaya for making bodily contact with a //pandaka//, a female

yakkha, or a dead woman; and a dukkata for bodily contact with a man

(or boy), a wooden doll, or a female animal.

//Pandaka //is usually translated as eunuch, but eunuchs are only

one of five types of pandakas recognized by the Commentary:

(1) An //asitta// (literally, a "sprinkled one") -- a man who

finds sexual fulfillment in performing fellatio on another man

and bringing him to climax. (For some reason, other homosexual

acts, even though they were known in ancient India, are not

included under this type nor under any of the types in this

list.)

(2) A voyeur -- a man who finds sexual fulfillment in watching

other people have sex.

(3) A eunuch -- one who has been castrated.

(4) A half-time pandaka -- one who is a pandaka only during the

waning moon. (!  --  The Sub-commentary's discussion of this

point shows that its author and his contemporaries were as

unfamiliar with this type as we are today. Perhaps this was how

bisexuals were understood in ancient times.)

(5) A neuter -- a person born without sexual organs.

According to the Commentary, the Mahavagga's statement (I.61) that

pandakas cannot receive ordination refers only to the last three

types, and to the half-time pandaka only during the waning moon.

As for female yakkhas, the Commentary says that this also includes

female deities. There is an ancient story in Chieng Mai of a bhikkhu

who was visited by a dazzling heavenly maiden late one night while

he was meditating alone in a cave at Wat Umong. He couldn't resist

touching her and, as soon as he did, went immediately out of his

mind. The moral: This is one thullaccaya not to be taken lightly.

Also from the Commentary:

(1) The thullaccaya for lustfully touching female corpses applies

only to those that would be grounds for a full offense under

Parajika 1, i.e., those with an anal, oral, or genital orifice

intact enough for one to perform the sexual act. Female corpses

decomposed beyond that point are grounds for a dukkata here.

(2) The dukkata for lustfully touching wooden dolls (mannikins)

applies also to any female form made out of other materials, and

even to any picture of a woman.

(3) Female animals include female nagas and other half-animal,

half-woman species as well.

According to the Sub-commentary, the dukkata for lustfully

touching female animals also applies to male animals.

For some reason, male yakkhas and deities slipped out of the list.

Perhaps they should come under "men."

//Perception//. Misperception affects the severity of the offense

only in the cases of women and pandakas. A bhikkhu who makes lustful

bodily contact with a woman while under the impression that she is

something else -- a pandaka, a man, or an animal -- incurs a

thullaccaya. If he makes lustful bodily contact with a pandaka while

under the impression that the pandaka is a woman, a man, or an

animal, the penalty is a dukkata. In the cases of men and animals,

misperception has no effect on the severity of the case: Lustful

bodily contact -- e.g., with a male transvestite whom one thinks to

be a woman -- still results in a dukkata.

//Intention//. The Vinita Vatthu contains cases of a bhikkhu who

caresses his mother out of filial affection, one who caresses his

daughter out of fatherly affection, and one who caresses his sister

out of brotherly affection. In each case the penalty is a dukkata.

The Vibhanga does not discuss the issue of bhikkhus who

intentionally make active contact with women for purposes other than

lust or affection -- e.g., helping a woman who has fallen into a

raging river -- but the Commentary does. It introduces the concept

of //anamasa//, things carrying a dukkata penalty when touched;

women and clothing belonging to a woman top the list. It then goes

into great detail to tell how one should behave when one's mother

falls into a raging river. Under no circumstances, it says, should

one grab hold of her, although one may extend a rope, a board, etc.,

in her direction. If she happens to grab hold of her son the

bhikkhu, he should not shake her off, but should simply let her hold

on as he swims back to shore.

Where the Commentary gets the concepts of //anamasa// is hard to

say. Perhaps it came from the practices of the Brahmin caste, who

are very careful not to touch certain things and people of certain

lower castes. At any rate, there is no direct basis for it in the

Canon. Although the concept has received universal acceptance in

Theravadin Communities, many highly-respected Vinaya experts have

made an exception right here, saying that there is nothing wrong in

touching a woman when one's action is based not on lust but on a

desire to save her from danger. Even if there is an offense in doing

so, there are other places where Buddhaghosa recommends that one be

willing to incur a minor penalty for the sake of compassion (e.g.,

digging a person out of a hole into which he has fallen), and the

same principle surely holds here.

There is no offense in touching a being other than a woman if

one's intentions are not lustful, although tickling is an offense

under Pacittiya 52.

//Effort//. Acts of lustful but indirect bodily contact with a

woman one perceives to be a woman and a pandaka one perceives to be

a woman carry the following penalties:

For the woman: Using one's body to make contact with an article

connected to her body -- e.g., using one's hand to touch the hem

of her dress, a rope, or stick she is holding: a thullaccaya.

Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with her

body -- e.g., using the edge of one's robe or a flower one is

holding to brush along her arm: a thullaccaya.

Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with an

item connected with her body: a dukkata.

Taking an object -- such as a flower -- and tossing it against her

body, an object connected with her body, or an object she has

tossed: a dukkata.

Taking hold of something she is standing or sitting on -- a

bridge, a tree, a boat, etc. -- and giving it a shake: a dukkata.

For the pandaka one assumes to be a woman, the penalty in all the

above cases is a dukkata.

These penalties for indirect contact have inspired the Commentary

to say that if a bhikkhu makes contact with a clothed portion of a

woman's body or uses a clothed portion of his body to make contact

with hers, and the cloth is so thick that neither his body hairs nor

hers can penetrate it, the penalty is only a thullaccaya, since he

is not making direct contact. Only if the contact is skin-to-skin,

skin-to-hair, or hair-to-hair (as might be possible through thin

cloth) does he commit the full offense. Thus a bhikkhu who fondles

the breasts or buttocks of a fully-clothed woman would incur only a

thullaccaya since the contact was indirect.

While this contention might be true in a technical sense, two

points from the Vibhanga indicate that its compilers did not have

this sort of thing in mind when they mentioned indirect contact.

(1) In its discussion of passive contact, the Vibhanga divides the

factor of effort into two parts: effort and result. The result

necessary for a full offense is that the bhikkhu detects contact.

The important word here is "detect" (//pativijanati//): The Canon

uses it to refer to cases where one perceives something that may not

be readily apparent, and here it seems specifically designed to

cover instances where the contact may not be skin-to-skin, but still

can be felt as bodily contact. Thus if the contact is such that the

bhikkhu could feel the presence of the woman's body through his or

under her clothing, direct contact has been made. If this much

contact is enough for a full offense under passive contact, there is

good reason to assume that it should also be enough under active

contact as well.

(2) The Vinita Vatthu contains the following case:

"Now at that time, a certain bhikkhu, seeing a woman he

encountered coming in the opposite direction, was infatuated

and gave her a blow with his shoulder. He was

remorseful....'Bhikkhu, you have committed a sanghadisesa

offense.'"

As mentioned in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption

that the Vibhanga compilers were careful enough to include all of

the relevant facts in describing the cases in the Vinita Vatthu. Now

if the Commentary's assertion were true -- that the amount of cloth

between the bodies of the bhikkhu and the woman is important in

determining an offense -- the compilers would have mentioned this

factor at least indirectly, saying, for instance, that the encounter

took place in the monastery, where he might have had his shoulder

uncovered, rather than outside of the monastery, where he should

have had it covered; or that he had neglected to cover his shoulders

when leaving the monastery; or that he was wearing a very fine robe

that allowed his hair to pass through. But they say nothing of the

sort, and their silence here suggests that such questions are

irrelevant.

The only cases of indirect contact mentioned in the Vinita Vatthu

refer to contact of a much more remote sort: a bhikkhu pulls a cord

of which a woman is holding another end, pulls a stick of which she

is holding the other end, or gives her a playful push with his bowl.

Thus in the context of this rule the Vibhanga defines "object

connected to the body," through which indirect contact is made, with

examples: things that the person is //holding//. The Vinaya Mukha

adds things that are //hanging// from the person, like the hem of a

robe or a dress. In this context, contact made through cloth that

the person is wearing, if the contact can be detected, would be

classed as direct. This would parallel Parajika 1, in which the

question of whether there is anything covering either of the organs

involved in intercourse is completely irrelevant to the offense.

Thus the concept of direct and indirect contact here would seem to

follow general linguistic usage: If a woman is wearing a

long-sleeved shirt, for instance, grabbing her by the arm and

grabbing her by the shirt-sleeve are two different things, and would

receive different penalties under this rule.

According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu feels desire for contact

with a woman and makes an effort but does not achieve even indirect

contact, the penalty is a dukkata.

//Passive contact//. The Vibhanga's analysis of passive contact --

when the bhikkhu is the object rather than the agent making the

contact -- deals with only a limited number of variables.

Agent: either a woman the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, or a

pandaka he perceives to be a woman.

The agent's effort: any of the actions that fulfill the factor of

act for the full offense under active contact -- rubbing, pulling,

pushing, squeezing, etc.

The bhikkhu's aim. The Vibhanga lists only two here: the desire to

come together and the desire to escape (%). The Sub-commentary

explains the first as desiring the pleasurable feeling of contact.

Effort. The bhikkhu either makes a physical effort or he doesn't.

The Commentary includes under this factor even the slightest

physical movements, such as winking, raising one's eyebrows, or

rolling one's eyes. At present we would include such things as

inviting a woman to caress one, or deliberately placing oneself in a

crowded entrance to a store so that women would have to make contact

with one as they walked past.

Result. The bhikkhu either detects the contact or he doesn't.

The most important factor here is the bhikkhu's aim: If he desires

to escape from the contact, then no matter who the person making the

contact is, whether or not the bhikkhu makes an effort, or whether

or not he detects the contact, there is no offense. The Vinita

Vatthu gives an example:

"Now at that time, many women, pressing up to a certain

bhikkhu, led him about arm-in-arm. He felt

conscience-stricken.... 'Did you consent, bhikkhu?' (the

Buddha) asked.

'No, Lord, I did not.'

'Then there was no offense, bhikkhu, as you did not

consent.'"

The Commentary mentions another example, in which a bhikkhu, not

desiring the contact, is molested by a lustful woman. He remains

perfectly still, with the thought, "When she realizes I am not

interested, she will go away." He too commits no offense.

However, if the bhikkhu desires the contact, then the offenses are

as follows:

The agent is a woman, the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects

contact: a sanghadisesa. He makes an effort but detects no contact:

a dukkata. He makes no effort (e.g., he remains perfectly still as

she grasps, squeezes, and rubs his body): no offense regardless of

whether or not he detects contact. One exception here, though, would

be the special case mentioned under "Consent" in the preceding rule,

in which a bhikkhu lets a woman -- or anyone at all, for that matter

-- make him have an emission and he incurs a sanghadisesa under that

rule as a result.

The agent is a pandaka whom the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman,

the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects contact: a dukkata. All

other possibilities -- effort but no detected contact, detected

contact but no effort, no effort and no detected contact: no

offense.

Counting offenses. According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu has

lustful bodily contact with //x// number of people in any of the

ways that constitute an offense here, he commits //x// number of

offenses. For example, if he lustfully rubs up against two women in

a bus, he incurs two sanghadisesas. If, out of fatherly affection,

he hugs his two daughters and three sons, he incurs two dukkatas for

hugging his daughters and no penalty for hugging his sons.

The Commentary adds that if he makes lustful contact with a person

//x// number of times, he commits //x// number of offenses. For

instance, he hugs a woman from behind, she fights him off, and he

strikes her out of lust: two sanghadisesas.

The question of counting sanghadisesas, though, is somewhat

academic, since the penalty for multiple offenses is almost

identical with the penalty for one. The only difference is in the

formal announcements that accompany the penalty -- e.g., when the

Sangha places the offender under probation, when he informs others

bhikkhus of why he is under probation, etc. For more on this point,

see the concluding section of this chapter.

Non-offenses. There is no offense for a bhikkhu who makes contact

with a woman --

//unintentionally// --  as when inadvertently running into a woman

in a crowded place;

//unthinkingly// --  as when a woman runs into him and, startled,

he pushes her away;

//unknowingly// -- as when, without lustful intent, he touches a

young tomboy he thinks to be a boy; or

//when he doesn't give his consent// -- as in the case of the

bhikkhu led around arm-in-arm by a crowd of women.

Summary: Lustful bodily contact with a woman whom one

perceives to be a woman is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

3.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind,

address lewd words to a woman in the manner of young men to

a young woman alluding to sexual intercourse, it entails

initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

"Now at that time Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. One

day many women came to the monastery to admire his dwelling.

They went to where he was staying and on arrival said to

him, 'Ven. Sir, we would like to admire your dwelling.' Then

Ven. Udayin, showing the dwelling to the women and referring

to their genital and anal orifices, praised and criticized

and begged and implored and asked and quizzed and advised

and instructed and ridiculed them. Those of the women who

were brazen, shameless, and sly giggled at Ven. Udayin,

exclaimed to him, laughed aloud, and teased him; while those

of the women who had a sense of decency complained to the

bhikkhus as they left: 'It is improper, Ven. sirs, and

unbecoming! Even from our husbands we wouldn't like to hear

this sort of thing, much less from Master Udayin.'"

The K/Commentary lists five factors for a full breach of this rule:

1) //Object//: a woman, i.e., any female human being experienced

enough to know what words are and are not lewd.

2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman.

3) //Intention//: He is lustful. As in the preceding rule, we can

take the Commentary's definition of lust here as the //minimum//

amount of lust to fulfill this factor: He wants to enjoy saying

something lewd or improper.

4) //Effort//: He makes remarks referring to her genitals, anus,

or to her performing sexual intercourse.

5) //Result//: The woman immediately understands.

The only factors requiring detailed explanation here are intention

and effort.

Intention. The minimum level of desire required to fulfill this

factor means that this rule covers cases where a bhikkhu simply gets

a charge out of referring to a woman's genitals, etc., in her

presence, without necessarily having any desire actually to have sex

with her.

The Vibhanga makes clear that this rule does not cover statements

made in anger. Thus any insults a bhikkhu may direct at a woman out

of anger rather than playfully in desire -- even if they refer to

her genitals, etc. -- would come under Pacittiya 2, rather than

here.

Effort. The Vibhanga states that to incur a sanghadisesa under

this rule when one is speaking to a woman, one must refer to //her//

genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse (%).

The Commentary goes further and says that to incur the full

penalty one must make direct mention of one of these three things,

or accuse her of being sexually deformed in a way that refers

directly to her genitals. Otherwise, if one refers lustfully to

these matters without directly mentioning them, there is no

sanghadisesa, although the Sub-commentary quotes ancient texts

called the Ganthipadas as assigning a dukkata for such an act.

All of this contradicts the Vibhanga, which lists the ways of

referring to the woman's anus, genitals, and sexual intercourse that

would entail the full penalty under this rule -- one speaks praise,

speaks criticism, begs, implores, asks, quizzes, advises, exhorts,

or ridicules -- and many of the examples it gives, although

referring to the woman's private parts or to her performing sexual

intercourse, do not actually mention those words: "How do you give

to your husband?" "How do you give to your lover?" "When will your

mother be reconciled?" "When will you have a good opportunity?"

Although all of these statements refer to sexual intercourse, and

people in those days would have understood them in that light, none

of them actually mentions it.

Thus the Vibhanga's examples seem to indicate that if a bhikkhu is

referring lustfully to the woman's private parts or to her

performing sexual intercourse, then whether or not he directly names

those things, he fulfills this factor.

None of the texts mention the case in which a bhikkhu talks to one

person about another person's private parts, etc.

Derived offenses. The factors of effort, object, perception, and

result permit a number of permutations that result in lesser

offenses. As for the permutations of intention, see the section on

non-offenses, below.

//Effort//. A bhikkhu speaks to a woman he perceives to be a woman

and refers lustfully to parts of her body -- aside from her private

parts -- below her collarbone and above her knees, such as her

breasts or her thighs: a thullaccaya. If he refers to parts of her

body outside of that area, such as her face or hair, or to clothing

or jewelry she is wearing: a dukkata.

//Object//. A bhikkhu speaks to a pandaka (in this and the

following cases we are assuming that he perceives his object

correctly) and refers lustfully to his private parts or to his

performing sexual intercourse: a thullaccaya. He refers lustfully to

other parts of the pandaka's body, his clothing, etc.: a dukkata.

A bhikkhu speaks to a man (or boy) and refers lustfully to any

part of his listener's body, clothing, etc.: a dukkata. The same

penalty holds for speaking lustfully to a common animal about its

body, ornaments, etc. (%). (This is a point with interesting

implications, but unfortunately the Commentary is silent. Perhaps

nagas would be included here, or perhaps the Vibhanga compilers had

in mind cases where one mentions such things to an animal within

earshot of a human or celestial being.)

The texts make no mention of speaking lustfully to a woman/girl

too young to understand what is and is not lewd. We might argue from

the cases included in the Vinita Vatthu, though -- where bhikkhus

make punning references to women's private parts, and the women do

not understand -- that a bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for referring

directly to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse in

her presence, and a dukkata for referring indirectly in her presence

to such things.

//Perception//. A bhikkhu speaking to a woman whom he perceives to

be something else -- a pandaka, a man, an animal -- incurs a

thullaccaya if he refers lustfully to her genitals, anus, or

performing sexual intercourse. If he is speaking to a pandaka, a

man, or an animal he misperceives -- e.g., he thinks the pandaka is

a woman, the man is a pandaka, the animal is a man -- he incurs a

dukkata if he refers lustfully to those topics.

//Result//. As mentioned above, the Vinita Vatthu contains a

number cases of bhikkhus speaking to women and making punning

references to the women's genitals that the women do not understand.

In one case the penalty is a thullaccaya, in the others a dukkata.

The thullaccaya case is the only one in which the bhikkhu uses a

word synonymous with genitals (//magga//, which also means road, the

meaning the woman understood). Thus we might argue that if a bhikkhu

makes direct reference to the genitals, anus, or sexual intercourse

-- and this includes slang expressions and euphemisms -- and the

woman doesn't immediately understand that he is referring to those

things, he incurs a thullaccaya. If he makes indirect mention of

those things, and she doesn't immediately understand what he is

referring to, he incurs a dukkata. If it so happens that she

understands later, the penalty remains the same.

Counting offenses. A bhikkhu making remarks of the sort covered by

this rule to //x// number of people commits //x// number of

offenses, the type of offense being determined by the factors

discussed above. Thus for lustful remarks to two women referring to

their breasts, he would incur two thullaccayas; for lustful remarks

to three men concerning their bodies, three dukkatas; for teasing a

group of twenty old ladies about how their time for sexual

performance is past, twenty sanghadisesas.

Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that there is no offense for a

bhikkhu who speaks aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming

at Dhamma, or aiming at teaching. Thus, for example, if one is

talking in front of women and has no lustful intent, one may recite

or explain the training rules that deal with these matters or go

into detail on the topic of the loathsomeness of the body as a topic

of meditation, all without incurring a penalty. The Commentary here

adds an example of a bhikkhu addressing a sexually deformed woman,

telling her to be heedful in her practice so as not to be born that

way again. If, however, one were to broach any of these topics out

of a desire to enjoy saying something lewd to one's listeners, one

would not be immune from an offense.

A bhikkhu who, without intending to be lewd, makes innocent

remarks that his listener takes to be lewd, commits no offense.

Summary: Making a lustful remark to a woman about her

genitals, anus, or about performing sexual intercourse is a

sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

4. Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind,

speak in the presence of a woman in praise of ministering to

his own sensuality thus: "This, sister, is the highest

ministration, that of ministering to a virtuous,

fine-natured follower of the celibate life such as myself

with this act" -- alluding to sexual intercourse -- it

entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

"Now at that time a certain woman, a widow, was beautiful,

attractive, and appealing. So Ven. Udayin, arising early in

the morning, taking his robe and bowl, went to her

residence. On arrival, he sat on an appointed seat. Then the

woman, approaching him, paying him homage, sat down to one

side. As she sat there, Ven. Udayin instructed, urged,

roused, and encouraged her with a talk on Dhamma. Then the

woman, instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged with a talk

on Dhamma...said to him, 'Tell me, Ven. sir, what would be

in my power to give you for your welfare: Robe-cloth?

Alms-food? Lodgings? Medicines for the sick?'

"'Those things aren't hard for us to come by sister....Give

just what is hard for us to come by.'

"'What, Ven. sir?'

"'Sexual intercourse.'

"'For your welfare, Ven. sir?'

"'For my welfare, sister.'

"'Then come, Ven. sir.' Entering into an inner room, taking

off her cloak, she lay back on a couch. Then Ven. Udayin

approached the woman and, on approaching, said, 'Who would

touch this foul-smelling wretch?' And he departed, spitting.

"Then the woman was offended and annoyed and spread it

about...'How can this contemplative Udayin, when he himself

begged me for sexual intercourse, say, "Who would touch this

foul-smelling wretch?" and depart spitting? What's wretched

about me? What's foul-smelling about me? In what am I

inferior to whom?'"

At first glance this rule might seem redundant with the preceding

one, for what we have here is another case of a bhikkhu advising,

begging, or imploring a woman to perform sexual intercourse.

However, some facts about language and belief in the Buddha's time

might have led some people to feel that this was a special case not

covered by the previous rule; so -- to prevent this misunderstanding

-- it gets separate treatment here.

"Giving," in the Buddha's time, was a common term for having sex.

If a woman gave to a man, that meant that she was willing to have

sexual intercourse with him. Now, Buddhism was not the only religion

of the time to teach that gifts -- of a more innocent sort -- given

to contemplatives produced great reward to those who gave them, and

ultimately somebody somewhere came up with the bright idea that

since sex was the highest gift, giving it to a contemplative would

produce the highest reward. Whether this idea was first formulated

by faithful women or by clever contemplatives is hard to say. There

are several cases in the Vinita Vatthu to Parajika 1 telling of

bhikkhus approached or attacked by women professing this belief,

which shows that it had some currency: that sex was somehow seen as

a way to higher benefits through the law of kamma.

Since the preceding rule gives exemptions for bhikkhus speaking

"aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming at Dhamma," some

misguided souls who did not comprehend the Buddha's teachings on

sensuality might believe that welfare of this sort might fit under

the exemption. Even today, although the rationale might be

different, there are people who believe that having sex with

spiritual teachers is beneficial for one's spiritual well-being.

Thus we have this separate rule to show that the Buddha would have

no part in such a notion, and that a bhikkhu who tries to suggest

that his listener would benefit from having sex with him is not

exempt from an offense.

The K/Commentary lists five factors for the full offense here.

Object: a woman experienced enough to know what words are and are

not lewd.

Perception. The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman.

Intention. He is lustful. According to the Sub-commentary, this

means that he wants to enjoy saying something lewd or improper. This

point is borne out by the origin story, where Ven. Udayin addressed

his remarks to the young widow apparently just to test her reaction.

As in the preceding rules, we can take the Sub-commentary's

definition to stand for the //minimum// amount of lust needed to

fulfill this factor.

Effort. The bhikkhu speaks to the woman in praise of her

ministering to his sensual needs, making reference to sexual

intercourse. The Commentary maintains that his remarks must directly

mention sexual intercourse for this factor to be fulfilled, but the

example in the rule itself would seem to contradict its assertion.

Result. The woman immediately understands.

Derived offenses. The only factors having permutations leading to

lesser offenses are object and perception.

//Object//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks to a

pandaka: a thullaccaya. To a man or animal: a dukkata.

//Perception//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks

to a woman he perceives to be something else -- a pandaka, man, or

animal: a thullaccaya. To a pandaka he perceives to be something

else: a dukkata.

Counting offenses. Offenses are counted by the number of people

one makes such remarks to.

Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga, in addition

to the blanket exemptions mentioned under Parajika 1, read simply:

"There is no offense if he speaks saying, 'Support us with the

requisites of robe-cloth, alms-food, lodgings, or medicines for the

sick.'" Thus there is apparently no way that a bhikkhu in his right

mind may speak in the presence of another person in praise of that

person's ministering to his (the bhikkhu's) own sexual desires,

without committing an offense.

Summary: Telling a woman that she would benefit from having

sexual intercourse with oneself is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

5. Should any bhikkhu engage in conveying a man's intentions

to a woman or a woman's intentions to a man, proposing

marriage or paramourage -- even if only for a momentary

liaison -- it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

There are essentially two factors for a full offense under this

rule: effort and object.

Effort. The Commentary says that to "engage in conveying" means to

take on the role of a go-between. This includes helping to arrange

not only marriages and affairs, but also "momentary associations"

that, from the way it describes them, could include anything from

appointments with a prostitute to arrangements for X to be Y's date.

The Vibhanga sets the component factors of a go-between's role at

three:

1) //accepting// the request of one party to convey a proposal;

2) //inquiring//, i.e., informing the second party and learning

his/her/their reaction; and

3) //reporting// what one has learned to the first party.

The penalties for these actions are: a dukkata for performing any

one of them, a thullaccaya for any two, and a sanghadisesa for the

full set of three. Thus a bhikkhu acting on his own initiative to

sound out the possibility of a date between a man and a woman would

incur a thullaccaya for inquiring and reporting. A bhikkhu planning

to disrobe who asks a woman if she would be interested in marrying

him after his return to lay life would incur a dukkata for

inquiring.

The penalties are the same if the bhikkhu, instead of acting as a

go-between himself, gets someone else to act for him. Thus a bhikkhu

who agrees to convey such a proposal but then gets a lay follower or

another bhikkhu to do the inquiring and reporting, would incur a

sanghadisesa all the same.

If a group of bhikkhus are asked to act as go-betweens and they

all accept, then even if only one of them takes the message, all

incur the penalty for his actions.

"Result" is not a factor here, and so the Commentary mentions that

whether or not the arrangements succeed has no bearing on the

offense.

"Intention" is also not a factor, which leads the Sub-commentary

to raise the issue of a man who writes his proposal in a letter and

then, without disclosing the contents, gets a bhikkhu to deliver it.

Its conclusion, though, is that this case would not qualify as an

offense under this rule, in that both the Vibhanga and the

Commentary define the action of conveying as "telling": Only if the

bhikkhu himself tells the proposal -- whether repeating it orally,

making a gesture or writing a letter -- does he commit an offense

here.

Object. The full offense is for acting as a go-between between a

man and a woman who are not married to each other. If, instead of

dealing directly with the man and woman, one deals with people

speaking on their behalf (their parents, a pimp), one incurs the

full penalty all the same.

There is no offense for a bhikkhu who tries to effect a

reconciliation between an estranged couple who are not divorced; but

a full offense for one who tries to effect a reconciliation between

a couple who are. "Perception" is also not a factor here, which

inspires the Commentary to note that even an arahant could commit an

offense under this rule if he tried to effect a reconciliation

between his parents whom he assumed to be separated when they

actually were divorced.

A bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for acting as a go-between for a

pandaka; and, according to the Commentary, the same penalty for

acting as a go-between for a female yakkha or peta. (!)

Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that, in addition to the usual

exemptions, there is no offense if a bhikkhu conveys a message from

a man to a woman or vice versa dealing with "business of the

Community, of a shrine, or of a sick person." The Commentary

illustrates the first two instances with cases of a bhikkhu

conveying a message dealing with construction work for the Community

or a shrine; and the third with a case where a bhikkhu, acting on

behalf of a fellow bhikkhu who is sick, is sent by a male lay

follower to a female lay follower for medicine.

The Sub-commentary adds that any similar errand is also exempt

from penalty as long as it is not a form of subservience to lay

people (see Sanghadisesa 13, below).

Summary: Acting as a go-between to arrange a marriage, an

affair, or a date between a man and a woman not married to

each other is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

6.When a bhikkhu is building a hut from (gains acquired by)

his own begging -- having no sponsor, destined for himself

-- he is to build it to the standard measurement. Here the

standard is this: twelve spans, using the sugata span, in

length (measuring outside); seven in width, (measuring)

inside. Bhikkhus are to be assembled to designate the site.

The site the bhikkhus designate should be without

disturbances and with adequate space. If the bhikkhu should

build a hut from his own begging on a site with disturbances

and without adequate space, or if he should not assemble the

bhikkhus to designate the site, or if he should exceed the

standard, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

"At that time the bhikkhus of Alavi were having huts built

from their own begging -- having no sponsors, destined for

themselves, not to any standard measurement -- that did not

come to completion. They were continually begging,

continually hinting: 'Give a man, give labor, give an ox,

give a wagon, give a knife, give an ax, give an adze, give a

spade, give a chisel, give rushes, give reeds, give grass,

give clay.' People, harassed with the begging, harassed with

the hinting, on seeing bhikkhus would feel apprehensive,

alarmed, would run away; would take another route, face

another direction, close the door. Even on seeing cows, they

would run away, imagining them to be bhikkhus."

This rule and the following one concern the procedures a bhikkhu

should follow when he wants to build a dwelling for his own use. The

following rule deals with cases where he has a sponsor to provide

him with funds and materials. This rule deals with cases where he

doesn't. The Vibhanga and Commentary define the words //hut// and

//dwelling// in these rules in such a way that they apply only to a

limited range of structures, but the Commentary's discussion of what

a bhikkhu may and may not beg for when building anything at all,

guarantees that even in cases not covered by these rules he is not

allowed to be burdensome to the people he asks for help. In

discussing this rule, we will first cover what kinds of begging are

proper and improper in connection with //any// kind of construction

work, and then go on to treat the particular case coming under this

rule.

Begging. A bhikkhu may ask for people to give labor in any

situation. Thus he may ask stone masons to carry stone posts to his

construction, or carpenters to carry boards there. If, after he has

asked them to help with the labor, they volunteer to donate the

materials as well, he may accept them without penalty. Otherwise, he

has to reimburse them for the materials.

As for tools, vehicles, and other things he will use in the

process of construction, he may ask only to borrow them from other

people and may not ask for them outright. If the tools get damaged,

he is responsible for getting them repaired before returning them to

the owner. The only things he needn't return to the owner are light

articles (//lahubhanda//), which the Sub-commentary identifies as

things like reeds, rushes, grass, and clay -- i.e., things having

little or no monetary value at all.

In effect, this means that unless a bhikkhu is going to build his

dwelling out of reeds, etc., or out of thrown-away scraps, he may

not ask for any of the materials that will actually go into the

dwelling. Keep in mind that these rules were made during a period

when wilderness was still plentiful, and solid building materials

such as timber and stones were free for the taking. At present,

unless a bhikkhu has access to unclaimed wilderness of this sort, to

unclaimed garbage, or has enough funds on deposit with his steward

(see NP 10) to cover the cost of materials, his only recourse if he

wants a solid structure is either to rammed earth or to hinting.

The Commentary notes that while hinting is not allowed with regard

to food or cloth, it is allowed with regard to construction

materials. One example it gives is asking, "Do you think this is a

good place to build a hut? An ordination hall?" Another example is

staking out a construction site in hope that someone will ask, "What

are you planning to do here?" If people get the hint and offer the

materials, the bhikkhu may accept them. If they don't, he may not

ask directly for any materials except the "light articles" mentioned

above.

From this it should be obvious that even in cases not covered by

this rule -- i.e., the dwelling he is building doesn't qualify as a

"hut," or he is building something for other people to use -- a

bhikkhu engaged in construction work is not allowed to be burdensome

to the laity. This is an important point, as the Buddha illustrated

in a story he told to the bhikkhus at Alavi. A certain bhikkhu had

once come to him with a complaint, and he reports the conversation

as follows:

"'Lord, there is a large forest on the slopes of the

Himalayas, and not far from it is a broad, low-lying marsh.

A great flock of birds, after feeding all day in the marsh,

goes to roost in the forest at nightfall. That is why I have

come to see the Blessed One -- because I am annoyed by the

noise of that flock of birds.'

"'Bhikkhu, you want those birds to go away for good?'

"'Yes, Lord, I want them to go away for good.'

"'Then go back there, enter the forest, and in the first

watch of the night make this announcement three times:

"Listen to me, good birds. I want a feather from everyone

roosting in this forest. Each of you give me one feather."

In the second watch...In the third watch of the night make

this announcement three times: "Listen to me, good birds. I

want a feather from everyone roosting in this forest. Each

of you give me one feather"....(The bhikkhu did as he was

told.) Then the flock of birds, thinking, 'The bhikkhu asks

for a feather, the bhikkhu wants a feather,' left the

forest. And after they were gone, they never again returned.

Bhikkhus, begging is unpleasant, hinting is unpleasant even

to these common animals -- how much more so to human

beings?"

The hut. Now we turn to the particular case covered by this rule.

The Vibhanga defines a hut as "plastered inside, outside, or both."

It also states that this rule does not apply to a //lena//, a

//guha//, or to a grass hut. A lena, according to the Commentary, is

a cave. A guha it doesn't define, except to say that guhas may be

built out of wood, stone, or earth. And as for a grass hut, it says

that this refers to any building with a grass //roof//, which means

that even a dwelling with plastered walls but a grass roof would not

count as a hut under this rule (although a hut whose roof has been

plastered and then covered with grass //would// count as a hut

here).

The Commentary goes on to stipulate that the plastering mentioned

in the Vibhanga refers to a plastered //roof//, that the plaster

must be either clay or white lime (plastering with cow dung or mud

doesn't count, although cement would probably come under "white

lime" here), and that the plastering on the inside or outside of the

roof must be contiguous with the plastering on the inside or outside

of the walls. Thus if the builder leaves a gap in the plastering

around the top of the wall so that the plastering of the roof and

the plastering of the walls don't touch at any point, the building

doesn't qualify as a hut and so doesn't come under the rule.

The Commentary's stipulations on these point may seem like

attempts to create gaping loopholes in the rule, but there is

nothing in the Vibhanga to prove them wrong. Perhaps in those days

only fully plastered buildings were considered to be finished,

permanent structures, while everything else was considered makeshift

and temporary and thus not worth the fuss and bother of the

procedures we will discuss below.

At another point in its discussions, the Commentary adds that any

building three sugata spans wide or less is not big enough to move a

bed around in and so does not count as a hut under this rule. The

Commentary itself defines a sugata span as three times the span of a

normal person, which would put it at approximately 75 cm. More

recent calculations, based on the fact that the Buddha was not

abnormally tall, set the sugata span at 25 cm.

The procedures. If, for his own use, a bhikkhu is planning to

build a hut as defined in this rule, he must chose a site, clear it,

and ask for the local Community to inspect and approve it before he

can go ahead with the actual construction.

//The site//. The site must be free of disturbances and have

adequate space.

"Free of disturbances" means that the site is not the abode of

such creatures as termites, ants, or rats who might do harm to the

building, or of those such as snakes, scorpions, tigers, lions,

elephants, or bears who might do harm to its inhabitant. The

Commentary states that the Vibhanga's purpose in forbidding a

bhikkhu from building on a site where termites and other small

animals have their home is to show compassion to these and other

small creatures like them by not destroying their nests. As for the

stipulation against building where snakes and other dangerous

animals live, this also extends, it says, to the areas where they

regularly forage for food.

In addition, the Vibhanga says that a site without disturbances is

one that is not near any places that will disturb the bhikkhu's

peace and quiet. Examples it gives are: fields, orchards, places of

execution, cemeteries, pleasure groves, royal property, elephant

stables, horse stables, prisons, taverns, slaughterhouses, highways,

crossroads, public rest-houses, and meeting places.

"Adequate space" means that there is enough room on the site for a

yoked wagon to go around, or for a man to carry a ladder around, the

proposed hut. The question arises as to whether this means that all

trees within that radius of the hut must be cut down, or whether it

simply means that there must be enough land around the hut so that

if the trees were not there, it would be possible to go around the

hut in the ways mentioned. The Sub-commentary states that the

stipulation for adequate space is so that the hut will not be built

on the edge of a precipice or next to a cliff wall, and the Vinaya

Mukha notes that the Vibhanga here is following the Laws of Manu (an

ancient Indian legal text) in ensuring that the dwelling not be

built right against someone else's property. Both of these

statements suggest that there is no need to cut the trees down.

The Vinaya Mukha maintains further that the procedures for getting

the site approved are concerned basically with laying claim to

unclaimed land, and this has led many Communities in Thailand to say

that the need to have the Community approve the site does not apply

to places where the Community already owns the land, such as in a

monastery. If a bhikkhu in such Communities wishes to build a hut

for his own use on monastery land, he need only get the approval of

the abbot. The ancient texts say nothing on this point, so it is an

area where the wise policy is to follow the views of the Community

to which one belongs.

//Clearing the site//. Before notifying the local Community, the

bhikkhu must get the site cleared -- so says the Vibhanga, and the

Commentary adds that he should get it leveled as well. In both

cases, he should arrange to have this done in such a way that does

not violate Pacittiyas 10 & 11. Again, the question arises as to

whether clearing the site means cutting down the trees on the spot

where one proposes building the hut. In the origin story to the

following rule, Ven. Channa caused an uproar by cutting down a

venerated tree on a site where he planned to build, which led the

Buddha to formulate the rule that the Community must inspect and

approve the site to prevent uproars of this sort. This suggests that

clearing the site here means clearing the underbrush. Only after the

Community has approved the site should the necessary trees be cut

down.

//Getting the site inspected//. The bhikkhu then goes to the local

Community and formally asks them to inspect the site. (The Pali

passages for this and the remaining formal requests and

announcements are in the Vibhanga.) Either the entire Community will

go to inspect the site or it will select two or three of its members

to go and inspect the site in its stead. The Vibhanga says that

these inspectors should know what does and does not constitute a

disturbance and adequate space, and requires that they be chosen by

a formal motion with one announcement. The Commentary, for some

reason, says that they may also be chosen by a simple declaration

(//apalokana//).

The inspectors then visit the site. If they find any disturbances

or see that the site has inadequate space, they should tell the

bhikkhu not to build there. If the site passes inspection, though,

the bhikkhu may go on to the next step.

//Getting the site approved//. The bhikkhu returns to the

Community and formally asks them to approve the site. The formal act

involves a motion and one announcement. Once this has passed, the

bhikkhu may start construction.

The size of the hut. As the rule states, the hut may be no more

than twelve spans long and seven spans wide, or approximately 3 x

1.75 meters. For some reason the Vibhanga states that the length of

the hut is measured from the outside (excluding the plastering, says

the Commentary), while the width is measured from the inside. The

Commentary adds that neither of these measurements may be exceeded.

Thus a hut ten by eight spans wide, even though it has less floor

area than a twelve by seven span hut, would exceed the standard

width and so would be a violation of this rule.

Offenses. The Vibhanga allots the penalties for building a hut

without a sponsor, for one's own use, without regard for the

stipulations in this rule, as follows:

an oversized hut -- a sanghadisesa;

a hut on an unapproved site -- a sanghadisesa;

a hut on a site without adequate space -- a dukkata;

a hut on a site with disturbances -- a dukkata.

These penalties are additive. Thus, for example, an oversized hut

on an unapproved site would entail a double sanghadisesa.

The wording of the training rule, though, suggests that building a

hut without a sponsor, for one's own use, on a site with

disturbances and without adequate space would entail a sanghadisesa;

but the Sub-commentary says -- without offering explanation -- that

to read the rule in this way is to misinterpret it. Since the

penalty for a multiple sanghadisesa is the same as that for a single

one, there is only one case where this would make an appreciable

difference: a hut of the proper size, built on a designated site

that has disturbances or does not have adequate space. This is a

case of a formal act of the Community improperly performed: Either

the bhikkhus inspecting the site were incompetent, or the

disturbances were not immediately apparent. Since the usual penalty

for improperly performing an act of the Community is a dukkata

(Mv.II.16.4), this may be why the Vibhanga allots penalties as it

does.

As we noted in the Introduction, in cases where the Vibhanga is

explaining the training rules that deal with formal acts of the

Community, it sometimes has to deviate from the wording of the rules

so as to bring them in line in with the general pattern for such

acts, a pattern that was probably formulated after the rules and

came to take precedence over them.

Getting others to build the hut. If, instead of building the hut

himself, a bhikkhu gets others to build it for him, he must inform

them of the four stipulations mentioned in this rule. If he neglects

to inform them, and they build the hut in such a way that it does

not meet any or all of the stipulations, he must either have it torn

down (to the ground, says the Commentary) and have it rebuilt in

line with the stipulations, give it to another, or face the full

penalty for each of the stipulations they violated that he neglected

to mention to them.

For example: He tells them to build a hut of the right size, but

neglects to tell them to have the site approved. They build it to

the right size, the site is without disturbances and has adequate

space but is not approved. Unless he has it torn down or gives it to

another, he incurs a sanghadisesa.

If the bhikkhu mentions the proper stipulations, but learns that

the builders are ignoring them, he must go himself or send a

messenger to reiterate the stipulations. Not to do so incurs a

dukkata. If, having been reminded of the stipulations, the builders

still ignore them, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty; but they -- if

they are bhikkhus -- incur a dukkata for each of the three criteria

regarding the site that they disobey. As for the standard

measurement, they are not bound by it as they are building the hut

for another's use.

If a bhikkhu, intending it for his own use, completes a hut that

others have started, or gets others to complete a hut he has

started, he is still bound by the stipulations given in this rule.

Preliminary offenses. The penalties in the preliminary steps are

as follows: If the hut is such that when finished it will entail a

sanghadisesa or two, each act in its construction entails a dukkata,

until the next to the last act, which entails a thullaccaya. Once

the hut is completed, and the bhikkhu incurs the sanghadisesa(s),

the dukkatas and thullaccaya are nullified.

Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses mention, in addition to the

usual exemptions, that there is no offense "in a lena, in a guha, in

a grass hut, in (a dwelling) for another's use, or in anything other

than a dwelling." The Commentary explains that no offense here means

that these cases are not subject to any of the four stipulations

given in this rule. As for the last case, if a bhikkhu is building,

e.g., a meeting hall for the Community, he is not bound by this

rule, but if he plans to live there as well, he is. This last case

suggests that if a bhikkhu is building a dwelling, planning to

donate it formally to the Community but also planning to live there

himself, he is not exempt from this rule.

Summary: Building a plastered hut -- or having it built --

without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, without

having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa

offense. Building a plastered hut -- or having it built --

without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, exceeding the

standard measurements, is also a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

7. When a bhikkhu is building a large dwelling -- having a

sponsor and destined for himself -- he is to assemble

bhikkhus to designate the site. The site the bhikkhus

designate should be without disturbances and with adequate

space. If the bhikkhu should build a large dwelling on a

site with disturbances and without adequate space, or if he

should not assemble the bhikkhus to designate the site, it

entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

The Vibhanga defines //dwelling// here with the same terms it uses

for //hut// in the preceding rule. All explanations for this rule

may be inferred from those above, the only difference being that, as

the dwelling here has a sponsor, no begging is involved in its

construction, and so there is no need to limit its size.

If a sponsor is building a dwelling for a bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu

is not involved in any way in building it or getting it built, this

rule does not apply.

Summary: Building a hut with a sponsor -- or having it built

-- destined for one's own use, without having obtained the

Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

8.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, charge

a (fellow) bhikkhu with an unfounded case involving defeat,

(thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall

from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not

he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue is

unfounded and the bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails

initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

"Now at that time a householder who served fine food gave

food to the Community on a regular basis, four bhikkhus

every day. (One day) he happened to go on some business to

the monastery. He went to where Ven. Dabba Mallaputta was

staying and on arrival bowed to him and sat down to one

side....Ven. Dabba Mallaputta roused... him with a Dhamma

talk. Then the householder with fine food...said to Dabba

Mallaputta, 'To whom, sir, is tomorrow's meal in our house

assigned?'

"'To (the) followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka,

householder.' [Mettiya and Bhummajaka were among the leaders

of the group-of-six, a faction notorious for its shameless

behavior, and instigators of many of the situations that

compelled the Buddha to formulate training rules.]

"This upset the householder with fine food. Thinking, 'How

can these evil bhikkhus eat in our house?' he returned home

and ordered his female slave: 'Hey. Those who are coming for

a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom

and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine.'

"'As you say, master,' the female slave answered....

"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one

another, 'Yesterday we were assigned a meal at the house of

the householder with fine food. Tomorrow, attending with his

wife and children, he will serve us. Some will offer rice,

some will offer curry, some oil, and some dainties.' Because

of their joy, they didn't sleep as much that night as they

had hoped.

"Early the next morning...they went to the home of the

householder with fine food. The female slave saw them coming

from afar. Preparing them a seat in the storeroom, she said

to them, 'Have a seat, honored sirs.'

"The thought occurred to the followers of Mettiya and

Bhummajaka, 'No doubt the food isn't ready yet, which is why

we are being made to sit in the storeroom.'

"Then the female slave brought them unhusked rice porridge

with pickle brine and said, 'Eat, honored sirs.'

"'Sister, we've come for the regular meal.'

"'I know you've come for the regular meal. But yesterday the

householder ordered me, "Hey. Those who are coming for a

meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom and

serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine." So

eat, honored sirs.'

"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one

another, 'Yesterday the householder with fine food went to

the monastery and met with Dabba Mallaputta. No doubt Dabba

Mallaputta turned him against us.' Because of their

disappointment, they didn't eat as much as they had hoped.

"Then they returned to the monastery and, putting away their

robes and bowls, went to the storeroom outside the gate and

sat on their outer cloaks, their arms around their knees,

silent, abashed, their shoulders drooping, their heads down,

brooding, at a loss for words.

"Then Mettiya Bhikkhuni came along and said to them, 'I

salute you, masters.' But when she had said this, they

didn't respond. A second time...A third time she said, 'I

salute you, masters.' And a third time they didn't respond.

"'Have I offended you, masters? Why don't you respond to

me?'

"'Because you stand by doing nothing, sister, when Dabba

Mallaputta treats us like dirt.'

"'What can I do?'

"'If you like, you could get the Blessed One to expel Dabba

Mallaputta right this very day.'

"'What can I do? How could I do that?'

"'Come, sister. Go to where the Blessed One is and say this:

"It is unfitting, Lord, and improper. The quarter without

dread, without harm, without danger, is (now) the quarter

with dread, with harm, with danger. Where there is calm,

there is a windstorm. The water, as it were, is ablaze. I

have been raped by Master Dabba Mallaputta."'

"'As you say, masters.' (And she went to carry out their

bidding.)"

This is just the heart of the origin story to this rule, which is

one of the longest and most controversial accounts in the Vinaya.

After Mettiya Bhikkhuni made her charge, the Buddha convened a

meeting of the Sangha to question Ven. Dabba Mallaputta. The latter,

who had attained arahantship at the age of seven, responded

truthfully that he could not call to mind ever having indulged in

sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when awake. The Buddha

then told the Sangha to expel Mettiya Bhikkhuni and returned to his

quarters.

According to the Commentary, the expulsion of Mettiya Bhikkhuni

was one of the controversial points in the split between the

Mahayanist bhikkhus in the Abhayagiri Vihara and the Theravadin

bhikkhus of the Mahavihara in the old Sri Lankan capital of

Anuradhapura. Even modern scholars have objected to the Buddha's

treatment of Mettiya Bhikkhuni and interpret this passage as a

"monkish gloss," as if the Buddha himself were not a monk, and the

entire Canon were not the work of monks and nuns. The Commentary

maintains that the Buddha acted as he did because he knew if he

treated her less harshly, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka

would never have volunteered the information that they had put her

up to making the charge in the first place, and the truth would

never have come out. This would have led some people to remain

secretly convinced of Ven. Dabba Mallaputta's guilt and -- because

he was an arahant -- would have been for their long-term detriment.

At any rate, what concerns us here is that at some point after

this rule was formulated, the Buddha put the Sangha in charge of

judging accusations of this sort and gave them a definite pattern to

follow in order to ensure that their judgments would be accurate and

fair. Because the Vibhanga and Commentary to this rule are based on

this pattern, we will discuss the pattern first before dealing with

the special case -- unfounded charges -- covered by this rule.

Admonition. As the Buddha states in Sanghadisesa 12, one of the

ways bhikkhus may hope for growth in his teachings is through mutual

admonition and mutual rehabilitation. If a bhikkhu commits an

offense, the responsibility is his to inform his fellow bhikkhus so

that they may help him through whatever procedures the offense may

entail. Now of course, human nature being what it is, there are

bound to be bhikkhus who neglect this responsibility, in which case

the responsibility falls to the offender's fellow bhikkhus who know

of the matter to admonish him in private, if possible, or -- if he

is stubborn -- to make a formal charge in a meeting of the

Community.

The pattern here is this: Before speaking to the bhikkhu, one must

first make sure that one is qualified to admonish him. According to

Cv.IX.1-2, this means one knows:

1) One is pure in bodily conduct.

2) One is pure in verbal conduct.

3) One is motivated by kindness, not vengeance.

4) One is learned in the Dhamma.

5) One knows both Patimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the

one for the bhikkhunis) in detail.

Furthermore, one determines that:

1) I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong time.

2) I will speak the truth and not untruths.

3) I will speak gently and not harshly.

4) I will speak what is connected with the goal and not what is

unconnected with the goal.

5) I will speak out of kindness and not out of inner anger.

The Parivara (XV.5.3) adds that one should keep five qualities in

mind: compassion, solicitude for the other's welfare, sympathy,

desire to see him rehabilitated, and a desire to keep the Vinaya

foremost.

If one feels that one is unqualified, yet believes that another

bhikkhu has committed an offense for which he has not made amends,

one should find another bhikkhu who is qualified to handle the

charge and inform him. Not to inform anyone in cases like this -- if

the case involves a parajika or sanghadisesa offense -- is to

violate Pacittiya 64, except in the extenuating circumstances

discussed under that rule.

The next step, if one is qualified to make the charge, is to look

for a proper time and place to talk with the other party -- e.g.,

when he is not likely to get embarrassed or upset -- and then to ask

his leave, i.e., to ask permission to speak with him: "Let the Ven.

One give me leave. I want to speak with you." To accuse him of an

offense without asking leave is to incur a dukkata (Mv.II.16.1).

As for the other party, the Buddha recommends that he should give

leave only after assessing the person asking for leave, for it is

possible that someone might ask for leave without any real grounds,

simply to be abusive. (A bhikkhu who asks for leave with no grounds

-- i.e., he has not seen the other party commit the offense, has

heard no reliable report to that effect, and has no reason to

suspect anything to that effect -- incurs a dukkata (Mv.II.16.3).)

The Parivara (XV.4.7) suggests that one should not give leave to a

bhikkhu who:

1) is unconscientious,

2) is ignorant,

3) is not a bhikkhu in regular standing,

4) speaks intent on creating a disturbance, or

5) is not intent on rehabilitating the bhikkhu he is accusing.

In another passage (XV.5.4), it suggests further that one should

not give leave to a bhikkhu who:

1) is not pure in bodily conduct,

2) is not pure in verbal conduct,

3) is not pure in his livelihood,

4) is foolish, childish, and unintelligent, or

5) is unable to give a consistent line of reasoning when

questioned.

If the bhikkhu, is not unqualified in any of these ways, though,

one should willingly give him leave to speak. The Cullavagga

(IX.5.7) says that, when being admonished or accused, one should

keep two qualities in mind: truth, and lack of anger. The Patimokkha

also contains a number of rules imposing penalties on behaving

improperly when one is being admonished formally or informally:

Sanghadisesa 12 for being difficult to admonish in general,

Pacittiya 12 for being evasive or refusing to answer when being

formally questioned, Pacittiya 54 for being disrespectful to one's

accuser or to the rule one is being accused of breaking, and

Pacittiya 71 for finding excuses for not listening to a particular

training rule.

If both sides act in good faith and without prejudice, accusations

of this sort are easy to settle on an informal basis. If they can't

be settled informally, they should be taken to a meeting of the

Community so that the group as a whole may pass judgment. The

procedures for this sort of formal meeting will be discussed under

the Aniyata and Adhikarana-Samatha rules, below.

Abuse of the system. As the origin story to this rule shows, it

can easily be the case that a bhikkhu making a charge against

another bhikkhu is acting out of a grudge and has simply made up the

charge. This rule and the following one cover cases where the

made-up charge is that the other bhikkhu has committed a parajika.

Pacittiya 76 covers cases where the made-up charge is that the other

bhikkhu has broken a less serious rule.

The full offense under this rule involves four factors:

1) //Object//: The other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained.

2) //Perception//: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense

one is charging him with.

3) //Intention//: One wants to see him expelled from the Sangha.

4) //Effort//: One makes an unfounded charge in his presence that

he is guilty of a parajika offense.

Object. The definition of this factor -- the other bhikkhu is

regarded as ordained -- may sound strange, but it comes from the

K/Commentary and is phrased that way with a reason: In normal cases

the object of this rule will be an innocent bhikkhu, but there may

be cases where a bhikkhu has actually committed a parajika offense

that no one knows about; yet instead of disrobing, he acts as if he

were still a bhikkhu, and everyone else assumes that he still is.

Yet even a "bhikkhu" of this sort would fulfill this factor as far

as this rule is concerned.

For example, Bhikkhu X steals some of the monastery funds, but no

one knows about it, and he continues to act as if he were a bhikkhu.

Bhikkhu Y later develops a grudge against him and makes an unfounded

charge that he has had sexual intercourse with one of the monastery

supporters. Even though X is not really a bhikkhu, the fact that

people in general assume him to be one means that he fulfills this

factor.

Perception. If one perceives the bhikkhu one is charging with a

parajika offense to be innocent of the offense, that is enough to

fulfill this factor regardless of whether the accused is actually

innocent or not. To make an accusation based on the assumption or

suspicion that the accused is //not// innocent entails no offense.

Intention. If, in making an unfounded charge of a parajika offense

against another bhikkhu, one's purpose is to see him expelled from

the Sangha, that fulfills this factor. If one's purpose is simply to

insult him, one's actions would come under Pacittiya 2. If one's

purpose is both to see him expelled and to insult him, one incurs

both a sanghadisesa and a pacittiya. If one has a strange sense of

humor and is making the charge as some sort of joke, the penalty is

either a pacittiya under Pacittiya 1 or a dubbhasita under Pacittiya

2: The texts are not clear on this point, but in either case this

sort of thing is no joking matter.

According to the Vibhanga, "confessing one's anger" can simply

mean admitting that one made the charge idly. Thus the amount of

malice motivating one's desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled can

be minimal indeed: If one wants to see him expelled just for the fun

of it, that would fulfill the factor of intention here.

Effort. The act covered by this rule is that of making an

unfounded charge of a parajika in the accused's presence. Whether

one makes the charge oneself or gets someone else to make it, the

penalty is the same. If that "someone else" is a bhikkhu and knows

the charge is unfounded, he too incurs the full penalty.

The Vibhanga defines an unfounded charge as one having no basis in

what has been seen, heard, or suspected. In other words, the accuser

has not seen the accused committing the offense in question, nor has

he heard anything reliable to that effect, nor is there anything in

the accused's behavior to give rise to any honest suspicion.

"Seeing" and "hearing," according to the Commentary, also include

the powers of clairvoyance and clairaudience one may have developed

through meditation. Thus if one charges X with having committed a

parajika offense on the basis of what one has seen clairvoyantly,

this would not be an unfounded charge, although one should be

careful to make clear from the very beginning what kind of seeing

the charge is based on.

If there is some basis in fact, but one changes the status of the

evidence, the penalty is the same. Changing the status means, e.g.,

saying that one saw something when in actuality one simply heard

about it or suspected it, or that one saw it clearly when in

actuality one saw it indistinctly.

An example from the Commentary: Bhikkhu X goes into a grove to

relieve himself. Ms. Y goes into the same grove to get something

there. One sees them leaving the grove at approximately the same

time -- which could count as grounds for suspicion -- but one then

accuses Bhikkhu X, saying that one actually saw him having sex with

Ms. Y. This would count as an unfounded charge. Another example: In

the dark of the night, one sees a man stealing something from the

monastery storehouse. He looks vaguely like Bhikkhu Z, but one can't

be sure. Still, one firms up one's accusation by saying that one

definitely saw Z steal the item. Again, this would count as an

unfounded charge.

The Commentary states that for an unfounded charge to count under

this rule, it must state explicitly (a) the precise act the accused

supposedly committed (e.g., having sexual intercourse, getting a

woman to have an abortion) or (b) that the accused is guilty of a

parajika, or (c) that the accused is no longer a true bhikkhu. If

one simply says or does something that might imply that the accused

is no longer a bhikkhu -- e.g., refusing to show him respect in line

with his seniority -- that does not yet count as a charge.

The Commentary adds that charging a bhikkhu with having committed

a virtual parajika, as discussed in the conclusion to the preceding

chapter, would fulfill this factor as well. For instance, if one

makes an unfounded charge accusing Bhikkhu A of having killed his

father before his ordination, that would constitute a full offense

here.

All of the charges given as examples in the Vibhanga are expressed

directly to the accused -- "I saw you have sexual intercourse," "I

heard you lay false claims to a superior human state" -- and the

Commentary concludes from this that the full offense occurs only

when one makes the charge in the accused's presence, in line with

the pattern for admonition discussed above. To make an unfounded

charge behind the accused's back, it states, incurs a dukkata.

Some people have objected to this point, saying that this gives a

very light penalty for backhanded character assassination, but there

is nothing in the Vibhanga to indicate that the Commentary is wrong

here. Remember that the correct procedures for making an accusation

require that an earnest charge be made in the presence of the

accused. If a bhikkhu spreads gossip about another bhikkhu, accusing

him of having committed a parajika, he should be asked whether he

has taken up the matter with the accused. If he hasn't, he should be

told to speak to the accused before he speaks to anyone else. If he

says that he doesn't feel qualified or that he fears the accused

will retaliate, he should be told to take the matter up with the

bhikkhus who will be responsible for calling a meeting of the

Community. If he refuses to do that, he shouldn't be listened to.

For some reason, the Commentary maintains that a charge made in

writing does not count, although a charge made by gesture -- e.g.,

pointing at the accused when one is asked who committed the parajika

-- does. Perhaps in those days written charges were regarded as too

cowardly to take seriously.

The rule seems to require that the accused confess that he was

acting out of anger, although the Vibhanga states that this means

simply that he admits the charge was a lie. The Commentary states

further that here the rule is showing the point where the rest of

the Community knows that the bhikkhu making the charge is guilty of

a sanghadisesa: He actually committed the offense when he made the

charge.

The Commentary adds "result" as a further factor to the offense

under this rule, saying that the accused must understand the charge

in a reasonable amount of time -- but nothing in the Vibhanga

supports this added factor.

Whether or not anyone actually believes the charge is not a factor

here.

Non-offenses. If one understands the accused to be guilty of a

parajika and accuses him accurately on the basis of what one has

seen, heard, or suspected, then -- regardless of whether he is

guilty or not -- one has not committed an offense. Even in a case

such as this, though, one incurs a dukkata if one makes the charge

without asking leave of the accused, and a pacittiya if one makes

the charge so as to insult him.

Summary: Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has

committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him

disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

9.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, using

as a mere ploy an aspect of an issue that pertains

otherwise, charge a bhikkhu with a case involving defeat,

(thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall

from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not

he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue

pertains otherwise, an aspect used as a mere ploy, and the

bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails initial and

subsequent meetings of the Community.

"At that time the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka,

descending from Vulture Peak Mountain, saw a billy-goat

copulating with a nanny-goat. Seeing them, they said, 'Look

here, friends, let's name this billy-goat Dabba Mallaputta,

and this nanny-goat Mettiya Bhikkhuni. Then we'll phrase it

like this: "Before, my friends, we accused Dabba Mallaputta

on the basis of what we had heard, but now we have seen him

with our very own eyes fornicating with Mettiya

Bhikkhuni!"'"

Some grudges die hard. This rule is almost identical with the

preceding one and involves the same factors except for one of the

sub-factors under "Effort": "Unfounded charge" here becomes "a

charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise." The phrase sounds

strange, but the origin story gives a perfect example of what it

means.

The precise difference between the two rules is this: With an

unfounded charge, one has neither seen, heard, nor suspected that an

offense has been committed; or if one has, one changes the status of

the evidence -- e.g., one states something one has suspected as if

one has heard it, or something one has heard as if one has seen it.

In a charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise, one has seen

an offense being committed and one does not change the status of the

evidence, but one distorts the facts of the case.

To summarize the Vibhanga, there are two basic ways in which this

can be done:

1) X, who may or may not be a bhikkhu, has something in common

with Bhikkhu Y -- they are both tall, short, dark, fair, have the

same name, or whatever. One sees X committing an action that

would amount to an offense and then, on the basis of the

similarity between the two, claims that one has seen Bhikkhu Y

committing a parajika. For instance, X and Y are both very tall.

Late at night one sees X -- knowing that it is X -- stealing

tools from the monastery storeroom. One has a grudge against Y

and so accuses him of being the thief, saying, "I saw this big

tall guy stealing the tools, and he looked just like you. It must

have been you."

2) One sees Bhikkhu Y actually committing an offense. Although one

perceives that it is a lesser offense, one magnifies the charge

to a parajika. For instance, one sees him get into an argument

with Bhikkhu Z and in a fit of anger give Z a blow to the head. Z

goes unconscious, falls to the floor and suffers a severe

concussion resulting in death. Since Y's intention was simply to

hurt him, not to kill him, he incurs only a pacittiya. If one

realizes the nature of Y's intention and the fact that the

penalty is a pacittiya, and yet accuses him of having committed a

parajika, one would incur a sanghadisesa under this rule.

If one sees Y committing an action that one knows does not violate

the rules, but that bears some resemblance to an offense, and then

accuses him of having committed a parajika, it would not fit under

this category. For instance, Y is teaching Vinaya to some new

bhikkhus and quotes a few of the statements that would count as

claims of superior human states. One overhears him and, although

realizing the context, later accuses him of having violated Parajika

4. Since one knows that Y committed no offense, this would count as

an unfounded charge and so would come under the preceding rule.

The other explanations here are exactly the same as those for the

preceding rule, except that in the no-offense clauses the Vibhanga

states that if one makes a charge against the accused based on what

one actually perceives, there is no offense even if the issue turns

out to pertain otherwise. For instance, from the examples already

given: One sees X stealing tools in the dark and, because of his

resemblance to Y, actually thinks Y is the thief. One sees Y give a

fatal blow to Z and actually thinks that Y's intention was to kill

Z. In either of these cases, if one then accuses Y of a parajika

offense, one incurs no penalty regardless of how the case comes out,

although -- as in the preceding rule -- one should be careful to ask

Y's leave before making the charge and to have no intention of

insulting him.

Summary: Distorting the evidence while accusing a bhikkhu of

having committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him

disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

10.Should any bhikkhu agitate for a schism in a Community in

concord, or should he persist in taking up an issue

conducive to schism, the bhikkhus should admonish him thus:

"Do not, Ven. sir, agitate for a schism in a Community in

concord or persist in taking up an issue conducive to

schism. Let the venerable one be reconciled with the

Community, for a Community in concord, on complimentary

terms, free from dispute, having a common recitation, dwells

in peace."

And should that bhikkhu, admonished thus by the bhikkhus,

persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to

three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to

three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist,

it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

This rule dates from Devadatta's attempt to create a schism in the

Sangha during the Buddha's life and is designed to help prevent such

an attempt from ever happening again.

Disputes. Schisms arise from disputes over what the Buddha did and

did not teach or, in the words of the Cullavagga, "when bhikkhus

dispute, saying:

'It is Dhamma,' or 'It is not Dhamma;'

'It is Vinaya,' or 'It is not Vinaya;'

'It was spoken by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not spoken by the

Tathagata;'

'It was regularly practiced by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not

regularly practiced by the Tathagata;'

'It was formulated by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not formulated by

the Tathagata;'

'It is an offense,' or 'It is not an offense;'

'It is a light offense,' or 'It is a heavy offense;'

'It is a curable offense,' or 'It is an incurable offense;'

'It is a serious offense,' or 'It is not a serious offense.'

Whatever strife, quarreling, contention, dispute, differing

opinions, opposing opinions, heated words, abusiveness based on

this, is an issue arising from disputes." (Cv.IV.14.2)

Thus not all disagreements on these matters are classed as issues.

Friendly disagreements or differences of interpretation aren't;

heated and abusive disagreements are.

The Buddha advises that a bhikkhu who wants to bring up such

questions for discussion should first consider five points: 1)

whether it is the right time for such a discussion; 2) whether it

concerns something true; 3) whether it is connected with the goal;

4) whether he will be able to get on his side bhikkhus who value the

Dhamma and Vinaya; and 5) whether the question will give rise to

strife, quarreling, disputes, cracks, and splits in the Community.

If the answer to the first four questions is yes, and to the fifth

question no (i.e., it is the right time for the discussion, it

concerns something true, it is connected with the goal, bhikkhus who

value the Dhamma and Vinaya will be willing to join his side, and

the discussion is not likely to lead to strife), he may go ahead and

start the discussion. Otherwise, he should let the matter rest for

the time being (Cv.IX.4).

The Cullavagga quotes the Buddha as saying that two sorts of

mental states -- skillful and unskillful -- can turn disputes into

issues. The unskillful states he lists are covetous, corrupt, or

confused states of mind; the skillful ones are states of mind that

are not covetous, corrupt, or confused. He adds, however, that six

character traits can lead to issues arising from disputes that will

tend toward the detriment of many people. They are when a bhikkhu --

is easily angered and bears ill will,

is mean and spiteful,

is jealous and possessive,

is scheming and deceitful,

has evil desires and wrong views,

is attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

Such a bhikkhu, he says, lives without deference or respect for

the Buddha, the Dhamma, or the Sangha, and does not complete the

training. If one should see any of these traits within oneself or

others, one should strive for their abandonment. If there are no

such traits present, one should make sure that they don't arise in

the future (Cv.IV.14.3).

Not all disputes, even when prolonged, will lead to schism. An

example is the dispute that led to the Second Council. Even though

it was bitterly fought, there was never a point when either faction

thought of splitting off and conducting communal business

separately. In fact, even after the early Buddhists had formed into

18 separate schools, and the Mahayana movement added //its// schools

of interpretation, Chinese visitors to India reported that bhikkhus

belonging to the different schools of thought could be found living

together harmoniously in the same monastery, performing communal

business together in peace. (Many scholars have misunderstood this

point, thinking that the various schools were schismatic, but in

fact they weren't.)

Thus there are two sets of procedures to follow when a dispute

becomes an issue: For a dispute in which none of the partisans is

aiming at a schism, there are the procedures listed in

Cv.IV.14.16-26. For one that is heading towards a schism (and

//only// for one in which at least one side is aiming at schism, the

Commentary implies and the Sub-commentary states explicitly), we

have this rule and the following one.

Schism. The Cullavagga (VII.5.1), states that schism occurs when

the leader of a schism puts the matter to a vote in a Community of

at least nine bhikkhus with at least four on either side of the

split. It further adds that all the bhikkhus involved must be

bhikkhus of regular standing in communion with the group as a whole

(i.e., they haven't been suspended from the Community), living in

the same boundary.

If one or the other of these qualifications is lacking -- the

issue goes to a vote in a Community of less than nine bhikkhus, one

side or the other gets less than four adherents, or the bhikkhus

involved are not on regular standing or do not belong to the same

boundary -- the efforts at schism count as a crack (//raji//) in the

Community, but not as a full split (//bheda//).

However, the Parivara (XV.10.9), drawing on material in A.X.35 &

37, lists five ways in which a schism can take place: discussion,

announcement, vote, act, and recitation. The Commentary, trying to

reconcile the Cullavagga and Parivara on this point, interprets the

five ways as four steps in a single process (the last two ways

counting as alternative forms of a single step):

1) //Discussion//. A bhikkhu aiming at schism begins a dispute

over the Buddha's teachings, explaining Dhamma as not-Dhamma;

not-Dhamma as Dhamma; Vinaya as not-Vinaya; not-Vinaya as Vinaya;

what was not spoken by the Buddha as having been spoken by him;

what was spoken by the Buddha as not; what was not regularly

practiced by him as having been regularly practiced by him; what

was regularly practiced by him as not; what was not formulated by

him as having been formulated by him; what was formulated by him

as not; an offense as a non-offense; a non-offense as an offense;

a heavy offense as a light offense; a light offense as heavy; a

curable offense as incurable; an incurable offense as curable; a

serious offense as not serious; or a not-serious offense as

serious.

2) //Announcement//. He announces that he is splitting off from

the Community and asks other bhikkhus to take sides.

3) //Vote//. The issue goes to a vote in a Community of at least

nine bhikkhus, with at least four on either side.

4) //Act or recitation//. The bhikkhus who side with the

schismatic split from the others and recite the Patimokkha or

perform other communal business separately.

According to the Commentary, the actual schism has not taken place

until step 4, when the schismatic group conducts communal business

or recites the Patimokkha separately. This is in accordance with

A.X.35 but seems to conflict with the Cullavagga, so the Commentary

explains that if the vote is taken in a split-off meeting of the

Community, steps 3 and 4 happen simultaneously, and the schism has

been accomplished. Otherwise, if the vote is taken outside of the

boundary, the schism is not finalized until the split-off faction

conducts communal business separately within the same boundary as

the Community (Pv.VI.2 & XV.10.10).

We can notice from the way the Vibhanga and Commentary analyze the

steps leading up to schism, that if a group of bhikkhus is living in

a Community that does not adhere to the Buddha's teachings and they

wish to leave the group so that they may more easily follow those

teachings, they do not count as schismatics. However, they should be

careful first to make sure that their views //are// genuinely in

line with the Buddha's teachings and then conduct their departure in

as amenable and unprovocative a manner as possible. In other words,

instead of announcing a split, they should simply say that they want

to go to a more congenial place to practice.

Schism is serious business -- one of the five most heinous crimes

a person can commit. The other four are killing one's mother,

killing one's father, killing an arahant, and maliciously causing a

Buddha to shed blood. A bhikkhu who creates a schism is expelled and

can never be readmitted into the Community during this lifetime

(Mv.I.67). If he knows that his schism is against the Dhamma, then

after death he will go immediately to Hell and be boiled there for

an aeon. The same fate awaits those who join his schismatic group

knowing that what he teaches is not the true Dhamma or Vinaya.

Those, however, who follow him not knowing that his teaching is not

the true Dhamma or Vinaya will not necessarily suffer that fate. If

they realize their mistake and ask to be allowed back into the

Community, they need only confess a thullaccaya and they are members

of the Community in full standing as before (Cv.VII.4.4;

Cv.VII.5.1-6).

Preventing a schism. The Vibhanga states that if a bhikkhu sees or

hears of an attempt at a schism, it is his duty to reprimand the

instigator three times, for the instigator, if he goes

unreprimanded, may continue with his efforts as he likes without

incurring a penalty. A bhikkhu who neglects this duty incurs a

dukkata. The Commentary adds that this dukkata applies to every

bhikkhu within a half-yojana (five-mile) radius who learns of the

attempt at a schism; any bhikkhu outside that radius, even though he

may not be subject to the penalty, should still regard it as his

duty, if he is able, to go reprimand the instigator as well.

(According to the Sub-commentary, any bhikkhu within the five-mile

radius who is ill or otherwise unable to go reprimand the instigator

is not subject to this penalty.) If the attempt takes place during

the Rains Retreat, other bhikkhus are allowed to cut short their

stay at other monasteries to help end the attempt (Mv.III.6-9).

If, after being reprimanded three times, the instigator abandons

his efforts, he incurs no penalty and nothing further need be done.

If he is still recalcitrant, though, he incurs a dukkata; and the

next step is to take him into the midst of a formal meeting of the

Community (by force, if necessary, says the Commentary) and admonish

him formally three more times. If he abandons his efforts before the

end of the third admonition, well and good. If not, he incurs

another dukkata. The next step is to recite a formal rebuke, by

mandate of the Community, using the formula of one motion and three

announcements given in the Vibhanga. If the instigator remains

obstinate, he incurs an additional dukkata at the end of the motion,

a thullaccaya at the end of each of the first two announcements, and

the full sanghadisesa at the end of the third. Once he commits the

full offense, the penalties he incurred in the preliminary stages

are nullified.

Perception. The Vibhanga states that if the acts of admonition and

rebuke are carried out properly -- i.e. the bhikkhu really is

misstating the Buddha's teachings, is really aiming at a schism, and

the various other formal requirements for a formal act are fulfilled

-- then if he does not abandon his intention to agitate for a

schism, he incurs the full sanghadisesa regardless of whether he

perceives the act to be proper, improper, or doubtful. If the act is

improperly carried out, then regardless of how he perceives its

validity, he incurs a dukkata for not abandoning his intention (%).

The fact that the bhikkhu is not free from an offense in the

latter case is important: There are several other, similar points in

the Vinaya -- such as the Buddha's advice to the Dhamma-expert in

the controversy at Kosambi (Mv.X.1.8) -- where for the sake of the

harmony of the Community in cases that threaten to be divisive, the

Buddha advises bhikkhus to abandon controversial behavior and to

yield to the mandate of the Community even if it seems unjust.

Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses, in addition to the usual

exemptions, state simply that there is no offense if the bhikkhu is

not reprimanded or if he gives up his attempt at a schism.

Further steps. If the bhikkhu is truly stubborn, it is possible

that he may continue in his efforts at a schism even after this

sanghadisesa is imposed on him. However, the fact that the Community

met to deal with his case should be enough to alert well-meaning

bhikkhus that the schismatic is following a wrong course of action,

and this should help unite the Community against his efforts. If

they deem it necessary -- to keep the laity from being taken in by

his arguments -- they may authorize one or more of their members to

inform the lay community that the schismatic has committed this

offense (see Pacittiya 9) and explain why. If the schismatic refuses

to undergo the penalty or remains divisive, they may suspend him

from the entire Sangha. If, unrepentant, he leaves to go elsewhere,

they may send word to whatever Community he tries to join.

All of this shows one of the reasons why schism is regarded so

seriously: As the Buddha states in the Discourse on Future Dangers

(A.V.78), it is difficult to find time to practice when the

Community is embroiled in controversy this way.

Summary: To persist in one's attempts at a schism, after the

third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the

Community, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

11.Should bhikkhus -- one, two, or three -- who are

followers and partisans of that bhikkhu, say, "Do not, Ven.

sirs, admonish that bhikkhu in any way. He is an exponent of

the Dhamma, an exponent of the Vinaya. He acts with our

consent and approval. He knows, he speaks for us, and that

is pleasing to us," other bhikkhus are to admonish them

thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sirs. That bhikkhu is not an

exponent of the Dhamma and he is not an exponent of the

Vinaya. Do not, Ven. sirs, approve of a schism in the

Community. Let the venerable ones' (minds) be reconciled

with the Community, for a Community in concord, on

complimentary terms, without dispute, with a common

recitation, dwells in peace."

And should those bhikkhus, thus admonished, persist as

before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke them up to three times so

as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times by

the bhikkhus they desist, that is good. If they do not

desist, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

If the schismatic mentioned in the preceding rule begins to attract

adherents, they are to be treated under this rule -- and quickly,

before the schismatic gains a fourth adherent. The reasons are

these:

1) One Community cannot impose a penalty on another Community

(four or more bhikkhus) in any one formal act. (Mv.IX.2)

2) Penalties of this sort may be imposed only with the unanimous

agreement of all the bhikkhus present in the meeting. If there is

a fourth adherent present in the meeting, he can prevent the

rebuke from being completed.

3) As the Sub-commentary points out, once a potential schismatic

has gained four adherents, he has enough of a following to go

through with his split.

The procedures for dealing with these partisans -- reprimanding

them in private, admonishing and rebuking them in the midst of the

Community -- are the same as in the preceding rule.

Summary: To persist in supporting a potential schismatic,

after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting

of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

12.In case a bhikkhu is by nature difficult to admonish --

who, when being legitimately admonished by the bhikkhus with

reference to the training rules included in the (Patimokkha)

recitation, makes himself unadmonishable (saying), "Do not,

venerable ones, say anything to me, good or bad; and I will

not say anything to the venerable ones, good or bad.

Refrain, venerable ones, from admonishing me" -- the

bhikkhus should admonish him thus: "Let the venerable one

not make himself unadmonishable. Let the venerable one make

himself admonishable. Let the venerable one admonish the

bhikkhus in accordance with what is right, and the bhikkhus

will admonish the venerable one in accordance with what is

right; for it is thus that the Blessed One's following is

nurtured: through mutual admonition, through mutual

rehabilitation."

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus,

persist as before, the bhikkhus are to be rebuke him up to

three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to

three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist,

it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

If a bhikkhu breaks any of the rules of the Vinaya without

undergoing the penalties they entail, or if he breaks them

habitually even when undergoing the penalties, the other bhikkhus

have the duty to admonish him, as explained under Sanghadisesa 8. If

he shows disrespect while being admonished or refuses to mend his

ways, he incurs a further penalty under Pacittiya 54. If his lack of

respect while being admonished becomes habitual, he is to be treated

under this rule.

The Commentary defines //difficult to admonish// as "impossible to

speak to," and then further clarifies by saying that a bhikkhu

difficult to admonish is one who cannot stand being criticized or

who does not mend his ways after his faults are pointed out to him.

It quotes from the Anumana Sutta (M.15) a list of traits, any one of

which makes a bhikkhu difficult to admonish: He has evil desires;

exalts himself and degrades others; is easily angered; because of

this he harbors ill will, holds a grudge, utters angry words;

accused, he throws a tantrum (literally, "explodes"); accused, he is

insulting; accused, he returns the accusation; he evades back and

forth; he does not respond; he is mean and spiteful; jealous and

possessive; scheming and deceitful; stubborn and proud; attached to

his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

A good number of these traits are exemplified by Ven. Channa --

according to tradition, the Buddha's horseman on the night of the

great Going Forth -- in the origin story to this rule.

"Who do you think you are to admonish me? It is I who should

admonish you! The Buddha is mine, the Dhamma is mine, it was

by my young master that the Dhamma was realized. Just as a

great blowing wind would gather up grass, sticks, leaves,

and rubbish, or a mountain-born river would gather up water

weeds and scum, so you, in going forth, have been gathered

up from various names, various clans, various ancestries,

various families. Who do you think you are to admonish me?

It is I who should admonish you!"

The procedures to follow when a bhikkhu is difficult to admonish

-- reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a

formal meeting of the Community -- are the same as under

Sanghadisesa 10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing

that Bhikkhu X is being difficult to admonish, incurs a dukkata if

he does not reprimand him. The question of perception and the

non-offenses are also the same as under that rule.

If the bhikkhu difficult to admonish carries on as before, even

after incurring the full penalty under this rule, the Community may

perform an act of banishment (//pabbajaniya-kamma//) against him for

speaking in dispraise of the Community (Cv.I.13) or -- if he admits

to performing acts that are offenses but refuses to see that they

are offenses or to undergo the penalty -- the Community may exclude

him from participating in the Patimokkha and Pavarana ceremonies

(Mv.IV.16.2; Cv.IX.2) or suspend him from the entire Sangha.

(Cv.I.26; Cv.I.31)

Summary: To persist in being difficult to admonish, after

the third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community,

is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

13.In case a bhikkhu living in dependence on a certain

village or town is a corrupter of families, a man of

depraved conduct -- whose depraved conduct is both seen and

heard about, and the families he has corrupted are both seen

and heard about -- the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus:

"You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man of

depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and

heard about; the families you have corrupted are both seen

and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough of

your staying here."

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus,

say about the bhikkhus, "The bhikkhus are prejudiced by

favoritism, prejudiced by aversion, prejudiced by delusion,

prejudiced by fear, in that for this sort of offense they

banish some and do not banish others," the bhikkhus are to

admonish him thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sir. The bhikkhus

are not prejudiced by favoritism, are not prejudiced by

aversion, are not prejudiced by delusion, are not prejudiced

by fear. You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man

of depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and

heard about, and the families you have corrupted are both

seen and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough

of your staying here."

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus,

persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to

three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to

three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist,

it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

A //corrupter of families// is a bhikkhu who -- behaving in a

demeaning, frivolous, or subservient way -- succeeds in ingratiating

himself to lay people to the point where they withdraw their support

from bhikkhus who are earnest in the practice and give it to those

who are more ingratiating instead. This is illustrated in the origin

story of this rule, in which the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu

(leaders of one faction of the group of six) had thoroughly

corrupted the lay people at Kitagiri.

"Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, having finished his

rains-residence among the people of Kasi and on his way to

Savatthi to see the Blessed One, arrived at Kitagiri.

Arising early in the morning, taking his robe and bowl, he

entered Kitagiri for alms: gracious in the way he approached

and departed, looked forward and behind, drew in and

stretched out his arm; his eyes downcast, his every movement

consummate. People seeing him said, 'Who is this weakest of

weaklings, this dullest of dullards, this most snobbish of

snobs? Who would go up and give him alms? Our masters, the

followers of Assaji and Punabbasu, are compliant, genial,

pleasing in conversation. They are the first to smile,

saying, "Come, you are welcome." //They// are not snobbish.

They are approachable. They are the first to speak. It is to

them that alms should be given.'"

The Vibhanga lists the ways of corrupting a family as giving gifts

of flowers, fruit, etc., practicing medicine, and delivering

messages -- although the Commentary qualifies this by saying there

is no harm in delivering messages that have to do with religious

activities, such as inviting bhikkhus to a meal or to deliver a

sermon, or in conveying a lay person's respects to a senior bhikkhu.

//Depraved conduct// the Vibhanga defines merely as growing

flowers and making them into garlands, but this, the Commentary

says, is a shorthand reference to the long list of bad habits

mentioned in the origin story, which includes such things as

presenting garlands to women, eating from the same dish with them,

sharing a blanket with them, eating at the wrong time, drinking

intoxicants, wearing garlands, using perfumes and cosmetics,

dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, playing games,

performing stunts, learning archery, swordsmanship, and

horsemanship; boxing and wrestling. Any one of these actions taken

in isolation carries only a minor penalty -- a dukkata or a

pacittiya -- but if indulged in habitually to the point where its

bad influence becomes "seen and heard about," i.e., common

knowledge, it can become grounds for his fellow bhikkhus to banish

him from their particular Community until he mends his ways.

The Cullavagga, in a section that begins with the same origin

story as the one for this rule (Cv.I.13-16), treats the act of

banishment in full detail, saying that a Community of bhikkhus, if

it sees fit, has the authority to perform an act of banishment

against a bhikkhu with any of the following qualities:

1) He is a maker of strife, disputes, quarrels, and issues in the

Community.

2) He is ignorant, inexperienced, and has many offenses for which

he has not made amends.

3) He lives in unbecoming association with householders.

4) He is corrupt in his precepts, corrupt in his conduct, or

corrupt in his views.

5) He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Sangha.

6) He is frivolous in word, deed, or both.

7) He misbehaves in word, deed, or both.

8) He is vindictive in word, deed, or both.

9) He practices wrong modes of livelihood.

This last category includes such practices as:

a) running messages and errands for kings, ministers of state,

householders, etc. A modern example would be participating in

political campaigns.

b) scheming, talking, hinting, belittling others for the sake of

material gain; pursuing gain with gain (giving items of small

value in hopes of receiving items of larger value in return,

making investments in hopes of profit, offering material

incentives to those who make donations). (For a full discussion

of these practices, see Ven. Nanamoli's translation of the

Visuddhi Magga, //The Path of Purification//, pp. 24-30.)

c) Practicing worldly arts, e.g., medicine, fortune telling,

astrology, exorcism, reciting charms, casting spells, performing

ceremonies to counteract the influence of the stars, determining

propitious sites, setting auspicious dates (for weddings, etc.),

interpreting oracles, auguries, or dreams, or -- in the words of

the Vibhanga to the Bhikkhunis' Pacittiya 49 & 50 -- engaging in

any art that is "external and unconnected with the goal." The

Cullavagga (V.33.2) gives a dukkata for studying and teaching

worldly arts or hedonist doctrines (//lokayata//). For extensive

lists of worldly arts, see the Brahmajala and Samannaphala Suttas

-- pp. 62-65 and pp. 35-38 in Ven. Bodhi's translations. For the

connection between lokayata and hedonism (e.g., the Kama Sutra),

see Warder, //Outline of Indian Philosophy//, pp. 38-39.

A bhikkhu banished for indulging in any of these activities is

duty-bound to undergo the 18 observances listed in Cv.I.15 and to

mend his ways so that the Community will revoke the act of

banishment. The Commentary adds that a bhikkhu banished for

corrupting families may not live in the monastery where he was

misbehaving, nor enter the city or town where he was corrupting

families, until after the banishment is revoked (this point is based

on Cv.I.16.1). Also, even after the revoking of the banishment, he

may never again accept gifts from the families he had corrupted. If

they ask him why, he may tell them. If they then explain that they

are giving the gifts not because of his former behavior but because

he has now mended his ways, he may then accept it.

If a bhikkhu, instead of mending his ways after being banished,

criticizes the act of banishment or those who performed it, he is

subject to this rule. The procedure to follow in dealing with him --

reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a

formal meeting of the Community -- is the same as under Sanghadisesa

10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing that Bhikkhu

X is criticizing his act of banishment, incurs a dukkata if he does

not reprimand him. The question of perception and the non-offenses

are also the same as under that rule.

Summary: To persist -- after the third announcement of a

formal rebuke in the Community -- in criticizing an act of

banishment performed against oneself is a sanghadisesa

offense.

* * *

A bhikkhu who commits an offense against any of these thirteen

sanghadisesa offenses is duty-bound to inform a fellow bhikkhu and

to ask a Community of at least four bhikkhus to impose a six-day

period of penance (//manatta//) on him. (The Canon says, literally,

a six-night period: At the time of the Buddha, the lunar calendar

was in use and, just as we using the solar calendar count the

passage of days, they counted the passage of nights; a 24-hour

period, which is a day for us, would be a night for them, as in the

Bhaddekaratta Sutta (M.131), where the Buddha explicitly says that a

person who spends a day and night in earnest practice has had an

"auspicious night.")

Penance. Penance does not begin immediately, but only at the

convenience of the Community giving it. During his period of

penance, the offender is partially stripped of seniority and must

observe a number of restrictions -- 94 in all (Cv.II.5-6). The four

most important are:

1) He must not live under the same roof as a full-fledged bhikkhu.

2) He must live in a monastery with at least four full-fledged

bhikkhus.

3) He may not go anywhere outside the monastery unless accompanied

by four full-fledged bhikkhus.

4) Every day he must inform all the bhikkhus in the monastery of

the fact that he is observing penance and the precise offense for

which the penance was imposed. If visiting bhikkhus come to the

monastery, he must inform them as well; if he goes to another

monastery, he must inform all the bhikkhus there, too.

If, on any day of his penance, the bhikkhu neglects to observe any

of these four restrictions, that day does not count toward the total

of six. In addition, he incurs a dukkata each time he fails to

observe any of the 94 restrictions.

Once the bhikkhu has completed his penance, he may ask a Community

of at least 20 bhikkhus to give him rehabilitation. Once

rehabilitated, he returns to his previous state as a full-fledged

bhikkhu in good standing.

Probation. If a bhikkhu who commits a sanghadisesa offense

conceals it from his fellow bhikkhus past dawn of the day following

the offense, he must observe an additional period of probation

(//parivasa//) for the same number of days as he concealed the

offense. Only after he has completed his probation may he then ask

for the six-day period of penance.

The Commentary sets the factors of concealment at ten, which may

be arranged in five pairs as follows:

1) He has committed a sanghadisesa offense and perceives it as a

sanghadisesa offense.

2) He has not been suspended and perceives that he has not been

suspended. (If a bhikkhu has been suspended, no other bhikkhus

will speak with him, and thus he cannot tell them until after his

suspension has been lifted.)

3) There are no obstacles (e.g., a flood, a forest fire, dangerous

animals) and he perceives that there are none.

4) He is able to inform another bhikkhu (i.e., a fellow bhikkhu

suitable to be informed lives in a place that may be reached in

that day, one is not too weak or ill to go, etc.) and he

perceives that he is able. //A bhikkhu suitable to be informed//

means a one who is --

a) in good standing (e.g., not undergoing penance or probation

himself) and

b) not on unfriendly terms with the offender.

5) He (the offender) desires to conceal the offense and so

conceals it.

If any of these factors are lacking, there is no penalty for not

informing another bhikkhu that day. For instance, the following

cases do //not// count as concealment:

A bhikkhu is not sure whether or not the action he has done

qualifies as a sanghadisesa and so waits until he can consult

with a knowledgeable bhikkhu before informing anyone else.

A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest and commits a sanghadisesa in

the middle of the night. Afraid of the snakes or other wild

animals he might encounter in the dark, he waits until daylight

before going to inform a fellow bhikkhu.

A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest, but the only other bhikkhu

within one day's traveling time is a personal enemy who, if he is

informed, will use this as an opportunity to smear the offender's

name, so the offender travels another day or two before reaching

a friendly bhikkhu whom he informs.

Once all of the first eight factors are complete, though, one must

inform another bhikkhu before dawn of the next day or else incur a

dukkata and undergo the penalty for concealment.

A bhikkhu who commits a slighter offense that he thinks is a

sanghadisesa and then conceals it, incurs a dukkata (Cv.III.34.1).

The restrictions for a bhikkhu undergoing probation are similar to

those for one undergoing penance and are discussed in detail at

Cv.II.1.

Sanghadisesas are classified as heavy offenses (//garukapatti//),

both because of the seriousness of the offenses themselves and

because the procedures of penance, probation, and rehabilitation are

burdensome by design, not only for the offender but also for the

Community of bhikkhus in which he lives -- a fact intended to act as

added deterrent to anyone who feels tempted to transgress.

* * * * * * * *

CHAPTER SIX

Aniyata

This term means undetermined or uncertain.  The rules in this

section do not determine fixed penalties, but instead give

procedures by which the Community may pass judgment when a bhikkhu

in uncertain circumstances is accused of having committed an

offense.  There are two training rules here.

1. Should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone with a woman in

a seat secluded enough to lend itself (to the sexual act),

so that a female lay follower whose word can be trusted,

having seen (them), might describe it as constituting any of

three cases -- involving either defeat, communal meetings,

or confession -- then the bhikkhu, acknowledging having sat

(there), may be dealt with for any of the three cases --

involving defeat, communal meetings, or confession -- or he

may be dealt with for whichever case the female lay follower

described.  This case is undetermined.

//Woman// here means a female human being, "even one born that very

day, all the more an older one."  //To sit// also includes lying

down.  Whether the bhikkhu sits near the woman when she is already

seated, or the woman sits near him when he is already seated, or

both sit down at the same time, makes no difference here.

//Private// means private to the eye and private to the ear.  Two

people sitting in a place private to the eye means that no one else

can see if they wink, raise their eyebrows, or nod.  If they are in

a place private to the ear, no one else can hear what they say in an

normal voice.  A secluded seat is one behind a wall, a closed door,

a large bush, or anything at all that would afford them enough

privacy to commit the sexual act.

For a bhikkhu to sit in such a place with a woman can be in itself

a breach of Pacittiya 44 (see the explanations for that rule) and

affords the opportunity for breaking Parajika 1 and Sanghadisesas 1,

2, 3, & 4 as well -- which is why this case is called uncertain or

undetermined.

If a trustworthy female lay follower happens to see a bhikkhu with

a woman in such circumstances, she may inform the Community and

charge him on the basis of what she has seen.  //Female lay

follower// here means one who has taken refuge in the Buddha,

Dhamma, and Sangha.  //Trustworthy// means that she is at least a

Stream-winner.  Even if she is not a Stream-winner, the Community

may chose to investigate the case anyway; but if she is, they have

to.  The texts do not discuss cases in which a man is making the

charge but, given the low legal status of women in the Buddha's

time, it seems reasonable to infer that if a woman's word was given

such weight, the same would hold true for a man's.  In other words,

if he is a Stream-winner, the Community has to investigate the case.

If he isn't, they are free to handle the case or not, as they see

fit.

The wording of the rule suggests that once the matter is

investigated and the bhikkhu in question has stated his side of the

story, the bhikkhus are free to judge the case either in line with

what he admits to having done or in line with the trustworthy female

lay follower's charge.  In other words, if his admission and her

charge are at variance, they may decide which side seems to be

telling the truth and impose a penalty -- or no penalty -- on the

bhikkhu as they see fit.

The Vibhanga, however, says that they may deal with him only in

line with what he admits to having done.  The Commentary offers no

explanations for this point aside from saying that in uncertain

cases things are not always as they seem, citing as example the

story of an arahant who was wrongly charged by another bhikkhu of

having broken Pacittiya 44.

Actually, the Vibhanga in departing from the wording of the rule

is simply following the general guideline the Khandhakas give for

handling accusations.  Apparently what happened was that this rule

and the following one were formulated early on.  Later, when the

general guidelines were first worked out, some group-of-six bhikkhus

abused the system to impose penalties on innocent bhikkhus they

didn't like (Mv.IX.3.1), so the Buddha formulated a number of checks

to prevent the system from working against the innocent.  We will

cover the guidelines in detail under the Adhikarana-Samatha rules,

but here we may note a few of their more important features.

As explained under Sanghadisesa 8, if Bhikkhu X is charged with an

offense, the bhikkhus who learn of the charge are duty-bound to

question him first in private.  If he admits to the charge, agrees

that it is an offense, and then undergoes the penalty, nothing

further need be done (Mv.IX.5.6).  If he admits that he did the act,

but refuses to see that it is an offense and/or refuses to undergo

the penalty, then if the act really did constitute an offense, the

Community may meet and suspend him (Mv.IX.5.8; Cv.I.26).  The

Khandhakas (Mv.IX.1.3 and Cv.XI.1.10) show that "not seeing an

offense" does //not// mean that one denies doing the act; simply

that one does not agree that the act was against any of the rules.

If, however, X denies the charge, and yet some of the members of

the Community suspect him of not telling the truth, the issue has to

go to a formal meeting.  Once the case reaches this stage, one of

only three verdicts is possible:  that the accused is innocent, that

he was insane at the time he committed the offense (and so absolved

of guilt), or that he is not only guilty as charged but also guilty

of "further misconduct" in having dragged out his confession to this

point (Cv.IV.14.27-29).  If the last verdict is the true one, then

the bhikkhu must not only undergo the penalty for the offense but

also be penalized with an act of further misconduct, which is the

same as an act of censure. (Cv.IV.11-12)

When the Community meets, both the accused and the accuser must be

present, and both must agree to the case's being heard by that

particular group.  (If the original accuser is a lay person, one of

the bhikkhus is to take up the charge.)  The accused is then asked

to state his version of the story and is to be dealt with in

accordance with what he admits to having done (Mv.IX.6.1-4).  The

Cullavagga (IV.14.29) shows that the other bhikkhus are not to take

his first statement at face value.  They should press and

cross-examine him until they are all satisfied that he is telling

the truth, and only then may they pass one of the three verdicts

mentioned above.

If necessary, they should be prepared to spend many hours in the

meeting to arrive at a unanimous decision, for if they cannot come

to a unanimous agreement, the case has to be left as unsettled,

which is a very bad question mark to leave in the communal life.

The Commentary to Sanghadisesa 8 suggests that if one side or the

other seems unreasonably stubborn, the senior bhikkhus present

should lead the group in long periods of chanting to wear down the

stubborn side.

If a verdict is reached but later discovered to be wrong -- the

accused got away with a plea of innocence when actually guilty, or

admitted to being guilty simply to end the interrogation when

actually innocent -- the Community may reopen the case and reach a

new verdict (Cv.IV.4.11; Cv.IV.8).  If a bhikkhu learns that a

fellow bhikkhu actually was guilty and yet got away with a verdict

of innocence, and he then helps conceal the truth, he is guilty of

an offense under Pacittiya 64.

Obviously, the main thrust of these guidelines is to prevent an

innocent bhikkhu from being unfairly penalized.  As for the opposite

case -- a guilty bhikkhu getting away with no penalty -- we should

remember that the laws of kamma guarantee that in the long run he is

not getting away with anything at all.

Although these guidelines supercede both Aniyata rules, the rules

still serve two important functions:

1)  They remind the bhikkhus that charges made by lay people are

not to be lightly ignored, and that the Buddha at one point was

willing to let the bhikkhus give more weight to the word of a female

lay follower than to that of the accused bhikkhu.  This in itself,

considering the general position of women in Indian society at the

time, is remarkable.

2) As we will see under Pacittiya 44, it is possible under some

circumstances -- depending on the bhikkhu's state of mind -- to sit

alone with a woman in a secluded place without incurring a penalty.

Still, a bhikkhu should not blithely take advantage of the

exemptions under that rule, for even if his motives are pure, it

doesn't look good to anyone who may come along and see him there.

These rules serve to remind such a bhikkhu that he could easily be

subject to a charge that would lead to a formal meeting of the

Community.  Even if he were to be declared innocent, the meeting

would waste a great deal of time both for himself and for the

Community.  And in some people's minds -- given the Vibhanga's

general rule that he is innocent until proven guilty -- there would

remain the belief that he was actually guilty and got off with no

penalty simply from lack of hard evidence.  A bhikkhu would be wise

to avoid such situations altogether, remembering what Lady Visakha

told Ven. Udayin in the origin story to this rule:

"It is unfitting, sir, and improper, for the master to sit in

private, alone with a woman....Even though the master may not be

aiming at that act, it is difficult to convince those who are

unbelievers."

Summary:  When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a

bhikkhu of having committed a parajika, sanghadisesa, or

pacittiya offense while sitting alone with a woman in a

private, secluded place, the Community should investigate

the charge and deal with the bhikkhu in accordance with

whatever he admits to having done.

* * *

2.In case a seat is not sufficiently secluded to lend itself

(to the sexual act) but sufficiently so to address lewd

words to a woman, should any bhikkhu sit in private, alone

with a woman in such a seat, so that a female lay follower

whose word can be trusted, having seen them, would describe

it as constituting either of two cases -- involving communal

meetings or confession -- then the bhikkhu, acknowledging

having sat (there), is to be dealt with for either of the

two cases -- involving communal meetings or confession -- or

he is to be dealt with for whichever case the female lay

follower described.  This case too is undetermined.

This rule differs from the preceding one mainly in the type of seat

it describes -- private to the eye and private to the ear, but not

secluded.  Examples would be an open-air meeting hall or a place out

in the open far enough away from other people so that they could not

see one wink, etc., or hear what one is saying in a normal voice.

Such a place, although inconvenient for committing Parajika 1,

Sanghadisesas 1 & 2, or Pacittiya 44, would be convenient for

committing Sanghadisesas 3 & 4 or Pacittiya 45.  As a result, the

term //woman// under this rule is defined as under those rules:  one

experienced enough to know what is and is not lewd.

Otherwise, all explanations for this rule are the same as under

the preceding rule.

Summary:  When a trustworthy female lay follower accuses a

bhikkhu of having committed a sanghadisesa or pacittiya

offense while sitting alone with a woman in a private place,

the Community should investigate the charge and deal with

the bhikkhu in accordance with whatever he admits to having

done.

* * * * * * * *

CHAPTER SEVEN

Nissaggiya Pacittiya

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The term //nissaggiya//, used in connection with training rules,

means "entailing forfeiture."  Used in connection with articles, it

means "to be forfeited."  //Pacittiya// is a word of uncertain

etymology.  The Parivara gives a didactic derivation -- that it

means letting skillful qualities fall away (//patati//) with a

deluded mind (//citta//) -- but the term is more likely related to

the verb //pacinati// (pp. //pacita//), which means to discern,

distinguish or know.

Each of the rules in this category involves an object that a

bhikkhu has acquired or used wrongly, and that he must forfeit

before he may "make the offense known" -- confess it -- to a fellow

bhikkhu or group of bhikkhus. Once he has made his confession, he is

absolved from the offense.  In most cases, the forfeiture is

symbolic -- after his confession, he receives the article in return

-- although three of the rules require that the offender give up the

article for good.

There are thirty rules in this category, divided into three

chapters (//vagga//) of ten rules each.

Part One: The Robe-cloth Chapter

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. When a bhikkhu has finished his robe-making and the frame

is destroyed (his kathina privileges are in abeyance), he is

to keep an extra robe-cloth ten days at most.  Beyond that,

it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The origin story for this rule is retold with more detail in the

Mahavagga (VIII.13.4-8).  Since the added details are what make it

interesting, that is the version translated here.

"(The Buddha addresses the bhikkhus:)  'As I was on the road

from Rajagaha to Vesali, I saw many bhikkhus coming along

buried in robe-cloth, with a mattress of robe-cloth on their

heads and a mattress of robe-cloth on their backs, and a

mattress of robe-cloth on their hips.  Seeing them, I

thought, "All too soon have these foolish men come under the

spell of luxury in terms of robe-cloth.  What if I were to

set a boundary, to lay down a restriction on robe-cloth for

the bhikkhus."

"'Then traveling by stages, I came to Vesali.  There I

stayed at the Gotamaka Shrine.  Now at that time, during the

cold winter middle-eight nights (the four nights on either

side of the full moon in February, the coldest time of the

year in India) when snow was falling, I sat outside wearing

one robe and was not cold.  Towards the end of the first

watch I became cold.  I put on a second robe and was not

cold. Towards the end of the middle watch I became cold.  I

put on a third robe and was not cold.  Towards the end of

the final watch, as dawn arose and the night smiled, I

became cold.  I put on a fourth robe and was not cold.  The

thought occurred to me, "Those in this doctrine and

discipline who are sons of respectable families -- sensitive

to cold and afraid of the cold -- even they are able to get

by with three robes.  Suppose I were to set a boundary, to

lay down a restriction on robes for the bhikkhus and were to

allow three robes."  Bhikkhus, I allow you three robes:  a

double-layer outer robe, a single-layer upper robe and a

single-layer inner robe (thus, four layers of cloth).'

"Now at that time, some group-of-six bhikkhus, thinking,

'The Blessed One allows three robes,' entered the village

wearing one set of robes, stayed in the monastery wearing

another set, and went down to bathe in still another.

Modest bhikkhus... were offended and annoyed and spread it

about, 'How can the group of six bhikkhus keep extra

robe-cloth?'  They told this matter to the Blessed One.

He...addressed the bhikkhus, saying, 'Bhikkhus, an extra

robe-cloth is not to be kept.'

"Now at that time an extra robe-cloth accrued to Ven.

Ananda, and he wanted to give it to Ven. Sariputta, but Ven.

Sariputta was at Saketa.  He thought, '...Now what should I

do?'  He told this matter to the Blessed One, who said, 'But

how long is it, Ananda, before Sariputta will come here?'

"'Nine or ten days.'

"Then the Blessed One...addressed the bhikkhus, 'I allow an

extra robe-cloth to be kept at most ten days.'

"Now at that time an extra robe accrued to the bhikkhus.

They thought, 'Now what should we do?'  They told this

matter to the Blessed One, who said, 'I allow you, bhikkhus,

to place an extra robe-cloth under dual ownership.'"

The offense under this rule involves two factors:

1) //Object//:  a piece of extra robe-cloth, i.e., a piece of

cloth suitable to be made into a robe or other cloth requisite,

measuring at least four by eight inches (fingerbreadths), that has

not been formally determined for use or placed under dual ownership.

This category includes finished requisites as well as simple pieces

of cloth, but does not include robe-cloth belonging to the

Community.

2) //Effort//:  One keeps it for more than ten days (except during

the allowed period) without determining it for use, placing it under

dual ownership, abandoning it (giving or throwing it away); or

without the cloth's being lost, destroyed, burnt, stolen or taken by

someone else on trust within that time.

Object.  According to the Mahavagga (VIII.3.1), six kinds of cloth

are suitable for making into cloth requisites:  linen, cotton, silk,

wool, hemp or canvas (any of the five preceding types mixed with

jute).  By extension, nylon, rayon and other synthetic fibers would

count as suitable as well.  Unsuitable materials -- such as cloth

made of hair, horse-hair, grass, bark, wood-shavings or antelope

hide (and by extension, leather) -- do not come under this rule.

(For a full list of unsuitable materials, see Mv.VIII.28.)

Mv.VIII.29 gives a list of colors -- such as black, blue and crimson

-- and patterns that are not suitable for robes but that, according

to the Commentary, are suitable for things like handkerchiefs and

bed sheets.  Pieces of cloth dyed these colors or printed with these

patterns //would// come under this rule.

If a bhikkhu receives a piece of suitable cloth measuring four by

eight fingerbreadths or more but does not yet plan to use it, he may

place it under dual ownership (//vikappana//) until he has need for

it.  Once he decides to make use of the cloth, he must rescind the

dual ownership (see Pacittiya 59) before making it into a finished

requisite (if it isn't already).  Once it is finished, he may then

determine it for use (//adhitthana//) or place it under dual

ownership again, depending on the nature of the article:

Each of the three basic robes, handkerchiefs, bed sheets and the

sitting cloth are to be determined, and may not be placed under

dual ownership.

//A rains-bathing cloth// (see NP 24) may be determined for the

four months of the rainy season, and is to be placed under dual

ownership for the remainder of the year.

//A skin-eruption cloth// (see Pacittiya 90) may be determined

when needed and is to be placed under dual ownership when not.

//Other items of cloth// may be determined as "accessory cloths."

(The procedures for determining and placing under dual ownership

are given in Appendices IV & V.)

Any cloth made of any of the suitable materials and of the

requisite size counts as an extra cloth if --

it has not been determined for use or put under dual ownership,

it has been improperly determined or placed under dual ownership,

or

its determination or dual ownership has lapsed.

Many of the cases in which determination and dual ownership lapse

also exempt the cloth from this rule:  e.g., the owner disrobes or

dies, he gives the cloth away, it gets stolen, destroyed (bitten by

things such as termites, says the Commentary), burnt, lost, or

someone else takes it on trust.  There are a few cases, however,

where determination and dual ownership lapse and the cloth //does//

fall under this rule.  They are --

//Under dual ownership//:  The first owner takes the cloth on

trust; or the second owner formally rescinds the dual ownership.

//Under determination//:  The owner rescinds the determination; or

(if the cloth has been determined as one of the three basic robes)

the cloth develops a hole.  This latter case comes in the

Commentary, which gives precise standards for deciding what kind of

hole does and does not make the determination of the robe lapse:

1) //Size//.  The hole has to be a full break (through both

layers of cloth, if in the outer robe) at least the size of the

nail on one's little finger.  If one or more threads remains

across the hole, then the hole makes the determination lapse

only if either of the two "halves" divided by the thread(s) is

the requisite size.

2) //Location//.  On an upper robe or outer robe, the hole has to

be at least one span (25 cm.) from the longer side and eight

fingerbreadths from the shorter; on an under robe, at least one

span from the longer side and four fingerbreadths from the

shorter.  Any hole closer to the edge of the robe than these

measurements does not make the determination lapse.

Because of these stipulations, the Commentary notes that if one is

patching a worn spot -- not a hole as defined above -- the requisite

distance away from the edge of one's robe, the determination lapses

if one cuts out the worn spot before applying the patch, but not if

one applies the patch before cutting out the worn spot.  If the

determination lapses, it is an easy matter to redetermine the robe,

but one must be mindful to do it within the time span allotted by

this rule.

Effort.  According to the Vibhanga, if one keeps a piece of extra

robe-cloth past the eleventh dawn (except when the end-of-vassa and

kathina privileges are in effect), one commits the full offense

under this rule.  The Commentary explains this by saying that the

dawn of the day on which one receives the cloth, or lets its

determination/dual ownership lapse, counts as the first dawn.  Thus

the eleventh dawn would actually be the tenth dawn after one

receives, etc., the cloth.  (The precise definition of dawn is a

controversial point.  See Appendix I.)

Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  Even if one miscounts

the days, or perceives a robe to be determined when it actually is

not, one is not immune from the offense:  The robe is to be

forfeited and the offense confessed.

To use such a robe or piece of robe-cloth before one has forfeited

it and confessed the offense, entails a dukkata.  This point holds

for each of the nissaggiya pacittiya rules.

End-of-vassa & kathina privileges.  The fourth lunar month of the

rainy season -- beginning the day after the first full moon in

October and lasting to dawn of the day following the next full moon

-- is termed the robe season, a period traditionally given over to

robe-making.  In the early days, when most bhikkhus spent the cold

and hot seasons wandering, and stayed put in one place only during

the Rains, this would have been the ideal period to prepare robes

for their wandering, and would have been the ideal time for lay

people who had come to know the bhikkhus during the Rains to show

their gratitude and respect for them by presenting them with gifts

of cloth for this purpose.

During this robe season, six of the training rules -- NP 1, 2, &

3; Pacittiyas 32, 33, & 46 -- are relaxed as a privilege for

bhikkhus who have observed the three-month rains residence

(//vassa//), to make it more convenient for them to make robes.

Also, any cloth accruing to a particular monastery during this

period may be shared only among the bhikkhus who spent the Rains

there, and not with any incoming visitors.

If the bhikkhus who have spent the Rains in a particular monastery

number five or more, they are also entitled to participate in a

//kathina// ceremony in which they receive a gift of cloth from lay

people, bestow it on one of their members, and then as a group make

it into a robe before dawn of the following day.  (//Kathina// means

frame, and refers to the frame over which the robe-cloth is

stretched, much like the frame used in America to make a quilt.)

After participating in this ceremony, the bhikkhus may take

advantage of the above-mentioned privileges for an additional four

lunar months, up to the dawn after the full-moon day that ends the

cold season in late February or early-to-mid March (called Phagguna

in Pali).  However, a bhikkhu's kathina privileges may be rescinded

earlier than that for either of two reasons:

1)  He participates in a meeting in which all the bhikkhus in the

monastery, as a formal act of the Community, voluntarily

relinquish their kathina privileges.  (This act is discussed

under Bhikkhunis' Pacittiya 30 -- see BD, vol. III, p. 302.)

2)  He comes to the end both of his commitment to the monastery

(//avasa-palibodha//) and of his commitment to making a robe

(//civara-palibodha//).   (See Mv.VII.1.7; Mv.VII.2 & Pv.XIV.6.)

a) Commitment to the monastery ends when either of the following

things happen:

-- One leaves the monastery without intending to return before

the four lunar months are up.

-- One has left the monastery, planning to return, but learns

that the bhikkhus in the monastery have formally decided to

relinquish their kathina privileges.

b) Commitment to making a robe ends when any of the following

occur:

-- One finishes making a robe.

-- One decides not to make a robe,

-- One's robe-cloth gets lost.

-- One expects to obtain robe-cloth, but doesn't obtain it as

expected.

Only if Point 1 happens, or //both// Points 2a and 2b happen, do

one's kathina privileges lapse before the dawn after the full moon

day marking the end of the cold season.

During the period in which one's end-of-vassa privileges or

kathina privileges are in effect, one may keep an extra piece of

robe-cloth for more than ten days without committing an offense

under this rule.  Once  these privileges lapse, though, one must

determine the cloth, place it under dual ownership, or abandon it

within ten days.  If one fails to do so by the 'eleventh dawn' after

the privileges lapse, the cloth is to be forfeited and the offense

confessed.

Forfeiture & confession.  To be absolved of the offense under this

rule, one must first forfeit the robe-cloth kept over ten days, and

then confess the offense.  This may be done in the presence of one

other bhikkhu, a group of two or three, or a Community of four or

more.  After confessing the offense, one receives the robe-cloth in

return.  This is the pattern followed under all the nissaggiya

pacittiya rules, except for the few in which forfeiture and

confession must be done in the presence of a full Community, and in

which the article may not be returned to the offender.  (We will

note these rules as we come to them.)

The Pali formulae to use in forfeiture, confession and return of

the article for this and all the following rules are given in

Appendix VI.  We should note, though, that according to the

Commentary one may conduct these procedures in any language at all.

In this and every other rule under which the article may be

returned to the offender, it //must// be returned to him.  According

to the Vibhanga, a bhikkhu who receives the article being forfeited

without returning it incurs a dukkata.  The Commentary qualifies

this by saying that this penalty applies only to the bhikkhu who

assumes that, in receiving an article being forfeited in this way,

it is his to take as he likes.  For the bhikkhu who knows that it is

not his to take -- and this includes every bhikkhu who has read this

passage and remembered it -- the offense is to be treated under

Parajika 2, and the penalty determined by the value of the article.

Viewed in this light, the act of accepting the forfeited article is

like accepting an object placed in trust.

A bhikkhu who has received the robe-cloth in return after

forfeiting it and confessing the offense may use it again without

penalty, unless he keeps it as a piece of extra robe-cloth for more

than an additional ten days.

Non-offenses.  Aside from extra robe-cloth kept more than ten days

while one's end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect, the

Vibhanga says that there is no offense if within ten days the cloth

is determined, placed under dual ownership, lost, stolen, destroyed,

burnt, taken by someone else on trust, thrown away, or given away.

In connection with this last point, the Commentary discusses

proper and improper ways of giving things away.  The article counts

as having been properly given if one says, "I give this to you," or

"I give this to so-and-so" or "Take this, it's yours," but not if

one says things like, "Make this yours," or "May this be yours."

Apparently, if one simply hands the article over without saying

anything to show that one is transferring ownership, it again does

not count.  As we noted above, perception is not a mitigating factor

under this rule.  If one gives extra robe-cloth away in an improper

manner, then even though one may assume that the cloth has been

given away, it still counts as one's own extra robe-cloth under this

rule.

Current practice.  As the origin story shows, the purpose of this

rule was to prevent bhikkhus from having more than one set of the

three robes at any one time.  With the passage of time, though,

gifts of cloth to the Community became more numerous, and the need

for stringency in this matter became less and less felt.  Exactly

when spare robes became accepted is not recorded, although the

passage on a student's duties to his preceptor (Mv.I.25.9) shows

that the practice of having a spare lower robe was already current

when that part of the Canon was compiled (see Appendix VIII).

Mv.VII.1 also makes mention of a group of forest dwelling monks who

were "wearers of the three robes," as if this were a special

distinguishing characteristic.  The Parivara (V.5) mentions the

practice of using only one set of three robes as special, and the

Visuddhi Magga (5th century A.D.) classes this practice as one of

the thirteen optional //dhutanga// (ascetic) practices.

As we will see below, Pacittiya 92 suggests that in the early days

the under, upper, and outer robes were all nearly the same size, so

there would have been no difficulties in washing one robe and using

the other two while the first one dried.  Later, when the compilers

of the ancient commentaries greatly enlarged the size of the upper

and outer robes after deciding that the Buddha was much larger than

an ordinary human being, getting  by with just one set of three

robes became less convenient.  Thus many teachers at present suggest

that even a frugal bhikkhu, when staying in monasteries, should use

one spare under robe or a spare under and upper robe -- so that he

will have no trouble keeping his robes clean and presenting an

acceptable appearance at all times -- and save the three-robe

dhutanga practice for periods when alone in the wilderness.

At any rate, since only one set of three robes may be determined

as such, spare robes -- once they became generally accepted -- were

determined as "accessory cloths."  This point may be inferred from

the Commentary's explanation of this rule, and the Sub-commentary's

explanation of NP 7.  The Commen-tary even contains a discussion of

the views of various elders as to whether or not a bhikkhu who

wishes to avoid the special rules surrounding the use of the three

robes (such as the following rule) may determine his basic set as

accessory cloths as well.  The majority opinion -- with only one

dissenting voice -- was yes, although at present many Communities do

not agree with this opinion.

The Sub-commentary suggests an alternative way of dealing with

spare robes:  placing them under dual ownership and -- since none of

the three robes may be placed under dual ownership -- calling them

simply "cloth" (//civara//).  This, however, plays havoc with

Pacittiya 59, and the general use of the idea of dual ownership in

the Canon, as a way of keeping cloth that one is not yet using.

Still, both methods of dealing with spare robes -- determining

them as "accessory cloths" and placing them under dual ownership as

"cloths" -- are in practice at present.  And since spare robes have

been accepted, the current effect of this rule is mainly to deter a

bhikkhu from hoarding up robe-cloth in secret and from letting a

hole in any of his basic set of three robes go unmended for more

than ten days.   Nevertheless, the spirit of the rule makes it

incumbent on each bhikkhu to keep his cloth requisites to a minimum.

Summary:  Keeping a piece of robe-cloth for more than ten

days without determining it for use or placing it under dual

ownership -- except when the end-of-vassa or kathina

privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya

offense.

* * *

2.When a bhikkhu has finished his robe-making and the frame

is destroyed (his kathina privileges are in abeyance):  If

he dwells apart from (any of) his three robes even for one

night -- unless authorized by the bhikkhus -- it is to be

forfeited and confessed.

In the origin story here, a number of bhikkhus went off on tour,

leaving their outer robes with their friends at the monastery.

Eventually the robes became moldy, and the bhikkhus at the monastery

were burdened with having to sun them to get rid of the mold.  The

Buddha thus formulated this rule so that bhikkhus would be

responsible for looking after their own robes.

The offense here consists of two factors:  object and effort.

Object: any one of the robes that a bhikkhu has determined as his

basic set of three -- the //antaravasaka// (under robe),

//uttarasanga// (upper robe) and //sanghati// (outer robe).  This

rule thus does not apply to spare robes or other cloth requisites.

Effort: greeting dawn at a place outside of the zone in which any

of ones robes are located, except when the exemptions mentioned in

the rule are in effect.

//Dawn// is a concept that would seem intuitive enough, but the

lack of a definition for the term in the Vibhanga has given rise to

a variety of later interpretations.  The Khuddasikkha -- a Vinaya

manual written by Ven. Dhammasiri, a Sri Lankan, in the 11th or 12th

century -- states that the sky lightens in four stages before

sunrise:  a slight reddening 2 hours before sunrise; a slight

whitening 1/2 hour later; a second reddening 48 minutes before

sunrise; and a second whitening 24 minutes after that.  Burmese, Sri

Lankan, and some Thai bhikkhus tend to follow this analysis, and

differ among themselves only as to which of the four stages

constitutes dawn, most of them favoring the first reddening.  Other

Thai bhikkhus ignore the Khuddasikkha entirely, and say that dawn

occurs in the half hour before the point when, by natural light, one

can see the lines in one's hand while holding it out at arm's

length.

Appendix I discusses a passage from the Canon -- M. 66 -- that

suggests that the first reddening and whitening is probably not the

dawn meant by the Vibhanga, but as with many other controversial

points of this sort, the wise policy is usually to adhere to the

traditions of one's Community.

//Zones//.  This is the most complex facet of this rule.  The zone

where a bhikkhu must be at dawn depends on the type of location

where his robes are placed, whether or not the property around the

location is enclosed (with a wall, a fence, or a body of water such

as a moat, river, or lake, says the Sub-commentary) and -- if it is

enclosed -- whether it belongs to one or more than one //kula//.

The term //kula// has different meanings for the different types

of locations.  According to the Commentary, a village, town or city

is one-kula if ruled by a single ruler, and multi-kula if ruled by a

council -- as in the case of Vesali and Kusinara during the time of

the Buddha.  At present, cities or towns governed under a social

contract -- such as a town charter -- would count as multi-kula

regardless of whether the highest authority in the government is

invested in a single individual or not.

A building, a vehicle or a piece of land is one-kula if it belongs

to one family, and multi-kula if it belongs to more than one (as in

an apartment house).

According to the Sub-commentary, a monastery is one-kula if the

people who initiated it belong to one kula -- of either type,

apparently -- and multi-kula if they belong to several.

What follows is a synopsis of the specific places listed in the

Vibhanga, together with explanations from the commentaries:

1.  //A village, town, or city//:

a. Enclosed and one-kula:  If the robes are in the enclosure, one

may greet dawn anywhere in the enclosure.

b. Enclosed and multi-kula:  If the robes are in a house, greet

dawn anywhere in the house, in the public meeting hall, at the

town gate, or one //hatthapasa// (1.25 meters) around any of

these places (%).  If the robes are in the public meeting hall

or in the area one hatthapasa around it, greet dawn in the

public meeting hall, at the town gate, or in the area one

hatthapasa around either of the two.

c. Unenclosed:  If the robes are in a one-kula dwelling, greet

dawn in the house, or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%).

(See 2 & 3 below for further details.)

2.  //A dwelling with a yard//:

a. Enclosed and one-kula:  If the robes are within the enclosure,

greet dawn anywhere within the enclosure.

b. Enclosed and multi-kula:  Greet dawn in the room where the

robes are located, at the entrance to the enclosure, or in the

area one hatthapasa around either of the two (%).

c. Unenclosed:  Greet dawn in the room where the robes are

located, or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%).

3.  //A monastic dwelling// (vihara -- //according to the

Sub-commentary, this includes entire monasteries//):

a. Enclosed and one-kula:  If the robes are within the enclosure,

greet dawn anywhere within the enclosure.

b. Enclosed and multi-kula:  Greet dawn in the dwelling where the

robes are located, at the entrance to the enclosure, or in the

area one hatthapasa around either of the two (%).

c. Unenclosed:  Greet dawn in the dwelling where the robes are

located or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%).

4.  //A field, orchard garden (park) or threshing floor//:

a. Enclosed and one-kula:   If the robes are within the

enclosure, greet dawn anywhere within the enclosure.

b.  Enclosed and multi-kula:  If the robes are within the

enclosure, greet dawn in the area one hatthapasa around the

entrance to the enclosure or in the area one hatthapasa around

the robes.

c.  Unenclosed:  Greet dawn within one hatthapasa of the robes.

5.  //Buildings with no yard (such as a fortress or city apartment

block)//:

a.  One-kula:  If the robes are in the building, greet dawn

anywhere within the building.

b.  Multi-kula:  Greet dawn within the room where the robes are

located or in the area one hatthapasa around it (%).

6.  //A boat (and by extension, other vehicles)//:

a.  One-kula:  If the robes are in the vehicle, greet dawn

anywhere within the vehicle.

b.  Multi-kula (as in a commercial airplane or bus):  If the robe

is within a room, greet dawn in the room or in the area one

hatthapasa around it (%).  (For this reason, a bhikkhu

traveling in an airplane overnight should wear his complete set

of robes or have it with him in his cabin baggage, rather than

in his checked baggage.)

7.  //A caravan (according to the Sub-commentary, this includes

groups traveling by foot as well as by cart; group hiking trips

would thus be included here)//:

a.  One-kula:  If the robes are anywhere in the caravan, greet

dawn anywhere up to seven //abbhantaras// (98 meters) in front

of or behind the robes, or up to one abbhantara (14 meters) to

either side.

b.  Multi-kula:  If the robes are anywhere in the caravan, greet

dawn within one hatthapasa of the caravan.

8.  //At the foot of a tree//:

a.  One-kula:  If the robes are in the area shaded by the tree at

noon, greet dawn within that area.  According to the

Commentary, this doesn't include spots where sun leaks through

gaps in the foliage, so be careful.

b.  Multi-kula (as a tree on the boundary between two pieces of

land):  Greet dawn within one hatthapasa of the robes.

9.  //In a wilderness area (where there are no villages)//:

Greet dawn anywhere within a seven-abbhantara (98 meter) radius

of the robes.

10.  //In other areas//:

If the robes are located in a place other than those mentioned

above (e.g., in the unshaded yard of an unenclosed monastery),

greet dawn within one hatthapasa of the robes.

Exemptions. 1)  As in the preceding rule, this rule does not apply

when the end-of-vassa and kathina privileges are in effect.

2)  In the origin story to this rule, the Buddha gives permission

for a Community of bhikkhus to authorize an ill bhikkhu to be

separated from his robes at dawn throughout the course of his

illness without penalty.  This authorization is to be given as a

formal act with one motion and one announcement

(//natti-dutiya-kamma//).

The Commentary discusses how long this authorization is to last,

and concludes that once the bhikkhu has recovered, he should make

every reasonable effort to get back to his robes as soon as possible

without jeopardizing his health.  The authorization then

automatically subsides, with no further formal act being required.

If his illness returns, the authorization is automatically

reinstated.

3) In Mv.II.12.1-3, the Buddha directs the bhikkhus to declare a

//sima// -- or territory in which formal acts of the Community are

enacted -- as a //ticivara-avippavasa//, which means that if a

bhikkhu's robes are anywhere within the territory, he may greet dawn

at any other part of that territory without committing an offense

under this rule.  In the early days, when such a territory might

cover many monasteries (the maximum allowable size is 3x3

//yojanas//, approximately 48x48 kilometers), this was a definite

convenience for bhikkhus who had to leave one monastery to join in

Community meetings at another one in the same territory.  Since it

was possible for such territories to include villages and homes as

well, the Buddha added the extra stipulation that robes left in the

houses of lay people lying in such a territory were not covered by

this exemption.

At present the custom is to designate much smaller areas as simas

-- usually only a fraction of the land in one monastery -- and

although these can also be designated as ticivara-avippavasa, this

arrangement in such cases is not the great convenience it is in the

larger simas.

Forfeiture & confession.  If a bhikkhu greets dawn outside of the

zone where any one of his three determined robes is placed -- except

when the exemptions are in effect -- the robe is to be forfeited and

the offense confessed.  Perception and intention are not mitigating

factors here.  If he thinks that he is in the same zone when he

actually isn't, if he thinks the robe is not determined when it

actually is, or if he means to be in the same zone when

circumstances prevent him, he incurs the penalty all the same.  If

he then uses the robe before forfeiting it and confessing the

offense, he incurs a dukkata.

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe

are the same as in the preceding rule.  For the Pali formula to use

in forfeiture, see Appendix VI.  Once the robe has been forfeited,

its determination lapses, so when the bhikkhu receives it in return

he must re-determine it for use or give it away within ten days so

as not to commit an offense under the preceding rule.

Non-offenses.  In addition to the above-mentioned exemptions,

there is no offense if, before dawn, the robe is lost, destroyed,

burnt or stolen; if someone else takes it on trust; or if the

bhikkhu gives it away or rescinds its determination.  Because of

this last allowance, the Commentary recommends that if a bhikkhu

realizes that he will not be able to get back to his robe before

dawn, he should verbally rescind the robe's determination before

dawn arrives so as to avoid an offense, and then redetermine the

robe after dawn has passed.

A note on Thai practice.  The author of the Vinaya Mukha missed

the Sub-commentary's discussion of monastic residences under this

rule, and so came to the conclusion that none of the texts discuss

the question of zones in a monastery.  As a result, he formulated

his own system, treating each separate monastic dwelling as a lay

dwelling with a yard.  Furthermore, he neglected to discuss the

question of what counts as single-kula and multi-kula in such a

dwelling.  In the absence of any other standard, Thai bhikkhus have

come to view a dwelling of two or more bhikkhus, in which the

bhikkhus come from different families, as a multi-kula dwelling.  If

the bhikkhus live in separate rooms, then the room where the robes

are placed, plus a radius of one hatthapasa around it, is the

bhikkhu's zone.  If two or more bhikkhus are spending the night in a

single room, each bhikkhu must greet dawn within one hatthapasa of

his robes.

Although there is no basis in the Canon or commentaries for this

practice, it is so widely accepted in Thailand that the wise policy

for anyone spending the night in the same dwelling or the same room

with a Thai bhikkhu is to be aware of it and abide by it, to avoid

the useless controversies that can arise over minor matters like

this.

Summary:  Being in a separate zone from any of one's three

robes at dawn -- except when the end-of-vassa or kathina

privileges are in effect, or one has received formal

authorization from the Community -- is a nissaggiya

pacittiya offense.

* * *

3. When a bhikkhu has finished his robe-making and the

kathina privileges are in abeyance:  If out-of-season

robe-cloth accrues to him, he may accept it if he so

desires.  Once he accepts it, he is to make it up

immediately (into a cloth requisite).  If it should not be

enough, he may lay it aside for a month at most if he has an

expectation for filling the lack.  Should he keep it beyond

that, even when there is an expectation (for further cloth),

it is to be forfeited and confessed.

There are two factors for an offense here:

1)  //Object//:  (a) out-of-season robe-cloth, made of any of the

proper six kinds of material, in pieces measuring at least four by

eight fingerbreadths;

(b) the cloth is not enough to make the cloth requisite one has in

mind, but one expects to receive more.

2)  //Effort//:  One keeps the cloth for more than 30 days, except

when the privileges are in effect.

Object.  Any gift of robe-cloth presented to the Community when

the end-of-vassa or kathina privileges are in effect is an in-season

robe-cloth.  Thus, out-of-season robe-cloth includes any gift of

robe-cloth:

1)  presented to the Community at any other time,

2) presented at any time to a bhikkhu or group of bhikkhus (except

for in-season cloth allotted to him/them by the Community); or

3) presented to the Community when the privileges are in effect,

with the stipulation that it be treated as out-of-season cloth.

The reason why a donor would present cloth under category (3) is

because, according to Mv.VIII.24-25, in-season cloth may be shared

among only the bhikkhus who spent the vassa in that particular

Community, and not among any visiting bhikkhus.  The Bhikkhunis' NP

2 tells of a case where well-behaved but shabbily dressed bhikkhunis

visited a Community of bhikkhunis when the end-of-vassa privileges

were in effect; lay donors, wishing to help them out, gave cloth to

the Community with the stipulation that it be treated as

out-of-season robe-cloth so that the visiting bhikkhunis would also

have a share.

Out-of-season cloth, if it is enough to make the cloth requisite

one has in mind, is treated as extra robe-cloth under NP 1.  If,

however, it is not enough, and one expects to get further cloth from

any source -- lay donors, the Community, cast-off cloth, or one's

own resources -- it may be kept for up to 30 days with no need to be

determined or placed under dual ownership.

The further cloth, when one receives it, has a life span of ten

days, as under NP 1, and one must finish making one's requisite

within the time period determined by whichever cloth has the shorter

life span.  Thus, if one obtains the expected cloth during the first

20 days, the requisite must be made within ten days, this being the

life span of the second cloth.  If one obtains it after the 21st

day, the requisite must be made before the original 30 days are up.

If the second cloth turns out to be of different quality from the

first, one is under no compulsion to put the two cloths together to

make up the requisite if one does not want to, and may continue

waiting for further cloth as long as the life span of the first

cloth allows.  The Commentary recommends that if the second cloth is

of poorer quality than the first, one may determine it as accessory

cloth; if the second cloth is of better quality, one may determine

the first cloth as accessory cloth, and start a new 30-day countdown

from the day of receiving the second cloth.

Effort.  Days are counted by dawns.  If, by the 30th dawn after

one receives the original cloth, one has not determined it, placed

it under dual ownership or abandoned it, it is to be forfeited and

the offense confessed.  The Sub-commentary adds that if at any time

after the first ten days have elapsed one abandons any expectation

for further cloth, one must determine the original cloth, place it

under dual ownership, or abandon it before the following dawn.

Otherwise, one commits an offense under NP 1.

As in the preceding rules, perception is not a mitigating factor

here.  If one miscounts the dawns, or thinks the cloth is properly

determined, etc., when in fact it isn't, there is an offense all the

same.

As for the question of out-of-season cloth that crosses the

boundary between times when the privileges are and are not in effect

-- i.e., cloth received less than a month before the privileges

start, or less than a month before they end:  The K/Commentary to NP

24 indicates that if cloth received when the privileges are still in

effect is not enough to make a robe, the one-month grace period

allowed in this rule begins the day after the privileges are

rescinded.  And the Commentary to NP 28 indicates that if the cloth

covered in this rule comes toward the end of the Rains Retreat, and

the day when the robe has to be finished falls in the robe season,

one  is allowed the entire robe season to finish it.

Still, these questions rarely come up in practice, as it is a

simple enough matter to determine the original cloth as accessory

cloth or place it under dual ownership until one has enough cloth to

make one's requisite, remove it from those arrangements to make the

requisite, and so avoid having to worry about this rule at all.

Forfeiture & confession.  The procedures for forfeiture,

confession, and return of the cloth are the same as in the preceding

rules.  For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth, see

Appendix VI.  Once the cloth is received in return, and it is now

enough for the requisite one has in mind, it is classed as extra

robe-cloth under NP 1.  If not, the 30-day countdown starts all over

again.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense if, before the 30 days are up,

the original cloth is stolen, lost, destroyed, burnt; if someone

else takes it on trust; or if the owner determines it for use,

places it under dual ownership or abandons it.  And, as stated

above, this rule does not apply when the end-of-vassa and kathina

privileges are in effect.

Summary: Keeping out-of-season cloth for more than 30 days

when it is not enough to make a requisite and one has

expectation for more -- except when the end-of-vassa and

kathina privileges are in effect -- is a nissaggiya

pacittiya offense.

* * *

4. Should any bhikkhu have a used robe washed, dyed, or

beaten by a bhikkhuni unrelated to him, it is to be

forfeited and confessed.

The origin story here is one of the classics of Vinaya literature,

although it is hard to say which is more memorable -- the dry,

matter-of-fact style with which the narrative relates the improbable

events, or the reaction of the bhikkhunis when they hear what has

happened.

"Now at that time Ven. Udayin's wife had gone forth among

the bhikkhunis.  She often went to his dwelling, and he

often went to hers.  One day he went to her dwelling for a

meal.  Arising early in the morning, carrying his robe and

bowl, he went to where she was staying and on arrival sat

down in front of her, exposing his male organ.  She sat down

in front of him, exposing her female organ.  He, full of

lust, stared at her organ.  His organ emitted semen.  He

said to her, 'Go and fetch some water, sister.  I'll wash my

under robe.'

"'Give it to me.  //I'll// wash it.'

"Then she took some of the semen in her mouth and inserted

some of it in her female organ.  With that, she conceived a

child.

"The bhikkhunis said, 'This bhikkhuni has been practicing

unchastity.  She's pregnant.'

"'It's not that I've been practicing unchastity.'  And she

told them what had happened.  The bhikkhunis were offended

and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can this Master Udayin

get a bhikkhuni to wash his used robe?'"

There are three factors for an offense here:  object, effort and

result.

Object:  a used robe.  //Robe//, here, according to the

Commentary, means any robe that has been dyed and properly marked

(see Pacittiya 58).  This is its way of saying that the robe must be

a finished cloth requisite of the type suitable for wearing, but

need not be determined as one of one's basic three robes.  In other

words, it could also be as yet undetermined, or a spare robe

determined as an accessory cloth.

//Used//, according to the Vibhanga, means worn around the body at

least once.  According to the Commentary, it can mean used in other

ways -- e.g., rolled up as a pillow or worn draped over the shoulder

or head -- as well.

Other cloth requisites, such as sitting cloths and bed sheets, are

grounds for a dukkata.  Non-cloth requisites are not grounds for an

offense.

Effort.  One tells an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or beat

the robe.

A //bhikkhuni//, here, means one who has received the double

ordination, first in the Bhikkhuni Sangha and secondly in the

Bhikkhu Sangha.  A bhikkhuni who has received only her first

ordination is grounds for a dukkata.  Female probationers and

novices and not grounds for an offense.

//Unrelated// is explained by the Vibhanga as meaning unrelated

back through seven grandfathers, either on the father's or the

mother's side.  The Commentary explains further that this means

seven generations counted back starting from one's grandfather.

Thus all descendants of one's

great-great-great-great-great-great-great-grandfathers are counted

as one's relatives.  In-laws, though, are not counted.  This

definition of unrelated applies wherever the Vibhanga mentions the

word.  At the time of the Buddha, perceived ties of kinship extended

more widely than they do today, and a bhikkhu at present would be

well-advised to regard as his relatives only those blood-relations

with whom ties of kinship are actually felt.

Perception is not an issue here.  If a bhikkhu perceives a

bhikkhuni as related when in fact she isn't, he is subject to the

penalty all the same.

//Telling//, according to the Commentary, includes gesturing as

well.  Thus if a bhikkhuni is washing her robes, and a bhikkhu

throws his robe down next to her, that would fulfill the factor

here.

Result.  The bhikkhuni washes, dyes or beats the robe as

requested.

Offenses.  A bhikkhu who tells an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash,

etc., his used robe incurs a dukkata in the telling.  For every

effort she then makes towards washing it, he incurs an extra

dukkata.  When she actually starts washing it, the robe is to be

forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed.  He incurs

a nissaggiya pacittiya and a dukkata if he gets her to do two of the

three actions mentioned in the rule -- e.g., washing and dyeing the

robe; and a nissaggiya pacittiya and two dukkatas if he gets her to

do all three.

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the robe

are the same as in the preceding rules.  Once the robe is returned,

it counts as an extra robe-cloth under NP 1.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense if the bhikkhuni is related to

the bhikkhu, if an unrelated bhikkhuni washes the robe unasked, if

an unrelated bhikkhuni helps a related bhikkhuni wash it, if the

robe has not yet been used, if one gets an unrelated bhikkhuni to

wash a non-cloth requisite, or if one gets an unrelated female

probationer or female novice to wash a used robe.

The Commentary discusses the case of a bhikkhu who gives a used

robe to a female probationer to wash:  She takes it, becomes

ordained as a bhikkhuni in the meantime, and then washes it.  The

verdict:  He incurs the full penalty under this rule.  For the fun

of it, the Commentary then goes on to discuss the case of a bhikkhu

who gives his used robe to a lay man to wash.  The lay man undergoes

a spontaneous sex change and becomes a bhikkhuni before washing the

robe, and again, the bhikkhu incurs the full penalty.  What lesson

is intended here is hard to say.

Summary:  Getting an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or

beat a robe that has been used at least once is a nissaggiya

pacittiya offense.

* * *

5. Should any bhikkhu accept robe-cloth from a bhikkhuni

unrelated to him -- unless it is in exchange -- it is to be

forfeited and confessed.

The reason behind this rule is expressed by a single sentence in the

origin story:  'It's hard for a woman to come by things.'  In the

original version of the rule, the Buddha made no allowance for

accepting robe-cloth in exchange, but this point was later changed

at the request of the bhikkhunis.  They had tried to exchange

robe-cloth with the bhikkhus, who refused because of the rule as it

stood at that time, and this upset the bhikkhunis.  As the

Commentary explains, their poverty was what made them complain, "If

the Masters are not on familiar terms with us even to this extent,

how are we supposed to keep going?"

The offense under this rule is composed of two factors:  object

and effort.

Object:  any piece of robe-cloth of the six suitable kinds,

measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.  Other requisites

are not grounds for an offense.

Effort.  The bhikkhu receives such cloth from an unrelated

bhikkhuni and does not give her anything in exchange.

//Unrelated bhikkhuni// here is defined in the same terms as under

the preceding rule:  a bhikkhuni who has received the double

ordination and is not related to the bhikkhu back through their

great x 7 grandfathers.  A bhikkhuni who has received only her first

ordination, from the bhikkhunis, is grounds for a dukkata.  Female

probationers and female novices are not grounds for an offense.

Perception here is not a mitigating factor:  According to the

Vibhanga, even if a bhikkhu perceives an unrelated bhikkhuni as

related, he is still subject to the penalty.  The Commentary adds

that even if one does not know that the robe comes from a bhikkhuni

-- as when many donors place robes in a pile for a bhikkhu, and one

of the donors, unbeknownst to the bhikkhu, is a bhikkhuni -- this

factor is fulfilled all the same.  If a bhikkhuni gives robe-cloth

to someone else to present to a bhikkhu, though, the bhikkhu commits

no offense in accepting it.

The Commentary also states that receiving need not be

hand-to-hand.  If a bhikkhuni simply places robe-cloth near a

bhikkhu as her way of giving it to him, and he accepts it as given,

this factor is fulfilled.

As for the item given in exchange for the cloth, the Vibhanga

states that it can be worth much more then the cloth or much less.

Buddhaghosa quotes the Mahapaccari, one of the ancient commentaries,

as saying that even if, in return for the cloth, the bhikkhu gives

the bhikkhuni a piece of yellow myrobalan -- a medicinal fruit, one

of the cheapest things imaginable in India -- he escapes the penalty

under this rule.

Offenses.  If all three factors of the offense here are fulfilled,

the bhikkhu incurs a dukkata in accepting the cloth.  He then must

forfeit the cloth and confess the additional nissaggiya pacittiya

offense.  The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of

the cloth are the same as in the preceding rules.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense:

if the bhikkhuni is a relation;

if the bhikkhuni is not related, but the bhikkhu gives her

something in exchange;

if the bhikkhu takes the cloth on trust;

if he borrows the cloth;

if he accepts a non-cloth requisite;

if he accepts robe-cloth from a female probationer or female

novice.

Exchange.  The origin story to this rule is where the Buddha

explicitly gives permission for bhikkhus, bhikkhunis, female

probationers, male novices and female novices to trade items with

one another.  NP 20 forbids bhikkhus from trading items with lay

people and people ordained in other religions.

Summary:   Accepting robe-cloth from an unrelated bhikkhuni

without giving her anything in exchange is a nissaggiya

pacittiya offense.

* * *

6. Should any bhikkhu ask for robe-cloth from a man or woman

householder unrelated to him, except at the proper occasion,

it is to be forfeited and confessed.  Here the proper

occasion is this:  The bhikkhu's robe has been stolen or

destroyed.  This is the proper occasion in this case.

"Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan had become

skilled in giving Dhamma talks.  A certain millionaire's son

went to where he was, and on arrival bowed down and sat to

one side.  As he was sitting there, Ven. Upananda the Sakyan

instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged him with a Dhamma

talk.  Then the millionaire's son...said to him, 'Tell me,

Ven. sir, what would be in my power to give you for your

welfare:  Robe-cloth?  Alms-food?  Lodgings?  Medicines for

the sick?'

"'If you want to give me something, friend, then give me one

of those cloths (you are wearing).'

"'I'm the son of a good family, Ven. sir.  How can I go

about wearing one cloth?  Wait until I've returned home.

After going home, I will send you one of these cloths, or a

finer one.'

"A second time...A third time, Ven. Upananda said to him,

'If you want to give me something, friend, then give me one

of those cloths.'

"'I'm the son of a good family, Ven. sir.  How can I go

about wearing one cloth?  Wait until I've returned home.

After going home, I will send you one of these cloths, or a

finer one.'

"'Are you making an offer when you don't want to give me

anything, in that having made the offer you don't give?'

"So the millionaire's son, being pressured by Ven. Upananda,

left having given him one cloth.  People seeing him said to

him, 'Why is it, master, that you go around wearing only one

cloth?'

"He told them what had happened.  So the people were

offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'They're

insatiable, these Sakyan contemplatives, and not easily

contented.  It's no simple matter to make a reasonable

request of them.  How can they, after being made a

reasonable request by the millionaire's son, take his

cloth?'"

The factors for an offense here are three:  object, effort, and

result.

Object:  a piece of any of the six suitable kinds of robe-cloth,

measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

Effort.  One asks, except at the proper time, for such cloth from

a lay person who is not related back through one's great x 7

grandfathers.  Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  Even if

one perceives the lay person to be related when in fact he/she

isn't, that fulfills the factor here.

Result.  One receives the cloth.

The proper occasions.  //Stolen//, according to the Vibhanga,

refers to a robe stolen by anyone at all. //Destroyed// means burnt,

carried away by water, eaten by such things as rats or termites, or

worn out by use -- although the Sub-commentary adds here that worn

out by use means worn to the point where the robe can no longer

cover the body.

If all of a bhikkhu's robes are stolen or destroyed, he is not to

go about naked.  To do so incurs a dukkata (as opposed to the

thullaccaya Mv.VIII.28.1 imposes on a bhikkhu who chooses to go

about naked when he has robes to wear).  A bhikkhu with no cloth to

cover his body should make a covering of grass and leaves.  If he

happens on an unoccupied Sangha residence, he is permitted to take

any cloth he finds there -- robes, sheets, mats, pillow cases, or

whatever -- to wear as a makeshift robe as long as he has the

intention of returning it when he obtains a proper robe.

The Commentary adds several points here:

If one picks leaves or cuts grass to make a covering for oneself

under these circumstances, one is exempt from the penalty for

damaging plant life under Pacittiya 11.

If, after getting one's makeshift robe, one has to go a great

distance before getting a proper robe, one may leave the

makeshift robe with any convenient monastery as property of the

Sangha.

If, under these circumstances, one asks lay people for cloth and

receives cloth of a type or color that normally is not allowed,

there is no offense in wearing it until one can obtain suitable

cloth.

The following rule adds extra stipulations on how much cloth one

may ask for in circumstances like this.

Offenses.  The act of asking for robe-cloth from an unrelated lay

person not at the proper time entails a dukkata.  The cloth, when

one receives it, is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya

offense confessed.  The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and

return of the cloth are the same as in the preceding rules.  The

Pali formula to use in forfeiting the cloth is given in Appendix VI.

Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if

--

one asks at the right time,

one asks from one's relations,

one asks from people who have invited one to ask for cloth,

one obtains cloth through one's own resources, or

one asks for the sake of another bhikkhu.

The Commentary explains that this last point means two things:

One may ask for cloth for the sake of another bhikkhu (1) from one's

own relations or from people who have invited one to ask for cloth

//or// (2) from the relatives of that bhikkhu or from people who

have invited //him// to ask.  This point applies for all rules where

one is allowed to ask for the sake of another.

As for obtaining cloth through one's own resources, the

Sub-commentary notes that one should be careful to do it in such a

way as not to commit an offense under NP 20.  Again, this applies to

all rules that contain this exemption.

Summary:  Asking for and receiving robe-cloth from an

unrelated lay person, except when one's robes have been

stolen or destroyed, is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

7. If that unrelated man or woman householder presents the

bhikkhu with many robes (pieces of robe-cloth), he is to

accept at most (enough for) an upper and an under robe.  If

he accepts more than that, it is to be forfeited and

confessed.

This rule is a continuation of the preceding one, dealing with the

protocol in asking for robe-cloth when one's robes have been stolen

or destroyed.  The origin story is as follows:

"At that time some group-of-six bhikkhus, having approached

bhikkhus whose robes had been stolen, said, 'Friends, the

Blessed One has allowed those whose robes are stolen or

destroyed to ask an unrelated man or woman householder for

robe-cloth.  Ask for robe-cloth, friends.'

"'Never mind, friends.  We have already received (enough)

robe-cloth.'

"'We are asking in your name, friends.'

"'Then go ahead and ask.'

"So the group-of-six bhikkhus, having approached unrelated

householders, said, 'Bhikkhus have come whose robes were

stolen.  Give us robe-cloth for them.' And they asked for a

lot of robe-cloth.  Then a certain man, sitting in a meeting

hall, said to another man, 'Master, bhikkhus have come whose

robes were stolen.  I gave robe-cloth for them.'

"And he said, 'I gave, too.'

"And another said, 'I gave, too.'

"They were offended and annoyed and spread it about:  'How

can these Sakyan contemplatives, not knowing moderation, ask

for a lot of robe-cloth?  Will the Sakyan contemplatives

deal in the cloth business?  Or will they set up a shop?'"

Protocol.  The Vibhanga states that when a bhikkhu's robes are

stolen or destroyed, the amount of cloth he may ask for and accept

from an unrelated householder who has not previously invited him to

ask for cloth depends on the number of robes stolen or destroyed.

If three, he may ask for and accept only enough for two.  If two, he

may ask for and accept only enough for one.  If one, he should not

ask for any cloth at all.

The K/Commentary mentions that these stipulations apply only when

robes from one's determined set of three are stolen or destroyed.

The way it phrases this suggests that if one's spare robes are

stolen or destroyed, one has no right to ask for robe-cloth at all.

The Sub-commentary, though, interprets this as opening a loophole so

that if one loses any of one's spare robes, one may ask for as much

cloth as one likes.  It then accuses the K/Commentary of

contradicting the Canon and Commentary, and of ignoring the purpose

of the rule, which is to teach moderation and fewness of wants.  Its

conclusion:  The protocol applies when any of one's robes are stolen

or destroyed -- whether determined as the basic set of three,

undetermined or determined as accessory cloths.

If, however, we recall that originally each bhikkhu had only one

set of three robes, and that the allowance in the preceding rule was

to relieve the hardship of having little or nothing to wear, we can

agree with the K/Commentary's interpretation:  that the allowance in

the preceding rule applies //only// when robes from one's basic set

of three are stolen and destroyed, and that this is the case we are

concerned with here.  If one's spare robes get stolen or destroyed,

one may not make use of the allowance to ask for robe-cloth at all.

The Vibhanga states further that if the householder presents one

with a great deal of cloth, with the invitation to take as much as

one likes, one should take only enough cloth to make the allowable

number of robes.  The no-offense clauses add that one may take

excess cloth if one promises to return the excess when one has

finished making one's robe(s).  And if the donor tells one to keep

the excess, one may do so without penalty.

The factors of the offense for overstepping the bounds of this

protocol are three:

1) //Object//:  any piece of the six kinds of suitable robe-cloth,

measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

2) //Effort//:  One asks for more than the allowable amount of

robe-cloth from an unrelated householder who has not previously made

an invitation to ask.  Perception is not a mitigating factor here:

Even if one perceives the householder to be related when in fact

he/she isn't -- or feels that he/she would be happy to offer the

excess cloth even though he/she has given no previous invitation to

ask -- this factor is fulfilled all the same.

3) //Result//:  One gets the excess robe-cloth.

The offenses here are as follows:  a dukkata for asking in the way

that fulfills the factor of effort, and a nissaggiya pacittiya when

all three factors are fulfilled.  The procedures to follow in

forfeiture, confession, and receiving the cloth in return are the

same as in the preceding rules.  For the Pali formula to use in

forfeiting the cloth, see Appendix VI.

Non-offenses.  In addition to the two cases mentioned above -- one

takes excess cloth with the promise to return the excess when one

has finished one's robe(s), and the donors tell one to keep the

excess -- there is no offense in taking excess cloth if:

the donors are offering cloth for reasons other than that one's

robes were stolen or destroyed (e.g., they are impressed with

one's learning, says the Commentary);

one is asking from one's relatives or people who have previously

made one an invitation to ask for cloth (//before// one's robes

were stolen or destroyed, says the Sub-commentary);

or one gets the cloth by means of one's own property.

The Commentary calls attention to the fact that the Vibhanga's

no-offense clauses make no mention of asking for the sake of

another.  It then draws the conclusion, based on the fact that the

rule was formulated in response to bhikkhus' requesting excess cloth

for the sake of others, that in the circumstances mentioned in this

rule, one may not ask for excess cloth for the sake of others.  The

Sub-commentary takes issue with this, and presents three arguments

for its case:

1)  There is no requirement that the working out of a training

rule has to follow from the origin story.  (It gives no examples,

but Parajikas 3 & 4, Sanghadisesas 8 & 9, NP 4 and Pacittiyas 8 &

58 are all cases in point.)

2)  The Ganthipadas state that since this training rule deals with

what to do when presented with offerings for one's own sake,

there is no need for the Vibhanga to mention the case of asking

for another's sake.

3)  If asking for another's sake is not allowable here, it should

also not be allowable in the preceding rule.

Thus it concludes that here, as under the preceding rule, there is

no offense in asking for excess cloth for Bhikkhu X from one's own

relatives or people who have invited one to ask, or from Bhikkhu X's

relatives or people who have invited X to ask.

Summary:  Asking for and receiving excess robe-cloth from

unrelated lay people when one's robes have been stolen or

destroyed is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

8. In case a man or woman householder prepares a robe fund

for the sake of an unrelated bhikkhu, thinking. "Having

purchased a robe with this robe fund, I will supply the

bhikkhu named so-and-so with a robe:" If the bhikkhu, not

previously invited, approaching (the householder) should

make a stipulation with regard to the robe, saying, "It

would be good indeed, sir, if you supplied me (with a robe),

having purchased a robe of such-and-such a sort with this

robe fund" -- out of a desire for something fine -- it is to

be forfeited and confessed.

"Now at that time a certain householder said to his wife, 'I

will supply Master Upananda with a robe.'  A certain bhikkhu

on his almsround overhead the man saying this, went to where

Ven. Upananda the Sakyan was staying and on arrival said to

him, 'You have a lot of merit, friend Upananda.  A certain

man over there said to his wife, 'I will supply Master

Upananda with a robe.'

"'He's my supporter, my friend.'

"So Ven. Upananda the Sakyan went to where the man was

staying and on arrival said to him, 'My friend, is it true

that you want to supply me with a robe?'

"'Now, wasn't I just thinking, 'I will supply Master

Upananda with a robe'?

"'Well, if you want to supply me with a robe, supply me with

a robe like this.  What use is it to me to be supplied with

a robe I won't use?'

"So the man was offended, annoyed and spread it about,

'They're insatiable, these Sakyan contemplatives, and not

easily contented.  It's no simple matter to supply them with

a robe.  How can this Master Upananda, without having first

been invited by me, make stipulations concerning a robe?'"

The situation covered by this rule is this:  An unrelated lay

person has put aside resources to purchase a robe to present to a

bhikkhu, but without yet asking the bhikkhu what kind of robe he

wants.  The factors for the offense here are four:

Object.  The texts mention only that this rule concerns funds for

a robe (civara), but without specifying whether this means funds

only for finished robes or pieces of robe-cloth suitable for making

into robes as well.  They also do not mention whether funds for

other requisites would be grounds for a lesser offense or no

offense, although given the spirit of the rule, it would be a wise

policy for a bhikkhu not to make stipulations, when uninvited, to a

lay person who has prepared funds for purchasing any kind of

requisite for his use.

Intention.  One wants to get a better robe than the lay person is

planning to buy.

Effort.  One makes a request to the unrelated lay person that

would involve raising the cost of the robe.  As in the previous

rules, perception is not a factor here.  Even if one perceives the

lay person to be related when he/she actually isn't, that would

fulfill the factor here all the same.

Result.  One gets the robe.  The way the texts define this factor

suggests that whether or not the lay person actually spends more on

the robe than he/she actually planned is not an issue here.

Offenses.  In the act of making a request that would fulfill the

factors of intention and effort, the penalty is a dukkata.  When one

receives the robe it is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya pacittiya

offense confessed.  The procedures to follow in forfeiture,

confession, and receiving the cloth in return are the same as in the

preceding rules.  For the Pali formula to use in forfeiting the

cloth, see Appendix VI.

Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if:

the lay person is a relative or has invited one to ask for cloth;

one asks for another's sake;

one is getting the robe with one's own resources; or

one asks the lay person to get a robe less expensive than the one

he/she is planning to get.  The Commentary adds here that there

is also no offense if one's request would result in a robe equal

in price to the one the lay person has in mind.

Summary:  When a lay person who is not a relative is

planning to get a robe for one, but has yet to ask one what

kind of robe one wants:  Receiving the robe after making a

request that would raise its cost is a nissaggiya pacittiya

offense.

* * *

9. In case two householders -- men or women -- prepare

separate robe funds for the sake of a bhikkhu unrelated to

them, thinking, "Having purchased separate robes with these

separate robe funds of ours, we will supply the bhikkhu

named so-and-so with robes": If the bhikkhu, not previously

invited, approaching (them) should make a stipulation with

regard to the robe, saying, "It would be good indeed, sirs,

if you supplied me (with a robe), having purchased a robe of

such-and-such a sort with these separate robe funds, the two

(funds) together for one (robe)" -- out of a desire for

something fine -- it is to be forfeited and confessed.

Explanations for this training rule are the same as those for the

preceding one, the only difference being in the factor of effort:

One asks the two donors to put their funds together to purchase one

robe.  Whether or not the request would raise the amount of money

they would have to spend is not an issue here, although the Vibhanga

says that if one makes a request that would //reduce// the amount of

money they would spend, there is no offense.

The Commentary adds that, under the conditions mentioned here,

making requests of three or more people to combine their robe funds

into one is also covered by this rule.

Summary: When two or more lay people who are not one's

relatives are planning to get separate robes for one, but

have yet to ask one what kind of robe one wants:  Receiving

a robe from them after asking them to pool their funds to

get one robe -- out of a desire for something fine -- is a

nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

10.In case a king, a royal official, a brahmin or a

householder sends a robe fund for the sake of a bhikkhu via

a messenger (saying), "Having purchased a robe with this

robe fund, supply the bhikkhu named so-and-so with a robe":

If the messenger, approaching the bhikkhu, should say, "This

is a robe fund being delivered for the sake of the venerable

one.  May the venerable one accept this robe fund," then the

bhikkhu is to tell the messenger:  "We do not accept robe

funds, my friend.  We accept robes (robe-cloth) as are

proper according to season."

If the messenger should say to the bhikkhu, "Does the

venerable one have a steward?" then, bhikkhus, if the

bhikkhu desires a robe, he may indicate a steward -- either

a monastery attendant or a lay follower -- (saying), "That,

my friend, is the bhikkhus' steward."

If the messenger, having instructed the steward and going to

the bhikkhu, should say, "I have instructed the steward the

venerable one indicated.  May the venerable one go (to him)

and he will supply you with a robe in season," then the

bhikkhu, desiring a robe and approaching the steward, may

prompt and remind him two or three times, "I have need of a

robe."  Should (the steward) produce the robe after being

prompted and reminded two or three times, that is good.

If he does not produce the robe, (the bhikkhu) should stand

in silence four times, five times, six times at most for

that purpose.  Should (the steward) produce the robe after

(the bhikkhu) has stood in silence for the purpose four,

five, six times at most, that is good.

If he should not produce the robe (at that point), should he

then produce the robe after (the bhikkhu) has endeavored

further than that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

If he should not produce (the robe), then the bhikkhu

himself should go to the place from which the robe fund was

brought, or a messenger should be sent (to say), "The robe

fund that you, venerable sirs, sent for the sake of the

bhikkhu has given no benefit to the bhikkhu at all.  May the

you be united with what is yours.  May what is yours not be

lost."  This is the proper course here.

The protocols surrounding gifts of money and their proper use are

quite complex -- much more complex than even this long training rule

would indicate -- and require a detailed explanation.  What follows

is an attempt to make them clear.  If it seems long and involved,

remember that the purpose of the protocols is to free bhikkhus from

the even more bothersome worries and complexities that come with

participating in buying, selling, and monetary matters in general.

This rule is one of four nissaggiya pacittiya rules covering a

bhikkhu's proper relationship to money.  The others are # 18, 19 &

20.  Although they sometimes seem to be splitting hairs, they focus

precisely on the two acts involving money that are most burdensome

to a sensitive mind:  In the act of accepting money, or having it

accepted in one's name, one is accepting all the cares,

responsibilities, and dangers that come with its ownership; in the

act of arranging a trade, one is accepting responsibility for the

fairness of the trade:  that it undervalues neither the generosity

of the person who donated the money, nor the goods or services of

the person receiving the money in exchange.

Thus to protect a bhikkhu from these mental burdens, this rule

sets up protocols so that lay donors may have the convenience of

dedicating amounts of money and other valuables to provide for a

bhikkhu's needs, and so that the bhikkhu may benefit from such gifts

without having to bear the responsibilities of ownership or of

having to arrange fair trades.

If a bhikkhu follows the protocols recommended here, the money

placed with the steward still belongs to the donor, and the

responsibility for making a fair trade lies with the steward.  The

bhikkhu's only responsibility is to inform the original donor if,

after a reasonable number of promptings, the steward entrusted with

the money does not provide him with the requisite the donor had in

mind, and then let the donor look after the matter if he/she cares

to.

Although the rule itself mentions only funds for robe-cloth

intended for individual bhikkhus, we should note from the outset

that the Commentary extends it to cover all funds -- composed of

money, jewels, commodities, land, livestock or other valuables that

bhikkhus are not allowed to accept -- not only for individual

bhikkhus, but also for Communities, groups of bhikkhus and buildings

in a monastery.

The money rules & allowances:  an overview.  NP 18 forbids a

bhikkhu from accepting gifts of money, from getting others to accept

them, and from consenting to gifts of money meant for him being

placed down next to him.  NP 19 & 20 forbid him from engaging in

buying, selling, or bartering, regardless of whether or not it

involves money.  In the Mahavagga, however, the Buddha makes the

following allowance, called the Mendaka Allowance, after the donor

who inspired it:

"There are people of conviction and confidence, bhikkhus,

who place gold and silver in the hand of stewards, saying

'Give the master whatever is allowable.'  I allow you,

bhikkhus, to accept whatever is allowable coming from that.

But in no way at all do I say that money is to be accepted

or sought for."

(Mv.VI.34.21)

Even given this allowance, though, it is important that the

bhikkhu, in his dealings with the steward, does not say or do

anything that would transgress NP 18-20.  At the same time, it is

important that he does not abuse the steward's services.  Otherwise

the steward will never want to perform this service for bhikkhus

again.  This is the main point of the origin story to this rule:

"Then Ven. Upananda the Sakyan approached the lay follower

(his steward) and on arrival said, 'My friend, I have need

of a robe.'

"'Wait just today, sir.  Today there is a town meeting, and

the town has made a rule that whoever comes late is fined 50

(kahapana).'

"'Friend, give me the robe this very day!'  (Saying this,)

he grabbed hold of him by the belt.  So the lay follower,

being pressured by Ven. Upananda the Sakyan, purchased a

robe for him and arrived late.  The people said to the lay

follower, 'Why, master, have you come late?  You have lost

50.'  So he told them what had happened.  They were offended

and annoyed and spread it about, 'They're insatiable, these

Sakyan contemplatives, and not easily contented.  It's no

simple matter even to render them a service.  How can

Upananda the Sakyan, being told by a layman, "Wait just

today, sir," not wait?'"

Stewards.  According to the Commentary, there are three ways money

may be placed with a steward:  the steward is either indicated by

the bhikkhu, indicated by the donor or his/her messenger, or else

indicated by neither.

1) //Indicated by the bhikkhu// covers two sorts of cases:

a) The donor asks the bhikkhu who his steward is, and the bhikkhu

points him/her out, as mentioned in the training rule.

b) The donor, knowing that a particular lay person has volunteered

to act as a steward or is on familiar terms with the bhikkhu,

gives the money to the lay person and informs the bhikkhu -- or

has someone else inform him -- either before or after the fact.

2) //Indicated by the donor// covers cases where the donor chooses

one of his/her own friends or employees to act as the steward for

that particular gift, and informs the bhikkhu -- or has someone else

inform him -- either before or after the fact.

3) //Indicated by neither// covers two separate cases:

a) The donor asks the bhikkhu who his steward is, and the bhikkhu

says that he has none.  Another person happens to overhear the

conversation and volunteers to act as the steward for that

particular gift.

b) The donor gives the gift to the lay person who is normally the

bhikkhu's steward or is on familiar terms with the bhikkhu, but

does not inform the bhikkhu or have him informed of the fact.

According to the Commentary, this training rule covers only cases

of the first sort:  the steward is indicated by the bhikkhu.  I will

discuss this case in detail first before going on to discuss the

protocol in the other two.

The protocol in accepting.  The Vibhanga gives the following

guidelines:

If donors offer money, they are to be told that bhikkhus do not

accept money.

If they ask who the bhikkhus' steward is, one may point out any

lay person at all, saying, "That's the steward."  One is //not//

to say, "Give it to him/her" or "He/she will keep (the money),"

for that would be to accept ownership and responsibility for the

money, and thus be an infraction of the rule against accepting

money.  Also, one is not to say, "He/she will buy (the

requisite)" or "He/she will get it in exchange," for even this

much would be an infraction of the rules against trading.

The K/Commentary adds that if the donor asks, "To whom should I

give this?" or "Who will keep this?" one is not to point anyone out.

It doesn't say what one //may// do in such a situation, although a

wise policy would be to broach the topic of stewards so that the

donor will ask a question to which one may give a allowable answer.

The protocol in obtaining requisites from the fund.  The rule

states that a bhikkhu may give his steward up to three verbal and

six silent promptings in order to get a requisite from the fund.

The Vibhanga works out an arrangement whereby he may exchange two

silent promptings for one verbal prompting, which leads the

Commentary to lay out the following scheme:  A bhikkhu may make up

to --

6 verbal &  0 silent promptings

5 verbal &  2 silent promptings

4 verbal &  4 silent promptings

3 verbal &  6 silent promptings

2 verbal &  8 silent promptings

1 verbal & 10 silent promptings, or

0 verbal & 12 silent promptings.

When giving a verbal prompting, one may say only, "I need a robe

(or whatever the requisite may be)" or statements to that effect.

One may not say, "Give me a robe," "Get me a robe," "Buy me a robe,"

or "Get a robe in exchange or me," for these statements would be

violations of the rules against trading.

According to the Commentary, promptings are counted not by the

number of visits to the steward, but by the number of times the

bhikkhu states his need/desire for the requisite.  Thus if, in one

visit, he states his need for a robe three times, that counts as

three verbal promptings.

As for silent promptings -- or "standings" -- the bhikkhu merely

stands in the steward's presence.  If he/she asks, "What have you

come for?' the bhikkhu should say, "You know," or "You should know."

The Vibhanga also notes that during the period when a bhikkhu has

yet to receive the requisite, he should not accept an invitation to

sit down at the steward's place, to accept alms, or to teach Dhamma

there.  If he does any of these things, that cuts back his number of

allowed standings.  The Sub-commentary contains a long discussion of

what precisely this means, and finally sides with the decision in

the Three Ganthipadas:  that each time a bhikkhu sits, receives alms

or teaches one sentence of Dhamma (see Pacittiya 7) under these

circumstances, he cuts down his allowed number of standings by one.

If one obtains the requisite after making the allowable number of

verbal and silent promptings -- or less -- there is no offense.  If

one does not obtain the requisite after the maximum allowable number

of promptings, one should inform the original donor, and then leave

the issue up to him/her.  Not to inform the donor here, the

Commentary says, entails a dukkata.  If the donor, being informed,

then makes arrangements to get the requisite for the bhikkhu, there

is no offense.

The factors of an offense here are three:

1) //Object//:  a fund left with a steward pointed out by a

bhikkhu.

2) //Effort//:  One makes an excessive number of promptings.

3) //Result//:  One obtains the requested requisite.

There is a dukkata for the excessive promptings, and the

requisite, when obtained, is to be forfeited and the nissaggiya

pacittiya offense confessed.  The procedures for forfeiture,

confession, and receiving the requisite in return are the same as in

the preceding rules. For the Pali formula to use in forfeiture, see

Appendix VI.

Cases where this rule does not apply.  According to the

Commentary, if the steward has been indicated by the donor, one may

make any number of promptings at all without committing an offense.

If the article is not forthcoming, one may get another lay person to

handle the issue (although one should be careful to phrase one's

request to this lay person so as not to transgress the rules against

accepting money, trading, and buying).  If the article is not

forthcoming, one is not duty-bound to inform the original donor.

There is nothing in the Canon to contradict any of these points,

but simple etiquette would suggest that one not harass the steward

excessively, and that one should inform the donor if the article is

not forthcoming, so as to let the donor handle the matter from there

on in if he/she sees fit.

As for the third case, in which the steward is not indicated

either by the donor or by a bhikkhu, the Commentary says that, as

far as that fund is concerned, the steward should be treated as a

person who is not related and has not made an invitation to ask.  In

other words, one may not make any requests of the steward at all,

unless he/she happens to invite one to make a request.  We can

qualify this by saying that if the article is not forthcoming after

a reasonable amount of time, one may inform the original donor.

Other funds.  The Commentary includes a long discussion of how

this rule applies to funds other than those intended for an

individual bhikkhu's requisites. A few of the more relevant cases:

//Monetary funds for Sangha or group requisites//.  If a donor

comes with a gift of money and says that it is being offered to the

Sangha or to a group for whatever purpose, one should follow the

protocol for accepting as under this rule. For instance, if the

donor says, "I'm giving this to the Sangha for you to make use of

the four requisites," one may not accept it in any of the three ways

covered by NP 18. As we will see under NP 18, there is a dukkata for

the bhikkhu who consents to money's being placed next to him under

these circumstances.  There is also a dukkata, says the

Sub-commentary, for every bhikkhu who uses any article bought with

the money.

If, however, the donor says, "The money will be with your steward"

or "with my people" or "with me:  All you need to do is make use of

the four requisites," then there is no offense in accepting and

making use of this arrangement.  The etiquette to follow in

obtaining requisites depends on who the money is left with:  if the

bhikkhus' steward, follow the protocol under this rule; if the

donor's workers, one may make any number of promptings; if the

donor, follow the guidelines under Pacittiya 47.

//Non-monetary funds for Sangha or group requisites//.  There are

a number of other articles that may not be owned by bhikkhus, and

that carry a dukkata penalty if they are.  They include land,

fields, and orchards; jewels; slaves; commodities (e.g., unhusked

grain); and animals.  If a donor wants to make a gift of such things

to the Sangha, the Commentary says, the question of whether or not

they may be accepted depends on how the donation is phrased.  If the

donor says, "I'm giving this to the Sangha" for whatever the

purpose, the gift may not be accepted.  As in the previous case,

there is a dukkata for whoever receives it, and also for whoever

uses an article obtained from proceeds coming from the gift.

If the donor says, "This is for the purpose of the four

requisites," or "Accept whatever is allowable coming from this,"

without mentioning the Sangha or any bhikkhu as custodians or

recipients of the unallowable object, the arrangement may be

accepted without penalty.  For instance, if a donor wants to present

a herd of cows, saying, "These are for the purpose of milk products

for the Sangha" (perhaps this sounds less stilted in Pali than it

does in English), this is an acceptable arrangement.  But if he/she

says, "I am giving these cows to the Sangha to provide milk products

for the Sangha," then it is not.

If a donor proposes to give pigs, chickens or other animals used

only for their meat to the Sangha, the bhikkhus are to say, "We

can't accept gifts like this, but we will be glad to set them free

for you."

If, after setting up an allowable arrangement, the donor asks the

bhikkhus to appoint a steward to look after it, they may.  If not,

they are to do nothing about the arrangement at all.

How the proceeds from such arrangements are to be used depends on

what they are:  If money, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, "Use this

money to buy such-and-such," no bhikkhu may make use of what is

bought with the money.  If the proceeds are commodities, such as

unhusked rice, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, "Use this rice to

trade for such-and-such," the bhikkhu who makes the order may not

use whatever is obtained from the trade, but other bhikkhus may

without incurring a penalty.  If the proceeds are allowable goods,

such as fruit, and a bhikkhu tells the steward, "Use this fruit to

trade for such-and-such," the Commentary says that any bhikkhu may

use what is obtained from the trade, but this would seem to

contradict NP 20.

//Building funds//.  If a donor comes with money or other

unallowable gift, and says, "I am giving this to the Sangha for the

meditation hall (or any other building)," the gift may not be

accepted.  But if the donor says, "I am giving this to (or for) the

meditation hall," without mentioning any individual bhikkhu, group

of bhikkhus or the Sangha as custodians or recipients of the gift at

all, then this arrangement is not to be refused, and the monastery

steward is to be informed of what the donor said.

In the context of NP 18, this means that the bhikkhus are not to

take the money directly, or to get anyone else to take it, but may

consent to its being placed next to them, since it is not meant as a

gift for them.

Many monasteries have donation boxes, and there is a question as

to whether or not the bhikkhus may tell a donor in this case to put

the money in the box.  The Commentary to NP 18 states that when a

donation has been placed down for a bhikkhu -- over his protests --

and someone besides the donor offers to put it in a safe place, the

bhikkhu may point out a safe place to put money, but may not tell

him/her to put it there, as that would imply that he is accepting

responsibility for the money.  If this also applies to funds given

"to a building," then the bhikkhus should be able to say to the

donor of such funds, "The donation box is over there," but they are

not to say, "Put it there."

At any rate, after the money has been placed by the donor, the

bhikkhus may then tell the monastery steward what the donor said,

but are not to tell him/her to take the money, as this would violate

NP 18.  Since the steward in this case would be classed as

"indicated by the bhikkhus," they are to follow the protocol in this

rule when they tell the steward of their need for building

materials, wages for the workers, and other necessities that come up

in the course of the of the building's construction or maintenance.

The Commentary mentions two other acceptable arrangements:

(1) The donor places the money with the workmen, and tells the

bhikkhus that their only responsibility is to check on whether

the work is being done poorly or well.

(2) The donor says that the money will be kept with him/her or

with his/her employees, and that the bhikkhus' only

responsibility is to inform them of whom the money is to be given

to.  At present such a donor would be able to set up a checking

account for the construction and upkeep of monastery buildings.

In this case, the bank would be the steward "indicated by the

donor," and the authorized bhikkhu signing a check drawing on the

fund would be informing the steward of where the money should go.

He should not, however, be the one who hands the check over to

the payee or payee's representative.  This point will be

discussed in more detail under NP 20.

Since the steward in both of these cases is indicated by the

donor, the bhikkhus may make as many requests as they like -- i.e.,

in the first case, telling the workers what to do; in the second

case, telling the steward or donor who is to be paid -- but here

again in this second case they should be careful to phrase their

requests so as not to violate the rules against trading and buying.

In addition to building funds, it would seem that any charitable

fund for schools, hospitals, etc. -- such as some wealthy

monasteries have -- would come under this category, as long as the

fund is not for requisites for the Sangha, either as a group or

individually.

Fund management.  The Commentary states that if a Sangha fund has

been set up for a particular requisite, it should as a general rule

be used to buy only that requisite.  If, however, the Sangha has

enough of one kind of //lahubhanda// -- goods that may be shared

among the bhikkhus -- but not enough for another, the fund for the

first kind may be diverted to the second kind by an

//apalokana-kamma//:  a formal meeting of the Community in which the

motion is phrased in one's own words and unanimously accepted.

Funds for lodgings and furniture, though, since they are

//garubhanda// (goods that may not be shared among the bhikkhus),

may not be diverted to lahubhanda at all.  But if there is Sangha

furniture that is going unused and is in danger of deteriorating

before it gets used, the Community may arrange to have it exchanged

-- using the procedure allowed under NP 20, and making sure not to

let it go for less than its full value -- and then use the proceeds

for lahubhanda.  The Commentary adds that proceeds of this sort

should be used 'frugally, just enough to keep life going.'  In other

words, don't use them to splurge on anything excessive.

Summary:  When a fund has been set up with a steward

indicated by a bhikkhu:  Obtaining an article from the fund

as a result of having prompted the steward more than the

allowable number of times is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * * * * * * *

CHAPTER SEVEN

Part Two: The Silk Chapter

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

11.Should any bhikkhu have a felt (blanket/rug) made of a

mixture containing silk, it is to be forfeited and

confessed.

//Santhata//, defined here as a felt blanket/rug, is a type of cloth

described in the texts simply by its method of manufacture:  Instead

of being woven, it is made by strewing threads over a smooth

surface, sprinkling them with a glue-like mixture made from boiled

rice, rolling it smooth, and then repeating the process until the

felt is thick and strong enough for one's purposes.  Although felt

made like this can be used for a number of purposes, its major use

in the time of the texts seems to have been as a small personal rug

for sitting or lying down, or as a rough blanket for wearing around

oneself when sick or cold.  Blanket/ rugs like this are still made

and used in parts of India even today, and as the no-offense clauses

to this and the following rules show, it is precisely to this type

of blanket/rug that these rules apply.

There are three factors for the full offense here:

1) //Object//:  a felt blanket/rug containing silk threads and

intended for one's own use.

2) //Effort//:  One either makes it oneself, gets someone else to

make it, finishes what others have let unfinished, or gets

someone else to finish what one has left unfinished.

3) //Result//:  One obtains it after it is finished (or finishes

it, if one is making it oneself).

According to the Commentary, intention and perception are not

mitigating factors here.  Thus if one is making a felt blanket/rug,

and silk threads happen to float in on the breeze and land in the

felt, one commits an offense all the same.  Perhaps the Commentary's

interpretation here is why bhikkhus no longer use felt rugs, for

there is no way of knowing whether or not there are any stray silk

filaments in them that would make them unsuitable for use.

There is a dukkata in the effort of making a blanket/rug with silk

mixed in it -- or in having it made -- and once it is obtained (or

finished, if one is making it oneself), it is to be forfeited and

the nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed. The procedures for

forfeiture, confession, and receiving the blanket/rug in return are

the same as in the preceding rules.  Since there is a dukkata in

using //any// felt blanket/rug made with silk in it, the bhikkhu

receiving such a rug in return after forfeiting it may use it only

in the ways described in the no-offense clauses.

According to the Vibhanga, there is a dukkata in making a

blanket/rug with silk mixed in it for another's use, and a dukkata

in acquiring or using such a blanket/rug made for someone else.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense in making felt with silk mixed

in it to use as a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a pillow,

or a kneeling mat.

Summary:  Making a felt blanket/rug with silk mixed in it

for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya

pacittiya offense.

* * *

12.Should any bhikkhu have a felt (blanket/rug) made of pure

black wool, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The origin story to this rule indicates that a pure black felt

blanket/rug was considered stylish at that time, and thus

inappropriate for a bhikkhu's use.  This is a recurrent theme

throughout the Vinaya:  that stylish, luxurious, or elegant articles

are not in keeping with the bhikkhus' way of life.

All other explanations for this training rule are the same as for

the preceding rule, simply replacing "a felt blanket/rug made with

silk mixed in it" with "a felt blanket made entirely of black wool."

Summary:  Making a felt blanket/rug entirely of black wool

for one's own use -- or having it made -- is a nissaggiya

pacittiya offense.

* * *

13.When a bhikkhu is making a new felt (blanket/rug), two

parts of pure black wool are to be incorporated, a third

(part) of white, and a fourth of brown.  If a bhikkhu should

have a new felt (blanket/rug) made without incorporating two

parts of pure black wool, a third of white, and a fourth of

brown, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

This is a continuation of the preceding rule and its purpose is to

set the maximum amount of black wool a bhikkhu may include when

making his felt blanket/rug or having it made for his own use.  The

Vibhanga gives precise measures for how much black, white, and brown

wool one should use in making the rug, but the Commentary says that

these quantities are relative:  As long as black wool constitutes no

more than half the total amount of wool used, the bhikkhu making the

rug commits no offense.

As in the preceding rules, there is a dukkata in acquiring and

using a felt blanket/rug that is more than one-half black wool no

matter who it is made for.  Thus if a bhikkhu makes such a rug,

forfeits it, and receives it in return, he may use it only in the

ways indicated by the no-offense clauses.

Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga states that there is no offense if the

rug is more than one-quarter white wool, more than one-quarter brown

wool, or made entirely of white wool or of brown. The Sub-commentary

here reiterates that the important point is that the rug be no more

than one-half black wool.  There is also no offense if one is making

the felt -- or having it made -- for a canopy, a floor-covering, a

wall screen, a pillow, or a kneeling mat.

Summary:  Making a felt blanket/rug that is more than

one-half black wool for one's own use -- or having it made

-- is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

14.When a new felt (blanket/rug) has been made by a bhikkhu,

it is to be kept for (at least) six years.  If after less

than six years he should have another new felt (blanket/rug)

made, regardless of whether or not he has disposed of the

first, then -- unless he has been authorized by the bhikkhus

-- it is to be forfeited and confessed.

"Now at that time bhikkhus were (each) having a new felt

blanket/rug made every year.  They were constantly begging,

constantly hinting, 'Give wool.  We need wool.'  People were

offended and annoyed and spread it about, 'How can these

Sakyan contemplatives have a new felt blanket/rug made every

year?...The felt blanket/rugs we make for ourselves last

five or six years, even though our children wet them and

soil them, and they get chewed on by rats.  But these Sakyan

contemplatives have a new felt blanket/rug made every year

and are constantly begging, constantly hinting, 'Give wool.

We need wool.'"

There are three factors for an offense here.

1) //Object//:  a new felt blanket/rug for one's own use.

2) //Effort//:  One makes it or has it made less than six

//vassa// after one's last one was made, even though one has not

been formally authorized by the bhikkhus to do so.

3) //Result//:  One acquires the rug when it is finished.

The texts are silent on the factor of perception here, which

suggests that if a bhikkhu miscounts the passage of years -- making

a new rug when six years haven't passed even though he thinks they

have -- he fulfills the factor of effort all the same.

According to the Vibhanga, there is a dukkata in the effort of

making the rug or having it made.  Once it is obtained (or finished,

if one is making it oneself), it is to be forfeited and the

nissaggiya pacittiya offense confessed.  The procedures for

forfeiture, confession, and receiving the blanket/rug in return are

the same as in the preceding rules.  Since the no-offense clauses

allow one under these conditions to use a felt blanket/rug made for

someone else, it would seem that the rug here, unlike those

forbidden by the preceding rules, is not //ipso facto// unusable as

a rug.  Thus a bhikkhu who has forfeited his rug under this rule

should be able to use it as a blanket/rug after receiving it in

return.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense if a bhikkhu makes a new felt

blanket/rug after six or more years have past; if he makes one for

another's use; if he uses one made for someone else; or if he makes

felt to use as a canopy, a floor-covering, a wall screen, a pillow,

or a kneeling mat.

Also, as the rule indicates, there is also no offense if within

less than six years he makes a felt blanket/rug for his own use

after being authorized to do so by the bhikkhus.  The Vibhanga

explains this by saying that the Community, if it sees fit, may

formally give this authorization to a bhikkhu who is too ill to do

without a new felt blanket/rug before his six years are up.  The

pattern for this formal act -- one motion and one announcement

(//natti-dutiya-kamma//) -- is in the Vibhanga.

Summary:  Unless one has received authorization to do so

from the Community, making a felt blanket/rug for one's own

use -- or having it made -- less than six years after one's

last one was made is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

15. When a felt sitting rug is being made by a bhikkhu, a

piece of old felt a sugata span (25 cm.) on each side is to

be incorporated for the sake of discoloring it.  If, without

incorporating a piece of old felt a sugata span on each

side, he should have a new felt sitting rug made, it is to

be forfeited and confessed.

A sitting cloth -- for protecting his robes from getting soiled by

any place where he sits down, and for protecting any place where he

sits down from being soiled by him -- is one of the requisites a

bhikkhu is allowed to have (Mv.VII.16.3).  In fact, if he goes

without one for more than four months, he incurs a dukkata

(Cv.V.18).  Pacittiya 89 gives stipulations for its size, and for

the fact that it should have at least one border piece.

There is some question as to whether the felt sitting rug

described in this rule counts as a sitting cloth.  The Commentary to

Pacittiya 89 says yes, the Sub-commentary no, but the Vibhanga's

definition for sitting cloth under that rule states simply that it

"has a border," and since the felt sitting rug also "has a border,"

it would seem to come under that definition, too.

The Commentary to that rule describes the border piece of a felt

sitting rug as follows:  "Having made a felt rug, then on one end in

an area of one sugata span, cutting it at two points, one makes

three border pieces."  Whether these three pieces are to be left

flapping, or are to be sewn back together, it doesn't say.

According to the Vibhanga, when one is making a felt sitting rug,

one should take a piece of old felt -- at least one span in diameter

or one span square -- and then either place it down in one part of

the new felt as is, or else shred it up and scatter the pieces

throughout the new felt.  This, it says, will help to strengthen the

new felt.

//Old felt// the Vibhanga defines as worn wrapped around oneself

at least once:  This is one of the few places indicating that felt

was commonly used as a blanket.  The Commentary rewords the

Vibhanga's definition, saying "sat on or lied down upon at least

once," which -- at least in the days of the commentators -- was the

more common usage.  The Commentary adds that, in addition to wanting

to discolor the new felt sitting rug and make it stronger, one of

the Buddha's purposes in formulating this rule was to teach bhikkhus

how to make good use of old, used requisites, so as to maintain the

good faith of those who donated them.

Offenses.  As with the previous rules, there is a dukkata for the

bhikkhu who makes a sitting rug -- or has one made -- that violates

this rule, whether it is for his own use or for that of another; and

a nissaggiya pacittiya offense when he acquires the rug thus made

for his own use (or finishes it, if he is making it himself).  The

procedures for forfeiture, confession, and receiving the rug in

return are the same as in the preceding rules.  Since the no-offense

clauses here, as under the preceding rule, allow one to use a felt

sitting rug made without old felt for the sake of another, it would

seem that a bhikkhu, having forfeited his rug, should be able to use

it as a sitting rug after receiving it in return.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense if, being unable to find a

large enough piece of old felt to provide the one-span piece, one

includes a smaller piece of old felt in the sitting rug; if, being

unable to find any old felt at all, one does not include any old

felt in the rug; if one makes use of a felt sitting rug made without

old felt for the sake of another; or if one is making a canopy, a

floor-covering, a wall screen, a pillow, or a kneeling mat.  It

seems logical that there would also be no offense for the bhikkhu

making a felt blanket/rug that does not have any border pieces and

that he is not planning to use for sitting, but for some reason none

of the texts mention this point.

Summary:  Making a felt sitting rug for one's own use -- or

having it made -- without incorporating a one-span piece of

old felt is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

16. If wool accrues to a bhikkhu as he is going on a

journey, he may accept it if he so desires.  Once he accepts

it, he may carry it by hand -- there being no one else to

carry it -- three leagues (48 km.=30 miles) at most.  Should

he carry it farther than that, even if there is no one else

to carry it, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

"At that time wool accrued to a bhikkhu as he was on the

road in the Kosalan districts, going to Savatthi.  So, tying

the wool into a bundle with his upper robe, he went along

his way.  People who saw him teased him, 'How much did you

pay for it, venerable sir?  How much will the profit be?'"

There are, in essence, three factors for an offense here:  object,

effort, and intention.

Object.  //Wool//, under this rule, refers to wool that has not

been made into goods (%).  The Commentary explains that wool here

thus does not refer to woolen cloth, woolen felt, woolen yarn, or

even raw wool tied up with a thread, although this last point is in

contradiction to the origin story, where the bhikkhu carried his

wool tied up with a robe.

The Commentary goes on to say, though, that wool here //does//

refer to even small quantities of "unmade" wool, such as wool placed

in the ear when one has an earache, or wrapped around scissors in

their sheath to protect them from rusting, so a bhikkhu should be

careful not to travel more than three leagues with such things.

Effort.  This factor includes not only carrying unmade wool more

than three leagues oneself, but also placing it in a bundle or

vehicle belonging to someone else without his/her knowing about it,

and then letting him/her take it more than three leagues.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here:  If one travels more

than three leagues, even if one thinks one hasn't, that fulfills

this factor all the same.

Intention.  The Vibhanga says that there is no offense for the

bhikkhu who, after traveling three leagues, cannot find a proper

place to stay and so carries his wool further until finding a proper

place.  Thus the offense under this rule is only for a bhikkhu who

carries wool past the three-league mark for reasons other than

looking for a place to stay.

Non-offenses.  In addition to the issue of intention just

mentioned, the no-offense clauses say that there is no offense for

the bhikkhu who is retrieving lost or stolen wool; for the bhikkhu

who carries the wool three leagues and then carries it back; or for

the bhikkhu who gets someone else to carry the wool for him.

Summary:  Carrying wool that has not been made into cloth or

yarn for more than three leagues is a nissaggiya pacittiya

offense.

* * *

17.Should any bhikkhu have wool washed, dyed, or carded by a

bhikkhuni unrelated to him, it is to be forfeited and

confessed.

The reason behind this rule is expressed succinctly in the following

conversation from the origin story:

"Then Mahapajapati Gotami went to the Blessed One, and on

approaching, greeting him, stood to one side.  As she was

standing there, the Blessed One said to her, 'I trust,

Gotami, that the bhikkhunis remain uncomplacent, ardent, and

resolute?'

"'Since when, Lord, is there uncomplacency among the

bhikkhunis?  The masters -- the group-of-six bhikkhus --

keep having the bhikkhunis wash, dye, and card wool.  The

bhikkhunis, washing, dyeing, and carding wool, neglect...the

training in heightened virtue, the training in heightened

mind, and the training in heightened discernment.'"

//Wool//, here, as in under the preceding rule, refers to wool

that has not been made into cloth or yarn.  Thus there is no offense

for a bhikkhu who gets a bhikkhuni unrelated to him to wash woolen

cloth or yarn that has not yet been used.

Otherwise, all the explanations for this training rule are

identical with those for NP 4, except that here "beating" is

replaced by "carding."

Summary:  Getting an unrelated bhikkhuni to wash, dye, or

card wool that has not been made into cloth or yarn is a

nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

18. Should any bhikkhu take gold and silver, or have it

taken, or consent to its being deposited (near him), it is

to be forfeited and confessed.

As mentioned under NP 10, one of the purposes of this rule is to

relieve a bhikkhu of the burden of ownership that comes as the

result of accepting gifts of money or having them accepted in one's

name.  The discourses contain passages, though, indicating other

purposes for this rule as well:

"For whomever gold and silver are suitable, headman, the

five strands of sensuality are also suitable.  And for

whomever the five strands of sensuality are suitable, gold

and silver are suitable.  You may take it for certain that

this is not the way of a contemplative, not the way of a son

of the Sakyan." (S.XLII.10)

"Bhikkhus, there are these four stains because of which the

sun and moon do not glow, do not shine, are not radiant.

What four?  Rain clouds...snow clouds...smoke and dust...an

eclipse.  In the same way, there are these four stains

because of which contemplatives and priests do not glow, do

not shine, are not radiant.  What four?  Drinking alcoholic

beverages...indulging in sexual intercourse... accepting

gold and silver...obtaining requisites through a wrong mode

of livelihood." (A.IV.50)

Bhikkhus, in abandoning the use of money, make real their

abandonment of worldly pursuits and show others by example that the

struggle for wealth is not the true way to find happiness.

The factors for an offense under this rule are two:  object and

effort.

Object. The Vibhanga defines //gold// so that it includes anything

made of gold.  //Silver// it defines to cover coins made of silver,

copper, wood, or lac, or whatever is used as a medium of exchange in

business.  The Commentary adds such examples as bones, pieces of

hide, fruit, seeds of trees used as currency, whether they have been

stamped with a figure or not.  At present, the term would include

coins and paper currency, but not checks, credit cards, bank drafts,

or promissory notes, as these -- on their own and without further

identification of the person carrying them -- do not function as

true currency.

The Commentary, in discussing this training rule, also gathers a

list of items from the Canon carrying a dukkata, rather than a

nissaggiya pacittiya, when accepted by a bhikkhu.  They include

pearls and precious stones, unhusked grain, slaves, fields,

orchards, and livestock.  For convenience's sake, we will refer to

these items from here on as dukkata objects (//dukkata-vatthu//), or

D.O. for short.

Effort.  This factor may be fulfilled by any of three actions:

1)  //Accepting//.  According to the K/Commentary, this includes

receiving gold or money when it is offered as a gift or picking up

gold or money left lying around ownerless.  (As the no-offense

clauses show, this factor does not cover cases where one picks up

money left lying around the monastery or a house where one is

visiting if one's purpose is to keep it in safekeeping for the

owner.  See Pacittiya 84.)  According to the Commentary, a bhikkhu

who accepts money wrapped up in a bolt of cloth would also commit an

offense here, which shows that this act includes receiving or taking

the money not only with one's body, but also with items connected

with the body.  Thus accepting money in an envelope or having it

placed in one's shoulder bag as it hangs from one's shoulder would

fulfill this factor as well.

The Vibhanga states that perception is not a mitigating factor.

Thus a bhikkhu accepting an envelope that unbeknownst to him

contains money would fall under this factor, too.

The K/Commentary adds the stipulation that in the taking there

must be some movement of the money from one place to another.  It

offers no explanation for this point, but it probably refers to

cases where money is forced on a bhikkhu, as when he is on alms

round and a lay donor, against the bhikkhu's protestations, places

money in his bowl.  In this case, the bhikkhu could simply stand

right there until he gets the donor or someone else to remove the

money, and he would be absolved of an offense under this rule.

The commentaries add an extra factor -- the full offense is

entailed only if the bhikkhu is taking the money for his own sake --

but there is no mention of this in the Vibhanga, so the added factor

does not seem warranted.  Thus whether the bhikkhu takes the money

for himself or for others is not an issue here.

2)  //Having money accepted//,  according to the K/Commentary,

includes getting someone else to do any of the actions covered under

accepting, as described above.  Examples from the texts include such

things as telling the donor to give the money to a steward, telling

the donor that so-and-so will take the money for him, telling the

steward to take the money, to put it in a donation box, to "do what

he thinks appropriate," or any similar command.

Anything that falls short of a command, though, would not fulfill

this factor, as we have already seen under NP 10.  Thus simply

telling the donor that X is the bhikkhus' steward -- or that the

monastery's stewards have placed a donation box in such-and-such a

place -- would not be a factor for an offense here.  Also, if the

donor leaves money, say, on a table as a gift for a bhikkhu, then if

the bhikkhu tells his steward what the donor did and said, without

telling the steward to do anything with the money -- letting the

steward figure things out on his/her own -- this too would not

entail a penalty.  The Commentary's discussion of stewards under the

next point shows that while a bhikkhu who tells a volunteer steward

to put such a donation in a donation box would incur a penalty, a

bhikkhu who simply points out the donation box would not.

3)  //Consenting to money being deposited//.  The Vibhanga defines

this action as follows:  "He (the donor), saying, 'This is for the

master,' places it, and the bhikkhu consents." (%)  According to the

K/Commentary, //placing// covers two sorts of situations:

(1) The donor places money anywhere in the bhikkhu's presence, and

says, "This is for the master;" OR

(2) The donor tells him, "I have some money placed in

such-and-such a location.  It's yours."  (One of the implications

of this second case is that any monastery with a donation box

should make clear that money left in the box is being placed with

the steward.)

//Consenting// in either of these cases, says the Commentary,

means that one does not refuse either in thought, word, or deed.

Refusing in thought means thinking, "This is not proper for me."

Refusing in word means telling the donor that such a gift is not

allowable.  Refusing in deed means making a gesture to the same

effect.  If one refuses in any of these ways -- e.g., one wants to

accept the money, but tells the donor that it is not allowable; or

one says nothing, but simply reminds oneself that such gifts are not

proper to accept -- one avoids the penalty here.

The question of whether or not it is best to express one's refusal

outwardly lies beyond the scope of the Vinaya, and often depends on

the situation.  Ideally, one should inform the donor so that he/she

will know enough not to present such gifts in the future, but there

are also cases where the donor is still new to the idea of rules and

will simply be offended if the bhikkhu objects to what he/she means

as a well-intentioned gesture.  This is thus a matter where a

bhikkhu should use his discretion.

The Commentary contains a long discussion of what a bhikkhu should

do if, after he refuses such a donation, the donor goes off leaving

it there anyway:  If someone else comes along and asks the bhikkhu,

"What is this?", the bhikkhu may tell him/her what he and the donor

said, but may not ask him/her to do anything about it.  If the

person volunteers to put the money into safekeeping, the bhikkhu may

point out a safe place but may not tell him/her to put it there.

Once the money is in a safe place, one may point it out to other

people -- one's steward, for instance -- but may not tell anyone to

take it.  The Commentary gives directions for how to arrange an

exchange with such money so as not to violate NP 19 & 20, but I will

save this part of the discussion until we come to those rules.

The Vibhanga's definition of the action of "placing" money for a

bhikkhu indicates that in this case the question of who the money is

for //does// make a difference, since the nature of the donor's

action is defined by what he or she says.  If the donor means the

money for the bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu accepts, that fulfills the

factor here.  This covers cases where the donor says, "This is for

you," or "This is for you to give to X."

If the donor simply says, "This is for the Community," or "This is

for Bhikkhu Y," and Bhikkhu X consents to its being placed down near

him, then according to the Commentary, X incurs a dukkata.  It does

not say, though, what should be done with the money, aside from the

fact that any bhikkhu who uses anything bought with it also incurs a

dukkata.  Its discussion of the following rule, though, would seem

to imply that it should be returned to the original donor.

If money for Bhikkhu Y is placed near Bhikkhu X in this way, and Y

in turn accepts the donation for himself, then of course Y would

incur the full penalty under this rule.  The Commentary's discussion

under NP 10 indicates that if money for the Community is placed near

Bhikkhu X, the Community is said to have accepted it only when all

members of the Community unanimously agree to it.  If one member

disagrees, he saves all the other members from committing an offense

-- except for X, who still has his dukkata.

The Commentary here also says that a bhikkhu who accepts monetary

donations "placed nearby" him for monastery buildings incurs a

dukkata as well.  This refers to cases where the donor says, "This

is for the Community to use in building such-and-such," and places

the money down next to the bhikkhu.  As the Commentary itself says

under NP 10,  if the donor does not mention the name of the bhikkhu

or the Community as custodians or recipients of the funds, the

donations are not to be refused.  Rather, they are to be left there

and the steward told of what the donor said.

Forfeiture & confession.  A bhikkhu who accepts money or gold, has

it accepted, or consents to its being placed down for him must

forfeit the money and confess the offense in the midst of a formal

meeting of the Community.  The formula for forfeiture is given in

Appendix VI.  This is one of the few rules where the offender may

not confess the offense to an individual bhikkhu or to a group of

less than four.  Once he has forfeited the money, the Community is

not to return it to him, as there is no way a bhikkhu is allowed to

possess money.

If a lay person then comes along, the bhikkhus should tell him,

"Look at this."  If he asks, "What should be bought with this?", the

bhikkhus are not to tell him to buy anything, although they may tell

him what in general is allowable for bhikkhus, such as the five

tonics, as under NP 23 below.  If he takes the money and purchases

any proper items, all the bhikkhus except for the one who originally

accepted the money may make use of them.  If it so happens that one

of the bhikkhus tells him explicitly to buy something, then the

Commentary says that the item(s) bought this way may be used by all

the bhikkhus except for the original offender and the bhikkhu who

gave the order to buy.  If the lay person does not volunteer to buy

anything with the money, the bhikkhus should tell him to get rid of

it.

If he does not get rid of it, they are to choose one of their

number as the "money-remover," by means of the formal act -- one

motion and one announcement (//natti-dutiya-kamma//) -- given in the

Vibhanga.  The money-remover's duty is to throw the money away

without taking note of where it falls.  If he does take note, he

incurs a dukkata.  The Commentary recommends that, "Closing his

eyes, he should throw it into a river, over a cliff, or into a

jungle thicket without paying attention to where it falls,

disinterested as if it were excrement."

None of the texts mention what a bhikkhu is to do with dukkata

objects he has received, but as we shall see under the following

rule, the Commentary would seem to suggest that he return them to

their donors.

Non-offenses.  As mentioned above, there is no offense for the

bhikkhu who, finding money lying around the monastery or in a house

he is visiting, puts it away in safe keeping for the owner.  This

point is discussed in detail under Pacittiya 84.

Summary:  Taking gold or money, having someone else take it,

or consenting to its being placed down as a gift for oneself

is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

19. Should any bhikkhu engage in various types of monetary

exchange, it (the income) is to be forfeited and confessed.

There are two factors for an offense here:  object and effort.

Object.  The Vibhanga defines //money// in the same terms it uses

to define gold and silver in the preceding rule:  any type of gold,

whether shaped into an ornament or not; and any coins or currency

used in business exchange.

Effort.  The Vibhanga's description of the kind of exchange

covered by this rule differs from that given in the Commentary, so

it is best to discuss them separately.

//The Vibhanga's interpretation//.  Monetary exchange refers

primarily to the type of business and speculation a gold dealer

would engage in -- exchanging currency, trading gold ore for gold

shaped into ornaments or vice versa, trading gold ore for gold ore,

or gold ornaments for gold ornaments -- but the Vibhanga's

discussion of the factor of perception shows that the factor of

effort here includes any exchange in which the bhikkhu ends up with

gold or money as the result of the exchange.  Thus it would cover

cases where a bhikkhu sells any kind of item -- allowable or

unallowable -- for money.

At first glance, this would seem redundant with the preceding rule

against receiving money, and the following rule against engaging in

trade, but actually it closes a number of loopholes in those rules.

In the preceding rule, a bhikkhu may point out a steward to a person

who brings money intended for him; and in the following rule he can,

if he words it right, propose a trade or tell a steward to arrange a

trade for him.  Thus, given just those two rules, it would be

possible for a bhikkhu using "proper" procedures to have his steward

engage in currency speculation and other money-making activities

without committing an offense.

This rule, though, includes no such exceptions for "wording things

right (//kappiya-vohara//)," and so closes those loopholes as far as

this type of trading is concerned.  As a result, a bhikkhu may not

express a desire to his steward that he/she sell something belonging

to him or take funds dedicated for his use and invest them for

monetary return.  And if the bhikkhu is going abroad, he must leave

it up to his steward to figure out that his funds may have to be

exchanged for foreign currency if they are going to be of any use.

//The Commentary's interpretation//.  According to the Commentary,

monetary exchange refers to any trade in which money is involved --

whether as the item the bhikkhu brings into the trade, gets out of

the trade, or both.  Buddhaghosa states that this interpretation is

based on a passage that is not in the Vibhanga but logically should

be.  The Sub-commentary supports him, explaining that if monetary

exchange covers trades in which money forms one side of the trade,

it shouldn't matter which side of the trade it is on.

This, however, contradicts a number of points in the Vibhanga. (1)

Its table of the possible actions covered by this rule includes only

cases where the outcome of the trade for the bhikkhu is money.  As

we noted in the Introduction, we have to trust that the Vibhanga

arrangers knew what was and was not an offense under a certain rule,

and that if they had meant the rule to cover more than the

alternatives listed in the table, they would have included them.

(2) In the Vibhanga's discussion of how the forfeiture is to be

conducted, it consistently refers to the offender as the "one who

purchased money" and to the bhikkhu who throws the forfeited object

away as the "one who removes the money."  (3) If //monetary

exchange// covers cases where the bhikkhu uses money to buy

allowable things, then the discussion of how a bhikkhu could get his

steward to use money rightfully placed with the steward to buy such

things would have been included under this rule; instead, it is

included under the following rule.  All of this seems to indicate

that the Commentary is on shaky ground when it tries to force its

interpretation on the Vibhanga here.

Still, the Commentary's interpretation is widely followed and

fairly complex, so it will be good to discuss it in some detail.

As under the preceding rule, the Commentary divides articles into

three sorts:

//nissaggiya objects// (N.O.), i.e., articles such as gold and

money, which entail a nissaggiya pacittiya when they are

accepted,

//dukkata objects// (D.O.), articles such as pearls, precious

stones, unhusked grain, fields, orchards, slaves and livestock,

which entail a dukkata when they are accepted;

//allowable objects// (A.O.), articles that a bhikkhu may

rightfully accept and possess.

It then works out the following scheme to cover all possible sorts

of trade involving these objects:

Using  to buy  results in

~~~~~  ~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~

N.O. >   N.O.   a nissaggiya pacittiya

N.O. >   D.O.   a nissaggiya pacittiya

N.O. >   A.O.   a nissaggiya pacittiya

D.O. >   N.O.   a nissaggiya pacittiya

D.O. >   D.O.   a dukkata*

D.O. >   A.O.   a dukkata*

A.O. >   N.O.   a nissaggiya pacittiya

A.O. >   D.O.   a dukkata*

A.O. >   A.O.   a nissaggiya pacittiya under NP 20

The trades marked with asterisks point out one of the anomalies of

the Commentary's interpretation:  Why trades involving D.O. should

entail only a dukkata, while A.O. > A.O. trades should entail a

nissaggiya pacittiya is hard to fathom.

At any rate, to continue with the Commentary's explanations: N.O.

> A.O. trades cover two possible cases, depending on whether the

money was obtained properly or improperly under the preceding rule.

If improperly, the object bought with the money is unallowable for

all bhikkhus.  This holds whether the bhikkhu makes the purchase

himself or a steward makes it for him.  The only way the item can be

made allowable is to have an equal sum of money returned to the

original donor and the item returned to the person who sold it, and

then arrange for a proper exchange as allowed under the following

rule.  (At first glance, it may seem strange for the Commentary to

insist that the price of the A.O. be returned to the original donor

of the N.O., since the bhikkhus are in no way in his/her debt; this

is probably the Commentary's way of ensuring that if the seller

returns the purchase price of the A.O. to the  bhikkhus' steward, it

is not used to repurchase the A.O.)

If, however, a bhikkhu engages in a N.O. > A.O. trade using money

obtained properly under the preceding rule, the item bought is

unallowable only for him, but allowable for other bhikkhus once he

has forfeited it.  If N.O. > A.O. exchanges really were covered by

this rule, though, this would contradict the Vibhanga, which insists

that the item obtained as a result of this rule either has to be

given to a lay person or thrown away.  Thus it seems better to

follow the Vibhanga in treating cases of this sort under the

following rule.

The Commentary makes no mention of what should be done with items

resulting from trades that carry a dukkata here, but its discussion

of how to "undo" a trade so as to make the item allowable suggests

the following scheme:

For a D.O > D.O. trade:  Return the object bought to the person

who sold it, return the original object to the donor, and confess

the offense.

For a D.O. > A.O. trade:  Return the object bought to the person

who sold it, return the original object to the donor, and confess

the offense.  If one wants to, one may then approach the person

who sold the allowable object and arrange a proper trade in

accordance with the following rule.

For an A.O. > D.O. trade:  Return the object bought to the person

who sold it and confess the offense.

As an intellectual exercise, the Commentary considers the question

of a trade that results in an A.O. that can never be made allowable,

and comes up with the following scenario:  A bhikkhu takes money

improperly obtained under the preceding rule, uses it to get iron

mined, smelted and made into a bowl.  Since there is no way to undo

these transactions -- the iron can never be returned to its state as

ore -- there is no way any bhikkhu may ever properly make use of the

iron no matter what is done with it.

As mentioned above, the Commentary's explanations here contradict

the Vibhanga on a number of points, and contain several anomalies as

well.  It seems preferable to treat a number of cases it mentions

here -- N.O. > D.O., N.O. > A.O., D.O. > D.O., D.O. > A.O., A.O. >

D.O., or in other words, any trade resulting in an allowable or a

dukkata object -- under the following rule instead.

Forfeiture & confession.  When a bhikkhu has obtained gold or

money in violation of this rule he is to forfeit it in the midst of

a formal meeting of the Community, following the procedures

explained under the preceding rule.  The Pali formula for forfeiture

is in Appendix VI.

Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga's no-offense clauses contain nothing

but the blanket exemptions mentioned under Parajika 1.

Summary:  Obtaining gold or money through trade is a

nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

20. Should any bhikkhu engage in various types of trade,

(the article obtained) is to be forfeited and confessed.

"Now at that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan had become

skilled at robe making.  Having made an outer robe of old

rags, having dyed it well and stitched it nicely, he wore

it.  A certain wanderer, wearing a very expensive cloak,

went to where he was staying and on arrival said to him,

'Your outer robe is beautiful, my friend.  Give it to me in

exchange for this cloak.'

"'Do you know (what you are doing), my friend?'

"'Yes, I know.'

"'Very well, then.' And he gave him the robe.

"Then the wanderer went to the wanderers' park wearing the

outer robe.  The other wanderers said to him, 'Your outer

robe is beautiful, friend.  Where did you get it?'

"'I got it in exchange for my cloak.'

"'But how long will this outer robe last you?  That cloak of

yours was better.'

"So the wanderer, thinking, 'It's true what the wanderers

said.  How long will this outer robe last me?  That cloak of

mine was better,' went to where Ven. Upananda the Sakyan was

staying, and on arrival said, 'Here is your outer robe, my

friend.  Give me my cloak.'

"'But didn't I ask you, "Do you know what you are doing?"  I

won't give it to you.'

"So the wanderer was offended and annoyed and spread it

about, 'Even a householder will give another householder the

item he regrets (trading).  How can one who has gone forth

not give (extend the same courtesy) to one who has gone

forth?'"

As we noted under NP 10, one of the purposes of this rule is to

relieve bhikkhus of the responsibilities that come with making

trades -- the responsibility of having to get a fair price for one's

goods and at the same time offering a fair deal to the person making

the trade.

The factors for an offense here are two:  object and effort.

Object.  The Vibhanga defines //various types of trade// as

covering deals involving the four requisites, "even a lump of

powder, a tooth-cleaner or unwoven thread" -- these being its

standard examples of objects with the least possible material value.

The Commentary interprets this as limiting this rule to deals

involving nothing but allowable objects (A.O. > A.O.), but there is

nothing in the Vibhanga to suggest that this is necessarily so.  The

emphasis in the Vibhanga seems to be that this rule covers even

allowable objects of the least possible value, and all the more so

more valuable and restricted objects.  In fact, since the Vibhanga

explicitly limits the preceding rule to trades that result in money

for the bhikkhu (N.O. > N.O.; D.O. > N.O.; A.O. > N.O.), it seems

best to interpret this rule as covering all types of trade not

covered in that rule:

N.O. > D.O.; N.O. > A.O.;

D.O. > D.O.; D.O. > A.O.;

A.O. > D.O.; and A.O. > A.O.

The Vibhanga and commentaries also mention that the goods one

offers in trade are one's own goods, but they do not mention

explicitly whether or not this also includes goods belonging to

someone else that have been placed on trust in one's keeping (such

as monastery funds placed under the supervision of a monastery

official).  Since the no-offense clauses make no exemptions for a

bhikkhu who trades using goods received on trust from someone else,

though, it would seem that such cases do fall under this rule as

well.

Effort.  //Engaging in trading//, according to the Vibhanga,

involves two steps:

(1) The bhikkhu proposes an exchange, saying, "Give this for

that," or "Take this for that," or "Exchange this for that," or

"Purchase this with that."

(2)  The goods exchange hands, the bhikkhu's goods ending up with

the other person, and the other person's goods ending up with the

bhikkhu.

The first step entails a dukkata; both steps together, a

nissaggiya pacittiya.  Perception is not a mitigating factor here:

If a bhikkhu manages an exchange in a way that he thinks avoids a

penalty under this rule but in fact doesn't (see below), he commits

the full offense all the same.

Forfeiture & confession.  Once a bhikkhu has received an article

from trading, he is to forfeit it either to an individual bhikkhu,

to a group of two or three, or to a full Community of four or more.

Only then may he confess the offense.  The procedures for

forfeiture, confession, and the return of the article are the same

as under NP 1.  The Pali formula for forfeiture is in Appendix VI.

The Vibhanga makes no mention of what the bhikkhu may and may not do

with after receiving it in return, but we may borrow a page from the

Commentary's discussion of the preceding rule and say that:

//If the exchange was N.O. > D.O.//, he should return the D.O. to

its seller.  If the N.O. was properly obtained under NP 18, there

is nothing further to be done.  If not, the bhikkhu should

confess the offense for violating that rule.  (If he accepts the

purchase price in return, he must forfeit it in the midst of the

Community.  If not, he should simply confess the pacittiya

offense.)

//If the exchange was N.O. > A.O.//, then if the N.O. was obtained

in violation of NP 18, no bhikkhu may make use of the A.O. unless

it is returned to the seller, the price of the article is turned

over to the original donor of the money, and the A.O. is then

repurchased in a way that does not violate this rule.  (Again, if

the seller refunds the purchase price, the offender should

forfeit it in the midst of the Community.  If not, he should

simply confess the pacittiya offense.)

//If the N.O. in this case was properly obtained//, then the

purchased article is allowable for other bhikkhus, but not for

the offender.  (Some might object that if the N.O. was properly

obtained it should be treated as A.O., but we must remember that

a bhikkhu who orders his steward to use money to buy an object is

assuming ownership of the money, which goes against the spirit of

NP 18 and the protocol of having a steward in the first place.)

//If the exchange was D.O. > D.O.//, the bhikkhu should return the

purchased article to the seller and the original article (if the

seller returns it to him) to the original donor.

//If the exchange was D.O. > A.O.//, the purchased article is not

allowable for any bhikkhu unless it is returned to the seller,

the D.O. is returned to the original donor, and the A.O. is then

repurchased in a way that does not violate this rule.

//If the exchange was A.O. > D.O.//, the bhikkhu should return the

purchased article to the seller.

//If the exchange was A.O. > A.O.//, the bhikkhu may make use of

the article as he likes.

//If the exchange was wages in payment for services rendered//,

the Commentary notes that there is no way the bhikkhu can

rightfully get the payment back, so he should simply confess a

pacittiya offense.

Non-offenses.  In the origin story to NP 5, the Buddha allows

bhikkhus to trade allowable articles with other bhikkhus,

bhikkhunis, female probationers, and male or female novices.  The

present rule thus covers trades made only with people who are not

one's co-religionists.

As for trades with people who are not one's co-religionists, the

Vibhanga here adds that a bhikkhu commits no offense --

if he asks the price of an object;

if he tells a steward (wording the request properly, as under NP

10);

or if he tells the seller, "I have this.  I have need of

such-and-such," and then lets the seller arrange the exchange as

he/she sees fit.

This last point may seem like a lot of hair splitting, but we must

remember that if a trade is arranged in this way, the bhikkhu is

absolved from any responsibility for the fairness of the deal, which

seems to be the whole point of the rule.

The Commentary, in discussing these exemptions, raises the

following points:

1)  A bhikkhu who tries to avoid the technicalities of what is

defined as engaging in trading by saying simply, "Give this.

Take that," may do so only with his close relatives.  Otherwise,

telling a lay person to take one's belongings as his/her own is a

"theft of faith" (//saddha-deyya//) -- i.e., a misuse of the

donations that lay supporters have sacrificed for the bhikkhu's

use.  (See Mv.VIII.22.1)  On the other hand, telling an unrelated

lay person to give something is a form of begging, which carries

a dukkata unless the lay person is related or has invited one to

ask in the first place.  (From this we may deduce that bhikkhus

should not bargain after having asked the price of goods or

services -- e.g., a taxi fare -- even in situations where

bargaining is the norm.)

2)  A bhikkhu desiring to get an article may tell his steward,

"Having taken that, give (the seller) this."  This, however,

contradicts other passages in the Commentary itself, in which

this form of speech is said to violate this rule when spoken

directly to the seller.  Since the Vibhanga includes orders to X

to purchase an item as coming under this rule, it would seem that

only the forms of speech allowed under NP 10 -- "I have need of

such-and-such;" "I want such-and-such" -- would be allowed under

the no-offense clauses here as well.

3)  Under the previous rule, the Commentary mentioned that a

bhikkhu engaging in an otherwise allowable trade for profit

incurs a dukkata.  Here it says that if a bhikkhu, proposing a

trade by wording it right (//kappiya-vohara//), deceives the

seller as to the value of his goods, he is to be treated under

Parajika 2.

4)  If a bhikkhu goes with his steward to a store and sees that

the steward is getting a bad deal, he may simply tell the

steward, "Don't take it."

5)  The Commentary to NP 10 describes how a bhikkhu may make a

purchase when his steward has left funds in safe-keeping on the

bhikkhu's premises but is not around to arrange a trade when,

say, a bowl-seller comes along.  The bhikkhu may tell the seller,

"I want this bowl, and there are funds of equal value here, but

there is no steward to make them allowable."  If the  seller

volunteers to make them allowable, the bhikkhu may show him where

they are but may not tell him how much to take.  If the seller

takes too much, the bhikkhu may cancel the sale by saying, "I

don't want your bowl after all."

In general it is not a wise policy to have funds left for

safe-keeping on one's premises -- a Community allowing this exposes

itself to the dangers of robbery and assault -- but the Commentary

here seems less interested in describing ideal behavior than in

simply drawing the line between what is and is not an offense.

Special cases.  1) The Bhikkhunis' Nissaggiya Pacittiya rules 4-10

show that if a lay donor gives money to a store owner to pay for

whatever a bhikkhuni will request from the store, the bhikkhuni may

avail herself of the arrangement.  If the donor stipulates that this

arrangement applies only to certain things, or to things worth a

certain amount, she may request only what falls under the

stipulation:  This is the point of the rules.  In effect, what this

is doing is making the storeowner her steward.  Such an arrangement

would thus also seem allowable for bhikkhus, as long as they word

their requests to the store owner properly, as advised under NP 10.

2)  As mentioned under NP 18, checks, credit cards, bank drafts,

and traveler's checks do not count as gold or money, but any trade

arranged with them would come under this rule.  With checks, the

point where the full offense is committed is when the bhikkhu hands

the check over to the seller -- or tells his steward to hand it over

-- in exchange for goods or services.  Simply signing a check does

not come under this rule.  Thus a bhikkhu responsible for monastery

building funds of the sort discussed in the Commentary to NP 10 --

where the donor makes the bhikkhu(s) responsible for saying who

money should go to -- may sign checks drawing on the fund without

committing an offense here, unless he hands the check over to the

seller or tells the steward, "Use this to buy X."

Similarly with credit cards:  The offense is committed when the

bhikkhu hands the signed credit card receipt -- or has it handed --

to the seller.  The receipt is an acknowledgement of goods purchased

or services rendered, which in the context of the card holder's

agreement with the credit card company is his promise to repay the

loan he is making on the company.  This promise is what he is

trading with the seller.

Summary:  Engaging in trade with anyone except one's

co-religionists is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * * * * * * *

CHAPTER SEVEN

Part Three: The Bowl Chapter

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

21. An extra alms bowl may be kept ten days at most.  Beyond

that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

Alms bowls.  This rule deals only with alms bowls that are fit to be

determined for use.  According to the Commentary, this means any

that are --

1) made of the proper material;

2) the proper size;

3) fully paid for;

4) properly fired; and

5) not damaged beyond repair.

//Material//.  In the Cullavagga (V.8.2 & V.9.1), the Buddha

allows two kinds of alms bowls -- made of clay and made of iron --

and forbids eleven:  made either of wood, gold, silver, pearl,

beryl, crystal, bronze, glass, tin, lead, or copper.  Using the

Great Standards, it has recently been decided that stainless steel

bowls are allowable, but aluminum bowls not.  In the time of the

Buddha, clay bowls were the more common.  At present, iron and steel

bowls are.

//Size//.  The Vibhanga contains a discussion of three proper

sizes for a bowl -- the medium size containing twice the volume of

the small, and the large twice the volume of the medium -- but they

are based on measurements that are not known with any precision at

present.  The author of the Vinaya Mukha reports having experimented

with various sizes of bowls based on a passage in the story of

Mendaka in the Dhammapada Commentary.  His conclusion:  A small bowl

is just a little larger than a human skull, and a medium bowl

approximately 27 1/2 English inches (70 cm.) in circumference, or

about 8.75 inches (22.5 cm.) in diameter. He did not try making a

large bowl.  Any size larger than the large size or smaller than the

small is inappropriate; any size between them falls under this rule.

//Fully paid for//.  According to the Commentary, if a bowl-maker

makes a gift of a bowl, it counts as fully paid for.  If a bowl has

been delivered to a bhikkhu but has yet to be fully paid for, it may

not be determined and does not come under this rule until paid for

in full.

//Fired//.  The Commentary states that a clay bowl must be fired

twice before it can be determined, to make sure it is properly

hardened; and an iron bowl five times, to prevent it from rusting.

Since stainless steel does not rust it need not be fired, but the

accepted practice is to find some way to make it gray -- either by

painting it on the outside or firing the whole bowl with leaves that

will give it a smoky color -- so that it will not stand out.

//Not damaged beyond repair//.  According to the Commentary, a

clay bowl is damaged beyond repair if it has at least ten inches

(fingerbreadths) of cracks in it, the smallest of the cracks being

at least two inches long.  (Cracks less than two inches long are

said not to merit mending, and so do not count.)  If a bowl has

fewer cracks than that, they should be mended either with tin wire,

sap (but for some reason not pure pine sap), or a mixture of sugar

cane syrup and powdered stone.  Other materials not to be used for

repair are beeswax and sealing wax.  If the total number of

countable cracks equals ten inches or more, the bowl becomes a

non-bowl, and the owner is entitled to ask for a new one.

As for iron and steel bowls, a hole in the bowl large enough to

let a millet grain pass through is enough to make the determination

lapse, but not enough to make the bowl a non-bowl.  The bhikkhu

should plug the hole -- or have a blacksmith plug it -- with

powdered metal or a tiny metal plug polished smooth with the surface

of the bowl and then redetermine the bowl for use.

If the hole is small enough to be plugged in this way, then no

matter how many such holes there are in the bowl, they do not make

it a non-bowl, and the bhikkhu should mend it and continue using it.

If, however, there is even one hole so large that the metal used to

plug it cannot be polished smooth with the surface of the rest of

the bowl, the tiny crevices in the patch will collect food.  This

makes it unfit for use, and the owner is entitled to ask for a new

one to replace it.

An extra alms bowl, according to the Vibhanga, is any that has not

yet been determined for use or placed under shared ownership.  Since

a bhikkhu may have only one bowl determined for use at any one time,

he should place any additional bowls he receives under dual

ownership if he plans to keep them on hand.  (The procedures for

placing bowls under determination and dual ownership, and for

rescinding their determination and dual ownership, are given in

Appendices IV & V.)

Effort.  According to the Commentary, once a bowl belonging to a

bhikkhu fulfills all the requirements for a determinable bowl, he is

responsible for it even if he has not yet received it into his

keeping.  For example, if a blacksmith promises to make him a bowl

and send word when it is finished, the bhikkhu is responsible for

the bowl as soon as he hears word from the blacksmith's messenger

that the bowl is ready, even if he has yet to receive it.  If the

blacksmith, prior to making the bowl, promises to send it when it is

done, then the bhikkhu is not responsible for it until the

blacksmith's messenger brings it to him.  (All of this assumes that

the bowl is already fully paid for.)

If, within ten days after becoming responsible for a new bowl, a

bhikkhu does not determine it for use, place it under dual

ownership, abandon it (give it or throw it away), or if the bowl is

not lost, stolen, damaged beyond repair, or taken on trust, then on

the tenth dawn after receiving it he incurs the full penalty under

this rule.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  Even if the bhikkhu

thinks that ten days have not passed when they have, or if he thinks

that the bowl is damaged beyond repair or placed under dual

ownership, etc., when it isn't, he incurs the penalty all the same.

Forfeiture & confession.  The procedures for forfeiture,

confession, and return of the bowl are the same as under NP 1.  For

the Pali formulae to use in forfeiting and returning the bowl, see

Appendix VI.  As with the rules concerning robe-cloth, the bowl must

be returned to the offender after he has confessed his offense.  Not

to return it entails a dukkata.  Once the bowl is returned, the

ten-day countdown starts all over again.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense if within ten days the bhikkhu

determines the bowl for use, places it under dual ownership,

abandons it, loses it, or if the bowl is stolen, damaged beyond

repair, or taken on trust.

Summary:  Keeping an alms bowl for more than ten days

without determining it for use or placing it under dual

ownership is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

22. Should a bhikkhu with an alms bowl having less than five

mends ask for another new bowl, it is to be forfeited and

confessed.  The bowl is to be forfeited by the bhikkhu to

the company of bhikkhus.  That company of bhikkhus' final

bowl should be presented to the bhikkhu, (saying,) "This,

bhikkhu, is your bowl.  It is to be kept until broken."

This is the proper procedure here.

"Now at that time a certain potter had invited the bhikkhus,

saying, 'If any of the masters need a bowl, I will supply

them with bowls.'  So the bhikkhus, knowing no moderation,

asked for many bowls.  Those with small bowls asked for

large ones.  Those with large ones asked for small ones.

The potter, making many bowls for the bhikkhus, could not

make other goods for sale.  (As a result,) he could not

support himself, and his wife and children suffered."

According to the Commentary, the phrase, a bowl "having less than

five mends" refers to one that is not beyond repair, as explained

under the preceding rule.  Thus this rule does not apply to a

bhikkhu whose bowl is beyond repair:  As the K/Commentary notes,

whether or not the damage in his bowl is actually mended is not an

issue here.

A bhikkhu whose bowl is not beyond repair incurs a dukkata in

asking for a new bowl, and a nissaggiya pacittiya in receiving it.

Forfeiture, confession, & bowl exchange.  Once a bhikkhu has

received a bowl in violation of this rule, he must forfeit it and

confess the offense in the midst of the Community.  (See Appendix VI

for the Pali formula used in forfeiture.)  He then receives the

Community's "final bowl" to use in place of the new one he has

forfeited.

The Community's final bowl is selected in the following way:  Each

bhikkhu coming to the meeting to witness the offender's forfeiture

and confession must bring the bowl he has determined for his own

use.  If a bhikkhu has an inferior bowl in his possession -- either

extra or placed under dual ownership -- he is not to determine that

bowl and take it to the meeting in hopes of getting a more valuable

one in the exchange about to take place.  To do so entails a

dukkata.

Once the bhikkhus have assembled, the offender forfeits his bowl

and confesses the offense.  The Community, following the pattern of

one motion and one announcement (//natti-dutiya-kamma//) given in

the Vibhanga, then chooses one of its members as bowl exchanger.

The bowl exchanger's duty is to take the forfeited bowl and show it

to the most senior bhikkhu, who is to choose whichever of the two

bowls pleases him more -- his own or the new one.  If the new bowl

is preferable to his own, and yet he does not take it out of

sympathy for the offender, he incurs a dukkata.  The K/Commentary

and Sub-commentary add that if he does not prefer the new bowl,

there is no offense in not taking it.

Once the most senior bhikkhu has taken his choice, the remaining

bowl is then shown to the bhikkhu second in seniority, who repeats

the process, and so on down the line to the most junior bhikkhu.

The bowl exchanger then takes the bowl left over from this last

bhikkhu's choice -- the least desirable bowl belonging to that

company of bhikkhus -- and presents it to the offender and tells him

to determine it for his use and care for it as best he can.

If the offender treats it improperly -- putting in a place where

it might get damaged, using it in the wrong sort of way -- or tries

to get rid of it, thinking, "How can this bowl be lost or destroyed

or broken," he incurs a dukkata.

Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga states that a bhikkhu whose bowl is

not beyond repair incurs no penalty if he asks for a new bowl from

relatives or from people who have invited him to ask, or if he gets

a new bowl with his own resources.  He is also allowed to ask for a

bowl for the sake of another, which -- following the Commentary to

NP 6 -- means that Bhikkhu X may ask for a bowl for Y only if he

asks from his own relatives or people who have invited him to ask

for a bowl OR if he asks from Y's relatives or people who have

invited Y to ask.  Asking for and receiving a bowl for Y from people

other than these would entail the full offense.

Summary:  Asking for a new alms bowl when one's current bowl

is not beyond repair is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

23.There are these tonics to be taken by sick bhikkhus:

ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar/molasses.  Having been

received, they are to be used from storage seven days at

most.  Beyond that, they are to be forfeited and confessed.

Tonics.  The five tonics mentioned in this rule form one of four

classes of edibles grouped according to the time period within which

they may be eaten after being received.  The other three -- food,

juice drinks, and medicines -- are discussed in detail at the

beginning of the Food Chapter in the pacittiya rules.  Here is the

story of how this group came to be a special class:

"Then as the Blessed One was alone in seclusion, this line

of reasoning occurred to him:  'At present the bhikkhus,

afflicted by the autumn disease, bring up the conjey they

have drunk and the food they have eaten.  Because of this

they are thin, wretched, unattractive, and jaundiced, their

bodies covered with veins.  What if I were to allow medicine

for them that would be both medicine and agreed to be

medicine for the world, and serve as food, yet would not be

considered gross (substantial) food.'

"Then this thought occurred to him:  'There are these five

tonics -- ghee, fresh butter, oil, honey, sugar/molasses --

that are both medicine and agreed to be medicine for the

world, and serve as food yet would not be considered gross

food.  What if I were now to allow the bhikkhus, having

accepted them at the right time (from dawn to noon), to

consume them at the right time'....

"Now at that time bhikkhus, having accepted the five tonics

at the right time, consumed them at the right time.  Because

of this they could not stomach even their ordinary coarse

meals, much less greasy ones.  As a result, afflicted both

by the autumn disease and this loss of appetite for food,

they became even more thin and wretched....So the Blessed

One, for this cause, for this reason, having given a Dhamma

talk, addressed the bhikkhus:  'I allow you, bhikkhus,

having accepted the five tonics, to consume them both at the

right time and at the wrong time (from noon to dawn).'"

(Mv.VI.1)

The Vibhanga defines the five tonics as follows:

//Ghee// means strained, boiled butter oil made from the milk of

any animal whose flesh is allowable for bhikkhus to eat (see the

introduction to the Food Chapter in the pacittiya rules).

//Fresh butter// must be made from the milk of any animal whose

flesh is allowable.  None of the Vinaya texts go into detail on how

fresh butter is made, but the Bhumija Discourse (M.126) describes

the process as "having sprinkled curds in a pot, one twirls them

with a churn."  Fresh butter of this sort is still made in India

today by taking a small churn -- looking like an orange with

alternate sections removed, attached to a small stick -- and

twirling it in curds, all the while sprinkling them with water.  The

fresh butter -- mostly milk fat plus some milk solids -- coagulates

on the churn, and when the fresh butter is removed, what is left in

the pot is diluted buttermilk.  Fresh butter, unlike creamery butter

made by churning cream, may be stored unrefrigerated in bottles for

several days even in the heat of India without going rancid.

Arguing by the Great Standards, creamery butter would obviously

come under fresh butter here.  A more controversial topic is cheese.

In Mahavagga VI.34.21, the Buddha allows bhikkhus to consume five

products of the cow:  milk, curds, buttermilk, fresh butter, and

ghee.  Apparently, cheese -- curds heated to evaporate their liquid

content and then cured with or without mold -- was not known in

those days, but it seems proper to include it under one of the five.

The question is which one.  Some have argued that it should come

under fresh butter, since the composition is similar -- milk fat and

solids derived from curds.  Others have argued that it should come

under curds, as it generally regarded to be more of a gross food.

Since the texts give no guidance here, the best policy would seem to

be to follow the views of the Community to which one belongs.

//Oil//, according to the Vibhanga, includes sesame oil, mustard

seed oil, "honey tree" oil, castor oil, and oil from tallow.  The

Mahavagga (VI.2.1) allows oil made from five kinds of tallow:  bear,

fish, alligator (shark?), pig, and donkey tallow.  Since bear meat

is one of the kinds normally unallowable for bhikkhus, the

Sub-commentary interprets this list as meaning oil from the tallow

of any animal whose flesh is allowable -- and from any animal whose

flesh, if eaten, carries a dukkata -- is allowable here.  Since

human flesh, if eaten, carries a thullaccaya, oil from human fat is

not allowed.  The Commentary adds that oil made from any plants not

listed in the Vibhanga carries a dukkata if kept more than seven

days.

//Honey// means the honey of bees, although the Commentary lists

two species of bee -- //cirika//, long and with wings, and

//tumbala//, large, black and with hard wings -- whose honey it says

is very viscous and ranks as a medicine, not as one of the five

tonics.

//Sugar/molasses// the Vibhanga defines simply as essence of sugar

cane.  The Commentary interprets this as meaning not only sugar and

molasses, but also fresh sugar cane juice.  The Vinaya Mukha

disagrees here, saying that sugar cane juice, if kept overnight, can

quickly turn into alcohol and so should be classed as a juice drink.

The Commentary also says that sugar or molasses made from any fruit

classed as a food -- e.g., coconut, date palm, sugar beet, etc. --

ranks as a food and not as a tonic, but it is hard to guess at its

reasoning here, since sugar cane itself is also classed as a food.

The Vinaya Mukha seems more correct in using the Great Standards to

say that all forms of sugar and molasses, no matter what the source,

would be included here.  Thus artificial sweeteners would also come

under this rule.

According to Mv.VI.16.1, even if the sugar has a little flour

mixed in with it simply to make it firmer -- as sometimes happens in

sugar cubes and blocks of palm sugar -- it is still classed as a

tonic as long as it is still regarded simply as "sugar."  If there

is enough flour mixed in so that people are conscious of the flour's

being there, or if the flour is meant to serve more than simply as a

firming agent, the mixture counts as a food and may not be eaten

after noon of the day on which it is received.

Proper use.  According to Mv.VI.40.3, any tonic received today may

be eaten mixed with food or juice drinks received today, but not

with food or juice drinks received on a later day.  Thus, as the

Commentary points out, tonics received in the morning may be eaten

with food that morning; if received in the afternoon, they may not

be eaten mixed with food at any time at all.

Also, the Commentary says at one point, one may take the tonic at

any time during those seven days regardless of whether or not one is

ill.  At another point, though, it says that one may take the tonic

after the morning of the day on which it is received only if one has

a reason.  This statement the Sub-commentary explains as meaning

that any reason suffices -- e.g., hunger, weakness -- as long as one

is not taking the tonic for nourishment as food.  In other words,

one may take enough to assuage one's hunger, but not to fill oneself

up.

Mv.VI.27, though, contains a special stipulation for the use of

sugar.  If one is ill, one may take it "as is" at any time during

the seven days; if not, then after noon of the first day one make

take it only if it is mixed with water.

Forfeiture & confession.  If a bhikkhu keeps a tonic past the

seventh dawn after receiving it, he is to forfeit it and confess the

nissaggiya pacittiya offense.  Perception is not a mitigating factor

here.  Even if he thinks that seven days have not yet passed when

they actually have -- or thinks that the tonic is no longer in his

possession when it actually is -- he incurs the penalty all the same

(%).

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the tonic

are the same as under NP 1.  The formula to use in forfeiting the

tonic is given in Appendix VI.  Once the bhikkhu receives the tonic

in return, he may not use it to eat or to apply to his body,

although he may use it for other external purposes, such as oil for

a lamp, etc.  Other bhikkhus may not eat the tonic either, but they

may apply it to their bodies -- for example, as oil to rub down

their limbs.

Non-offenses.  According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if

within seven days the tonic gets lost, destroyed, burnt, stolen, or

taken on trust; or if the bhikkhu determines it for use, abandons it

or -- having given it away to an unordained person, abandoning

possession of it in his mind -- he receives it in return and makes

use of it (%).

The Commentary has an extended discussion of the last three

points.

1)  Determining the tonic for use means that, within the seven

days, the bhikkhu determines that he will use it not as a medicine,

but only to apply to the outside of his body or for other external

purposes instead.  In this case, he may keep the tonic as long as he

likes without penalty.

2)  Unlike the other rules dealing with robe-cloth or bowls kept X

number of days, the no-offense clauses here do not include

exemptions for tonics placed under dual ownership, but the

Commentary discusses "abandons it" as if it read "places it under

dual ownership."  Its verdict:  Any tonic placed under dual

ownership may be kept for more than seven days without incurring a

penalty as long as the owners do not divide up their shares, but

after the seventh day they may not use it for internal purposes.

The Sub-commentary adds that any tonic placed under dual ownership

may not be used at all until the arrangement is rescinded.

3)  The Commentary reports a controversy between two Vinaya

experts on the meaning of the last exemption in the list -- i.e.,

"having given it away to an unordained person, abandoning possession

of it in his mind, he receives it in return and makes use of it."

Ven. Maha Sumatthera states that the phrase, "if within seven days"

applies here as well:  If within seven days the bhikkhu gives the

tonic to an unordained person, having abandoned possession of it in

his mind, he may then keep it and consume it for another seven days

if the unordained person happens to return it to him.

Ven. Maha Padumathera disagrees, saying that the exemption

"abandons it" already covers such a case, and that the exemption

here refers to the situation where a bhikkhu has kept a tonic past

seven days, has forfeited it and received it in return, and then

gives it up to an unordained person.  If the unordained person then

returns the tonic to him, he may use it to rub on his body.

The K/Commentary agrees with the latter position, but this creates

some problems, both textual and practical.  To begin with, the

phrase, "if within seven days," modifies every one of the other

no-offense clauses, and there is nothing to indicate that it does

not modify this one, too.  Secondly, every one of the other

exemptions refers directly to ways of avoiding the full offense, and

not to ways of dealing with the forfeited article after it is

returned, and again there is nothing to indicate that the last

exemption breaks this pattern.

On the practical side, if the exemption "abandons it" covers cases

where a bhikkhu may give up the tonic to anyone at all and then

receive it in return to use for another seven days, bhikkhus could

spend their time trading hoards of tonics among themselves

indefinitely, and the rule would become meaningless.  But as the

origin story shows, it was precisely to prevent them from amassing

such hoards that the rule was formulated in the first place.

"Then Ven. Pilindavaccha approached the residence of King

Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha, and on arrival sat down on an

appointed seat.  Then King Seniya Bimbisara... approached

Ven. Pilindavaccha and, paying homage, sat down to one side.

As he sat there, Ven. Pilindavaccha addressed him:  'For

what reason, great king, has the monastery attendant's

family been imprisoned?'

"'Sir, in the monastery attendant's house was a garland of

gold:  beautiful, attractive, exquisite.  There is no

garland of gold like it even in our own women's quarters.

From where could he have gotten it?  It must have been

stolen.'

"Then Ven. Pilindavaccha willed that the palace of King

Seniya Bimbisara be gold.  And it became made entirely of

gold.  'But from where did you get so much gold, great

king?'

"(Saying,) 'I understand, sir.  This is simply the master's

psychic power,' he had the monastery attendant's family

released.

"The people, saying, 'The master Pilindavaccha displayed a

psychic wonder, a superior human feat, to the king and his

retinue,' were gladdened and delighted.  They presented Ven.

Pilindavaccha with the five tonics:  ghee, fresh butter,

oil, honey, and sugar.

"Now ordinarily Ven. Pilindavaccha was already a receiver of

the five tonics, so he distributed his gains among his

company, who came to live in abundance.  They put away their

gains having filled pots and pitchers.  They hung up their

gains having filled water strainers and bags.  These kept

oozing and seeping, and their dwellings were crawling and

creeping with rats.  People, engaged in a tour of the

dwellings, having seen this, were offended and annoyed and

spread it about, 'These Sakyan contemplatives have inner

store rooms like the king....'"

Thus it seems more likely that the Vibhanga's no-offense clauses

should be interpreted like this:  A bhikkhu is no longer held

responsible for a tonic if he abandons it or gives it away -- no

matter who he gives it to, or what his state of mind -- but he may

receive it in return and use it another seven days only if he has

given it to an unordained person, having abandoned all possession of

it in his mind.

Summary:  Keeping any of the five tonics -- ghee, fresh

butter, oil, honey, or sugar/molasses -- for more than seven

days, unless one determines to use them only externally, is

a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

24. When a month is left to the hot season, a bhikkhu may

seek a rains-bathing cloth.  When a half-month is left to

the hot season, (the cloth) having been made, may be worn.

If when more than a month is left to the hot season he

should seek a rains-bathing cloth, (or) when more than a

half-month is left to the hot season, (the cloth) having

been made should be worn, it is to be forfeited and

confessed.

Bhikkhus in the time of the Buddha commonly bathed in a river or

lake.  Passages in the Canon give an indication of some of the

dangers involved:  They had to watch over their robes to make sure

they weren't stolen or washed away by the river, and at the same

time make sure they didn't expose themselves.  (S.II.10 tells of a

female deity who, seeing a young bhikkhu bathing, became smitten

with the sight of him wearing only his under robe.  She appeared to

him, suggesting that he leave the monkhood to take his fill of

sensual pleasures before his youth had past, but fortunately he was

far enough in the practice to resist her advances.)  A further

danger during the rainy season was that the rivers would become

swollen and their currents strong.  During this time, then, bhikkhus

would bathe in the rain.

Rains-bathing cloth.  The Mahavagga (Mv.VIII.15.1-7) contains the

story of a servant girl who went to a monastery and -- seeing

bhikkhus out bathing naked in the rain -- concluded that there were

no bhikkhus there, but only naked ascetics.  She returned to tell

her mistress, Lady Visakha, who realized what was actually happening

and made this the occasion to ask permission of the Buddha to

provide rains-bathing cloths for the bhikkhus, because as she put

it, "Nakedness is repulsive."  He granted her request, and at a

later point (Mv.VIII.20.2) stated that a rains-bathing cloth could

be determined for use during the four months of the rainy season --

beginning with the day after the full moon in July, or the second if

there are two -- and that at the end of the four months it was to be

placed under dual ownership.  This training rule deals with the

protocol for seeking and using such a cloth during the rains and the

period immediately preceding them.

The protocol is sketched out in the Vibhanga, the details being

filled in by the Commentary as follows:  During the first two weeks

of the fourth lunar month of the hot season -- the lunar cycle

ending with the full moon in July, or the first if there are two --

a bhikkhu may seek a rains-bathing cloth and make it if he gets

enough material, but may not yet use it or determine it for use.  In

seeking the cloth he may directly ask for it from relatives or

people who have invited him to ask, or he may approach people who

have provided rains-bathing cloths in the past and give them such

hints as:  "It is the time for material for a rains-bathing cloth,"

or "People are giving material for a rains-bathing cloth."   If he

asks directly from people who are not relatives or who have not

invited him to ask, he incurs a dukkata; if he then receives cloth

from them, he incurs the full penalty under NP 6.  If he gives hints

to people who have never provided rains-bathing cloths in the past,

he incurs a dukkata.

During the last two weeks of the fourth lunar month of the hot

season he may now begin using his cloth, although he may not yet

determine it for use.  This shows clearly that this rule is

providing an exemption to NP 1, under which he otherwise would be

forced to determine the cloth within ten days after receiving it.

If he has not yet received enough material, he may continue seeking

for more in the way described above and make himself a cloth when he

receives enough.

When the first day of the rainy season arrives, he may determine

the cloth.  If he does not yet have enough material to make his

rains-bathing cloth, he may continue seeking it throughout the four

months of the rains.  If he bathes naked in the rain when he has a

cloth to use, he incurs a dukkata, although he may bathe naked in a

lake or river without penalty.  If he has no cloth to use, he may

also bathe naked in the rain.

At the end of the four months, he is to wash his cloth, place it

under dual ownership, and put it aside if it is still usable.  He

may begin using it again the last two weeks of the last lunar month

before the next rainy season and is to redetermine it for use on the

day the rainy season officially begins.

Towards the end of his discussion of this rule, Buddhaghosa adds

his own personal opinion on when the rains-bathing cloth should be

determined for use if it is finished during the rains -- on the

grounds that the ancient commentaries do not discuss the issue --

one of the few places where he overtly gives his own opinion

anywhere in the Commentary.   His verdict:  If one receives enough

material to finish the cloth within ten days, one should determine

it within those ten days.  If not, one may keep what material one

has, undetermined and throughout the rainy season if need be, until

one does obtain enough material and then determine the cloth on the

day it is completed.

Offenses.  As the K/Commentary points out, this rule covers two

separate offenses whose factors are somewhat different:  the offense

for seeking a rains-bathing cloth at the wrong time and that for

using it at the wrong time.

//Seeking//.  The factors here are three:  object, effort, and

result.  The bhikkhu is looking for material for a rains-bathing

cloth, he makes hints to people during the time he is not allowed to

make hints, and he receives the cloth.  There is a dukkata in the

hinting and a full offense in receiving the cloth.

//Using//.  The factors here are two:  object -- he has a

rains-bathing cloth -- and effort -- he has other robes to use,

there are no dangers, and yet he wears the cloth during the period

when he is not allowed to wear it.  (The conditions here are based

on the no-offenses clauses, which we will discuss below.)

In neither of these cases is perception a mitigating factor.  Even

if a bhikkhu thinks that the right time to hint for the cloth or to

wear it has come when it actually hasn't, he is not immune from an

offense.

Forfeiture & confession.  A bhikkhu who has committed either of

the two full offenses here is to forfeit the cloth and confess the

offense.  The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of

the cloth are the same as under NP 1.

Non-offenses.  As the rule states, there is no offense for the

bhikkhu who hints for a rains-bathing cloth within the last lunar

month of the hot season, or for one who wears his rains-bathing

cloth during the last two weeks of that month.

The Vibhanga then refers to a situation that occasionally happens

under the lunar calendar:  The four months of the hot season end,

but the Rains Retreat is delayed another lunar cycle due to the fact

that a thirteenth lunar month has to be added to that year in order

to bring the lunar year back into line with the solar year.  (This

usually occurs when there are two full moons in July.)  In this

case, it says that the rains-bathing cloth -- having been sought for

during the fourth month and worn during the last two weeks of the

hot season -- is to be washed and then put aside.  When the proper

season arrives, it may be brought out for use (%).

The Commentary adds that there is no need to determine the cloth

in this period until the day the Rains Retreat officially starts,

but it doesn't say whether the proper season to use the cloth begins

with the Rains Retreat or two weeks before.  It would make sense to

allow the bhikkhu to begin using the cloth two weeks before, but

this is simply my own opinion.

The Vibhanga then adds three more exemptions:  There is no offense

for a "stolen-robe" bhikkhu, a "destroyed-robe" bhikkhu, or when

there are dangers.  The Commentary interprets "robe" here as meaning

rains-bathing cloth, and says that these exemptions apply to the

dukkata offense for bathing naked in the rain.  A bhikkhu whose

rains-bathing cloth has been stolen or destroyed may bathe naked in

the rain without incurring a penalty, as may a bhikkhu with an

expensive bathing cloth who would rather bathe naked because of his

fear of cloth thieves.

Strangely enough,  Buddhaghosa's own K/Commentary makes the

Vibhanga's exemptions refer also to the full offense.  If a

bhikkhu's other robes have been stolen or destroyed, he may wear his

rains-bathing cloth out of season.  The same holds true when, in the

words of the K/Commentary, "naked thieves are plundering," and a

bhikkhu decides to wear his rains-bathing cloth out-of-season in

order to protect either it or his other robes from being stolen.

The Sub-commentary follows the K/Commentary in holding to both

interpretations.

At present, much of this discussion is purely academic, inasmuch

as most bhikkhus -- if they use a bathing cloth -- tend to determine

it for use as a "cloth accessory" so as to avoid any possible

offense under this rule.

Summary:  Seeking and receiving a rains-bathing cloth before

the fourth month of the hot season is a nissaggiya pacittiya

offense.

Using a rains-bathing cloth before the last two weeks of the

fourth month of the hot season is also a nissaggiya

pacittiya offense.

* * *

25. Should any bhikkhu, having himself given a robe-cloth to

(another) bhikkhu, and then being angered and displeased,

snatch it back or have it snatched back, it is to be

forfeited and confessed.

"At that time Ven. Upananda the Sakyan said to his brother's

student, 'Come, friend, let's set out on a tour of the

countryside.'

"'I can't go, sir.  My robe is threadbare.'

"'Come, friend, I'll give you a robe.'  And he gave him a

robe.  Then that bhikkhu heard, 'The Blessed One, they say,

is going to set out on a tour of the countryside.'  The

thought occurred to him:  'In that case I won't set out on a

tour of the countryside with Ven. Upananda the Sakyan.  I'll

set out on a tour of the countryside with the Blessed One.'

"Then Ven. Upananda said to him, 'Come, friend, let's set

out on that tour of the countryside now.'

"'I won't set out on a tour of the countryside with you,

sir.  I'll set out on a tour of the countryside with the

Blessed One.'

"'But the robe I gave you, my friend, will set out on a tour

of the countryside with //me//.'  And angered and

displeased, he snatched the robe back."

As the Commentary points out, this rule applies to cases where one

perceives the robe-cloth as being rightfully one's own even after

having given it away, as when giving it on an implicit or explicit

condition that the recipient does not later fulfill.  Thus the act

of snatching away here does not entail a parajika.  If, however, one

has mentally abandoned ownership of the robe and then for some

reason snatches it back, the case would come under Parajika 2.

The factors for an offense here are two.

Object:  a piece of any of the six allowable kinds of robe-cloth,

measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths.

Effort.  One has given the cloth to another bhikkhu on one

condition or another and then, angered and displeased with him,

either snatches it back or has someone else snatch it back.  In the

latter case, one incurs a dukkata in giving the order to snatch the

robe, and the full offense when the robe is snatched.  Perception

(with regard to the recipient/victim) is not a mitigating factor

here.  If he actually is a bhikkhu, then whether or not one

perceives him to be so makes no difference as far as the offense is

concerned.

Forfeiture & confession.  A bhikkhu who has obtained robe-cloth in

violation of this rule is to forfeit it and confess the offense.

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth

are the same as under NP 1.  The formula to use in forfeiting the

cloth is given in Appendix VI.

Lesser offenses.  There is a dukkata for angrily snatching back

from a bhikkhu requisites other than cloth; and for angrily

snatching back any kind of requisite -- cloth or otherwise -- that

one has given to someone who is not a bhikkhu.  The Sub-commentary

adds that to give robe-cloth to a layman planning to be ordained,

and then to snatch it back in this way after his ordination, entails

the full offense.

According to the Vibhanga, there is no offense if the recipient

returns the robe of his own accord or if the donor takes it back on

trust (%).  The Commentary's discussion of the first exemption shows

that if the recipient returns the robe after receiving a gentle hint

from the donor -- "I gave you the robe in hopes that you would study

with me, but now you are studying with someone else" -- the donor

incurs no penalty.  But if the donor's hint shows anger -- "I gave

this robe to a bhikkhu who would study with me, not to one who would

study with somebody else!" -- he incurs a dukkata for the hint, but

no penalty when the recipient returns the robe.

Summary:  Having given another bhikkhu a robe on a condition

and then -- angry and displeased -- snatching it back or

having it snatched back is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

26. Should any bhikkhu, having requested thread, have a robe

woven by weavers, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The factors for an offense here are three: object, effort, and

result.

1) //Object//:  thread or yarn of the six allowable types for

robe-cloth, that a bhikkhu -- with the purpose of making a robe --

has requested from people who are not his relatives or who have not

invited him to ask.

2) //Effort//:  He takes this thread to weavers who are unrelated

to him and have not offered their services for free, and gets them

to weave him robe-cloth measuring at least four by eight

fingerbreadths.

3) //Result//:  He receives the cloth.

Offenses.  The Commentary has a table that works out the various

combinations of offenses here based on two variables:  thread

properly or improperly received, and weavers proper or improper for

the bhikkhu to ask.  Thread properly received is any that the

bhikkhu has requested from people who are related to him or have

invited him to ask.  Similarly, weavers proper for him to ask are

any who are related to him or have offered him their services.

If both the thread and the weavers are classed as not proper,

there is a dukkata in getting them to weave cloth, and a nissaggiya

pacittiya in receiving the cloth when it is done.

There is a dukkata in receiving the cloth if the thread is proper,

but the weavers not; OR if the thread is not proper, but the weavers

are.  (For ease of remembrance:  a dukkata if one variable is proper

and the other not.)

If both variables are proper, there is no offense.

The Commentary then has a field day working out the permutations

if two different weavers -- one proper and one improper -- work on

the cloth, or if proper and improper thread are used in the cloth --

proper warp and improper woof, or alternating strands of proper and

improper thread -- which if nothing else goes to show how few truly

burning issues have sprung up around this rule.

Forfeiture & confession.  Robe-cloth received in a way that

entails the full offense under this rule is to be forfeited and the

offense confessed, following the procedure under NP 1.

Non-offenses.  The Vibhanga says that there is no offense "to sew

a robe, or in a binding, a belt, a shoulder-strap, a bag for

carrying the bowl, or a water-strainer."  The Commentary interprets

this as meaning that there is no offense in asking for thread or

yarn to sew a robe or to make any of the other things listed.  Since

these articles are small, and since bhikkhus are allowed looms

(Cv.V.28.2), perhaps they are things that bhikkhus could be expected

to make themselves.

The no-offense clauses also say that there is no offense if they

-- the donors or the weavers -- are relatives, if they have invited

one to ask, if the cloth is for the sake of another, or if it is by

means of one's own property.  These exemptions apply both to asking

for thread and for getting weavers to weave cloth.  As under NP 6 &

22, "for the sake of another" means that one may ask from one's own

relatives or from those who have invited one to ask OR from

relatives of the other person or people who have invited him to ask.

Asking for his sake from people other than these would entail the

full offense.

If the cloth is obtained by means of one's own property -- i.e.,

one arranges to pay for the thread and hire the weavers -- the

Commentary states that one is responsible for the cloth as soon as

it is finished and fully paid for, whether or not it is delivered

into one's possession.  One must therefore determine it for use

within 10 days of that date so as not to commit an offense under NP

1.  If the weavers have promised to send word when the cloth is

done, one's responsibility starts when one receives word from their

messenger; similarly, if they have promised to send the cloth when

done, one's responsibility begins when their messenger delivers it.

Summary: Taking thread that one has asked for improperly and

getting weavers to weave cloth from it -- when they are

unrelated and have not made a previous offer to weave -- is

a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

27. In case a man or woman householder unrelated to a

bhikkhu has weavers weave robe-cloth for his sake, and if

the bhikkhu, not previously invited (by the householder),

having approached the weavers, should make stipulations with

regard to the cloth, saying, "This cloth, friends, is to be

woven for my sake.  Make it long, make it broad, make it

tightly woven, well woven, well spread, well scraped, well

smoothed, and perhaps I may reward you with a little

something;" and should the bhikkhu, having said that, reward

them with a little something, even as much as alms food, it

(the cloth) is to be forfeited and confessed.

Here the factors for an offense are four:

Object:  a piece of any of the six allowable types of robe-cloth,

measuring at least four by eight fingerbreadths, which is being made

for one's sake by the arrangement of a donor who is unrelated and

has not given an invitation to ask.

Intention.  One wants to get better cloth than what the donors are

planning to give.

Effort.  One approaches the weavers and gets them to increase the

amount of thread going into the cloth.  The Commentary explains that

the bhikkhu's words quoted in the rule are meant simply to be an

example of any way in which one might do this.  The Vibhanga defines

the reward of "alms food" as covering anything of even the slightest

material value -- food, a lump of powder, tooth wood, unwoven

thread, or even a phrase of Dhamma.  A bhikkhu who offers to pay for

the extra thread in full would thus also fulfill this factor.

The Sub-commentary adds that even if the bhikkhu doesn't deliver

the reward, this factor is fulfilled all the same as long as the

weavers, as a result of his stipulations, actually increase the

amount of thread from that which they and the donors had agreed on.

Result.  One receives the cloth.

Offenses.  The bhikkhu incurs a dukkata as soon as the weavers add

even a little extra thread to the cloth, and the full offense when

he receives it.  The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and

return of the cloth are the same as under NP 1.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense if --

the donors are relatives,

they have invited one to ask,

one asks for the sake of another,

one gets the weavers to make the cloth less expensive than the

donors had ordered, or

if it is by means of one's own property.  (This last point refers

only to cases where the bhikkhu was the one who had the weavers

hired in the first place.)

Summary:  When donors who are not relatives -- and have not

invited one to ask -- have arranged for weavers to weave

robe-cloth intended for one:  Receiving the cloth after

getting the weavers to increase the amount of thread used in

it is a nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

28.Ten days prior to the third-month Kattika full moon,

should robe-cloth offered in urgency accrue to a bhikkhu, he

is to accept it if he regards it as offered in urgency.

Once he has accepted it, he may keep it throughout the robe

season.  Beyond that, it is to be forfeited and confessed.

The //third-month Kattika full moon// is the full moon in October,

or the first if there are two.  This is the final day of the Rains

Retreat, and the day before the beginning of the robe season.

//Robe-cloth offered in urgency// is any piece of the six

allowable kinds of robe-cloth, measuring at least four by eight

fingerbreadths, offered by a person who does not want to wait until

the robe season to make an offering, either because his/her survival

is in doubt -- as when a soldier is going into war, a traveler is

about to set out on a journey, or a woman has become pregnant -- or

because he/she has developed new-found faith in the religion.

The Commentary points out that the period allowed for giving

robe-cloth offered in urgency begins on the fifth day of the waxing

moon before the end of the Rains Retreat; and that robe-cloth

offered to an individual bhikkhu beginning on the sixth day of the

waning moon can, under NP 1, be kept throughout the robe season

because the tenth dawn after the sixth waning moon is the beginning

of the robe season. Thus it would seem that this rule is giving only

a one-day special allowance.

However, we should note that the Vibhanga implicitly, and the

Commentary explicitly, treat robe-cloth offered in urgency as

in-season cloth (see NP 3):  In other words, the cloth goes to the

Community, and is to be divided only among those bhikkhus who spend

the Rains Retreat in that Community.  Thus if a bhikkhu has broken

the retreat, he must return his share to the Community, as he no

longer has any right to it.

The factors for an offense here are two:  //object// -- robe-cloth

offered in urgency; and //effort// -- one keeps it past the end of

the robe season:  the dawn after the full moon following the Rains

Retreat, if one does not participate in a kathina; or the end of

one's kathina privileges, if one does.  And, as noted above, if one

has broken one's Retreat, one has no right to any share in such

cloth and must return it to the Community immediately.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here.  Thus if the period to

keep the cloth has passed even though one thinks it hasn't -- or if

it is not determined for use, etc., when one thinks it is -- one is

still subject to the offense all the same.

The procedures for forfeiture, confession, and return of the cloth

are the same as under NP 1.  See Appendix VI for the Pali formula to

use in forfeiting the cloth.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense if, before the robe season is

over, one determines the cloth, places it under dual ownership, or

abandons it (gives it away or throws it away); if it is lost,

destroyed, burnt, or stolen, or if someone else takes it on trust.

Summary:  Keeping robe-cloth offered in urgency past the end

of the robe season after having accepted it during the last

eleven days of the Rains Retreat is a nissaggiya pacittiya

offense.

* * *

29. There are wilderness abodes that are considered dubious

and risky.  A bhikkhu living in such abodes after the

(fourth-month) Kattika full moon has passed may keep any one

of his three robes in a village if he so desires.  Should he

have any reason to live apart from the robe, he may do so

for six nights at most.  If he should live apart from it

longer than that -- unless authorized by the bhikkhus -- it

is to be forfeited and confessed.

As we noted under NP 2, every bhikkhu who has spent the Rains

Retreat has the right to live separated from his set of three robes

during the following month.  This rule is a partial one-month

extension of this right for bhikkhus living in dangerous wilderness

areas.  The reason for this extension is that this one-month period

was when thieves were active -- perhaps because they knew that

bhikkhus had just received new cloth, or simply because now that

roads were passable again it was time for them to get back to their

work.

The Commentary defines this situation in terms of four factors:

1)  The bhikkhu has spent the first Rains Retreat -- the one

beginning with the full moon in July, or the second full moon if

there are two in that month -- without break.

2) He is staying in a wilderness abode, defined in the Vibhanga as

one at least 500 bow-lengths, or one kilometer, from the nearest

village, this distance being measured by the shortest walkable

path between the two and not as the crow flies.  At the same

time, he is not so far from a village that he cannot go for alms

there in the morning and then return to eat in his abode before

noon.

3)  The abode is dubious and risky:  dubious in that thieves are

known to be about, risky in that people are known to have been

hurt or plundered by them.

4)  The time period for the extension is one month beginning the

day after the fourth Kattika moon, the full moon one month after

the end of the Rains Retreat.

The dawn after this full moon day is when the robe season normally

ends for those bhikkhus who have not participated in a kathina.

However, a bhikkhu living in the situation outlined above may keep

one of his set of triple robes in the village where he normally goes

for alms, and -- if he has a reason -- may stay apart from it six

nights at most.  As usual, nights are counted by dawns.

The factors for an offense here are two:  //object// -- one of a

bhikkhu's basic set of three robes; and //effort// -- staying away

from the robe past the sixth dawn after first being apart from it.

Perception is not a mitigating factor here:  Even if one thinks that

six nights have not passed when they actually have, one is not

immune from the offense.

As the Sub-commentary points out, the Commentary and K/Commentary

differ in their definition of the factor of effort here.  According

to the K/Commentary, the bhikkhu staying in a forest abode during

the period in question is counted as being apart from his robe when

it is placed in the village, and thus can keep it there while he is

in his forest abode only six nights at a stretch.  Thus, it says, if

he is in his wilderness abode at the sixth dawn, he incurs the full

penalty.

The Commentary, however, maintains that the bhikkhu staying in the

wilderness abode is not counted as being apart from his robe when it

is placed in the village, but if he leaves that abode on business

and lets his robe remain in the village, he may stay away from the

abode only six nights at a stretch.  Thus, it says, if in returning

from his business he cannot make it to his forest abode by the sixth

dawn, and the village is closer, he may stop over in the village

long enough to check up on the robe and still be immune from the

offense.

The second interpretation makes more sense, in that if the bhikkhu

is staying in his abode and going for alms in the village, he may

check up on his robe every day.  It is also more in line with the

Vibhanga's definition of "any reason" -- i.e., "any business" --

which indicates situations where the bhikkhu would be away from his

abode.  The Sub-commentary, following Bhadanta Buddhadatta Thera,

adopts the second interpretation.

Forfeiture & confession.  A bhikkhu under these conditions who has

been away from his robe for more than six nights is to forfeit it

and confess the offense.  The procedures for forfeiture, confession,

and return of the robe are the same as under NP 1.  The Pali formula

for forfeiting the robe is in Appendix VI.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense for a bhikkhu who has stayed

away from his robe six nights or less; or

if, having been apart from his robe six nights, he enters the

village boundary (and, according to the Commentary, stays long

enough to check up on his robe);

if, within the six nights, he rescinds the determination of the

robe, places it under dual ownership, abandons it; or the robe

gets lost, burnt, destroyed, stolen, or taken by someone on

trust;

or if he has been authorized by the Community to be apart from his

robe.  (This, according to the Commentary, refers to the

authorization discussed under NP 2.)

The commentaries refer the reader to NP 2 for the remaining

explanations to this rule, which would seem to indicate that if a

bhikkhu's kathina privileges are still in effect, he is also immune

from an offense under this rule during the period in question no

matter how many nights he is away from his robe.

Summary:  When one is living in a dangerous wilderness abode

during the month after the fourth Kattika full moon and has

left one of one's robes in the village where one normally

goes for alms:  Being away from the abode and the village

for more than six nights at a stretch -- except when

authorized by the Community -- is a nissaggiya pacittiya

offense.

* * *

30. Should any bhikkhu knowingly divert to himself gains

that had been intended for a Community, they are to be

forfeited and confessed.

"Now in Savatthi at that time a certain guild had prepared a

meal with cloth for the Community, (thinking,) 'Having fed

(the bhikkhus) we will supply them with cloth.'

"Then some group-of-six bhikkhus went to where the guild

members were staying and on arrival said, 'Give us these

cloths, friends.'

"'We can't, sirs.  We arrange alms with cloth for the

Community (like this) on a yearly basis.'

"'The Community has lots of donors, my friends.  The

Community gets lots of meals.  It is in dependence on you,

looking to you, that we live here.  If you won't give to us,

is there anyone who will?  Give us the cloths, friends.'

"So the guild, pressured by the group-of-six bhikkhus, gave

them what cloth they had prepared and then served the meal

to the Community.  The bhikkhus who knew that a meal with

cloth had been prepared, but not that the cloth had been

given to the group-of-six bhikkhus, addressed the guild

members:  'Present the cloth to the Community, friends.'

"'There isn't any, sirs.  What cloth we had prepared, the

masters -- the group-of-six bhikkhus -- have diverted to

themselves.'

"Those bhikkhus who were of few wants...were offended and

annoyed and spread it about:  'How can these group-of-six

bhikkhus divert to themselves gains intended for the

Community?'"

There are four factors for an offense here.

Object:  any requisite -- "robe-cloth, alms-food, lodgings,

medicine, even a lump of powder, toothwood, or unwoven thread" --

that donors have indicated by word or gesture that they intend to

give to a Community.  As the Commentary notes, //donors// here

include not only lay people in general, but also one's fellow

bhikkhus and relatives -- even one's own mother:  The fact that a

gift is intended for a Community overrides all other considerations,

even when one is ill.

Perception.  One perceives that the donors have intended the

requisite for a Community (%).

Effort.  One tries to persuade them that they should give it to

oneself instead.  This in itself, following on the first two

factors, entails a dukkata.

Result.  One receives the article from the donors.  This entails

the full offense.

Forfeiture & confession.  Any gains received in violation of this

rule are to be forfeited and the offense confessed.  The procedures

here are the same as under NP 1.  The Pali formula for forfeiting

the gains is in Appendix VI.

Related offenses.  If one knowingly tries to divert gains intended

for a Community to oneself, but the donors go ahead and give the

gains to the Community anyway, then the Commentary says that one

should not have a share in them.  If one does receive a share from

the Community, one should return it.  If, instead of returning it,

one shares it among lay people, the case is to be treated under

Parajika 2.

If one is in doubt as to whether items are intended for the

Community but goes ahead and diverts them anyway, one incurs a

dukkata regardless of whether the items really were intended for the

Community or not (%).

To divert items intended for a Community to another individual

entails a pacittiya under Pacittiya 82.  To divert items intended

for one Community of bhikkhus to another Community or to a shrine,

entails a dukkata.  The same holds true for diverting items intended

for a shrine to a Community, to an individual, or to another shrine;

and for diverting items intended for an individual to a Community,

to a shrine, or to another individual.

The Commentary states that the term //individual// here can mean

common animals as well as human beings, and that this last case thus

includes even such things as saying, "Don't give it to that dog.

Give it to this one."  This point is well-taken:  A bhikkhu has no

business interfering with the gains that are to be freely given to

another being, no matter what that being's current status.

The Sub-commentary holds that once an item has been presented by a

donor, there is nothing wrong in diverting it elsewhere.  Thus, it

says, taking flowers presented to one shrine and placing them at

another -- or chasing a dog away from food that has been given to it

so that another dog can have a share -- would be perfectly all

right, but the Thai editors of the Sub-commentary state in a

footnote that they disagree.

Non-offenses.  There is no offense in diverting items to oneself

if one does not perceive them as intended for a Community, another

individual, or a shrine, regardless of whether the donors intended

them that way or not.  Still, one should be careful not to do this

in such a way as to violate any of the other rules on asking from

people who are unrelated or have not given an invitation to ask.

The no-offense clauses recommend a safer line of conduct:  If one

is asked, "To whom should we give this?" one may answer, "Give

wherever your gift would be used, or would be well-cared for, or

would last long, or wherever your mind feels inspired."

Summary:  Persuading a donor to give to oneself a gift that

he or she had planned to give to the Community -- when one

knows that it was intended for the Community -- is a

nissaggiya pacittiya offense.

* * *

A bhikkhu who commits an offense against any of these thirty

nissaggiya pacittiya offenses must first forfeit the item in

question before confessing the offense.  If he makes use of the item

before forfeiting it, he incurs an extra dukkata -- except for money

received in violation of NP 18 or 19, which would involve another

nissaggiya pacittiya if used in trade.  If the item gets lost or

destroyed before the bhikkhu forfeits it, he may simply confess a

pacittiya.

Except in cases where forfeiture must be made to a Community of

four bhikkhus or more (NP 18, 19, & 22), the offender may forfeit

the item to a single bhikkhu, to a group of two or three, or to a

Community of four or more.  Once he has confessed the offense, he is

cleared of the penalty.

In cases where he must forfeit the item to the Community, he may

not receive it in return.  In the remaining cases, though, the item

must be returned to him.  Not to do so entails a dukkata for the

bhikkhu(s) to whom it is forfeited.  In a few cases, there are

restrictions as to what use a bhikkhu may make of an item received

in return after forfeiture -- e.g., he may not use the five tonics

to treat his body internally or externally, and may not use felt

made with silk or composed of more than 1/2 black wool as a rug --

but apart from this he is free to use the returned item as he likes.

The act of forfeiture is thus symbolic in most cases, and the

effect of the rules is more internal:  The offender may not make use

of the item until he has confessed his wrong-doing, and this in

itself should give him time to reflect on his actions.  Similarly,

in the act of handing the nissaggiya item over to another, he has an

opportunity to reflect on whether or not is it worth whatever greed,

anger, or delusion it has sparked in his mind.

Offenses of this and the remaining categories in this book are

classed as light offenses (//lahukapatti//) and are also termed

//desana-gamini//, meaning that they can be cleared through

confession.

* * * * * * * *