CHAPTER FIVE

Sanghadisesa

~~~~~~~~~~~~

This term means "involving the Community in the initial (//adi//)

and subsequent (//sesa//) acts." It refers to the fact that the

Community is the agent that initially calls on the bhikkhu who

breaks any of the rules in this category to undergo the penalty (of

//manatta//, penance, and //parivasa//, probation), subsequently

reimposes the penalty if he does not properly carry it out, and

finally lifts the penalty when he does. There are thirteen training

rules here, the first nine entailing a sanghadisesa immediately on

transgression, the last four only after the offender has been

rebuked three times as a formal act of the Community.

1.Intentional discharge of semen, except while dreaming,

entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

The origin story to this rule is as follows:

"Now at that time Ven. Seyyasaka was leading the celibate

life dissatisfied. Because of this, he was thin, wretched,

unattractive, and jaundiced, his body covered with veins.

Ven. Udayin saw that Ven. Seyyasaka was thin...his body

covered with veins; and seeing him, said to him, 'Seyyasaka,

my friend, why are you thin...your body covered with veins?

Could it be that you're leading the celibate life

dissatisfied?'

"'Yes, friend.'

"'In that case, eat as you like and sleep as you like and

bathe as you like; and having eaten, slept, and bathed as

you like, when dissatisfaction arises and lust assails the

mind, emit semen making do with your hand.'

"'But is it okay to do that?'

"'Of course. I do it myself.'

"So then Ven. Seyyasaka ate as he liked and slept as he

liked...and when dissatisfaction arose and lust assailed his

mind, he would emit semen making do with his hand. Then it

wasn't long before he became attractive, with rounded

features, a clear complexion, and very bright skin. So the

bhikkhus who were his friends said to him, 'Before, friend

Seyyasaka, you were thin...your body covered with veins. But

now you are attractive, with rounded features, a clear

complexion, and very bright skin. Could it be that you're

taking medicine?'

"'No, I'm not taking medicine, my friends. I just eat as

like and sleep as I like...and when dissatisfaction arises

and lust assails my mind, I emit semen making do with my

hand.'

"'But do you emit semen making do with the same hand you use

to eat the gifts of the faithful?'

"'Yes, my friends.'

"So the bhikkhus...were offended and annoyed and spread it

about, 'How can this Ven. Seyyasaka emit semen making do

with the same hand he uses to eat the gifts of the

faithful?'"

This rule, in its outline form, is one of the simplest to explain.

In its details, though, it is one of the most complex, not only

because the subject is a sensitive matter, but also because the

Commentary deviates somewhat from the Vibhanga in its explanations

of two of the three factors that constitute the full offense.

The three factors are result, intention, and effort: Emission of

semen caused by an intentional effort. When all three factors are

present, the offense is a sanghadisesa. If the last two -- intention

and effort -- are present, the offense is a thullaccaya. Any single

factor or any other combination of two factors -- i.e., intention

and result without making a physical effort, or effort and result

without intention -- is not grounds for an offense.

It may seem strange to list the factor of result first, but I want

to explain it first partly because, in understanding the types of

intention and effort covered by this rule, it is necessary to know

what they are aimed at, and also because result is the one factor

where the Vibhanga and Commentary are in basic agreement.

Result. The Commentary discusses the physiology of semen as it was

understood at the time, and in passing touches on the question of

whether the word //semen// refers to the clear liquid produced in

small quantities by the prostrate and Cooper's glands prior to

ejaculation, or to the seminal fluid released at orgasm (in its

words, "having made the whole body shake, it is released and

descends into the urinary tract.") It concludes that the latter is

what is meant here.

As for the Vibhanga, it devotes long passages to the various

colors and qualities that semen can come in, only to conclude that

the color and quality are irrelevant to the offense. This suggests

that a bhikkhu who has had a vasectomy can still commit an offense

under this rule, since he can still discharge the various components

that go into seminal fluid -- minus only the sperm -- at orgasm.

//Discharge//, according to the Vibhanga, refers to the point in

time when the semen "falls from its base." The Commentary explains

this as the point when the semen enters the urinary tract, because

from that point on the process is irreversible. Thus if the process

of sexual stimulation has reached this point, the factor of result

has been fulfilled, even if one tries to prevent the semen from

leaving the body by pinching the end of one's penis.

Intention. The Vibhanga defines //intentionally// as "having made

the decision knowingly, consciously, and purposefully." According to

the Commentary, "having made the decision" refers to the moment when

one "crushes" one's indecisiveness by taking an act. (These are the

same terms it uses to explain the same phrase under Parajika 3 and

several other rules. The meaning is that one has definitely made up

one's mind to start with the act and is not simply toying with the

idea.) //Knowingly// means that one knows that, "I am making an

exertion." //Consciously// means that one is aware that one's

efforts are bringing about an emission of semen. //Purposefully//

means that one's purpose is to enjoy the bringing about of an

emission.

This last point is where the Commentary deviates from the

Vibhanga's discussion of the factor of intention. The Vibhanga,

throughout its analysis, expresses the factor of purpose simply as

"aiming at causing an emission," and it lists ten possible reasons

for wanting to bring the emission about:

for the sake of health,

for the sake of pleasure,

for the sake of a medicine,

for the sake of a gift (to insects, says the Commentary),

for the sake of merit,

for the sake of sacrifice,

for the sake of heaven,

for the sake of seed (to produce a child -- a bhikkhu who gave

semen to be used in artificial insemination would fit in this

category),

for the sake of investigating (to see what color it will be --

ancient medicine sometimes used this as a way of diagnosing

disease), or

for the sake of fun.

Each of these reasons, the Vibhanga says, fulfills the factor of

intention here. Thus for the Commentary to limit the question of

"purpose" strictly to the enjoyment of the act of bringing about an

emission (numbers 2 and 10 in the Vibhanga's list) has no basis in

the Canon. And so the factor of intention under this rule is

fulfilled when one wants to cause an emission of semen, for no

matter what reason.

Given the way //intention// is defined, there is no offense for a

bhikkhu who brings on an emission of semen --

//accidentally// -- e.g., toying with his penis simply for the

pleasure of the contact, when it suddenly and unexpectedly goes

off;

//not knowing that he is making an effort// -- e.g., when he is

dreaming or in a semi-conscious state before fully waking up from

sleep;

//not conscious that his efforts are bringing about an emission of

semen// -- e.g., when he is so engrossed in applying medicine to

a sore on his penis that he doesn't realize that he is bringing

on an ejaculation;

or when his efforts are //motivated by a purpose other than that

of causing an emission// -- e.g., when he wakes up, finds that he

is about to have a spontaneous ejaculation, and grabs hold of his

penis to keep the semen from soiling his robes or bedding.

Effort. The Vibhanga defines four types of effort that fulfill

this factor: A bhikkhu causes an emission making an effort (1) at an

internal object, (2) at an external object, (3) at both an internal

and an external object, or (4) by shaking his pelvis in the air. It

then goes on to explain these terms: The internal object is one's

own living body. External objects can either be animate or inanimate

objects. The third type of effort involves a combination of the

first two, and the fourth covers cases when one makes one's penis

erect ("workable") by making an effort in the air.

The extremely general nature of these definitions gives the

impression that the compilers of the Vibhanga wanted them to cover

every imaginable type of bodily effort aimed at arousing oneself

sexually, and this impression is borne out by the wide variety of

cases covered in the Vinita Vatthu. They include, among others, a

bhikkhu who squeezes his penis with his fist, one who rubs his penis

with his thumb, one who rubs his penis against his bed, one who

inserts his penis into sand, one who bathes against the current in a

stream, one who rubs his preceptor's back in the bathing room, one

who gets an erection from the friction of his thighs and robes while

walking along, one who has his belly heated in the bathing room, and

one who stretches his body. In each of these cases, if the bhikkhu

aims at and succeeds in causing an emission, he incurs a

sanghadisesa.

The Vinita Vatthu also includes a case in which a bhikkhu,

desiring to cause an emission, orders a novice to take hold of his

(the bhikkhu's) penis. He gets his emission and a sanghadisesa to

boot, which shows that getting someone else to make the effort for

one fulfills the factor of effort here.

In discussing the factor of effort, though, the Commentary makes a

slight change in the Vibhanga's definition -- that one makes an

effort //with// or //upon// one's own body, etc., rather than //at//

one's own body, etc. -- and adds an additional factor: that the

effort must be directed at one's own penis. If this is so, then a

bhikkhu who succeeds in causing an emission by stimulating any of

the erogenous zones of his body aside from his penis would incur no

penalty. The Commentary itself actually makes this point, and the

Sub-commentary seconds it, although the V/Sub-commentary says that

such a bhikkhu would incur a dukkata -- what it bases this opinion

on, it doesn't say: perhaps a misreading of the Case of the Sleeping

Novice, which we will discuss below.

At any rate, the Commentary in adding this last factor runs up

against a number of cases in the Vinita Vatthu in which the effort

does not involve the penis: the bhikkhu warming his belly, the

bhikkhu rubbing his preceptor's back, a bhikkhu having his thighs

massaged, and others. The Commentary deals with these cases by

rewriting them, stating in most cases that the effort somehow had to

involve the penis. This in itself is questionable, but when the

Commentary actually contradicts the Vinita Vatthu in the case of the

bhikkhu who warms his belly, saying that this sort of effort could

not involve an offense at all, even if one aims at and succeeds in

causing an emission, the commentators have moved beyond the realm of

commenting into the realm of rewriting the rule.

As stated in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption

that the compilers of the Vibhanga knew the crucial factors well

enough to know what is and is not an offense, and were careful

enough to include all the relevant facts when describing the

precedents in the Vinita Vatthu in order to show how the Buddha

arrived at his judgments. Since the Commentary's position -- adding

the extra factor that the physical effort has to involve one's own

penis -- directly contradicts the Vibhanga on this point, the extra

factor cannot stand.

The question then is why the commentators added the extra factor

in the first place. An answer may be found in one of the cases in

the Vinita Vatthu: the Case of the Sleeping Novice.

"On that occasion a certain bhikkhu grabbed hold of the

penis of a sleeping novice. His semen was emitted. He felt

remorseful....'Bhikkhu, there is no sanghadisesa offense.

There is a dukkata offense.'"

The issue here is whose semen was emitted. Pali syntax, unlike

English, doesn't give us a clue, for there is no rule that the

pronoun in one sentence should refer to the subject of the preceding

sentence. There are many cases under Parajika 3 that follow the

form, "A stone badly held by the bhikkhu standing above hit the

bhikkhu standing below on the head. The bhikkhu died. He felt

remorseful." In these cases it is obvious from the context within

the story which bhikkhu died and which one felt remorseful, while

with the sleeping novice we have to look for the context in terms of

the other parts of the Vibhanga.

If the bhikkhu was the one who emitted semen, then perhaps there

is a contradiction in the Vibhanga, and the Commentary is justified

in saying that the effort must involve one's penis, for otherwise

the case would seem to fulfill the Vibhanga's general definition for

the factor of effort: The bhikkhu is making an effort at an outside

body and has an emission. Following the general pattern of the rule,

he would incur a sanghadisesa if he intended emission, and no

penalty at all if he didn't. Yet the question of intention is not

mentioned at all, and the bhikkhu is given a dukkata, which suggests

an inconsistency.

If, however, the novice was the one who emitted, there is no

inconsistency at all: The bhikkhu gets his dukkata for making

lustful bodily contact with another man (see the discussion under

Sanghadisesa 2, below), and the case is included here to show that

the full offense under this rule concerns instances where one makes

//oneself// emit semen, and not where one makes others emit. (Other

than this case, there is nothing in the rule or the Vibhanga that

expressly makes this point. The rule simply mentions bringing about

the emission of semen, without explicitly mentioning whose. This

would explain the bhikkhu's uncertainty as to whether or not he had

committed a sanghadisesa.) And the reason there is no mention of

whether or not the bhikkhu intended to emit semen is because -- as

it comes under another rule -- it is irrelevant to the case.

Thus, since the second reading -- the novice was the one who had

an emission -- does no violence to the rest of the Vibhanga, it

seems to be the preferable one. So if this was the case that led the

commentators to add their extra factor, we can see that they misread

it, and that the Vibhanga's original definition for the factor of

effort still stands: Any bodily effort made at one's own body, at

another body or physical object, at both, or any effort made in the

air -- like shaking one's pelvis or stretching one's body --

fulfills the factor of effort here.

One case that does //not// fulfill the factor of effort is when

one is filled with lust and stares at the private parts of a woman

or girl. In the case dealing with this contingency, the bhikkhu

emits semen, but again no mention is made of whether he intended to.

In any event, the Buddha lays down a separate rule, imposing a

dukkata for staring lustfully at a women's private parts. This

suggests that efforts with one's eyes do not count as bodily efforts

under this sanghadisesa, for otherwise the penalty would have been a

sanghadisesa if the bhikkhu had intended emission, and no offense if

he hadn't. And this also suggests that the dukkata under this

separate rule holds regardless of intention or result. The

Commentary adds that this dukkata applies also to staring lustfully

at the genitals of a female animal or at the area of a fully-clothed

woman's body where her sexual organ is, thinking, "Her sexual organ

is there." At present we would impose the penalty on a bhikkhu who

stares lustfully at a woman's private parts in a pornographic

photograph.

Consent. A special contingency covered by this rule is mentioned

twice in the Vinita Vatthu for Parajika 1: A woman approaches a

bhikkhu and offers to make him emit semen by making do with her hand

(%). The bhikkhu lets her go ahead, and the Buddha says that he

incurs a sanghadisesa in doing so. The commentaries treat the case

as self-evident and offer no extra details. Thus, given the facts as

we have them, it would seem that consent under this rule can be

expressed physically simply by letting the act happen. A bhikkhu who

acquiesces mentally when someone tries and succeeds in making him

emit semen is not absolved from the full offense here even if he

otherwise lies perfectly still throughout the event.

Derived offenses. As stated above, a bhikkhu who fulfills all

three factors -- result, intention, and effort -- incurs a

sanghadisesa. One who fulfills only the last two -- intention and

effort -- incurs a thullaccaya.

People have sometimes asked how much of an effort is necessary to

incur a thullaccaya and, in particular, whether the thullaccaya is

only for cases where a bhikkhu tries to go all the way to an

emission but cannot have one for physical reasons beyond his control

-- e.g., he is unable to have an erection or to produce semen -- or

whether it also covers cases where a bhikkhu starts out trying to

cause an emission but stops short and changes his mind before the

emission can come.

The Vibhanga suggests indirectly that the penalty covers both

cases when it says simply that the thullaccaya is for one who

intends, makes the effort, but does not emit. If it had meant to

limit the penalty to those who //cannot// emit, it would have said

so and would have set some kind of standard for determining when the

bhikkhu passed the threshold from //does not// to //cannot// so that

there would be no doubt as to where the realm of non-offense ends

and thullaccaya begins. But it doesn't.

The Commentary is even clearer on this topic when it discusses the

case of a bhikkhu who, filled with his lust, grabs his penis with

the purpose of causing an emission but drifts off to sleep before an

emission occurs. The emission does occur while he is asleep, though,

and he incurs a sanghadisesa. Since efforts made during sleep do not

count (see below), this shows that the factor of effort does not

need to go all the way to ejaculation in order to count.

In discussing the case of a bhikkhu with fat thighs who develops

an erection simply by walking along, the Commentary mentions that if

one finds sensual "fever" arising in such a case, one must

immediately stop walking and start contemplating the foulness of the

body so as to purify the mind before continuing on one's way.

Otherwise, one would incur a thullaccaya simply for moving one's

legs. //Sensual fever//, here, probably refers to the desire to

cause an emission, for there are several spots where the Commentary

discusses bhikkhus who stimulate an erection simply for the

enjoyment of the contact rather than to cause an emission, and the

judgment is that they incur no penalty, even if an emission does

inadvertently result.

Aside from the thullaccaya, there are no other derived offenses

under this rule. A bhikkhu who has an ejaculation while thinking

sensual thoughts but without making any physical effort to cause it,

incurs no penalty regardless of whether or not the idea crosses his

mind that he would like to have an emission, and whether or not he

enjoys it when it occurs. However, the Commentary notes here that

even though there is no offense involved, one should not let oneself

be overcome by sensual thoughts in this way. This point is borne out

by the famous simile that occurred to Prince Siddhattha before his

Awakening and that later, as Buddha, he related to a number of

listeners:

"'Suppose there were a wet sappy piece of timber lying on

dry ground far from water, and a man were to come along with

an upper fire-stick, thinking, "I'll light a fire. I'll

produce heat." Now what do you think? Would he be able to

light a fire and produce heat by rubbing the upper

fire-stick in the wet sappy timber...?'

"'No, Master Gotama. And why not? Because the wood is wet

and sappy, even though it is lying on dry ground far from

water. The man would reap nothing but weariness and

disappointment.'

"'So it is with any priest or contemplative who lives

withdrawn from sensuality only in body, but whose desire,

infatuation, urge, thirst, and fever for sensuality is not

relinquished and stilled within him: Whether or not he feels

painful, racking, piercing feelings due to his striving (for

Awakening), he is incapable of knowledge, vision, and

unexcelled self-awakening.'" (M.36)

Non-offenses. In addition to the cases already mentioned -- the

bhikkhus who bring about emissions accidentally, not knowing that

they are making an effort, not conscious that their efforts are

bringing about an emission, whose efforts are motivated by a purpose

other than that of causing an emission, or who without making any

physical effort have an ejaculation while overcome by sensual

thoughts -- there is no offense for a bhikkhu who has an ejaculation

during a dream.

In the wording of the rule, the phrase "except while dreaming" is

expressed by an idiom that could also mean "at the end of a dream."

This second possibility, though, is ruled out by the Commentary,

which states that what happens in the mind while one is sleeping

falls in the bounds of the Abhidhamma, but what happens after one

awakens falls within the bounds of the Vinaya; and that there is no

such thing as a misdeed performed when one is in a "non-negligible"

state of mind that does not count as an offense. ("Non-negligible,"

according to the Sub-commentary, means "normal.")

In making the exception for what happens while asleep, the Buddha

states that even though there may be the intention to cause an

emission, it doesn't count. The Commentary goes on to say, however,

that if a bhikkhu fully awakens in the course of a wet dream, he

should lie still and be extremely careful not to make a move that

would fulfill the factor of effort under this rule. If the process

has reached the point where it is irreversible, and the ejaculation

occurs spontaneously, he incurs no penalty regardless of whether or

not he enjoys it. And as the Commentary quotes from the Kurundi, one

of the ancient Sinhalese commentaries on which it is based, if he

wakes up in the course of a wet dream and grabs hold of his penis so

that the ejaculation will not soil his robes or bedding, there is no

offense.

However, the case from the Commentary mentioned above -- the

bhikkhu who had the desire and made the effort towards an emission

before falling off to sleep -- suggests that the exemption for

emissions during a dream does not extend to cases where both the

intention and the effort occur while one is fully conscious, for all

three factors under this rule are fully present: One makes the

conscious decision to cause an emission, makes a conscious effort

aimed at causing the emission, and the emission occurs. Whether or

not one is conscious that it is occurring is of no account.

Summary: Intentionally causing oneself to emit semen, or

getting someone else to cause one to emit semen -- except

during a dream -- is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

2.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind,

engage in bodily contact with a woman, or in holding her

hand, holding a lock of her hair, or caressing any of her

limbs, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

This rule has sometimes been viewed as a sign of prejudice against

women. But, as the origin story makes clear, the Buddha formulated

the rule not because women are bad, but because bhikkhus sometimes

can be.

"Now at that time, Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. His

dwelling was beautiful, attractive, and appealing. The inner

chamber was in the middle, entirely surrounded by the outer

rooms. The bed and chair, the pillows and bolsters were well

arranged, the water for washing and drinking well placed,

the surrounding area well swept. Many people came to admire

it. Even a certain Brahmin together with his wife went to

where Ven. Udayin was staying and on arrival said, 'We would

like to admire your dwelling.'

"'Very well then, Brahmin, have a look.' Taking the key,

unfastening the lock, and opening the door, he entered the

dwelling. The Brahmin entered after Ven. Udayin; the Brahmin

lady after the Brahmin. Then Ven. Udayin, opening some of

the windows and closing others, walking around the inner

room and coming up from behind, rubbed up against the

Brahmin lady limb by limb.

"After a while the Brahmin exchanged pleasantries with Ven.

Udayin and left. Delighted, he burst out with an exclamation

of joy: 'How splendid are are these Sakyan contemplatives

who live in the forest like this! And how splendid is Ven.

Udayin who lives in the forest like this!'

"When he had said this, his wife said to him, 'What's so

splendid about him? He rubbed up against me limb by limb

just the way you do!'

"So the Brahmin was offended and annoyed and spread it

about: 'How shameless these bhikkhus are, how immoral and

hypocritical!...How can this contemplative Udayin rub up

against my wife limb by limb? It isn't possible to go with

your women-folk to a monastery or dwelling. If you go to a

monastery or dwelling with your womenfolk, the Sakyan

contemplatives will molest them!'"

There are two ways in which a bhikkhu can come into contact with a

woman: either actively (the bhikkhu makes the contact) or passively

(the woman does). Since the Vibhanga uses different terms to analyse

these two possibilities, we will discuss them separately.

//Active contact//. The full offense for active contact here is

composed of four factors:

1) //Object//: a living woman -- "even one born on that very day,

all the more an older one." Whether or not she is awake to

realize what is going on is irrelevant to the offense.

2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu correctly perceives her to be a

woman.

3) //Intention//: He is acting under the influence of lust.

4) //Effort//: He comes into physical contact with her.

Since the system of derived offenses based on the various

permutations of these factors is one of the most complex in the

Vibhanga, we will limit our discussion first to the full offense

before going into the permutations.

Of the four factors listed above, only two -- intention and effort

-- require detailed explanation.

Intention. The Vibhanga explains the term //overcome with lust//

as meaning "impassioned, desiring, a mind bound by attraction."

//Altered//, it says, can refer in general to one of three states of

mind -- passion, aversion, or delusion -- but here it refers

specifically to passion.

The Commentary adds a piece of Abhidhamma analysis at this point,

saying that //altered// refers to the moment when the mind leaves

its state of pure neutrality in the //bhavanga// under the influence

of desire. Thus the factor of intention here can be fulfilled not

only by a prolonged or intense feeling of desire, but also by a

momentary infatuation.

The Commentary also tries to limit the range of passion to which

this rule applies, saying that it covers only desire for the

enjoyment of contact. As we noted under Parajika 1, the ancient

commentators formulated a list of eleven types of lust, each

mutually exclusive, and the question of which rule applies to a

particular case depends on which type of lust provokes the bhikkhu's

actions. Thus if a bhikkhu lusting for intercourse touches a woman,

it says, he incurs only a dukkata as a preliminary to sexual

intercourse under Parajika 1. If he touches her from his lust for an

ejaculation, he incurs a thullaccaya as a preliminary to causing an

emission under Sanghadisesa 1. Only if he touches her with the

simple desire to enjoy the sensation of contact does he incur a

sanghadisesa under this rule.

This system, though very neat and orderly, flies in the face of

common sense and, as we noted under Parajika 1, contradicts the

Vibhanga as well, so there is no need to adopt it. We can stick with

the Vibhanga to this rule and say that //any// state of passion

fulfills the factor of intention here. The Commentary's discussion,

though, is useful in showing that the passion needn't be full-scale

sexual lust. Even a momentary desire to enjoy the sensation of

physical contact -- overwhelming enough that one acts on it -- is

enough to fulfill this factor.

Effort. The Vibhanga illustrates the effort of making physical

contact with a list of activities: rubbing, rubbing up against,

rubbing downwards, rubbing upwards, bending down, pulling up,

drawing to, pushing away, seizing hold (or pinning down --

//abhinigganhana//), squeezing, grasping, or touching. The Vinita

Vatthu includes a case of a bhikkhu giving a woman a blow with his

shoulder: He too incurs a sanghadisesa, which shows that the

Vibhanga's list is meant to cover all similar actions as well. If a

bhikkhu with lustful mind does anything of this sort to a living

woman's body, perceiving that she is a woman, he incurs the full

penalty under this rule.

Derived offenses. Each of the factors of an offense allows a

number of permutations that admit for different classes of offenses.

Taken together, they form a complex system. Here we will consider

each factor in turn.

//Object//. Assuming that the bhikkhu is acting with lustful

intentions and is perceiving his object correctly, he incurs a

thullaccaya for making bodily contact with a //pandaka//, a female

yakkha, or a dead woman; and a dukkata for bodily contact with a man

(or boy), a wooden doll, or a female animal.

//Pandaka //is usually translated as eunuch, but eunuchs are only

one of five types of pandakas recognized by the Commentary:

(1) An //asitta// (literally, a "sprinkled one") -- a man who

finds sexual fulfillment in performing fellatio on another man

and bringing him to climax. (For some reason, other homosexual

acts, even though they were known in ancient India, are not

included under this type nor under any of the types in this

list.)

(2) A voyeur -- a man who finds sexual fulfillment in watching

other people have sex.

(3) A eunuch -- one who has been castrated.

(4) A half-time pandaka -- one who is a pandaka only during the

waning moon. (!  --  The Sub-commentary's discussion of this

point shows that its author and his contemporaries were as

unfamiliar with this type as we are today. Perhaps this was how

bisexuals were understood in ancient times.)

(5) A neuter -- a person born without sexual organs.

According to the Commentary, the Mahavagga's statement (I.61) that

pandakas cannot receive ordination refers only to the last three

types, and to the half-time pandaka only during the waning moon.

As for female yakkhas, the Commentary says that this also includes

female deities. There is an ancient story in Chieng Mai of a bhikkhu

who was visited by a dazzling heavenly maiden late one night while

he was meditating alone in a cave at Wat Umong. He couldn't resist

touching her and, as soon as he did, went immediately out of his

mind. The moral: This is one thullaccaya not to be taken lightly.

Also from the Commentary:

(1) The thullaccaya for lustfully touching female corpses applies

only to those that would be grounds for a full offense under

Parajika 1, i.e., those with an anal, oral, or genital orifice

intact enough for one to perform the sexual act. Female corpses

decomposed beyond that point are grounds for a dukkata here.

(2) The dukkata for lustfully touching wooden dolls (mannikins)

applies also to any female form made out of other materials, and

even to any picture of a woman.

(3) Female animals include female nagas and other half-animal,

half-woman species as well.

According to the Sub-commentary, the dukkata for lustfully

touching female animals also applies to male animals.

For some reason, male yakkhas and deities slipped out of the list.

Perhaps they should come under "men."

//Perception//. Misperception affects the severity of the offense

only in the cases of women and pandakas. A bhikkhu who makes lustful

bodily contact with a woman while under the impression that she is

something else -- a pandaka, a man, or an animal -- incurs a

thullaccaya. If he makes lustful bodily contact with a pandaka while

under the impression that the pandaka is a woman, a man, or an

animal, the penalty is a dukkata. In the cases of men and animals,

misperception has no effect on the severity of the case: Lustful

bodily contact -- e.g., with a male transvestite whom one thinks to

be a woman -- still results in a dukkata.

//Intention//. The Vinita Vatthu contains cases of a bhikkhu who

caresses his mother out of filial affection, one who caresses his

daughter out of fatherly affection, and one who caresses his sister

out of brotherly affection. In each case the penalty is a dukkata.

The Vibhanga does not discuss the issue of bhikkhus who

intentionally make active contact with women for purposes other than

lust or affection -- e.g., helping a woman who has fallen into a

raging river -- but the Commentary does. It introduces the concept

of //anamasa//, things carrying a dukkata penalty when touched;

women and clothing belonging to a woman top the list. It then goes

into great detail to tell how one should behave when one's mother

falls into a raging river. Under no circumstances, it says, should

one grab hold of her, although one may extend a rope, a board, etc.,

in her direction. If she happens to grab hold of her son the

bhikkhu, he should not shake her off, but should simply let her hold

on as he swims back to shore.

Where the Commentary gets the concepts of //anamasa// is hard to

say. Perhaps it came from the practices of the Brahmin caste, who

are very careful not to touch certain things and people of certain

lower castes. At any rate, there is no direct basis for it in the

Canon. Although the concept has received universal acceptance in

Theravadin Communities, many highly-respected Vinaya experts have

made an exception right here, saying that there is nothing wrong in

touching a woman when one's action is based not on lust but on a

desire to save her from danger. Even if there is an offense in doing

so, there are other places where Buddhaghosa recommends that one be

willing to incur a minor penalty for the sake of compassion (e.g.,

digging a person out of a hole into which he has fallen), and the

same principle surely holds here.

There is no offense in touching a being other than a woman if

one's intentions are not lustful, although tickling is an offense

under Pacittiya 52.

//Effort//. Acts of lustful but indirect bodily contact with a

woman one perceives to be a woman and a pandaka one perceives to be

a woman carry the following penalties:

For the woman: Using one's body to make contact with an article

connected to her body -- e.g., using one's hand to touch the hem

of her dress, a rope, or stick she is holding: a thullaccaya.

Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with her

body -- e.g., using the edge of one's robe or a flower one is

holding to brush along her arm: a thullaccaya.

Using an item connected with one's body to make contact with an

item connected with her body: a dukkata.

Taking an object -- such as a flower -- and tossing it against her

body, an object connected with her body, or an object she has

tossed: a dukkata.

Taking hold of something she is standing or sitting on -- a

bridge, a tree, a boat, etc. -- and giving it a shake: a dukkata.

For the pandaka one assumes to be a woman, the penalty in all the

above cases is a dukkata.

These penalties for indirect contact have inspired the Commentary

to say that if a bhikkhu makes contact with a clothed portion of a

woman's body or uses a clothed portion of his body to make contact

with hers, and the cloth is so thick that neither his body hairs nor

hers can penetrate it, the penalty is only a thullaccaya, since he

is not making direct contact. Only if the contact is skin-to-skin,

skin-to-hair, or hair-to-hair (as might be possible through thin

cloth) does he commit the full offense. Thus a bhikkhu who fondles

the breasts or buttocks of a fully-clothed woman would incur only a

thullaccaya since the contact was indirect.

While this contention might be true in a technical sense, two

points from the Vibhanga indicate that its compilers did not have

this sort of thing in mind when they mentioned indirect contact.

(1) In its discussion of passive contact, the Vibhanga divides the

factor of effort into two parts: effort and result. The result

necessary for a full offense is that the bhikkhu detects contact.

The important word here is "detect" (//pativijanati//): The Canon

uses it to refer to cases where one perceives something that may not

be readily apparent, and here it seems specifically designed to

cover instances where the contact may not be skin-to-skin, but still

can be felt as bodily contact. Thus if the contact is such that the

bhikkhu could feel the presence of the woman's body through his or

under her clothing, direct contact has been made. If this much

contact is enough for a full offense under passive contact, there is

good reason to assume that it should also be enough under active

contact as well.

(2) The Vinita Vatthu contains the following case:

"Now at that time, a certain bhikkhu, seeing a woman he

encountered coming in the opposite direction, was infatuated

and gave her a blow with his shoulder. He was

remorseful....'Bhikkhu, you have committed a sanghadisesa

offense.'"

As mentioned in the Introduction, we have to go on the assumption

that the Vibhanga compilers were careful enough to include all of

the relevant facts in describing the cases in the Vinita Vatthu. Now

if the Commentary's assertion were true -- that the amount of cloth

between the bodies of the bhikkhu and the woman is important in

determining an offense -- the compilers would have mentioned this

factor at least indirectly, saying, for instance, that the encounter

took place in the monastery, where he might have had his shoulder

uncovered, rather than outside of the monastery, where he should

have had it covered; or that he had neglected to cover his shoulders

when leaving the monastery; or that he was wearing a very fine robe

that allowed his hair to pass through. But they say nothing of the

sort, and their silence here suggests that such questions are

irrelevant.

The only cases of indirect contact mentioned in the Vinita Vatthu

refer to contact of a much more remote sort: a bhikkhu pulls a cord

of which a woman is holding another end, pulls a stick of which she

is holding the other end, or gives her a playful push with his bowl.

Thus in the context of this rule the Vibhanga defines "object

connected to the body," through which indirect contact is made, with

examples: things that the person is //holding//. The Vinaya Mukha

adds things that are //hanging// from the person, like the hem of a

robe or a dress. In this context, contact made through cloth that

the person is wearing, if the contact can be detected, would be

classed as direct. This would parallel Parajika 1, in which the

question of whether there is anything covering either of the organs

involved in intercourse is completely irrelevant to the offense.

Thus the concept of direct and indirect contact here would seem to

follow general linguistic usage: If a woman is wearing a

long-sleeved shirt, for instance, grabbing her by the arm and

grabbing her by the shirt-sleeve are two different things, and would

receive different penalties under this rule.

According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu feels desire for contact

with a woman and makes an effort but does not achieve even indirect

contact, the penalty is a dukkata.

//Passive contact//. The Vibhanga's analysis of passive contact --

when the bhikkhu is the object rather than the agent making the

contact -- deals with only a limited number of variables.

Agent: either a woman the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman, or a

pandaka he perceives to be a woman.

The agent's effort: any of the actions that fulfill the factor of

act for the full offense under active contact -- rubbing, pulling,

pushing, squeezing, etc.

The bhikkhu's aim. The Vibhanga lists only two here: the desire to

come together and the desire to escape (%). The Sub-commentary

explains the first as desiring the pleasurable feeling of contact.

Effort. The bhikkhu either makes a physical effort or he doesn't.

The Commentary includes under this factor even the slightest

physical movements, such as winking, raising one's eyebrows, or

rolling one's eyes. At present we would include such things as

inviting a woman to caress one, or deliberately placing oneself in a

crowded entrance to a store so that women would have to make contact

with one as they walked past.

Result. The bhikkhu either detects the contact or he doesn't.

The most important factor here is the bhikkhu's aim: If he desires

to escape from the contact, then no matter who the person making the

contact is, whether or not the bhikkhu makes an effort, or whether

or not he detects the contact, there is no offense. The Vinita

Vatthu gives an example:

"Now at that time, many women, pressing up to a certain

bhikkhu, led him about arm-in-arm. He felt

conscience-stricken.... 'Did you consent, bhikkhu?' (the

Buddha) asked.

'No, Lord, I did not.'

'Then there was no offense, bhikkhu, as you did not

consent.'"

The Commentary mentions another example, in which a bhikkhu, not

desiring the contact, is molested by a lustful woman. He remains

perfectly still, with the thought, "When she realizes I am not

interested, she will go away." He too commits no offense.

However, if the bhikkhu desires the contact, then the offenses are

as follows:

The agent is a woman, the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects

contact: a sanghadisesa. He makes an effort but detects no contact:

a dukkata. He makes no effort (e.g., he remains perfectly still as

she grasps, squeezes, and rubs his body): no offense regardless of

whether or not he detects contact. One exception here, though, would

be the special case mentioned under "Consent" in the preceding rule,

in which a bhikkhu lets a woman -- or anyone at all, for that matter

-- make him have an emission and he incurs a sanghadisesa under that

rule as a result.

The agent is a pandaka whom the bhikkhu perceives to be a woman,

the bhikkhu makes an effort and detects contact: a dukkata. All

other possibilities -- effort but no detected contact, detected

contact but no effort, no effort and no detected contact: no

offense.

Counting offenses. According to the Vibhanga, if a bhikkhu has

lustful bodily contact with //x// number of people in any of the

ways that constitute an offense here, he commits //x// number of

offenses. For example, if he lustfully rubs up against two women in

a bus, he incurs two sanghadisesas. If, out of fatherly affection,

he hugs his two daughters and three sons, he incurs two dukkatas for

hugging his daughters and no penalty for hugging his sons.

The Commentary adds that if he makes lustful contact with a person

//x// number of times, he commits //x// number of offenses. For

instance, he hugs a woman from behind, she fights him off, and he

strikes her out of lust: two sanghadisesas.

The question of counting sanghadisesas, though, is somewhat

academic, since the penalty for multiple offenses is almost

identical with the penalty for one. The only difference is in the

formal announcements that accompany the penalty -- e.g., when the

Sangha places the offender under probation, when he informs others

bhikkhus of why he is under probation, etc. For more on this point,

see the concluding section of this chapter.

Non-offenses. There is no offense for a bhikkhu who makes contact

with a woman --

//unintentionally// --  as when inadvertently running into a woman

in a crowded place;

//unthinkingly// --  as when a woman runs into him and, startled,

he pushes her away;

//unknowingly// -- as when, without lustful intent, he touches a

young tomboy he thinks to be a boy; or

//when he doesn't give his consent// -- as in the case of the

bhikkhu led around arm-in-arm by a crowd of women.

Summary: Lustful bodily contact with a woman whom one

perceives to be a woman is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

3.Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind,

address lewd words to a woman in the manner of young men to

a young woman alluding to sexual intercourse, it entails

initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

"Now at that time Ven. Udayin was living in the forest. One

day many women came to the monastery to admire his dwelling.

They went to where he was staying and on arrival said to

him, 'Ven. Sir, we would like to admire your dwelling.' Then

Ven. Udayin, showing the dwelling to the women and referring

to their genital and anal orifices, praised and criticized

and begged and implored and asked and quizzed and advised

and instructed and ridiculed them. Those of the women who

were brazen, shameless, and sly giggled at Ven. Udayin,

exclaimed to him, laughed aloud, and teased him; while those

of the women who had a sense of decency complained to the

bhikkhus as they left: 'It is improper, Ven. sirs, and

unbecoming! Even from our husbands we wouldn't like to hear

this sort of thing, much less from Master Udayin.'"

The K/Commentary lists five factors for a full breach of this rule:

1) //Object//: a woman, i.e., any female human being experienced

enough to know what words are and are not lewd.

2) //Perception//: The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman.

3) //Intention//: He is lustful. As in the preceding rule, we can

take the Commentary's definition of lust here as the //minimum//

amount of lust to fulfill this factor: He wants to enjoy saying

something lewd or improper.

4) //Effort//: He makes remarks referring to her genitals, anus,

or to her performing sexual intercourse.

5) //Result//: The woman immediately understands.

The only factors requiring detailed explanation here are intention

and effort.

Intention. The minimum level of desire required to fulfill this

factor means that this rule covers cases where a bhikkhu simply gets

a charge out of referring to a woman's genitals, etc., in her

presence, without necessarily having any desire actually to have sex

with her.

The Vibhanga makes clear that this rule does not cover statements

made in anger. Thus any insults a bhikkhu may direct at a woman out

of anger rather than playfully in desire -- even if they refer to

her genitals, etc. -- would come under Pacittiya 2, rather than

here.

Effort. The Vibhanga states that to incur a sanghadisesa under

this rule when one is speaking to a woman, one must refer to //her//

genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse (%).

The Commentary goes further and says that to incur the full

penalty one must make direct mention of one of these three things,

or accuse her of being sexually deformed in a way that refers

directly to her genitals. Otherwise, if one refers lustfully to

these matters without directly mentioning them, there is no

sanghadisesa, although the Sub-commentary quotes ancient texts

called the Ganthipadas as assigning a dukkata for such an act.

All of this contradicts the Vibhanga, which lists the ways of

referring to the woman's anus, genitals, and sexual intercourse that

would entail the full penalty under this rule -- one speaks praise,

speaks criticism, begs, implores, asks, quizzes, advises, exhorts,

or ridicules -- and many of the examples it gives, although

referring to the woman's private parts or to her performing sexual

intercourse, do not actually mention those words: "How do you give

to your husband?" "How do you give to your lover?" "When will your

mother be reconciled?" "When will you have a good opportunity?"

Although all of these statements refer to sexual intercourse, and

people in those days would have understood them in that light, none

of them actually mentions it.

Thus the Vibhanga's examples seem to indicate that if a bhikkhu is

referring lustfully to the woman's private parts or to her

performing sexual intercourse, then whether or not he directly names

those things, he fulfills this factor.

None of the texts mention the case in which a bhikkhu talks to one

person about another person's private parts, etc.

Derived offenses. The factors of effort, object, perception, and

result permit a number of permutations that result in lesser

offenses. As for the permutations of intention, see the section on

non-offenses, below.

//Effort//. A bhikkhu speaks to a woman he perceives to be a woman

and refers lustfully to parts of her body -- aside from her private

parts -- below her collarbone and above her knees, such as her

breasts or her thighs: a thullaccaya. If he refers to parts of her

body outside of that area, such as her face or hair, or to clothing

or jewelry she is wearing: a dukkata.

//Object//. A bhikkhu speaks to a pandaka (in this and the

following cases we are assuming that he perceives his object

correctly) and refers lustfully to his private parts or to his

performing sexual intercourse: a thullaccaya. He refers lustfully to

other parts of the pandaka's body, his clothing, etc.: a dukkata.

A bhikkhu speaks to a man (or boy) and refers lustfully to any

part of his listener's body, clothing, etc.: a dukkata. The same

penalty holds for speaking lustfully to a common animal about its

body, ornaments, etc. (%). (This is a point with interesting

implications, but unfortunately the Commentary is silent. Perhaps

nagas would be included here, or perhaps the Vibhanga compilers had

in mind cases where one mentions such things to an animal within

earshot of a human or celestial being.)

The texts make no mention of speaking lustfully to a woman/girl

too young to understand what is and is not lewd. We might argue from

the cases included in the Vinita Vatthu, though -- where bhikkhus

make punning references to women's private parts, and the women do

not understand -- that a bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for referring

directly to her genitals, anus, or performing sexual intercourse in

her presence, and a dukkata for referring indirectly in her presence

to such things.

//Perception//. A bhikkhu speaking to a woman whom he perceives to

be something else -- a pandaka, a man, an animal -- incurs a

thullaccaya if he refers lustfully to her genitals, anus, or

performing sexual intercourse. If he is speaking to a pandaka, a

man, or an animal he misperceives -- e.g., he thinks the pandaka is

a woman, the man is a pandaka, the animal is a man -- he incurs a

dukkata if he refers lustfully to those topics.

//Result//. As mentioned above, the Vinita Vatthu contains a

number cases of bhikkhus speaking to women and making punning

references to the women's genitals that the women do not understand.

In one case the penalty is a thullaccaya, in the others a dukkata.

The thullaccaya case is the only one in which the bhikkhu uses a

word synonymous with genitals (//magga//, which also means road, the

meaning the woman understood). Thus we might argue that if a bhikkhu

makes direct reference to the genitals, anus, or sexual intercourse

-- and this includes slang expressions and euphemisms -- and the

woman doesn't immediately understand that he is referring to those

things, he incurs a thullaccaya. If he makes indirect mention of

those things, and she doesn't immediately understand what he is

referring to, he incurs a dukkata. If it so happens that she

understands later, the penalty remains the same.

Counting offenses. A bhikkhu making remarks of the sort covered by

this rule to //x// number of people commits //x// number of

offenses, the type of offense being determined by the factors

discussed above. Thus for lustful remarks to two women referring to

their breasts, he would incur two thullaccayas; for lustful remarks

to three men concerning their bodies, three dukkatas; for teasing a

group of twenty old ladies about how their time for sexual

performance is past, twenty sanghadisesas.

Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that there is no offense for a

bhikkhu who speaks aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming

at Dhamma, or aiming at teaching. Thus, for example, if one is

talking in front of women and has no lustful intent, one may recite

or explain the training rules that deal with these matters or go

into detail on the topic of the loathsomeness of the body as a topic

of meditation, all without incurring a penalty. The Commentary here

adds an example of a bhikkhu addressing a sexually deformed woman,

telling her to be heedful in her practice so as not to be born that

way again. If, however, one were to broach any of these topics out

of a desire to enjoy saying something lewd to one's listeners, one

would not be immune from an offense.

A bhikkhu who, without intending to be lewd, makes innocent

remarks that his listener takes to be lewd, commits no offense.

Summary: Making a lustful remark to a woman about her

genitals, anus, or about performing sexual intercourse is a

sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

4. Should any bhikkhu, overcome by lust, with altered mind,

speak in the presence of a woman in praise of ministering to

his own sensuality thus: "This, sister, is the highest

ministration, that of ministering to a virtuous,

fine-natured follower of the celibate life such as myself

with this act" -- alluding to sexual intercourse -- it

entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

"Now at that time a certain woman, a widow, was beautiful,

attractive, and appealing. So Ven. Udayin, arising early in

the morning, taking his robe and bowl, went to her

residence. On arrival, he sat on an appointed seat. Then the

woman, approaching him, paying him homage, sat down to one

side. As she sat there, Ven. Udayin instructed, urged,

roused, and encouraged her with a talk on Dhamma. Then the

woman, instructed, urged, roused, and encouraged with a talk

on Dhamma...said to him, 'Tell me, Ven. sir, what would be

in my power to give you for your welfare: Robe-cloth?

Alms-food? Lodgings? Medicines for the sick?'

"'Those things aren't hard for us to come by sister....Give

just what is hard for us to come by.'

"'What, Ven. sir?'

"'Sexual intercourse.'

"'For your welfare, Ven. sir?'

"'For my welfare, sister.'

"'Then come, Ven. sir.' Entering into an inner room, taking

off her cloak, she lay back on a couch. Then Ven. Udayin

approached the woman and, on approaching, said, 'Who would

touch this foul-smelling wretch?' And he departed, spitting.

"Then the woman was offended and annoyed and spread it

about...'How can this contemplative Udayin, when he himself

begged me for sexual intercourse, say, "Who would touch this

foul-smelling wretch?" and depart spitting? What's wretched

about me? What's foul-smelling about me? In what am I

inferior to whom?'"

At first glance this rule might seem redundant with the preceding

one, for what we have here is another case of a bhikkhu advising,

begging, or imploring a woman to perform sexual intercourse.

However, some facts about language and belief in the Buddha's time

might have led some people to feel that this was a special case not

covered by the previous rule; so -- to prevent this misunderstanding

-- it gets separate treatment here.

"Giving," in the Buddha's time, was a common term for having sex.

If a woman gave to a man, that meant that she was willing to have

sexual intercourse with him. Now, Buddhism was not the only religion

of the time to teach that gifts -- of a more innocent sort -- given

to contemplatives produced great reward to those who gave them, and

ultimately somebody somewhere came up with the bright idea that

since sex was the highest gift, giving it to a contemplative would

produce the highest reward. Whether this idea was first formulated

by faithful women or by clever contemplatives is hard to say. There

are several cases in the Vinita Vatthu to Parajika 1 telling of

bhikkhus approached or attacked by women professing this belief,

which shows that it had some currency: that sex was somehow seen as

a way to higher benefits through the law of kamma.

Since the preceding rule gives exemptions for bhikkhus speaking

"aiming at (spiritual) welfare (//attha//), aiming at Dhamma," some

misguided souls who did not comprehend the Buddha's teachings on

sensuality might believe that welfare of this sort might fit under

the exemption. Even today, although the rationale might be

different, there are people who believe that having sex with

spiritual teachers is beneficial for one's spiritual well-being.

Thus we have this separate rule to show that the Buddha would have

no part in such a notion, and that a bhikkhu who tries to suggest

that his listener would benefit from having sex with him is not

exempt from an offense.

The K/Commentary lists five factors for the full offense here.

Object: a woman experienced enough to know what words are and are

not lewd.

Perception. The bhikkhu perceives her to be such a woman.

Intention. He is lustful. According to the Sub-commentary, this

means that he wants to enjoy saying something lewd or improper. This

point is borne out by the origin story, where Ven. Udayin addressed

his remarks to the young widow apparently just to test her reaction.

As in the preceding rules, we can take the Sub-commentary's

definition to stand for the //minimum// amount of lust needed to

fulfill this factor.

Effort. The bhikkhu speaks to the woman in praise of her

ministering to his sensual needs, making reference to sexual

intercourse. The Commentary maintains that his remarks must directly

mention sexual intercourse for this factor to be fulfilled, but the

example in the rule itself would seem to contradict its assertion.

Result. The woman immediately understands.

Derived offenses. The only factors having permutations leading to

lesser offenses are object and perception.

//Object//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks to a

pandaka: a thullaccaya. To a man or animal: a dukkata.

//Perception//. A bhikkhu, motivated by lust, makes such remarks

to a woman he perceives to be something else -- a pandaka, man, or

animal: a thullaccaya. To a pandaka he perceives to be something

else: a dukkata.

Counting offenses. Offenses are counted by the number of people

one makes such remarks to.

Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses in the Vibhanga, in addition

to the blanket exemptions mentioned under Parajika 1, read simply:

"There is no offense if he speaks saying, 'Support us with the

requisites of robe-cloth, alms-food, lodgings, or medicines for the

sick.'" Thus there is apparently no way that a bhikkhu in his right

mind may speak in the presence of another person in praise of that

person's ministering to his (the bhikkhu's) own sexual desires,

without committing an offense.

Summary: Telling a woman that she would benefit from having

sexual intercourse with oneself is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

5. Should any bhikkhu engage in conveying a man's intentions

to a woman or a woman's intentions to a man, proposing

marriage or paramourage -- even if only for a momentary

liaison -- it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

There are essentially two factors for a full offense under this

rule: effort and object.

Effort. The Commentary says that to "engage in conveying" means to

take on the role of a go-between. This includes helping to arrange

not only marriages and affairs, but also "momentary associations"

that, from the way it describes them, could include anything from

appointments with a prostitute to arrangements for X to be Y's date.

The Vibhanga sets the component factors of a go-between's role at

three:

1) //accepting// the request of one party to convey a proposal;

2) //inquiring//, i.e., informing the second party and learning

his/her/their reaction; and

3) //reporting// what one has learned to the first party.

The penalties for these actions are: a dukkata for performing any

one of them, a thullaccaya for any two, and a sanghadisesa for the

full set of three. Thus a bhikkhu acting on his own initiative to

sound out the possibility of a date between a man and a woman would

incur a thullaccaya for inquiring and reporting. A bhikkhu planning

to disrobe who asks a woman if she would be interested in marrying

him after his return to lay life would incur a dukkata for

inquiring.

The penalties are the same if the bhikkhu, instead of acting as a

go-between himself, gets someone else to act for him. Thus a bhikkhu

who agrees to convey such a proposal but then gets a lay follower or

another bhikkhu to do the inquiring and reporting, would incur a

sanghadisesa all the same.

If a group of bhikkhus are asked to act as go-betweens and they

all accept, then even if only one of them takes the message, all

incur the penalty for his actions.

"Result" is not a factor here, and so the Commentary mentions that

whether or not the arrangements succeed has no bearing on the

offense.

"Intention" is also not a factor, which leads the Sub-commentary

to raise the issue of a man who writes his proposal in a letter and

then, without disclosing the contents, gets a bhikkhu to deliver it.

Its conclusion, though, is that this case would not qualify as an

offense under this rule, in that both the Vibhanga and the

Commentary define the action of conveying as "telling": Only if the

bhikkhu himself tells the proposal -- whether repeating it orally,

making a gesture or writing a letter -- does he commit an offense

here.

Object. The full offense is for acting as a go-between between a

man and a woman who are not married to each other. If, instead of

dealing directly with the man and woman, one deals with people

speaking on their behalf (their parents, a pimp), one incurs the

full penalty all the same.

There is no offense for a bhikkhu who tries to effect a

reconciliation between an estranged couple who are not divorced; but

a full offense for one who tries to effect a reconciliation between

a couple who are. "Perception" is also not a factor here, which

inspires the Commentary to note that even an arahant could commit an

offense under this rule if he tried to effect a reconciliation

between his parents whom he assumed to be separated when they

actually were divorced.

A bhikkhu incurs a thullaccaya for acting as a go-between for a

pandaka; and, according to the Commentary, the same penalty for

acting as a go-between for a female yakkha or peta. (!)

Non-offenses. The Vibhanga states that, in addition to the usual

exemptions, there is no offense if a bhikkhu conveys a message from

a man to a woman or vice versa dealing with "business of the

Community, of a shrine, or of a sick person." The Commentary

illustrates the first two instances with cases of a bhikkhu

conveying a message dealing with construction work for the Community

or a shrine; and the third with a case where a bhikkhu, acting on

behalf of a fellow bhikkhu who is sick, is sent by a male lay

follower to a female lay follower for medicine.

The Sub-commentary adds that any similar errand is also exempt

from penalty as long as it is not a form of subservience to lay

people (see Sanghadisesa 13, below).

Summary: Acting as a go-between to arrange a marriage, an

affair, or a date between a man and a woman not married to

each other is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

6.When a bhikkhu is building a hut from (gains acquired by)

his own begging -- having no sponsor, destined for himself

-- he is to build it to the standard measurement. Here the

standard is this: twelve spans, using the sugata span, in

length (measuring outside); seven in width, (measuring)

inside. Bhikkhus are to be assembled to designate the site.

The site the bhikkhus designate should be without

disturbances and with adequate space. If the bhikkhu should

build a hut from his own begging on a site with disturbances

and without adequate space, or if he should not assemble the

bhikkhus to designate the site, or if he should exceed the

standard, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

"At that time the bhikkhus of Alavi were having huts built

from their own begging -- having no sponsors, destined for

themselves, not to any standard measurement -- that did not

come to completion. They were continually begging,

continually hinting: 'Give a man, give labor, give an ox,

give a wagon, give a knife, give an ax, give an adze, give a

spade, give a chisel, give rushes, give reeds, give grass,

give clay.' People, harassed with the begging, harassed with

the hinting, on seeing bhikkhus would feel apprehensive,

alarmed, would run away; would take another route, face

another direction, close the door. Even on seeing cows, they

would run away, imagining them to be bhikkhus."

This rule and the following one concern the procedures a bhikkhu

should follow when he wants to build a dwelling for his own use. The

following rule deals with cases where he has a sponsor to provide

him with funds and materials. This rule deals with cases where he

doesn't. The Vibhanga and Commentary define the words //hut// and

//dwelling// in these rules in such a way that they apply only to a

limited range of structures, but the Commentary's discussion of what

a bhikkhu may and may not beg for when building anything at all,

guarantees that even in cases not covered by these rules he is not

allowed to be burdensome to the people he asks for help. In

discussing this rule, we will first cover what kinds of begging are

proper and improper in connection with //any// kind of construction

work, and then go on to treat the particular case coming under this

rule.

Begging. A bhikkhu may ask for people to give labor in any

situation. Thus he may ask stone masons to carry stone posts to his

construction, or carpenters to carry boards there. If, after he has

asked them to help with the labor, they volunteer to donate the

materials as well, he may accept them without penalty. Otherwise, he

has to reimburse them for the materials.

As for tools, vehicles, and other things he will use in the

process of construction, he may ask only to borrow them from other

people and may not ask for them outright. If the tools get damaged,

he is responsible for getting them repaired before returning them to

the owner. The only things he needn't return to the owner are light

articles (//lahubhanda//), which the Sub-commentary identifies as

things like reeds, rushes, grass, and clay -- i.e., things having

little or no monetary value at all.

In effect, this means that unless a bhikkhu is going to build his

dwelling out of reeds, etc., or out of thrown-away scraps, he may

not ask for any of the materials that will actually go into the

dwelling. Keep in mind that these rules were made during a period

when wilderness was still plentiful, and solid building materials

such as timber and stones were free for the taking. At present,

unless a bhikkhu has access to unclaimed wilderness of this sort, to

unclaimed garbage, or has enough funds on deposit with his steward

(see NP 10) to cover the cost of materials, his only recourse if he

wants a solid structure is either to rammed earth or to hinting.

The Commentary notes that while hinting is not allowed with regard

to food or cloth, it is allowed with regard to construction

materials. One example it gives is asking, "Do you think this is a

good place to build a hut? An ordination hall?" Another example is

staking out a construction site in hope that someone will ask, "What

are you planning to do here?" If people get the hint and offer the

materials, the bhikkhu may accept them. If they don't, he may not

ask directly for any materials except the "light articles" mentioned

above.

From this it should be obvious that even in cases not covered by

this rule -- i.e., the dwelling he is building doesn't qualify as a

"hut," or he is building something for other people to use -- a

bhikkhu engaged in construction work is not allowed to be burdensome

to the laity. This is an important point, as the Buddha illustrated

in a story he told to the bhikkhus at Alavi. A certain bhikkhu had

once come to him with a complaint, and he reports the conversation

as follows:

"'Lord, there is a large forest on the slopes of the

Himalayas, and not far from it is a broad, low-lying marsh.

A great flock of birds, after feeding all day in the marsh,

goes to roost in the forest at nightfall. That is why I have

come to see the Blessed One -- because I am annoyed by the

noise of that flock of birds.'

"'Bhikkhu, you want those birds to go away for good?'

"'Yes, Lord, I want them to go away for good.'

"'Then go back there, enter the forest, and in the first

watch of the night make this announcement three times:

"Listen to me, good birds. I want a feather from everyone

roosting in this forest. Each of you give me one feather."

In the second watch...In the third watch of the night make

this announcement three times: "Listen to me, good birds. I

want a feather from everyone roosting in this forest. Each

of you give me one feather"....(The bhikkhu did as he was

told.) Then the flock of birds, thinking, 'The bhikkhu asks

for a feather, the bhikkhu wants a feather,' left the

forest. And after they were gone, they never again returned.

Bhikkhus, begging is unpleasant, hinting is unpleasant even

to these common animals -- how much more so to human

beings?"

The hut. Now we turn to the particular case covered by this rule.

The Vibhanga defines a hut as "plastered inside, outside, or both."

It also states that this rule does not apply to a //lena//, a

//guha//, or to a grass hut. A lena, according to the Commentary, is

a cave. A guha it doesn't define, except to say that guhas may be

built out of wood, stone, or earth. And as for a grass hut, it says

that this refers to any building with a grass //roof//, which means

that even a dwelling with plastered walls but a grass roof would not

count as a hut under this rule (although a hut whose roof has been

plastered and then covered with grass //would// count as a hut

here).

The Commentary goes on to stipulate that the plastering mentioned

in the Vibhanga refers to a plastered //roof//, that the plaster

must be either clay or white lime (plastering with cow dung or mud

doesn't count, although cement would probably come under "white

lime" here), and that the plastering on the inside or outside of the

roof must be contiguous with the plastering on the inside or outside

of the walls. Thus if the builder leaves a gap in the plastering

around the top of the wall so that the plastering of the roof and

the plastering of the walls don't touch at any point, the building

doesn't qualify as a hut and so doesn't come under the rule.

The Commentary's stipulations on these point may seem like

attempts to create gaping loopholes in the rule, but there is

nothing in the Vibhanga to prove them wrong. Perhaps in those days

only fully plastered buildings were considered to be finished,

permanent structures, while everything else was considered makeshift

and temporary and thus not worth the fuss and bother of the

procedures we will discuss below.

At another point in its discussions, the Commentary adds that any

building three sugata spans wide or less is not big enough to move a

bed around in and so does not count as a hut under this rule. The

Commentary itself defines a sugata span as three times the span of a

normal person, which would put it at approximately 75 cm. More

recent calculations, based on the fact that the Buddha was not

abnormally tall, set the sugata span at 25 cm.

The procedures. If, for his own use, a bhikkhu is planning to

build a hut as defined in this rule, he must chose a site, clear it,

and ask for the local Community to inspect and approve it before he

can go ahead with the actual construction.

//The site//. The site must be free of disturbances and have

adequate space.

"Free of disturbances" means that the site is not the abode of

such creatures as termites, ants, or rats who might do harm to the

building, or of those such as snakes, scorpions, tigers, lions,

elephants, or bears who might do harm to its inhabitant. The

Commentary states that the Vibhanga's purpose in forbidding a

bhikkhu from building on a site where termites and other small

animals have their home is to show compassion to these and other

small creatures like them by not destroying their nests. As for the

stipulation against building where snakes and other dangerous

animals live, this also extends, it says, to the areas where they

regularly forage for food.

In addition, the Vibhanga says that a site without disturbances is

one that is not near any places that will disturb the bhikkhu's

peace and quiet. Examples it gives are: fields, orchards, places of

execution, cemeteries, pleasure groves, royal property, elephant

stables, horse stables, prisons, taverns, slaughterhouses, highways,

crossroads, public rest-houses, and meeting places.

"Adequate space" means that there is enough room on the site for a

yoked wagon to go around, or for a man to carry a ladder around, the

proposed hut. The question arises as to whether this means that all

trees within that radius of the hut must be cut down, or whether it

simply means that there must be enough land around the hut so that

if the trees were not there, it would be possible to go around the

hut in the ways mentioned. The Sub-commentary states that the

stipulation for adequate space is so that the hut will not be built

on the edge of a precipice or next to a cliff wall, and the Vinaya

Mukha notes that the Vibhanga here is following the Laws of Manu (an

ancient Indian legal text) in ensuring that the dwelling not be

built right against someone else's property. Both of these

statements suggest that there is no need to cut the trees down.

The Vinaya Mukha maintains further that the procedures for getting

the site approved are concerned basically with laying claim to

unclaimed land, and this has led many Communities in Thailand to say

that the need to have the Community approve the site does not apply

to places where the Community already owns the land, such as in a

monastery. If a bhikkhu in such Communities wishes to build a hut

for his own use on monastery land, he need only get the approval of

the abbot. The ancient texts say nothing on this point, so it is an

area where the wise policy is to follow the views of the Community

to which one belongs.

//Clearing the site//. Before notifying the local Community, the

bhikkhu must get the site cleared -- so says the Vibhanga, and the

Commentary adds that he should get it leveled as well. In both

cases, he should arrange to have this done in such a way that does

not violate Pacittiyas 10 & 11. Again, the question arises as to

whether clearing the site means cutting down the trees on the spot

where one proposes building the hut. In the origin story to the

following rule, Ven. Channa caused an uproar by cutting down a

venerated tree on a site where he planned to build, which led the

Buddha to formulate the rule that the Community must inspect and

approve the site to prevent uproars of this sort. This suggests that

clearing the site here means clearing the underbrush. Only after the

Community has approved the site should the necessary trees be cut

down.

//Getting the site inspected//. The bhikkhu then goes to the local

Community and formally asks them to inspect the site. (The Pali

passages for this and the remaining formal requests and

announcements are in the Vibhanga.) Either the entire Community will

go to inspect the site or it will select two or three of its members

to go and inspect the site in its stead. The Vibhanga says that

these inspectors should know what does and does not constitute a

disturbance and adequate space, and requires that they be chosen by

a formal motion with one announcement. The Commentary, for some

reason, says that they may also be chosen by a simple declaration

(//apalokana//).

The inspectors then visit the site. If they find any disturbances

or see that the site has inadequate space, they should tell the

bhikkhu not to build there. If the site passes inspection, though,

the bhikkhu may go on to the next step.

//Getting the site approved//. The bhikkhu returns to the

Community and formally asks them to approve the site. The formal act

involves a motion and one announcement. Once this has passed, the

bhikkhu may start construction.

The size of the hut. As the rule states, the hut may be no more

than twelve spans long and seven spans wide, or approximately 3 x

1.75 meters. For some reason the Vibhanga states that the length of

the hut is measured from the outside (excluding the plastering, says

the Commentary), while the width is measured from the inside. The

Commentary adds that neither of these measurements may be exceeded.

Thus a hut ten by eight spans wide, even though it has less floor

area than a twelve by seven span hut, would exceed the standard

width and so would be a violation of this rule.

Offenses. The Vibhanga allots the penalties for building a hut

without a sponsor, for one's own use, without regard for the

stipulations in this rule, as follows:

an oversized hut -- a sanghadisesa;

a hut on an unapproved site -- a sanghadisesa;

a hut on a site without adequate space -- a dukkata;

a hut on a site with disturbances -- a dukkata.

These penalties are additive. Thus, for example, an oversized hut

on an unapproved site would entail a double sanghadisesa.

The wording of the training rule, though, suggests that building a

hut without a sponsor, for one's own use, on a site with

disturbances and without adequate space would entail a sanghadisesa;

but the Sub-commentary says -- without offering explanation -- that

to read the rule in this way is to misinterpret it. Since the

penalty for a multiple sanghadisesa is the same as that for a single

one, there is only one case where this would make an appreciable

difference: a hut of the proper size, built on a designated site

that has disturbances or does not have adequate space. This is a

case of a formal act of the Community improperly performed: Either

the bhikkhus inspecting the site were incompetent, or the

disturbances were not immediately apparent. Since the usual penalty

for improperly performing an act of the Community is a dukkata

(Mv.II.16.4), this may be why the Vibhanga allots penalties as it

does.

As we noted in the Introduction, in cases where the Vibhanga is

explaining the training rules that deal with formal acts of the

Community, it sometimes has to deviate from the wording of the rules

so as to bring them in line in with the general pattern for such

acts, a pattern that was probably formulated after the rules and

came to take precedence over them.

Getting others to build the hut. If, instead of building the hut

himself, a bhikkhu gets others to build it for him, he must inform

them of the four stipulations mentioned in this rule. If he neglects

to inform them, and they build the hut in such a way that it does

not meet any or all of the stipulations, he must either have it torn

down (to the ground, says the Commentary) and have it rebuilt in

line with the stipulations, give it to another, or face the full

penalty for each of the stipulations they violated that he neglected

to mention to them.

For example: He tells them to build a hut of the right size, but

neglects to tell them to have the site approved. They build it to

the right size, the site is without disturbances and has adequate

space but is not approved. Unless he has it torn down or gives it to

another, he incurs a sanghadisesa.

If the bhikkhu mentions the proper stipulations, but learns that

the builders are ignoring them, he must go himself or send a

messenger to reiterate the stipulations. Not to do so incurs a

dukkata. If, having been reminded of the stipulations, the builders

still ignore them, the bhikkhu incurs no penalty; but they -- if

they are bhikkhus -- incur a dukkata for each of the three criteria

regarding the site that they disobey. As for the standard

measurement, they are not bound by it as they are building the hut

for another's use.

If a bhikkhu, intending it for his own use, completes a hut that

others have started, or gets others to complete a hut he has

started, he is still bound by the stipulations given in this rule.

Preliminary offenses. The penalties in the preliminary steps are

as follows: If the hut is such that when finished it will entail a

sanghadisesa or two, each act in its construction entails a dukkata,

until the next to the last act, which entails a thullaccaya. Once

the hut is completed, and the bhikkhu incurs the sanghadisesa(s),

the dukkatas and thullaccaya are nullified.

Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses mention, in addition to the

usual exemptions, that there is no offense "in a lena, in a guha, in

a grass hut, in (a dwelling) for another's use, or in anything other

than a dwelling." The Commentary explains that no offense here means

that these cases are not subject to any of the four stipulations

given in this rule. As for the last case, if a bhikkhu is building,

e.g., a meeting hall for the Community, he is not bound by this

rule, but if he plans to live there as well, he is. This last case

suggests that if a bhikkhu is building a dwelling, planning to

donate it formally to the Community but also planning to live there

himself, he is not exempt from this rule.

Summary: Building a plastered hut -- or having it built --

without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, without

having obtained the Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa

offense. Building a plastered hut -- or having it built --

without a sponsor, destined for one's own use, exceeding the

standard measurements, is also a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

7. When a bhikkhu is building a large dwelling -- having a

sponsor and destined for himself -- he is to assemble

bhikkhus to designate the site. The site the bhikkhus

designate should be without disturbances and with adequate

space. If the bhikkhu should build a large dwelling on a

site with disturbances and without adequate space, or if he

should not assemble the bhikkhus to designate the site, it

entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

The Vibhanga defines //dwelling// here with the same terms it uses

for //hut// in the preceding rule. All explanations for this rule

may be inferred from those above, the only difference being that, as

the dwelling here has a sponsor, no begging is involved in its

construction, and so there is no need to limit its size.

If a sponsor is building a dwelling for a bhikkhu, and the bhikkhu

is not involved in any way in building it or getting it built, this

rule does not apply.

Summary: Building a hut with a sponsor -- or having it built

-- destined for one's own use, without having obtained the

Community's approval, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

8.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, charge

a (fellow) bhikkhu with an unfounded case involving defeat,

(thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall

from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not

he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue is

unfounded and the bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails

initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

"Now at that time a householder who served fine food gave

food to the Community on a regular basis, four bhikkhus

every day. (One day) he happened to go on some business to

the monastery. He went to where Ven. Dabba Mallaputta was

staying and on arrival bowed to him and sat down to one

side....Ven. Dabba Mallaputta roused... him with a Dhamma

talk. Then the householder with fine food...said to Dabba

Mallaputta, 'To whom, sir, is tomorrow's meal in our house

assigned?'

"'To (the) followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka,

householder.' [Mettiya and Bhummajaka were among the leaders

of the group-of-six, a faction notorious for its shameless

behavior, and instigators of many of the situations that

compelled the Buddha to formulate training rules.]

"This upset the householder with fine food. Thinking, 'How

can these evil bhikkhus eat in our house?' he returned home

and ordered his female slave: 'Hey. Those who are coming for

a meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom

and serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine.'

"'As you say, master,' the female slave answered....

"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one

another, 'Yesterday we were assigned a meal at the house of

the householder with fine food. Tomorrow, attending with his

wife and children, he will serve us. Some will offer rice,

some will offer curry, some oil, and some dainties.' Because

of their joy, they didn't sleep as much that night as they

had hoped.

"Early the next morning...they went to the home of the

householder with fine food. The female slave saw them coming

from afar. Preparing them a seat in the storeroom, she said

to them, 'Have a seat, honored sirs.'

"The thought occurred to the followers of Mettiya and

Bhummajaka, 'No doubt the food isn't ready yet, which is why

we are being made to sit in the storeroom.'

"Then the female slave brought them unhusked rice porridge

with pickle brine and said, 'Eat, honored sirs.'

"'Sister, we've come for the regular meal.'

"'I know you've come for the regular meal. But yesterday the

householder ordered me, "Hey. Those who are coming for a

meal tomorrow: Prepare a seat for them in the storeroom and

serve them unhusked rice porridge with pickle brine." So

eat, honored sirs.'

"Then the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka said to one

another, 'Yesterday the householder with fine food went to

the monastery and met with Dabba Mallaputta. No doubt Dabba

Mallaputta turned him against us.' Because of their

disappointment, they didn't eat as much as they had hoped.

"Then they returned to the monastery and, putting away their

robes and bowls, went to the storeroom outside the gate and

sat on their outer cloaks, their arms around their knees,

silent, abashed, their shoulders drooping, their heads down,

brooding, at a loss for words.

"Then Mettiya Bhikkhuni came along and said to them, 'I

salute you, masters.' But when she had said this, they

didn't respond. A second time...A third time she said, 'I

salute you, masters.' And a third time they didn't respond.

"'Have I offended you, masters? Why don't you respond to

me?'

"'Because you stand by doing nothing, sister, when Dabba

Mallaputta treats us like dirt.'

"'What can I do?'

"'If you like, you could get the Blessed One to expel Dabba

Mallaputta right this very day.'

"'What can I do? How could I do that?'

"'Come, sister. Go to where the Blessed One is and say this:

"It is unfitting, Lord, and improper. The quarter without

dread, without harm, without danger, is (now) the quarter

with dread, with harm, with danger. Where there is calm,

there is a windstorm. The water, as it were, is ablaze. I

have been raped by Master Dabba Mallaputta."'

"'As you say, masters.' (And she went to carry out their

bidding.)"

This is just the heart of the origin story to this rule, which is

one of the longest and most controversial accounts in the Vinaya.

After Mettiya Bhikkhuni made her charge, the Buddha convened a

meeting of the Sangha to question Ven. Dabba Mallaputta. The latter,

who had attained arahantship at the age of seven, responded

truthfully that he could not call to mind ever having indulged in

sexual intercourse even in a dream, much less when awake. The Buddha

then told the Sangha to expel Mettiya Bhikkhuni and returned to his

quarters.

According to the Commentary, the expulsion of Mettiya Bhikkhuni

was one of the controversial points in the split between the

Mahayanist bhikkhus in the Abhayagiri Vihara and the Theravadin

bhikkhus of the Mahavihara in the old Sri Lankan capital of

Anuradhapura. Even modern scholars have objected to the Buddha's

treatment of Mettiya Bhikkhuni and interpret this passage as a

"monkish gloss," as if the Buddha himself were not a monk, and the

entire Canon were not the work of monks and nuns. The Commentary

maintains that the Buddha acted as he did because he knew if he

treated her less harshly, the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka

would never have volunteered the information that they had put her

up to making the charge in the first place, and the truth would

never have come out. This would have led some people to remain

secretly convinced of Ven. Dabba Mallaputta's guilt and -- because

he was an arahant -- would have been for their long-term detriment.

At any rate, what concerns us here is that at some point after

this rule was formulated, the Buddha put the Sangha in charge of

judging accusations of this sort and gave them a definite pattern to

follow in order to ensure that their judgments would be accurate and

fair. Because the Vibhanga and Commentary to this rule are based on

this pattern, we will discuss the pattern first before dealing with

the special case -- unfounded charges -- covered by this rule.

Admonition. As the Buddha states in Sanghadisesa 12, one of the

ways bhikkhus may hope for growth in his teachings is through mutual

admonition and mutual rehabilitation. If a bhikkhu commits an

offense, the responsibility is his to inform his fellow bhikkhus so

that they may help him through whatever procedures the offense may

entail. Now of course, human nature being what it is, there are

bound to be bhikkhus who neglect this responsibility, in which case

the responsibility falls to the offender's fellow bhikkhus who know

of the matter to admonish him in private, if possible, or -- if he

is stubborn -- to make a formal charge in a meeting of the

Community.

The pattern here is this: Before speaking to the bhikkhu, one must

first make sure that one is qualified to admonish him. According to

Cv.IX.1-2, this means one knows:

1) One is pure in bodily conduct.

2) One is pure in verbal conduct.

3) One is motivated by kindness, not vengeance.

4) One is learned in the Dhamma.

5) One knows both Patimokkhas (the one for the bhikkhus and the

one for the bhikkhunis) in detail.

Furthermore, one determines that:

1) I will speak at the right time and not at the wrong time.

2) I will speak the truth and not untruths.

3) I will speak gently and not harshly.

4) I will speak what is connected with the goal and not what is

unconnected with the goal.

5) I will speak out of kindness and not out of inner anger.

The Parivara (XV.5.3) adds that one should keep five qualities in

mind: compassion, solicitude for the other's welfare, sympathy,

desire to see him rehabilitated, and a desire to keep the Vinaya

foremost.

If one feels that one is unqualified, yet believes that another

bhikkhu has committed an offense for which he has not made amends,

one should find another bhikkhu who is qualified to handle the

charge and inform him. Not to inform anyone in cases like this -- if

the case involves a parajika or sanghadisesa offense -- is to

violate Pacittiya 64, except in the extenuating circumstances

discussed under that rule.

The next step, if one is qualified to make the charge, is to look

for a proper time and place to talk with the other party -- e.g.,

when he is not likely to get embarrassed or upset -- and then to ask

his leave, i.e., to ask permission to speak with him: "Let the Ven.

One give me leave. I want to speak with you." To accuse him of an

offense without asking leave is to incur a dukkata (Mv.II.16.1).

As for the other party, the Buddha recommends that he should give

leave only after assessing the person asking for leave, for it is

possible that someone might ask for leave without any real grounds,

simply to be abusive. (A bhikkhu who asks for leave with no grounds

-- i.e., he has not seen the other party commit the offense, has

heard no reliable report to that effect, and has no reason to

suspect anything to that effect -- incurs a dukkata (Mv.II.16.3).)

The Parivara (XV.4.7) suggests that one should not give leave to a

bhikkhu who:

1) is unconscientious,

2) is ignorant,

3) is not a bhikkhu in regular standing,

4) speaks intent on creating a disturbance, or

5) is not intent on rehabilitating the bhikkhu he is accusing.

In another passage (XV.5.4), it suggests further that one should

not give leave to a bhikkhu who:

1) is not pure in bodily conduct,

2) is not pure in verbal conduct,

3) is not pure in his livelihood,

4) is foolish, childish, and unintelligent, or

5) is unable to give a consistent line of reasoning when

questioned.

If the bhikkhu, is not unqualified in any of these ways, though,

one should willingly give him leave to speak. The Cullavagga

(IX.5.7) says that, when being admonished or accused, one should

keep two qualities in mind: truth, and lack of anger. The Patimokkha

also contains a number of rules imposing penalties on behaving

improperly when one is being admonished formally or informally:

Sanghadisesa 12 for being difficult to admonish in general,

Pacittiya 12 for being evasive or refusing to answer when being

formally questioned, Pacittiya 54 for being disrespectful to one's

accuser or to the rule one is being accused of breaking, and

Pacittiya 71 for finding excuses for not listening to a particular

training rule.

If both sides act in good faith and without prejudice, accusations

of this sort are easy to settle on an informal basis. If they can't

be settled informally, they should be taken to a meeting of the

Community so that the group as a whole may pass judgment. The

procedures for this sort of formal meeting will be discussed under

the Aniyata and Adhikarana-Samatha rules, below.

Abuse of the system. As the origin story to this rule shows, it

can easily be the case that a bhikkhu making a charge against

another bhikkhu is acting out of a grudge and has simply made up the

charge. This rule and the following one cover cases where the

made-up charge is that the other bhikkhu has committed a parajika.

Pacittiya 76 covers cases where the made-up charge is that the other

bhikkhu has broken a less serious rule.

The full offense under this rule involves four factors:

1) //Object//: The other bhikkhu is regarded as ordained.

2) //Perception//: One perceives him to be innocent of the offense

one is charging him with.

3) //Intention//: One wants to see him expelled from the Sangha.

4) //Effort//: One makes an unfounded charge in his presence that

he is guilty of a parajika offense.

Object. The definition of this factor -- the other bhikkhu is

regarded as ordained -- may sound strange, but it comes from the

K/Commentary and is phrased that way with a reason: In normal cases

the object of this rule will be an innocent bhikkhu, but there may

be cases where a bhikkhu has actually committed a parajika offense

that no one knows about; yet instead of disrobing, he acts as if he

were still a bhikkhu, and everyone else assumes that he still is.

Yet even a "bhikkhu" of this sort would fulfill this factor as far

as this rule is concerned.

For example, Bhikkhu X steals some of the monastery funds, but no

one knows about it, and he continues to act as if he were a bhikkhu.

Bhikkhu Y later develops a grudge against him and makes an unfounded

charge that he has had sexual intercourse with one of the monastery

supporters. Even though X is not really a bhikkhu, the fact that

people in general assume him to be one means that he fulfills this

factor.

Perception. If one perceives the bhikkhu one is charging with a

parajika offense to be innocent of the offense, that is enough to

fulfill this factor regardless of whether the accused is actually

innocent or not. To make an accusation based on the assumption or

suspicion that the accused is //not// innocent entails no offense.

Intention. If, in making an unfounded charge of a parajika offense

against another bhikkhu, one's purpose is to see him expelled from

the Sangha, that fulfills this factor. If one's purpose is simply to

insult him, one's actions would come under Pacittiya 2. If one's

purpose is both to see him expelled and to insult him, one incurs

both a sanghadisesa and a pacittiya. If one has a strange sense of

humor and is making the charge as some sort of joke, the penalty is

either a pacittiya under Pacittiya 1 or a dubbhasita under Pacittiya

2: The texts are not clear on this point, but in either case this

sort of thing is no joking matter.

According to the Vibhanga, "confessing one's anger" can simply

mean admitting that one made the charge idly. Thus the amount of

malice motivating one's desire to see the other bhikkhu expelled can

be minimal indeed: If one wants to see him expelled just for the fun

of it, that would fulfill the factor of intention here.

Effort. The act covered by this rule is that of making an

unfounded charge of a parajika in the accused's presence. Whether

one makes the charge oneself or gets someone else to make it, the

penalty is the same. If that "someone else" is a bhikkhu and knows

the charge is unfounded, he too incurs the full penalty.

The Vibhanga defines an unfounded charge as one having no basis in

what has been seen, heard, or suspected. In other words, the accuser

has not seen the accused committing the offense in question, nor has

he heard anything reliable to that effect, nor is there anything in

the accused's behavior to give rise to any honest suspicion.

"Seeing" and "hearing," according to the Commentary, also include

the powers of clairvoyance and clairaudience one may have developed

through meditation. Thus if one charges X with having committed a

parajika offense on the basis of what one has seen clairvoyantly,

this would not be an unfounded charge, although one should be

careful to make clear from the very beginning what kind of seeing

the charge is based on.

If there is some basis in fact, but one changes the status of the

evidence, the penalty is the same. Changing the status means, e.g.,

saying that one saw something when in actuality one simply heard

about it or suspected it, or that one saw it clearly when in

actuality one saw it indistinctly.

An example from the Commentary: Bhikkhu X goes into a grove to

relieve himself. Ms. Y goes into the same grove to get something

there. One sees them leaving the grove at approximately the same

time -- which could count as grounds for suspicion -- but one then

accuses Bhikkhu X, saying that one actually saw him having sex with

Ms. Y. This would count as an unfounded charge. Another example: In

the dark of the night, one sees a man stealing something from the

monastery storehouse. He looks vaguely like Bhikkhu Z, but one can't

be sure. Still, one firms up one's accusation by saying that one

definitely saw Z steal the item. Again, this would count as an

unfounded charge.

The Commentary states that for an unfounded charge to count under

this rule, it must state explicitly (a) the precise act the accused

supposedly committed (e.g., having sexual intercourse, getting a

woman to have an abortion) or (b) that the accused is guilty of a

parajika, or (c) that the accused is no longer a true bhikkhu. If

one simply says or does something that might imply that the accused

is no longer a bhikkhu -- e.g., refusing to show him respect in line

with his seniority -- that does not yet count as a charge.

The Commentary adds that charging a bhikkhu with having committed

a virtual parajika, as discussed in the conclusion to the preceding

chapter, would fulfill this factor as well. For instance, if one

makes an unfounded charge accusing Bhikkhu A of having killed his

father before his ordination, that would constitute a full offense

here.

All of the charges given as examples in the Vibhanga are expressed

directly to the accused -- "I saw you have sexual intercourse," "I

heard you lay false claims to a superior human state" -- and the

Commentary concludes from this that the full offense occurs only

when one makes the charge in the accused's presence, in line with

the pattern for admonition discussed above. To make an unfounded

charge behind the accused's back, it states, incurs a dukkata.

Some people have objected to this point, saying that this gives a

very light penalty for backhanded character assassination, but there

is nothing in the Vibhanga to indicate that the Commentary is wrong

here. Remember that the correct procedures for making an accusation

require that an earnest charge be made in the presence of the

accused. If a bhikkhu spreads gossip about another bhikkhu, accusing

him of having committed a parajika, he should be asked whether he

has taken up the matter with the accused. If he hasn't, he should be

told to speak to the accused before he speaks to anyone else. If he

says that he doesn't feel qualified or that he fears the accused

will retaliate, he should be told to take the matter up with the

bhikkhus who will be responsible for calling a meeting of the

Community. If he refuses to do that, he shouldn't be listened to.

For some reason, the Commentary maintains that a charge made in

writing does not count, although a charge made by gesture -- e.g.,

pointing at the accused when one is asked who committed the parajika

-- does. Perhaps in those days written charges were regarded as too

cowardly to take seriously.

The rule seems to require that the accused confess that he was

acting out of anger, although the Vibhanga states that this means

simply that he admits the charge was a lie. The Commentary states

further that here the rule is showing the point where the rest of

the Community knows that the bhikkhu making the charge is guilty of

a sanghadisesa: He actually committed the offense when he made the

charge.

The Commentary adds "result" as a further factor to the offense

under this rule, saying that the accused must understand the charge

in a reasonable amount of time -- but nothing in the Vibhanga

supports this added factor.

Whether or not anyone actually believes the charge is not a factor

here.

Non-offenses. If one understands the accused to be guilty of a

parajika and accuses him accurately on the basis of what one has

seen, heard, or suspected, then -- regardless of whether he is

guilty or not -- one has not committed an offense. Even in a case

such as this, though, one incurs a dukkata if one makes the charge

without asking leave of the accused, and a pacittiya if one makes

the charge so as to insult him.

Summary: Making an unfounded charge to a bhikkhu that he has

committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him

disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

9.Should any bhikkhu, malicious, angered, displeased, using

as a mere ploy an aspect of an issue that pertains

otherwise, charge a bhikkhu with a case involving defeat,

(thinking), "Surely with this I may bring about his fall

from the celibate life," then regardless of whether or not

he is cross-examined on a later occasion, if the issue

pertains otherwise, an aspect used as a mere ploy, and the

bhikkhu confesses his anger, it entails initial and

subsequent meetings of the Community.

"At that time the followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka,

descending from Vulture Peak Mountain, saw a billy-goat

copulating with a nanny-goat. Seeing them, they said, 'Look

here, friends, let's name this billy-goat Dabba Mallaputta,

and this nanny-goat Mettiya Bhikkhuni. Then we'll phrase it

like this: "Before, my friends, we accused Dabba Mallaputta

on the basis of what we had heard, but now we have seen him

with our very own eyes fornicating with Mettiya

Bhikkhuni!"'"

Some grudges die hard. This rule is almost identical with the

preceding one and involves the same factors except for one of the

sub-factors under "Effort": "Unfounded charge" here becomes "a

charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise." The phrase sounds

strange, but the origin story gives a perfect example of what it

means.

The precise difference between the two rules is this: With an

unfounded charge, one has neither seen, heard, nor suspected that an

offense has been committed; or if one has, one changes the status of

the evidence -- e.g., one states something one has suspected as if

one has heard it, or something one has heard as if one has seen it.

In a charge based on an issue that pertains otherwise, one has seen

an offense being committed and one does not change the status of the

evidence, but one distorts the facts of the case.

To summarize the Vibhanga, there are two basic ways in which this

can be done:

1) X, who may or may not be a bhikkhu, has something in common

with Bhikkhu Y -- they are both tall, short, dark, fair, have the

same name, or whatever. One sees X committing an action that

would amount to an offense and then, on the basis of the

similarity between the two, claims that one has seen Bhikkhu Y

committing a parajika. For instance, X and Y are both very tall.

Late at night one sees X -- knowing that it is X -- stealing

tools from the monastery storeroom. One has a grudge against Y

and so accuses him of being the thief, saying, "I saw this big

tall guy stealing the tools, and he looked just like you. It must

have been you."

2) One sees Bhikkhu Y actually committing an offense. Although one

perceives that it is a lesser offense, one magnifies the charge

to a parajika. For instance, one sees him get into an argument

with Bhikkhu Z and in a fit of anger give Z a blow to the head. Z

goes unconscious, falls to the floor and suffers a severe

concussion resulting in death. Since Y's intention was simply to

hurt him, not to kill him, he incurs only a pacittiya. If one

realizes the nature of Y's intention and the fact that the

penalty is a pacittiya, and yet accuses him of having committed a

parajika, one would incur a sanghadisesa under this rule.

If one sees Y committing an action that one knows does not violate

the rules, but that bears some resemblance to an offense, and then

accuses him of having committed a parajika, it would not fit under

this category. For instance, Y is teaching Vinaya to some new

bhikkhus and quotes a few of the statements that would count as

claims of superior human states. One overhears him and, although

realizing the context, later accuses him of having violated Parajika

4. Since one knows that Y committed no offense, this would count as

an unfounded charge and so would come under the preceding rule.

The other explanations here are exactly the same as those for the

preceding rule, except that in the no-offense clauses the Vibhanga

states that if one makes a charge against the accused based on what

one actually perceives, there is no offense even if the issue turns

out to pertain otherwise. For instance, from the examples already

given: One sees X stealing tools in the dark and, because of his

resemblance to Y, actually thinks Y is the thief. One sees Y give a

fatal blow to Z and actually thinks that Y's intention was to kill

Z. In either of these cases, if one then accuses Y of a parajika

offense, one incurs no penalty regardless of how the case comes out,

although -- as in the preceding rule -- one should be careful to ask

Y's leave before making the charge and to have no intention of

insulting him.

Summary: Distorting the evidence while accusing a bhikkhu of

having committed a parajika offense, in hopes of having him

disrobed, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

10.Should any bhikkhu agitate for a schism in a Community in

concord, or should he persist in taking up an issue

conducive to schism, the bhikkhus should admonish him thus:

"Do not, Ven. sir, agitate for a schism in a Community in

concord or persist in taking up an issue conducive to

schism. Let the venerable one be reconciled with the

Community, for a Community in concord, on complimentary

terms, free from dispute, having a common recitation, dwells

in peace."

And should that bhikkhu, admonished thus by the bhikkhus,

persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to

three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to

three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist,

it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

This rule dates from Devadatta's attempt to create a schism in the

Sangha during the Buddha's life and is designed to help prevent such

an attempt from ever happening again.

Disputes. Schisms arise from disputes over what the Buddha did and

did not teach or, in the words of the Cullavagga, "when bhikkhus

dispute, saying:

'It is Dhamma,' or 'It is not Dhamma;'

'It is Vinaya,' or 'It is not Vinaya;'

'It was spoken by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not spoken by the

Tathagata;'

'It was regularly practiced by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not

regularly practiced by the Tathagata;'

'It was formulated by the Tathagata,' or 'It was not formulated by

the Tathagata;'

'It is an offense,' or 'It is not an offense;'

'It is a light offense,' or 'It is a heavy offense;'

'It is a curable offense,' or 'It is an incurable offense;'

'It is a serious offense,' or 'It is not a serious offense.'

Whatever strife, quarreling, contention, dispute, differing

opinions, opposing opinions, heated words, abusiveness based on

this, is an issue arising from disputes." (Cv.IV.14.2)

Thus not all disagreements on these matters are classed as issues.

Friendly disagreements or differences of interpretation aren't;

heated and abusive disagreements are.

The Buddha advises that a bhikkhu who wants to bring up such

questions for discussion should first consider five points: 1)

whether it is the right time for such a discussion; 2) whether it

concerns something true; 3) whether it is connected with the goal;

4) whether he will be able to get on his side bhikkhus who value the

Dhamma and Vinaya; and 5) whether the question will give rise to

strife, quarreling, disputes, cracks, and splits in the Community.

If the answer to the first four questions is yes, and to the fifth

question no (i.e., it is the right time for the discussion, it

concerns something true, it is connected with the goal, bhikkhus who

value the Dhamma and Vinaya will be willing to join his side, and

the discussion is not likely to lead to strife), he may go ahead and

start the discussion. Otherwise, he should let the matter rest for

the time being (Cv.IX.4).

The Cullavagga quotes the Buddha as saying that two sorts of

mental states -- skillful and unskillful -- can turn disputes into

issues. The unskillful states he lists are covetous, corrupt, or

confused states of mind; the skillful ones are states of mind that

are not covetous, corrupt, or confused. He adds, however, that six

character traits can lead to issues arising from disputes that will

tend toward the detriment of many people. They are when a bhikkhu --

is easily angered and bears ill will,

is mean and spiteful,

is jealous and possessive,

is scheming and deceitful,

has evil desires and wrong views,

is attached to his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

Such a bhikkhu, he says, lives without deference or respect for

the Buddha, the Dhamma, or the Sangha, and does not complete the

training. If one should see any of these traits within oneself or

others, one should strive for their abandonment. If there are no

such traits present, one should make sure that they don't arise in

the future (Cv.IV.14.3).

Not all disputes, even when prolonged, will lead to schism. An

example is the dispute that led to the Second Council. Even though

it was bitterly fought, there was never a point when either faction

thought of splitting off and conducting communal business

separately. In fact, even after the early Buddhists had formed into

18 separate schools, and the Mahayana movement added //its// schools

of interpretation, Chinese visitors to India reported that bhikkhus

belonging to the different schools of thought could be found living

together harmoniously in the same monastery, performing communal

business together in peace. (Many scholars have misunderstood this

point, thinking that the various schools were schismatic, but in

fact they weren't.)

Thus there are two sets of procedures to follow when a dispute

becomes an issue: For a dispute in which none of the partisans is

aiming at a schism, there are the procedures listed in

Cv.IV.14.16-26. For one that is heading towards a schism (and

//only// for one in which at least one side is aiming at schism, the

Commentary implies and the Sub-commentary states explicitly), we

have this rule and the following one.

Schism. The Cullavagga (VII.5.1), states that schism occurs when

the leader of a schism puts the matter to a vote in a Community of

at least nine bhikkhus with at least four on either side of the

split. It further adds that all the bhikkhus involved must be

bhikkhus of regular standing in communion with the group as a whole

(i.e., they haven't been suspended from the Community), living in

the same boundary.

If one or the other of these qualifications is lacking -- the

issue goes to a vote in a Community of less than nine bhikkhus, one

side or the other gets less than four adherents, or the bhikkhus

involved are not on regular standing or do not belong to the same

boundary -- the efforts at schism count as a crack (//raji//) in the

Community, but not as a full split (//bheda//).

However, the Parivara (XV.10.9), drawing on material in A.X.35 &

37, lists five ways in which a schism can take place: discussion,

announcement, vote, act, and recitation. The Commentary, trying to

reconcile the Cullavagga and Parivara on this point, interprets the

five ways as four steps in a single process (the last two ways

counting as alternative forms of a single step):

1) //Discussion//. A bhikkhu aiming at schism begins a dispute

over the Buddha's teachings, explaining Dhamma as not-Dhamma;

not-Dhamma as Dhamma; Vinaya as not-Vinaya; not-Vinaya as Vinaya;

what was not spoken by the Buddha as having been spoken by him;

what was spoken by the Buddha as not; what was not regularly

practiced by him as having been regularly practiced by him; what

was regularly practiced by him as not; what was not formulated by

him as having been formulated by him; what was formulated by him

as not; an offense as a non-offense; a non-offense as an offense;

a heavy offense as a light offense; a light offense as heavy; a

curable offense as incurable; an incurable offense as curable; a

serious offense as not serious; or a not-serious offense as

serious.

2) //Announcement//. He announces that he is splitting off from

the Community and asks other bhikkhus to take sides.

3) //Vote//. The issue goes to a vote in a Community of at least

nine bhikkhus, with at least four on either side.

4) //Act or recitation//. The bhikkhus who side with the

schismatic split from the others and recite the Patimokkha or

perform other communal business separately.

According to the Commentary, the actual schism has not taken place

until step 4, when the schismatic group conducts communal business

or recites the Patimokkha separately. This is in accordance with

A.X.35 but seems to conflict with the Cullavagga, so the Commentary

explains that if the vote is taken in a split-off meeting of the

Community, steps 3 and 4 happen simultaneously, and the schism has

been accomplished. Otherwise, if the vote is taken outside of the

boundary, the schism is not finalized until the split-off faction

conducts communal business separately within the same boundary as

the Community (Pv.VI.2 & XV.10.10).

We can notice from the way the Vibhanga and Commentary analyze the

steps leading up to schism, that if a group of bhikkhus is living in

a Community that does not adhere to the Buddha's teachings and they

wish to leave the group so that they may more easily follow those

teachings, they do not count as schismatics. However, they should be

careful first to make sure that their views //are// genuinely in

line with the Buddha's teachings and then conduct their departure in

as amenable and unprovocative a manner as possible. In other words,

instead of announcing a split, they should simply say that they want

to go to a more congenial place to practice.

Schism is serious business -- one of the five most heinous crimes

a person can commit. The other four are killing one's mother,

killing one's father, killing an arahant, and maliciously causing a

Buddha to shed blood. A bhikkhu who creates a schism is expelled and

can never be readmitted into the Community during this lifetime

(Mv.I.67). If he knows that his schism is against the Dhamma, then

after death he will go immediately to Hell and be boiled there for

an aeon. The same fate awaits those who join his schismatic group

knowing that what he teaches is not the true Dhamma or Vinaya.

Those, however, who follow him not knowing that his teaching is not

the true Dhamma or Vinaya will not necessarily suffer that fate. If

they realize their mistake and ask to be allowed back into the

Community, they need only confess a thullaccaya and they are members

of the Community in full standing as before (Cv.VII.4.4;

Cv.VII.5.1-6).

Preventing a schism. The Vibhanga states that if a bhikkhu sees or

hears of an attempt at a schism, it is his duty to reprimand the

instigator three times, for the instigator, if he goes

unreprimanded, may continue with his efforts as he likes without

incurring a penalty. A bhikkhu who neglects this duty incurs a

dukkata. The Commentary adds that this dukkata applies to every

bhikkhu within a half-yojana (five-mile) radius who learns of the

attempt at a schism; any bhikkhu outside that radius, even though he

may not be subject to the penalty, should still regard it as his

duty, if he is able, to go reprimand the instigator as well.

(According to the Sub-commentary, any bhikkhu within the five-mile

radius who is ill or otherwise unable to go reprimand the instigator

is not subject to this penalty.) If the attempt takes place during

the Rains Retreat, other bhikkhus are allowed to cut short their

stay at other monasteries to help end the attempt (Mv.III.6-9).

If, after being reprimanded three times, the instigator abandons

his efforts, he incurs no penalty and nothing further need be done.

If he is still recalcitrant, though, he incurs a dukkata; and the

next step is to take him into the midst of a formal meeting of the

Community (by force, if necessary, says the Commentary) and admonish

him formally three more times. If he abandons his efforts before the

end of the third admonition, well and good. If not, he incurs

another dukkata. The next step is to recite a formal rebuke, by

mandate of the Community, using the formula of one motion and three

announcements given in the Vibhanga. If the instigator remains

obstinate, he incurs an additional dukkata at the end of the motion,

a thullaccaya at the end of each of the first two announcements, and

the full sanghadisesa at the end of the third. Once he commits the

full offense, the penalties he incurred in the preliminary stages

are nullified.

Perception. The Vibhanga states that if the acts of admonition and

rebuke are carried out properly -- i.e. the bhikkhu really is

misstating the Buddha's teachings, is really aiming at a schism, and

the various other formal requirements for a formal act are fulfilled

-- then if he does not abandon his intention to agitate for a

schism, he incurs the full sanghadisesa regardless of whether he

perceives the act to be proper, improper, or doubtful. If the act is

improperly carried out, then regardless of how he perceives its

validity, he incurs a dukkata for not abandoning his intention (%).

The fact that the bhikkhu is not free from an offense in the

latter case is important: There are several other, similar points in

the Vinaya -- such as the Buddha's advice to the Dhamma-expert in

the controversy at Kosambi (Mv.X.1.8) -- where for the sake of the

harmony of the Community in cases that threaten to be divisive, the

Buddha advises bhikkhus to abandon controversial behavior and to

yield to the mandate of the Community even if it seems unjust.

Non-offenses. The no-offense clauses, in addition to the usual

exemptions, state simply that there is no offense if the bhikkhu is

not reprimanded or if he gives up his attempt at a schism.

Further steps. If the bhikkhu is truly stubborn, it is possible

that he may continue in his efforts at a schism even after this

sanghadisesa is imposed on him. However, the fact that the Community

met to deal with his case should be enough to alert well-meaning

bhikkhus that the schismatic is following a wrong course of action,

and this should help unite the Community against his efforts. If

they deem it necessary -- to keep the laity from being taken in by

his arguments -- they may authorize one or more of their members to

inform the lay community that the schismatic has committed this

offense (see Pacittiya 9) and explain why. If the schismatic refuses

to undergo the penalty or remains divisive, they may suspend him

from the entire Sangha. If, unrepentant, he leaves to go elsewhere,

they may send word to whatever Community he tries to join.

All of this shows one of the reasons why schism is regarded so

seriously: As the Buddha states in the Discourse on Future Dangers

(A.V.78), it is difficult to find time to practice when the

Community is embroiled in controversy this way.

Summary: To persist in one's attempts at a schism, after the

third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting of the

Community, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

11.Should bhikkhus -- one, two, or three -- who are

followers and partisans of that bhikkhu, say, "Do not, Ven.

sirs, admonish that bhikkhu in any way. He is an exponent of

the Dhamma, an exponent of the Vinaya. He acts with our

consent and approval. He knows, he speaks for us, and that

is pleasing to us," other bhikkhus are to admonish them

thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sirs. That bhikkhu is not an

exponent of the Dhamma and he is not an exponent of the

Vinaya. Do not, Ven. sirs, approve of a schism in the

Community. Let the venerable ones' (minds) be reconciled

with the Community, for a Community in concord, on

complimentary terms, without dispute, with a common

recitation, dwells in peace."

And should those bhikkhus, thus admonished, persist as

before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke them up to three times so

as to desist. If while being rebuked up to three times by

the bhikkhus they desist, that is good. If they do not

desist, it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the

Community.

If the schismatic mentioned in the preceding rule begins to attract

adherents, they are to be treated under this rule -- and quickly,

before the schismatic gains a fourth adherent. The reasons are

these:

1) One Community cannot impose a penalty on another Community

(four or more bhikkhus) in any one formal act. (Mv.IX.2)

2) Penalties of this sort may be imposed only with the unanimous

agreement of all the bhikkhus present in the meeting. If there is

a fourth adherent present in the meeting, he can prevent the

rebuke from being completed.

3) As the Sub-commentary points out, once a potential schismatic

has gained four adherents, he has enough of a following to go

through with his split.

The procedures for dealing with these partisans -- reprimanding

them in private, admonishing and rebuking them in the midst of the

Community -- are the same as in the preceding rule.

Summary: To persist in supporting a potential schismatic,

after the third announcement of a formal rebuke in a meeting

of the Community, is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

12.In case a bhikkhu is by nature difficult to admonish --

who, when being legitimately admonished by the bhikkhus with

reference to the training rules included in the (Patimokkha)

recitation, makes himself unadmonishable (saying), "Do not,

venerable ones, say anything to me, good or bad; and I will

not say anything to the venerable ones, good or bad.

Refrain, venerable ones, from admonishing me" -- the

bhikkhus should admonish him thus: "Let the venerable one

not make himself unadmonishable. Let the venerable one make

himself admonishable. Let the venerable one admonish the

bhikkhus in accordance with what is right, and the bhikkhus

will admonish the venerable one in accordance with what is

right; for it is thus that the Blessed One's following is

nurtured: through mutual admonition, through mutual

rehabilitation."

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus,

persist as before, the bhikkhus are to be rebuke him up to

three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to

three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist,

it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

If a bhikkhu breaks any of the rules of the Vinaya without

undergoing the penalties they entail, or if he breaks them

habitually even when undergoing the penalties, the other bhikkhus

have the duty to admonish him, as explained under Sanghadisesa 8. If

he shows disrespect while being admonished or refuses to mend his

ways, he incurs a further penalty under Pacittiya 54. If his lack of

respect while being admonished becomes habitual, he is to be treated

under this rule.

The Commentary defines //difficult to admonish// as "impossible to

speak to," and then further clarifies by saying that a bhikkhu

difficult to admonish is one who cannot stand being criticized or

who does not mend his ways after his faults are pointed out to him.

It quotes from the Anumana Sutta (M.15) a list of traits, any one of

which makes a bhikkhu difficult to admonish: He has evil desires;

exalts himself and degrades others; is easily angered; because of

this he harbors ill will, holds a grudge, utters angry words;

accused, he throws a tantrum (literally, "explodes"); accused, he is

insulting; accused, he returns the accusation; he evades back and

forth; he does not respond; he is mean and spiteful; jealous and

possessive; scheming and deceitful; stubborn and proud; attached to

his own views, obstinate, unable to let them go.

A good number of these traits are exemplified by Ven. Channa --

according to tradition, the Buddha's horseman on the night of the

great Going Forth -- in the origin story to this rule.

"Who do you think you are to admonish me? It is I who should

admonish you! The Buddha is mine, the Dhamma is mine, it was

by my young master that the Dhamma was realized. Just as a

great blowing wind would gather up grass, sticks, leaves,

and rubbish, or a mountain-born river would gather up water

weeds and scum, so you, in going forth, have been gathered

up from various names, various clans, various ancestries,

various families. Who do you think you are to admonish me?

It is I who should admonish you!"

The procedures to follow when a bhikkhu is difficult to admonish

-- reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a

formal meeting of the Community -- are the same as under

Sanghadisesa 10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing

that Bhikkhu X is being difficult to admonish, incurs a dukkata if

he does not reprimand him. The question of perception and the

non-offenses are also the same as under that rule.

If the bhikkhu difficult to admonish carries on as before, even

after incurring the full penalty under this rule, the Community may

perform an act of banishment (//pabbajaniya-kamma//) against him for

speaking in dispraise of the Community (Cv.I.13) or -- if he admits

to performing acts that are offenses but refuses to see that they

are offenses or to undergo the penalty -- the Community may exclude

him from participating in the Patimokkha and Pavarana ceremonies

(Mv.IV.16.2; Cv.IX.2) or suspend him from the entire Sangha.

(Cv.I.26; Cv.I.31)

Summary: To persist in being difficult to admonish, after

the third announcement of a formal rebuke in the Community,

is a sanghadisesa offense.

* * *

13.In case a bhikkhu living in dependence on a certain

village or town is a corrupter of families, a man of

depraved conduct -- whose depraved conduct is both seen and

heard about, and the families he has corrupted are both seen

and heard about -- the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus:

"You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man of

depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and

heard about; the families you have corrupted are both seen

and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough of

your staying here."

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus,

say about the bhikkhus, "The bhikkhus are prejudiced by

favoritism, prejudiced by aversion, prejudiced by delusion,

prejudiced by fear, in that for this sort of offense they

banish some and do not banish others," the bhikkhus are to

admonish him thus: "Do not say that, Ven. sir. The bhikkhus

are not prejudiced by favoritism, are not prejudiced by

aversion, are not prejudiced by delusion, are not prejudiced

by fear. You, Ven. sir, are a corrupter of families, a man

of depraved conduct. Your depraved conduct is both seen and

heard about, and the families you have corrupted are both

seen and heard about. Leave this monastery, Ven. sir. Enough

of your staying here."

And should that bhikkhu, thus admonished by the bhikkhus,

persist as before, the bhikkhus are to rebuke him up to

three times so as to desist. If while being rebuked up to

three times he desists, that is good. If he does not desist,

it entails initial and subsequent meetings of the Community.

A //corrupter of families// is a bhikkhu who -- behaving in a

demeaning, frivolous, or subservient way -- succeeds in ingratiating

himself to lay people to the point where they withdraw their support

from bhikkhus who are earnest in the practice and give it to those

who are more ingratiating instead. This is illustrated in the origin

story of this rule, in which the followers of Assaji and Punabbasu

(leaders of one faction of the group of six) had thoroughly

corrupted the lay people at Kitagiri.

"Now at that time a certain bhikkhu, having finished his

rains-residence among the people of Kasi and on his way to

Savatthi to see the Blessed One, arrived at Kitagiri.

Arising early in the morning, taking his robe and bowl, he

entered Kitagiri for alms: gracious in the way he approached

and departed, looked forward and behind, drew in and

stretched out his arm; his eyes downcast, his every movement

consummate. People seeing him said, 'Who is this weakest of

weaklings, this dullest of dullards, this most snobbish of

snobs? Who would go up and give him alms? Our masters, the

followers of Assaji and Punabbasu, are compliant, genial,

pleasing in conversation. They are the first to smile,

saying, "Come, you are welcome." //They// are not snobbish.

They are approachable. They are the first to speak. It is to

them that alms should be given.'"

The Vibhanga lists the ways of corrupting a family as giving gifts

of flowers, fruit, etc., practicing medicine, and delivering

messages -- although the Commentary qualifies this by saying there

is no harm in delivering messages that have to do with religious

activities, such as inviting bhikkhus to a meal or to deliver a

sermon, or in conveying a lay person's respects to a senior bhikkhu.

//Depraved conduct// the Vibhanga defines merely as growing

flowers and making them into garlands, but this, the Commentary

says, is a shorthand reference to the long list of bad habits

mentioned in the origin story, which includes such things as

presenting garlands to women, eating from the same dish with them,

sharing a blanket with them, eating at the wrong time, drinking

intoxicants, wearing garlands, using perfumes and cosmetics,

dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, playing games,

performing stunts, learning archery, swordsmanship, and

horsemanship; boxing and wrestling. Any one of these actions taken

in isolation carries only a minor penalty -- a dukkata or a

pacittiya -- but if indulged in habitually to the point where its

bad influence becomes "seen and heard about," i.e., common

knowledge, it can become grounds for his fellow bhikkhus to banish

him from their particular Community until he mends his ways.

The Cullavagga, in a section that begins with the same origin

story as the one for this rule (Cv.I.13-16), treats the act of

banishment in full detail, saying that a Community of bhikkhus, if

it sees fit, has the authority to perform an act of banishment

against a bhikkhu with any of the following qualities:

1) He is a maker of strife, disputes, quarrels, and issues in the

Community.

2) He is ignorant, inexperienced, and has many offenses for which

he has not made amends.

3) He lives in unbecoming association with householders.

4) He is corrupt in his precepts, corrupt in his conduct, or

corrupt in his views.

5) He speaks in dispraise of the Buddha, Dhamma, or Sangha.

6) He is frivolous in word, deed, or both.

7) He misbehaves in word, deed, or both.

8) He is vindictive in word, deed, or both.

9) He practices wrong modes of livelihood.

This last category includes such practices as:

a) running messages and errands for kings, ministers of state,

householders, etc. A modern example would be participating in

political campaigns.

b) scheming, talking, hinting, belittling others for the sake of

material gain; pursuing gain with gain (giving items of small

value in hopes of receiving items of larger value in return,

making investments in hopes of profit, offering material

incentives to those who make donations). (For a full discussion

of these practices, see Ven. Nanamoli's translation of the

Visuddhi Magga, //The Path of Purification//, pp. 24-30.)

c) Practicing worldly arts, e.g., medicine, fortune telling,

astrology, exorcism, reciting charms, casting spells, performing

ceremonies to counteract the influence of the stars, determining

propitious sites, setting auspicious dates (for weddings, etc.),

interpreting oracles, auguries, or dreams, or -- in the words of

the Vibhanga to the Bhikkhunis' Pacittiya 49 & 50 -- engaging in

any art that is "external and unconnected with the goal." The

Cullavagga (V.33.2) gives a dukkata for studying and teaching

worldly arts or hedonist doctrines (//lokayata//). For extensive

lists of worldly arts, see the Brahmajala and Samannaphala Suttas

-- pp. 62-65 and pp. 35-38 in Ven. Bodhi's translations. For the

connection between lokayata and hedonism (e.g., the Kama Sutra),

see Warder, //Outline of Indian Philosophy//, pp. 38-39.

A bhikkhu banished for indulging in any of these activities is

duty-bound to undergo the 18 observances listed in Cv.I.15 and to

mend his ways so that the Community will revoke the act of

banishment. The Commentary adds that a bhikkhu banished for

corrupting families may not live in the monastery where he was

misbehaving, nor enter the city or town where he was corrupting

families, until after the banishment is revoked (this point is based

on Cv.I.16.1). Also, even after the revoking of the banishment, he

may never again accept gifts from the families he had corrupted. If

they ask him why, he may tell them. If they then explain that they

are giving the gifts not because of his former behavior but because

he has now mended his ways, he may then accept it.

If a bhikkhu, instead of mending his ways after being banished,

criticizes the act of banishment or those who performed it, he is

subject to this rule. The procedure to follow in dealing with him --

reprimanding him in private, admonishing and rebuking him in a

formal meeting of the Community -- is the same as under Sanghadisesa

10, beginning with the fact that a bhikkhu who, hearing that Bhikkhu

X is criticizing his act of banishment, incurs a dukkata if he does

not reprimand him. The question of perception and the non-offenses

are also the same as under that rule.

Summary: To persist -- after the third announcement of a

formal rebuke in the Community -- in criticizing an act of

banishment performed against oneself is a sanghadisesa

offense.

* * *

A bhikkhu who commits an offense against any of these thirteen

sanghadisesa offenses is duty-bound to inform a fellow bhikkhu and

to ask a Community of at least four bhikkhus to impose a six-day

period of penance (//manatta//) on him. (The Canon says, literally,

a six-night period: At the time of the Buddha, the lunar calendar

was in use and, just as we using the solar calendar count the

passage of days, they counted the passage of nights; a 24-hour

period, which is a day for us, would be a night for them, as in the

Bhaddekaratta Sutta (M.131), where the Buddha explicitly says that a

person who spends a day and night in earnest practice has had an

"auspicious night.")

Penance. Penance does not begin immediately, but only at the

convenience of the Community giving it. During his period of

penance, the offender is partially stripped of seniority and must

observe a number of restrictions -- 94 in all (Cv.II.5-6). The four

most important are:

1) He must not live under the same roof as a full-fledged bhikkhu.

2) He must live in a monastery with at least four full-fledged

bhikkhus.

3) He may not go anywhere outside the monastery unless accompanied

by four full-fledged bhikkhus.

4) Every day he must inform all the bhikkhus in the monastery of

the fact that he is observing penance and the precise offense for

which the penance was imposed. If visiting bhikkhus come to the

monastery, he must inform them as well; if he goes to another

monastery, he must inform all the bhikkhus there, too.

If, on any day of his penance, the bhikkhu neglects to observe any

of these four restrictions, that day does not count toward the total

of six. In addition, he incurs a dukkata each time he fails to

observe any of the 94 restrictions.

Once the bhikkhu has completed his penance, he may ask a Community

of at least 20 bhikkhus to give him rehabilitation. Once

rehabilitated, he returns to his previous state as a full-fledged

bhikkhu in good standing.

Probation. If a bhikkhu who commits a sanghadisesa offense

conceals it from his fellow bhikkhus past dawn of the day following

the offense, he must observe an additional period of probation

(//parivasa//) for the same number of days as he concealed the

offense. Only after he has completed his probation may he then ask

for the six-day period of penance.

The Commentary sets the factors of concealment at ten, which may

be arranged in five pairs as follows:

1) He has committed a sanghadisesa offense and perceives it as a

sanghadisesa offense.

2) He has not been suspended and perceives that he has not been

suspended. (If a bhikkhu has been suspended, no other bhikkhus

will speak with him, and thus he cannot tell them until after his

suspension has been lifted.)

3) There are no obstacles (e.g., a flood, a forest fire, dangerous

animals) and he perceives that there are none.

4) He is able to inform another bhikkhu (i.e., a fellow bhikkhu

suitable to be informed lives in a place that may be reached in

that day, one is not too weak or ill to go, etc.) and he

perceives that he is able. //A bhikkhu suitable to be informed//

means a one who is --

a) in good standing (e.g., not undergoing penance or probation

himself) and

b) not on unfriendly terms with the offender.

5) He (the offender) desires to conceal the offense and so

conceals it.

If any of these factors are lacking, there is no penalty for not

informing another bhikkhu that day. For instance, the following

cases do //not// count as concealment:

A bhikkhu is not sure whether or not the action he has done

qualifies as a sanghadisesa and so waits until he can consult

with a knowledgeable bhikkhu before informing anyone else.

A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest and commits a sanghadisesa in

the middle of the night. Afraid of the snakes or other wild

animals he might encounter in the dark, he waits until daylight

before going to inform a fellow bhikkhu.

A bhikkhu lives alone in a forest, but the only other bhikkhu

within one day's traveling time is a personal enemy who, if he is

informed, will use this as an opportunity to smear the offender's

name, so the offender travels another day or two before reaching

a friendly bhikkhu whom he informs.

Once all of the first eight factors are complete, though, one must

inform another bhikkhu before dawn of the next day or else incur a

dukkata and undergo the penalty for concealment.

A bhikkhu who commits a slighter offense that he thinks is a

sanghadisesa and then conceals it, incurs a dukkata (Cv.III.34.1).

The restrictions for a bhikkhu undergoing probation are similar to

those for one undergoing penance and are discussed in detail at

Cv.II.1.

Sanghadisesas are classified as heavy offenses (//garukapatti//),

both because of the seriousness of the offenses themselves and

because the procedures of penance, probation, and rehabilitation are

burdensome by design, not only for the offender but also for the

Community of bhikkhus in which he lives -- a fact intended to act as

added deterrent to anyone who feels tempted to transgress.

* * * * * * * *