


COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY - 1963 Master's Thesis

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDA
Nhất Hạnh, Thích

The doctrine of Vijñānavāda is a phenomenological approach to the problem of the ultimate reality, tathatā. The term phenomenological here may be understood exactly in the Husserl's sense. Vijñāna is usually interpreted as mind, or cognition, or consciousness. But by using these terms, one is inclined to think of Vijñāna as the subject of cognition, the thinker or knower which exists by itself as an independent mental entity. Actually, Vijñāna, according to the Vijñānavādins, is not this subject of cognition, or this thinker or knower. Such a mental entity which exists independently from its object is not possible in the doctrine of Vijñānavāda; Vijñāna includes in itself the subject and the object of cognition. This concept is by no means the foundation of a subjectivistic idealism. Cognition is always cognition of something, there can not be cognition all by itself. This basic principle must be kept in mind if one is to understand the doctrine of Vijñānavāda at all.

Alternative forms of the author's name: Thich Nhat Hanh; Nguyễn Xuân Bảo;
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THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDA

Nguyen Xuan Bao

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The doctrine of Vijñānavāda is a phenomenological approach to the problem of the ultimate reality, tathatā. The term phenomenological here may be understood exactly in the Husserl's sense. Vijñāna is usually interpreted as mind, or cognition, or consciousness. But by using these terms, one is inclined to think of Vijñāna as the subject of cognition, the thinker or knower which exists by itself as an independent mental entity. Actually, Vijñāna, according to the Vijñānavādins, is not this subject of cognition, or this thinker or knower. Such a mental entity which exists independently from its object is not possible in the doctrine of Vijñānavāda; Vijñāna includes in itself the subject and the object of cognition. This concept is by no means the foundation of a subjectivistic idealism. Cognition is always cognition of something, there can not be cognition all by itself. This basic principle must be kept in mind if one is to understand the doctrine of Vijñānavāda at all.

It is obvious that the object of the Vijnanavada is not the study of the tathata itself: such a study is not the aim of the school which is known as the "dharmalakṣaṇa school," the school of the study of the dharmas in their phenomenal aspects. 法相宗 . This name, however, is relatively late and belongs to the Vijnana school founded in China by Huan Tsang and his disciple K'ouei-ki. The name Vijñānavāda is thus more universal, although its meaning does not embrace both Mahayana and Hinayana. The famous Chinese monk Tai-Hsu 太虛大師 says that since in the tradition of Hinayana

there is also the study of the dharmas in their phenomenal aspects, the term dharmalaksana school is common to both the Mahayana and Hinayana tradition. The early Chinese Vijnanavadins stress the fact that it is impossible to deal with phenomena and noumena together. This is the principle of "separate inspection of nature and characters" 性相別觀. Noumena and Phenomena are not on the same place. They cannot be dealt with by the same method of study and inquiry. The method by which the Vijñānavādins deal with the phenomenal world cannot be used to deal with the noumenal world. The Vijñānavāda theory of "the production of the phenomenal world from Ālaya by the principle of interdependent origins 阿賴耶緣起 is radically different from the theory of "the production of the phenomenal world from the tathata by the principle of interdependent origins" 真如緣起. It is impossible to speak of the tathata in the same way as one speaks of Ālaya.

This principle, however, should be applied in a flexible manner. It is clear that in the basic work of the Vijñānavāda system of philosophy, namely the Trimsika, Vasubandhu does not make any attempt to explain or to analyse the concept of tathatā, but he does mention tathatā as the real nature of vijñāna. He proceeds from the phenomenal to the noumenal 從相入性. He begins with the analysis of the vijñānas, he uses concepts and expressions, but at the edge of the phenomenal all analysis and concepts and expressions are completely destroyed in order to make room for the non-conceptual realization of the paramārtha, or ultimate

reality of the dharmas. The study of the phenomenal is not made for its own sake: it helps to see the world in its true aspect, it helps the disciple to free himself from the conceptual world in order to look into the real world of the absolute. The principle of "separate inspection" is valid only in that it prevents the analytical and conceptual interpretation of what cannot be interpreted either analytically or conceptually. But it fails to see that the tool used for sweeping out the concepts is the concepts themselves. The notion of three natures (trīsvabhāva) 三性 in the doctrine of Vijñānavāda, for instance, is a concept. But it needs to be de-conceptualized. In this case, another concept is to be used: this is the concept of three non-natures trīniḥsvabhāva 三無性. These concepts destroy each other, in order to let the non-conceptual wisdom arise. This method is also used in the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine: the concept of emptiness [śūnyatā 空] is neutralized by the concept of non-emptiness [aśūnyatā 不空]. However, we cannot deny the fact that the Vijñānavāda doctrine is primarily an analysis of the dharmas in their phenomenological aspects.

The main theme of the doctrine is, of course, the problem of knowledge. The sources of the doctrine can be traced back to the teaching of primitive Buddhism. In the four Nikāyas, we find diverse tendencies toward cosmology: there are, besides the obvious accents of a naive realism, the various tendencies toward acosmism, ontologism and idealism. But it is not the intention of the present writer to deal

with the question of the history of the Vijñānavāda system here. Among the Mahāyāna sūtras which are usually considered as scriptural authorities, we have to mention the Avataṃsakasūtra 華嚴經, the Sandhinirmocanasūtra 解深密經, the Abhidharmasūtra 阿毘達摩經, the Lankāvatārasūtra 楞伽經 and the Ghanavyūhasūtra 厚嚴經. As to the Śāstras, commentaries, there are eleven basic works. Among them, we can mention the Yogācāryabhūmiśāstra 瑜伽師地論 by [Maitreya and] Asanga, the Mahāyānasūtrālamkārasāstra 大乘莊嚴經論, by the same authors, the Alambanaparīkṣa 觀所緣緣論 by Dīnaga, the Mahāyānasamgrahasāstra 攝大乘論 by Asanga, the Daśabhūmikasūtrasāstra 十地經論 by Vasubandhu, the Madhyāntavibhanga Śāstra 辯中邊論 by [Maitreya and] Vasubandhu, the Vimsika 唯識二十論 and the Trimsika 唯識三十論 by Vasubandhu.

The materials for the study of the Vijñānavāda are extremely abundant, especially in the Chinese Buddhist literature. Besides these basic works there are many later commentaries and essays on the doctrine of Vijñānavāda. The works of Hiuan Tsang and his disciples constitute an abundant source of materials, not to mention the later works. In the present essay, the quotations are made from the two basic śāstras in verse form: the Trimsikavijñapti Karikā of Vasubandhu and the Pa shih Kwei chu sung 八識規矩誦 of Hiuan Tsang.

The Trimsika is usually considered as the most basic and important work in the tradition of Vijñānavāda. This is a

positive exposition of the Vijñānavāda position, not simply a refutation of the other doctrines like the Vimśika. It consists of 30 Kārikas, or verses, and has been commented on by many doctors of the school like Sthiramati, Nanda, Dharmapāla, Bandhuśrī and many others whose names and views are known to us by the Vijñaptimātrasiddhi of Hiuan Tsang. Only the commentaries of Sthiramati on the Vimśika and Trimśika still survive in Sanskrit.

The Kwei chu sung is a crystallization of the understanding of Hiuan Tsang of the doctrine of Vijñānavāda. It consists of four sections, each section having twelve verses, thus forty eight verses in all. The first section deals with the five vijñānas of sensation, which are usually called the first five vijñānas; the second section deals with Manovijñāna on the sixth vijñāna, the third with Manas or the seventh vijñāna; the fourth with Ālayavijñāna or the eighth vijñāna. The Kwei chu sung is more elaborated than the Trimśika in its analysis of the pramanas and viśayas, namely, aspects and spheres of knowledge. This is of course the mark of the influence of the Logic School of Diñnāga on the Vijñānavāda. Diñnāga himself was a Vijñānavādin; he was a disciple of Vasubandhu. The accent of momentariness in his doctrine has usually been misunderstood as a deviation from the original idea of Vijñānavāda. Dr. Chandradhar Sharma, for instance, thinks of Diñnāga as holding a purely phenomenological doctrine which is not the same as the absolute idealism of Vasubandhu, whose doctrine has a strong ontologi-

cal accent.¹ A careful study of Dinnāga's treatise on the phenomenological analysis of the mind, the Ālambanaparīkṣa, will reveal that he understands very deeply the doctrine of his teacher and has elaborated it into a perfectly rational system based on his logic. Many works in Vijñānavāda can be read only in the light of this logic which is usually called the new system of hetuvidya 新因明, as distinguished from the old system of hetuvidya 古因明 which is pre-buddhistic whose tracks and application can be also found in the works of Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu.

Hiuan Tsang came to India in 629 A.D., that means about one hundred years after Dinnāga, when the doctrine of Vijñānavāda was still in its ascendant. He studied the logic of Dinnāga carefully and accumulated all commentaries on Vasubandhu by the most famous doctors of the school. The notion of aspects and spheres of cognition became the notion of method. In the present essay, the writer begins with that notion and thus has some quotations from the Kwei chu sung. But when the problem is set down the quotations will be made from the Trimsika. In a space like this, there is not room for many quotations from later works and commentaries. That is why quotations are made only when necessary. And these quotations are from the original sources. As for the question of terminology, technical terms are avoided when it is possible, and translations of the original verses into English are usually longer than the verses in order to make

¹Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, 1960.

sense.

Before going into the analysis of the notion of aspects and realms of cognition, let us first have an idea about the term dharmalakṣana as used in the literature of Vijñānavāda. Dharmalakṣana is the object of study of the Vijñānavāda school. It means, to say it in the simplest way, the phenomenal aspects of things.

The term dharma is sometimes translated by Western scholars as law, but this translation while being correct in other contexts is not applicable in Vijñānavāda. Dharma, in the context of Vijñānavāda, implies both concrete and abstract things. Everything which can give us a concept about itself is called a dharma. The classical definition of dharma in the school of Vijñāna is "anything which has its own nature and which has, by means of its characteristics, the ability of making itself known (to the mind) as a thing"

任持自性軌生物解¹

According to this definition, emptiness is a dharma, because it has its own nature and it can give us a notion about it. The word emptiness here is to be understood as the void, not in the ontological sense of the Prajñāpāramitā. In existing things like the Buddhist famous simile of the hair of the turtle or the horn of the hare are also dharmas, because they can give us concepts about them. This is very meaningful in Vijñānavāda: it denotes already the phenomenological

1 丁福寶, 佛學大辭典, page 1375 下

aspect of cognition. The meaning of the term dharma is thus broader than that of the term thing.

Lakṣana is the phenomenal aspects of the dharmas. Its basic meaning is mark, or character, or form. But in the doctrine of Vijñānavāda, none of these terms is satisfying. Lakṣana here is the opposite of Svabhāva, self-nature or noumenon. It follows that lakṣana should be understood as the phenomenal aspect of things.

It is interesting to note that in the Ta-cheng pai-fa ming-men lun 大乘百法明門論, one of the basic works of the Vijñānavāda school, all the unconditioned factors, asaṃskṛta, 無為 are classified as dharmas. The last of the six asaṃskṛta is tathatāśāṃskṛta, 真如無為, the noumenal ground of things. Being the ground of all that exists, it should not be called a dharma or be said to have lakṣana. It should transcend all categories of dharmas and lakṣanas. But since we can not go directly to the unconceptual without the medium of the conceptual, we must speak of it, firstly as a dharma. And as a dharma, it has also its lakṣana, because it is impossible to have dharma without lakṣana. In other words, a dharma is known to our mind by its lakṣana. That is why the Vijñānavādins speak of the tathatā lakṣana 真如實相. Actually, tathatā cannot be known by way of concept, cannot be labeled by a name. To mention it is to conceptualize it. Therefore, tathatā as classified in the Ta-ch'eng pai-fa-ming-men lun is the concept of tathatā and not tathatā itself. All the great au-

thors of the school are aware of this fact.

The study of the dharmalakṣana can therefore be understood as the study of the dharmas in their phenomenal (or conceptual, or phenomenological) aspects. These dharmas are in the number of one hundred, classified in five categories. First come the citta dharmas, 心法 which consist of Ālayavijñāna, Manas, Manovijñāna and Five Vijñānas of sensation. Then come the fifty one caitasikas dharmas or mental proprieties 心所法 which are classified in five groups. Then come the eleven rūpa dharmas or material things, the twenty four cittaviprayukta dharmas or non-mental (but non material) things. Finally, come the six asamkrta dharmas or unconditioned factors.

The classification and description of these dharmas are found in the Pai-fa-ming-men lun which have been believed to be the work of Dharmapāla 護法. Mr. Reimon Yuki, professor of University of Tokyo in his study of Vasubandhu, has proved, by the comparative study of texts, that the author is Vasubandhu himself.¹ The compilation of the Pai-fa-ming-men lun was based on the Asangas Yogācaryabhūmi-sāstra 瑜伽師地論. In the study of the Vijñānavāda doctrine, the Pai-fa-ming-men lun is usually considered as the first and necessary step.

¹Reimon Yuki, The Vijñaptimātratā thought of Vasubandhu, University of Tokyo, 1955.

The notion of three aspects (pramāna, 量) and three spheres (viśaya, 境) of cognition is the key for the understanding of the doctrine of Vijñānavāda.

Let us first consider the three aspects (or modes) of cognition. The first is called intuitive cognition (pratyakṣa pramāna 現量) the direct apprehension of an object, not by way of thinking or inference. The act of knowledge here consists simply of pure sensation. This is the way by which the "first five vijñānas" work. There is neither evaluation nor judgment here. Sometimes, the first five vijñānas, in cooperation with the sixth vijñāna (manovijñāna, 意識), function in this intuitive way: the apprehension of the external object now involves the element of determination which completes the final stage of perception; yet we still do not see any discursive element in it. The sixth vijñāna has other ways and aspects of cognition, of course, but the intuitive cognition is one of these ways. The second aspect of cognition is called discursive cognition (anumāna pramāna 比量), the knowledge attained not by direct insight but by inference and discrimination. Of the eight vijñānas, the sixth is the only one which has this kind of cognition. The knowledge here is the result of the act of evaluation, comparison, distinction, inference and discrimination. The third aspect of cognition is called erroneous cognition (abhāva-pramāna, 非量). This is not something that exists independently from those above. It consists simply of their erroneous sides. Walking in the dark and

mistaking a rope for a snake, or misunderstanding a theory, for instance, are aspects of the erroneous cognition. The seventh vijñāna, Mana, which consists in an illusion of the existence of a self is itself an erroneous form of cognition.

The notion of three spheres of cognition 三境 is closely connected with that of three aspects of cognition. The first is the sphere of things-in-themselves 性境. In this sphere, things are what they really are; they are not affected by the discrimination of the human mind. They exist in their own nature, and are the "nature of vijñānavāda" (vijñāptimātrata, 唯識實性) itself. Two categories of them are to be distinguished:

a) things-in-themselves without substance 無質性境, the everlasting nature and essence of Vijñāna. This can be reached only by Prajñā, real wisdom, and not by the present ability of the vijñānas. When the eighth Vijñāna, Ālaya-vijñāna, has become the "wisdom of the great mirror" (Ādarśajñānam, 大圓境智), it reflects, in itself, this world of things-in-themselves without substance.

b) things-in-themselves with substance 有質性境, the manifestation of all dharmas from the nature and essence of Vijñāna, according to the law of interdependent origins. This sphere can be reached only by the first form of cognition, the intuitive one, in the case of correct cognition, in other words when it does not fall in the category of the third, which is erroneous cognition 非量.

The second sphere of cognition is the sphere of repre-

representations 帶質境 which is the object of all vijñānas except Ālaya. This kind of object which consists simply of the inner representations of the vijñānas, is created by the vijñānas for themselves and is created on the basis of the sphere existence of the sphere of things-in-themselves. Because of Avidya, this ignorance of the true nature of reality which is the raison d'être of all errors in knowledge, the Vijñānas cannot always reach out to the sphere of things-in-themselves; they build up a world of representations, basing it on the dim data they receive from reality and believe it to be reality itself. This sphere is mostly the object of the Manovijñāna which, by its power of reasoning and inferring, creates the world of vikalpa (discrimination) in which selves and essences 我,法 seem to be really existing.

The third sphere of cognition is the sphere of mere images 獨影境, the sensory qualities reinstated by the Manovijñāna in the absence of sensory stimulation. This sphere is only the object of the sixth Vijñāna. When Manovijñāna works in cooperation with the first five vijñānas, its object may be either the sphere of things-in-themselves (as in the case of pure perception) or the sphere of pure images (as in the case of reminiscence or imagination or dream). Two categories of images are to be distinguished:

a/ images depending on substance 有質獨影境.

These images are either faithful or modified reproductions of the perceptions and representations as perceived and thought by the sixth vijñāna. It not reconstitutes them as its ob-

ject. The image of an elephant that one saw yesterday now appearing in one's mind, for instance, is neither a perception nor a representation, but an image. This image has been created from the perception of an elephant which has existed, so it is called an image depending on substance.

b/ images without substance 無質獨影境. These images are mere creations of Manovijñāna, not the result of what one has seen or heard or smelled. The image of a fairy in the mind of a child, or that of a future building created in the mind of an architect are creative images, not reproductive. They are "without substance."

The first verse of Hiuan-Tsang's Pa Shih Kwei chu sung 八識規矩誦 deals with the form of cognition of the first five vijñānas as well as their sphere of cognition and their nature:

性境現量通三性

"Their object is the sphere of things-in-themselves, their form of cognition is intuitive, their nature is either good, evil or neutral"¹

The term good here means conformation to wisdom, not going against it. It also means working correctly and performing good Karmas (Cognition is primarily a Karma) and leading to enlightenment. The term evil has, of course, the opposite meaning and the term neutral means neither good nor evil. The

¹Hiuan Tsang. Pa shih kwei chu sung, verse 1.

sixth vijñāna, Manovijñāna, shares the same nature. Its Kamma may lead either to samsāra or to nirvāna or may have a neutral effect. But its way of cognition is not just Intuitive and its sphere of cognition is not just that of things-in-themselves:

三性三量通三境

"Its nature is either good or evil or neutral, its form of cognition is either intuitive, discursive or erroneous, its object of cognition is either the sphere of things-in-themselves or the sphere of representations on the sphere of images"¹

Manovijñāna has therefore the largest realm and power of cognition. This is the vijñāna which leads the way to samsāra or nirvāna, because it is the most powerful force that engenders Karmas in action and in speech:

動身發語獨為最

"It is the most important motive power that makes the body acting and the mouth speaking."²

Since the seventh vijñāna, Manas, is only a false intuitive-cognition and an erroneous awareness of an imaginary self, its manner of apprehension is erroneous. It has Ālayavijñāna as its support and origin, yet it turns back to take Ālayavijñāna as its object and serves as support 所依 and root 根 to Manovijñāna. The Trimsika says:

¹Hiuan Tsang. Pa shih Kwei chu sung, verse 13

²Ibid, verse 19.

TAD ĀSRITYA PRAVARTATE /

TADĀLAMBAM MANONĀMA VIJÑĀNAM MANYANĀTMAKAM //

"Having Ālayavijñāna as support and as object, is the vijñāna named Manas which consists in cogitation."¹ The word manyana indicates the nature and form of Manas' way of cognition. It is translated by Hiuan Tsang by 思量, mentation.

Ālayavijñāna is also called the basic vijñāna 本識, on which stands Manas which serves as support to Manovijñāna. This is why the Kwei chu sung says:

帶質有覆通情本
隨緣執我量為非

"Its sphere of cognition is that of representations, its knowledge is erroneous, it is related both to Manovijñāna (情識) and to the Basic vijñāna (本識). It follows the latter and takes it as its object. Being covered, its form of cognition is erroneous."²

The term covered (有覆) means to be veiled and conditioned by ignorance. The Ālayavijñāna is however non-covered (無覆); its nature is neutral, indefinite, and its way of cognition is also a kind of intuitive cognition. The Trisika stresses the fact that its way of cognition as well as its sphere of cognition and its place of manifestation can not be conceived by the ordinary mind:

¹Vasubandhu - Trisikavijñāptikarika, verse 5.

²Hiuan Tsang, Pa shih kwei chu sung, verse 25-26.

ASAMVIDITAKOPĀDISTHĀNAVIJŅĀPTIKAM CA TAT /

"It is impossible to understand its sphere of cognition, its form of cognition and its place of manifestation"¹

Let us examine the idea of place of manifestation later. We should inquire first about the notion of "substance" in the doctrine of Vijñānavāda. What people usually conceive as mind is simply Manovijñāna. It is clear that the Vijñānavādins do not contend that the external world exists only inside or as the subjective manifestation of this faculty of cognition. It is evident that they do not think of the World of manifestations which constitutes the object of Manovijñāna and of the five vijñānas of sensation as the world of things-in-themselves itself, so it would be unjust to say that they hold the theory of subjectivistic idealism. The world of things-in-themselves must exist in order to serve as "substance" to the world of representations. The doctrine of Vijñānavāda, here, has a realist aspect, although it is clear that it can not be conceived as a form of naive realism.

To make it clearer, let us consider the notion of organs 根 (indriya) and fields 境 (ā lambana). The vijñānas are not permanent entities; they are subject to change in every second, in every kṣana 刹那, and this change is due to the fact that they are phenomena which can only come into existence by the contact between organs and their fields or spheres of objects. The first five vijñānas have their ma-

¹Vasubandhu. Trimsīkavijñaptikarīkā, verse 3.

terial organs and objects. The Manovijñāna has as organ Manas and the whole body. Manas takes Ālayavijñāna to be its organ. However Manas and Ālayavijñāna continue their existence without disruption; they change but they exist continually as a "flow of a river".

The first five vijñānas may be discontinued, and do not function as such in the case of sleeping. Manovijñāna too may be discontinued in the case of fainting or sleeping without dream. They are therefore psychical phenomena which are closely related to the physical and the biological.

The Vijñānavādins distinguish two kind of organs: the coarse organ (浮塵根) and the subtle organ (勝義根). It is said that the latter can not be seen by the human eyes. The famous Chinese Buddhist teacher Tai-Hsu (太虛) identifies it with sensory nerves and the center of reception of sensory images in the brain. Let us take the example of an eye seeing a flower. The eye is the "coarse organ" and the flower, a phenomenon of the world of substance, the world of things-in-themselves, is the object of the eye. The "contact" produces a projection of an image of the flower on the retina of the eye which is immediately transmitted to the center of perception by optical nerves. In the first phase, we have the eye, coarse organ, and the flower, its object. Now in the second phase, we have the "subtle organ" (retina and optical nerves) and the "image of the object" which is to be distinguished from the flower itself. In the second phase, we still remain in the realm of physical and physiological

phenomena. It is only in the third phase that vijñāna comes into existence. The five vijñānas of sensation and Manovijñāna are therefore closely bound within the biological and the physical, and cannot exist independently from them. It follows that it is impossible to say that the world of substance exists only in those vijñānas.

In the third phase vijñāna is produced; and what is important here is that it involves in itself subject and object, the darśanabhāga 見分 and the nimittabhāga 相分 which are the necessary two parts of a vijñāna, a cognition. Sensation must always mean sensation of something; perception must always be perception of something; consciousness must always be consciousness of something. The idea of the independent existence of a mental entity which seeks to sense, to perceive or to know things outside of itself is the most heretical idea one may have, as far as the doctrine of Vijñānavāda is concerned.




Fig. I

Vijnana is thus a succession of either pure sensations, if we speak of the first five vijñānas, or perceptions and discriminations if we speak of Manovijñānas. Vijñānas are produced and manifested according to the laws of interdependent conditions like any other phenomenon. The eye-vijñānas (眼識) for instance, cannot exist without its organ (眼根) and its object (色塵). The continuance of a series of contacts (sparśas - 觸) between the biological organs and their material objects causes the continuance of a series of sensations which we call vijñāna. The vijñāna, being in perpetual change, consists of a chain of sensations or perceptions, not a permanent entity which remains always identical to itself. As for the Manovijñāna, the object is called 法, dharma. This term, here, implies objects of perceptions, representations, images and imageless thoughts. All these objects first appear in Manovijñāna as its Nimittabhāga and then fall down to this store-house of sub-consciousness (an "aspect" of Ālaya) in the form of seeds of images 獨影種子 which can be re-actualized again as objects of Manovijñānas as in the case of reminiscence or imagination or dream. So the discontinuity of Manovijñāna does not cause the loss of the images which have been perceived or created. There are six categories of images that can be reproduced from Ālaya:

1. images of forms and colors
2. images of sounds
3. images of odours

4. images of tastes
5. images of contacts
6. images of dharmas

Let us call Manovijñāna by the name of Consciousness 意識. There are two forms of consciousness as distinguished by the Vijñānavādins:

1. Independent Consciousness (獨頭意識). This is the case in which Consciousness operates independently from the five vijñānas of sensation, that means when it is thinking, reasoning, remembering, imagining, dreaming or concentrating. First, we mention the most usual case: that of the active Consciousness which functions without stopping while we are awake. This Consciousness is called by the Vijñānavādins 散位意識 or Consciousness in the state of dispersion. Then comes the Consciousness in dream, 夢中意識 which functions only while we are dreaming. In dreams, people usually have the impression that they perceive real things; but the sphere of things in dream is only that of the images reproduced or re-actualized from their seeds in Ālayavijñāna. However the object of the Consciousness in dream may be connected with the sphere of representations 帶質境. A man who sleeps in a very hot room may dream of being in the Sahara Desert at noon: the image of the desert, in this case, resuscitated by the unconscious sensations of the body. The "subtle organ" here is sensitive enough to cause the vijñāna of the body 身識 to function when the man is sleeping. Finally, there is Consciousness in trance

定中意識。 This can be possessed only by the practice of trance. Not only the practitioners of the doctrine of Buddhism but anyone who practices any kind of dhyāna can also reach trances.

The Consciousness in dream deals with the sphere of reproductive images. These images are resuscitated from Ālaya. And since the object of cognition is mere images, the subject of cognition bears the same illusory aspect. In dream, one thinks, imagines and reasons as if one were awake, but since things and events appearing in dreams usually obey unconscious wishes and happen in an illogical way, the Consciousness loses its sharpness and clairvoyance. The Consciousness in dream is thus tainted with errors and fallacies and therefore falls mostly in the third category of cognition 非量。

When man is awake, his Consciousness, as mentioned before, is related to all spheres of cognition. But it can very seldom be in contact with the sphere of things-in-themselves. Most of its objects are representations, bearing in themselves some predicates and attributes of the substance of the things-in-themselves. The data supplied to it by the vijñānas of sensations represent only, and to a very limited extent, some features of the real things-in-themselves. The representation of a table, for instance, as the object of Consciousness consists only of a few concepts such as that of the color of the table, the height of the table, the use of the table... But the table-in-itself is not as poor as its representation in our Consciousness. The Consciousness has

its own categories of cognition: all elements of cognition brought to it are framed in these categories and become thus considerably mutilated and deformed. Representations do not "represent" faithfully the world of things in themselves. To the human mind, the world of representations as appearing in Consciousness (Manovijñānas) is the true world of reality. But the Vijñānavādins say that this belief is the root of all errors and illusions; the liberation of man consists in the destruction of these errors by the practice of the Meditation on Vijñaptimātra 唯識觀見 .

All representations fall into the reservoir of Ālaya and remain there in the form of seeds. They may be re-actualized on various occasions, as in the case of remembrance, of dreams or of recognition. The recognition of an object usually occurs as a comparison of the new sensory data with the image of a representation as conserved in and re-manifested from Ālaya. This is called "reminiscence" by modern psychology.

II. Co-operative Consciousness 五俱意識 . This is the case in which Manovijñānas is closely associated with the five vijñānas of sensations. In the case of pure perceptions, for instance, this form of cognition is intuitive, it follows that the co-operative Consciousness may reach to the sphere of things-in-themselves. But as soon as it passes into the phase of reflection and discrimination, it withdraws from that sphere. The object of the cooperative consciousness is reality itself, not just representation as in the

case of the independent Consciousness. The cooperative Consciousness is produced by the contact between sense organs and their objects. To admit the reality of the objects and of sense organs is to admit the existence of the objective world, independently from Consciousness. Here the doctrine of Vijñānavāda has a realist accent; but the world of representations as object of the reflective consciousness is considered as purely objective. It is separated from the world of things-in-themselves. Having the latter as basis, the world of representations is only the conceptual world which consists in categories, concepts, genus, species and discriminations. It is primarily a mental creation, although it has for basis something real and existing which is the world of things-in-themselves. This aspect of the Vijñānavāda has an accent of subjectivism.

The difference between Vijñānavāda and Realism lies in the fact that Vijñānavāda does not recognize the conceptual world as the real image of the world of reality. It is just mere representations, i.e. illusive and distorted images of reality. The difference between Vijñānavāda and Subjectivistic Realism is that the former admits the existence of the objective world of reality which it called the sphere of things-in-themselves.

The world of things in themselves serves as the condition for the appearance of the world of representation. The former is the support (aśraya 所依) of the latter. The nature of cognition in the case of the Cooperative Conscious-

ness is very similar to the nature of knowledge as conceived by the Empiricists. The basis of experience is sensation, and the Cooperative Consciousness is nothing but pure sensation. This means that its form of cognition is devoided of reflection, discernment and discrimination.

Concerning the function of Manovijñānas both with and without the cooperation of the five vijñanas of sensation, the Trimūṣka takes the example of waves and water in order to illustrate the case. Consciousness, regarding the other five vijñānas, is considered as the root-vijñāna (mūlavijñāna 根本識):

PAÑCĀNĀM MŪLAVIJÑĀNE YATHĀPRATYAYAM UDBHAVAḤ/
VIJÑĀNĀNAM SAHA NA VĀ TARANĀN GĀNĀM YATHĀ JALE//

"In the root-vijñāna the arising of the five vijñānas is according to causal factors, functioning with or without the [cooperation of the root-vijñāna], like the waves in the water"¹

Sensation consist in subject (能緣) of sensation and object (所緣) of sensation. These two parts (bhāgas) are to be distinguished from organs and objects of organs which are only the conditions for the occurrence of a sensation. The object of sensation is the world of things-in-themselves, although not perfect. It is similar to what Kant calls "noumena", because the world of representations which appears in our conceptual mind is identical to the Kantian

¹Vasubandhu, Trīmśikavijñāptikārikā, verse 15.

notion of "phenomena". The difference however is that in Kant, the human mind can never reach the noumena, while in Vijñānavāda, one can get to the world of things-in-themselves 性 ± 竟 - at least in the case of pure sensation and pure perception effected by the Cooperative Consciousness- The object of the Cooperative Consciousness is not, of course, a production of the subjective mind. In the case of Berkeley, it is God Himself. It is not a material substance but an active reality, an Omni-present Mind which observes the universe through all time and eternity. In the case of Realism, it is the objective world of the materialists. If we call it a "principle" it will become exactly the T'ai chi 太極 of Confucius or what Schopenhauer would call "the will". For Schopenhauer, "the will" is thing-in-itself.

To know how the Vijñānavāda solves the problem, we are invited to consider the notion of Ālaya. Up to now, we only know, by the notion of spheres and forms of cognition, that in Vijñānavāda the world of things-in-themselves is the world of reality while that of representations as object of the first five vijñanas and of Manovijñana is only a subjective and illusory world. The world of reality exists independently from Manovijñāna.

The sphere of things-in-themselves being the essence and support of the sphere of representations, is at the same time the object of Ālayavijñāna, the eighth vijñāna 第八識 . The word Ālaya means to deposit 藏 . This vijñāna is the power and ability of conservation and maintenance of exist-

ence. Existence, in this context, implies:

1. the material world 器世間,
2. the living being 情世間 consisting of body and sense organs,
3. the vijñānas, powers of cognition.

Ālayavijñāna is usually described in three aspects.

First, it is described as the maintainer 系能藏: its function is to maintain the existence of all dharmas either in actuality 現行 or in seed 種子, namely in potentiality. Secondly, it is described as the maintained 所藏 which means all the dharmas themselves, either in manifestation or in seed. Finally, it is described as the object of the wrong view of self 我愛執藏. In this aspect, Ālayavijñāna is misconceived as the self by the seventh vijñāna 第七識, namely, Manas. This latter in its wrong form of cognition sticks to Ālayavijñāna and "believes" it to be a real ātma or self.

It is clear that Ālayavijñāna consists in itself subject (the maintainer) and object (the maintained): these two parts (bhāgas) are perpetually in movement. The seeds (bijas) tend to be manifested and re-actualized, the actual dharmas fall back into seeds: all dharmas are in perpetual becoming. The *Trimśika* compares Ālayavijñāna to the flow of a river:

TAC CA VARTATE ŚROTASAUGHAVAT//

"and it is in perpetual change, like the flow of a river"¹

¹Vasubandhu. *Trimśikavijñaptikā*, verse 4. Hiuan Tsang's translation: 恆轉如瀑流

Nothing is lost; everything is changing. Even in the state of seeds, things change. The frequent manifestation of certain types of dharmas into actual dharmas and their return into the form of seeds cause these dharmas to develop themselves and to assimilate or transform other seeds which are not strong enough to be actualized or which have no occasion to manifest themselves. Let us take the example of a dharma in the sphere of images: the name of a man we met ten years ago, for instance. This image-dharma still exists in the form of a seed in Ālaya. During these ten years, we have not had occasion to think of the man or to hear about him, and now we forget completely his name. We are not able to call it back in our Manovijñāna any more. But the seed of the man's name still remains there, in the bottom of our Ālaya, although it is now very weak. It may have been assimilated to another series of seeds - the unconscious function of the seeds being unknowable to our conscious mind.

If a school boy repeats again and again his lesson, he is strengthening his power of memorizing the lesson. The images of the lesson which his eyes and his ears receive fall into Ālaya as seeds, and each time the lesson is repeated, the seeds become stronger. Thus, he will know by heart the lesson. It is unconceivable that all these images could be retained or deposited in a few-inches-brain; the physiological solution of memory does not seem to be acceptable. It follows that, according to the Vijñānavādins, all images are conserved in Ālaya, which is able to reproduce them any time,

if necessary and if conditions are available. Ālaya has no form; it is without form; it is universal. In the realm of phenomena, each being has his own Ālaya: intelligence and knowledge can not be transferred from one Ālaya to another. Neither can merits and Karmas. But Ālaya is not just the maintainer of images and seeds of images. It is also the maintainer of the existence of the being (sattva 有情) and of the material world in which the being is living. "This power of maintaining existence can not be known to us consciously" says the Trimsika.¹

The object of Ālayavijñāna is nāmarūpa, name and form, namely, the mental and the physical. This double-word implies all dharmas which are maintained by Ālayavijñāna. In the Plane of Desire (Kāmadhātu 欲界) and the Plane of Form (Rūpadhātu 色界) the object of Ālaya consists of those two categories of dharmas. But in the Plane of No-Form (Arūpadhātu 無色界) only the category of the mental remains.

Modern psychology speaks of "Unconsciousness" and "sub-consciousness," and Henri Bergson speaks of the "élan vital." These notions can be found in the idea of Ālaya the maintainer. Ālaya is the essence of the existence of the being and

¹Explanation by Sthiramati: "Comme cette Appropriation n'est pas Connue en pleine conscience, comme elle n'est pas connue à la façon d'un Morphème de connaissance détaillée en pleine conscience qui s'exprime par les mots "Ceci est dans cela, dans ceci il y a cela"; on dit que cette notation de Tréfonds a une Appropriation qui n'est pas connue en pleine conscience". Translation by Sylvain Lévi. Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimatra, page 72.

of the milieu in which the being is. The two characteristics of Ālayavijñāna are the ability to maintain 能持 and the ability to manifest 能變. That is Ālayavijñāna which maintains the being (根身) alive and the world (器界) existing. That is Ālayavijñāna which produces all phenomena in the world by way of manifestation of dharmas from potentialities (種子) to actualities (現行).

This manifestation proceeds strictly according to the principle of interdependent origins and the principle of Karma. The being and the world in which he is are "manifested" according to the sum of the value of his previous karma. He consists primarily of a body and five organs which are the support of and the origin from which Manovijñāna and the five vijñānas manifest themselves. But this organ-body 根身 is not all that the being is. The world is another part of his existence. This sphere of things-in-themselves which constitutes a part of the object of the Cooperative Consciousness is also the cooperative manifestation of Ālaya. It is the world of the objective reality. The conceptual world which is the object of the discursive Consciousness, although bearing some essence taken from the world of things-in-themselves, consists only of mental representations and is thus full of delusions and errors.

Since the world of things-in-themselves exists as the manifestation of Ālayavijñāna itself, how can it be called an objective world? We come now to the notion of "collective manifestation and individual manifestation" 共變自變.

The world of things-in-themselves is said to be one part of Ālayavijñāna itself, namely, its object (ā lambana). But is it only the manifestation of a single Ālaya? or is it the manifestation of many Ālayas? The problem is here set out. If the world of reality is the manifestation of a single individual Ālaya, it will cease to be after the individual dies. If it is the manifestation of all Ālayas, then it will turn out that outside of Ālaya there still exists an objective world.

According to the doctrine of Vijñānavāda the being and the world are the result of both individual manifestation 自變 and collectivemanifestation 共變. In the world of things-in-themselves, the dharmas exist either from pure individual manifestation or pure collective manifestation or both at the same time. There are strictly personal matters that exist only for the individual and cannot be perceived by others; they do not have any effect on influence on the others. The "subtle organ" for instance, is usually thought by the Vijñānavādins as an example of this category of purely individual manifestation. It has its root from Ālaya; it manifests itself as part of the individual being and it has nothing to do with the others. But things like the eyes, the tongue, the brain etc. are not purely individual. They can be seen by others, they can have effect on others. It follows that they are collective manifestations and thus fall into the other category. In this one are included sky, mountains, rivers, seas, time, space... Suppose I see someone

walking on the street. His existence is, of course, the manifestation of his own Ālaya. But since I can see him, it follows that he is the manifestation of my Ālaya, too. Thus, the existence of his being is a collective manifestation, although this manifestation is much more on his part and much less on my part. In other words, he is his own individual manifestation, but I contribute to a certain extent to that manifestation. Let us now take the example of time and space, or of the earth. These things are strictly collective manifestations, because they have the same value and meaning for all beings. But in the case of my house or my car, I see that they are not purely collective manifestations any more. They mean more for me and less for others. They are collective manifestations, yes, because everybody can see them but they are closer to me, to my Karma, and are primarily the fruit of my Karma, brought about by my vijñāna of Retribution. So they do not belong to the category of pure collective manifestation. They are "individually collective". Thus we have four categories of manifestations:

1. Pure individual manifestation 自變
2. Pure collective manifestation 共變
3. Individual manifestation in collective manifestation 其中自變
4. Collective manifestation in individual manifestation 自中共變

These categories may be subdivided into many others, but the above is enough for us to understand how the world of things in themselves is manifested. All Ālayas have the same

characteristics; that is why they can manifest themselves in a collective way. This can be accounted for by the fact that these Ālayas have the same Karmas which are related to each other in certain ways. If we have one hundred candles of different sizes, here and there in the room, and if we light them up, the light they give will be a "collective" light. But each candle has its own light. Each candle is seen in the collective light, but primarily in its own light which comes from it and which is closest to it. When a candle is blown out, its light no longer exists, but the light in the room still does. Therefore when an individual being dies, the world of things-in-themselves still remains as the collective manifestation of all other Ālayas. But what will become of the dead? His being and his part of participation in the world now return to bījas, namely in the form of seeds in Ālaya. No more manifestation of any kind can be seen. The body, the five organs and their objects return to Ālaya as seeds. The five vijñānas of sensation and Manovijñāna also return to Ālaya as seeds. They do not function any more, because they are not now actual dharmas, and they lack conditions for their appearance. All things that the individual has done during his life, all his Karmas, are now potentialities in Ālaya. In the form of seeds, everything continues to transform itself under the law of Karma. Ālaya is the sum of all these things; it is considered, in this respect, as the body of Karma. All Karmas are within Ālaya, acting in Ālaya. When they are ripe, a new phase of manifestation will begin.

According to the sum and the value of the Karmas, all the seeds manifest themselves in a form of existence which consists of a new being and a new participation in or manifestation of the collective Karma. If the Karma is good, Ālaya will participate in a good manifestation and enjoy a happy retribution. Ālaya, by this reason, is called by another name: vijñāna of Retribution 異熟識 . An examination of the notion of Karma will illustrate this.

Karma means actions and the fruits of these actions.

Three categories of actions are to be distinguished:

1. action of body 身業
2. action of speech 口業
3. action of thought 意業

As for the fruits of Karmas (or retrIBUTIONS of Karmas 業果) there are two kinds:

1. retribution of being, consisting of the body, the organs and all physiological and mental conditions - this is called main reward or direct reward 正報.

2. retribution of environment, consisting of the cosmic, social and cultural conditions. This is called a reward of environment or reward of support 依報.

The actions as causes of retribution are called seeds of Karma or Karmabījas. Their fruits are called Karmaphalas. After the individual dies, the Karmabījas continue to transform themselves and will be ripe at a certain time. Then, from Ālaya, they manifest themselves into a being and an environment which are the Karmaphala - the fruit of all actions

done during the previous existence. The Retribution is brought about according to the principle of collective manifestation. If my Karmas are good, I can share a good retribution with other individuals who have also good Karmas. They and I shall be born in a good milieu, for instance in a civilized society - and enjoy our special condition of living. We are considered to be happier than some others. The good fruit of one's Karma can be seen in one's person and environment. In other words, the Ālayas which have the same level of Karma 同業, manifest themselves, in cooperation into a collective retribution. But since they still differ from each other, each of them receives an individual retribution in a collective retribution. This is based on the notion of individual and collective manifestation which has been treated above.

If my Karmas are bad, my Ālaya will detach itself from the good collective retribution. I shall be born as a poor man for instance, or as an infirm man and in a miserable condition of life. All of that is done automatically, following the law of hetupratīyaya - interdependent origins. No God and no Buddha can interfere in the course of the function.

To illustrate it a little further, let us take the example of a democracy. A democracy is the retribution for the people of a country who have worked hard enough for its establishment. And this is the collective retribution for everyone in the country concerned. People who are living in other countries cannot enjoy the same retribution if they do

not strive and work for democracy. But, since each person in the country has his own position in the society and his own property which is the fruit of his own labor, he is enjoying his individual retribution. So we have different kinds of retribution which are the necessary derivations from the law of individual and collective manifestations: pure individual retribution, pure collective retribution, individual retribution within collective retribution, collective retribution within individual retribution.

Ālaya is called, as we have seen, Vijñāna of Retribution. The term vijñāna of retribution is fairly understandable, but does not denote the real meaning of the Sanskrit word vipāka vijñāna which means the vijñāna of the ripening [of Karmas by their transformation]. The term was beautifully translated by Hiuan Tsang: 異熟識 . Sylvain Lévi translates it by the notation of concoction. This term is nearer to the Sanskrit because it denotes the meaning of fruit and ripeness. But since Retribution is more understandable, Louis de la Vallée Poussin uses it in his translation of the Vijñāpti-mātrasiddhi 成唯識論 of Hiuan Tsang.

The three characteristics of the Karmas in Ālaya are:

1. they take time to be ripe; each seed has to wait during a certain time in order to reach ripeness. 異時而熟
2. the seeds which are ripening are of many kinds. 異類而熟
3. the seeds transform themselves in ripening. 變異而熟

The ensemble of these seeds is called wipakahetu 異熟因, and the retribution which is the result of the ripeness of the vipa Kahetu is called wipakaphala 異熟果. Thus, Karmas are the cause of birth and rebirth.

The manifestation of Ālaya into a being 正報 and into an environment 依報 depends on the nature of the Karmas. The individual may be born in any of the three worlds (dhātu). The first world, Kāmadhātu, is the world of sensuous desire, and food and sex. The second world, rūpadhātu, is the world of form which has no more lust. The third world, arūpadhātu, is the world of no-form, realm of pure spirit having no bodies, organs, places, things as in the Kamadhātu and rūpadhātu. These three worlds are called triloka. The manifestation may be also in any of the ten earths, or bhūmi, 十地. The stages mentioned in the 52 sections of the development of a bodhisattva into a Buddha. All that depends on the value of the Karma. The Kwei chu sung, says:

界地隨他業力生

"The manifestation and participation of Ālaya in any dhātu or in any bhūmi depends on the power of the Karmas"¹

The Vijñānavāda term for the reception of dharmas and Karmas in Ālaya is perfumation (Vāsanā 薰集). The role of Ālaya is of two kinds:

1. to receive all Karmas and dharmas by way of perfumation

¹Hiuan Tsang. Pa shih Kwei chu sung, verse 38.

2. to maintain the seeds, the body and organs, and the material environment

These roles of Ālaya can not be known to the Manovijñāna. The Trimsika says:

ASAMVIDITAKOPĀDISTHĀNAVIJÑAPTİKAM CA TAT/

"We cannot know [the way in which Ālaya] maintains [the seeds, the way in which the body and organs and its] emplacement [is manifested in bhūmi or dhātu, the way in which Ālaya function] as a vijñāna"¹

The translation is long. The chinese verse consists only of seven words: 不可知 執受 處 了 which may be divided into four groups:

- | | |
|--------|---|
| 1) 不可知 | = unable to know, equivalent to <u>asamviditaka</u> |
| 2) 執受 | = maintenance (of the existence of seeds and body and organs), equivalent to <u>upādi</u> |
| 3) 處 | = emplacement (environment, bhūmi or dhātu) equivalent to <u>sthāna</u> . |
| 4) 了 | = form of cognition, (ākāra 量) equivalent to <u>vijñapti</u> . |

Sthiramati analyses the verse as following:

"ASAMVIDITAKA UPADIR YAS-MIN, ASAM-VIDITAKĀ VASTHĀNA VIJÑAPTIR YASMIN." (It is impossible to know the [nature of the] maintenance [of Ālaya]; it is impossible to know the cognition of emplacement [of Ālaya]).²

¹Vasubandhu, Trimsikavijñaptikarikā, verse 3.

²Sthiramati, Vijñaptimātratasiddhi, original Sanskrit published by Sylvain Levi. Page 19.

In the Vijñaptimātrasiddhi of Hiuan Tsang, however, we have a different interpretation. The compound upadisthānavijñapti is understood as a Dvandva: upadi and sthana and vijñapti. Sthiramati takes the last two terms as a Tatpuruṣa, so he reads: upadi and vijñapti of sthana. Hiuan Tsang must have read Sthiramati, but he does not follow his interpretation whose meaning is vague. Perhaps among the ten doctors and commentators of the Vijñānavāda school many were of Hiuan Tsang's idea, since the Vijñaptimātra siddhi is supposed to be an intelligent selection and resumé of the ideas of these ten doctors. Any way we find the interpretation of the Siddhi very understandable while we can hardly set any clear idea of vijñāna of emplacement.

On this, the Kwei chu sung is very clear:

受薰持種根身器
去後來先作主翁

"Receiving perfumation, maintaining seeds 種, body 身 and environment 器, Ālaya is the chief who comes first and who departs last"¹

"The chief" here means "the chief" of all other vijñānas. Ālaya is the ground of all other vijñānas which can be actualized only when Ālaya has settled itself.

Let us come now to the notion of Manas, the seventh vijñāna which is usually considered as the chief cause of samsara. Manas is the function of mentality which dis-

¹Hiuan Tsang. Pa shih Kwei chu sung, verse 43-44.

tinguishes the self from the non-self. It is not of the same kind of cognition with Manovijñāna and the five vijñānas of sensation. Its faculty of cognition is a non-discursive attachment to the illusion of the self. Manovijñāna has also a wrong view on the existence of the self, but this wrong view is much easier to be destroyed. It is called the discursive wrong view on the self 分別我報 . In Manas, the wrong view is intuitive and has existed since before the individual was born. It manifests itself as an actual dharma as soon as the individual is born. It is called 俱生我報, the wrong view on the self which is born together with the being. As far as this wrong view exists, whether potentially or actually, Ālaya remains the victim of samsara. The object of Manas is the darśanabhāga (or subject) of Ālaya itself. Manas has Ālaya as support and created its own ālam-bana from that support. In other words, Manas takes the darśanabhāga of Ālaya as object and misconceives it as the self - all errors of cognition, according to the doctrine of Vijñānavāda, comes from this basic illusion. The bad Karmas continue to strengthen Mana thus make it more erroneous. Bad Karmas are identified with Avidya and Desire; they constitute the nature of Manas itself. If the Karmas are good, their seeds in Ālaya (and that means Ālaya itself) become pure: Avidya will lose its power and pressure on Mana. When all the seeds become pure, Avidya ceases to exist and Mana is destroyed. Mana now is transformed into the Wisdom of the Nature of Equality 平等性智 .

We are invited to go deeper into the nature and function of the Vijñānas. As we have seen before, the vijñānas are not permanent entities. Vijñāna is a succession of mental phenomena, each of these phenomena having its subject and object. These two parts of each mental phenomenon occur at the same time, there can not be one without the other. The conditions for this occurrence are organs and supports. Manovijñāna has Mana as its organ. Like the five vijñānas of sensation, it may be interrupted and cease to function, as in the case of sleeping without dream. This is because in such a case, the conditions for its occurrence are incomplete. It has no support or ālambana pratyaya 所縁縁. But for Mana and Ālaya, ālambana-pratyaya is always present, although in perpetual becoming. The so-called "instinct of conservation of the self" can be ascribed to Mana, because it needs no consciousness as its support. Alayavijñāna can not be interrupted, because if it can, memory is impossible. That is why it is said in Vijñānavāda that Mana and Ālaya are never discontinued or interrupted, even when the individual dies. The mental phenomena which succeed each other give the impression of a unique phenomenon: vijñāna. In reality, vijñāna is a stream of mental phenomena and thus not static. These phenomena are called mental properties or caittas 心所. They may be understood as mental conditions or as attributes of the vijñānas, but all these terms are not satisfying. These caittas are the content of the vijñānas, in other words they are the vijñānas themselves, as water is the river it-

self. Vijñāna is the continuance of these mental properties which succeed each other according the law of causation. As streams of mental properties, the vijñanas are called by the term cittarāja 心王, "the mental as King"

The caittas are of five classes:

1. universal caittas 徧行心所 : attention (or mental excitation), sensation, impression produced by sensation, imagination, volition.
2. particular caittas 別境心所 : will (or desire for action), resolution (or determination), concentration, memory (or reminiscence), comprehension.
3. meritorious caittas 善心所 : confidence (or belief), activity, shame, humility, absence of cupidity, absence of anger, absence of ignorance, serenity, attention, innocuousness, indifference.
4. non-meritorious caittas 不善心所 : cupidity, anger, avidya, pride, doubt, erroneous view, wrath, hostility, hypocrisy, vexation, jealousy, egoism, dishonesty, deceit, injuriousness, arrogance, indecency, shamelessness, agitation, indolence, lack of faith, negligence (or inattention), laziness, forgetfulness, confusion, erroneous judgment.
5. undetermined caittas: remorse, torpor, initial application, extended application.

These 52 caittas are fully described in the commentary of the *Trimśika* by Sthiramati and in the *Vijñaptimātrasiddhi* of Hiuan Tsang. Manovijñāna is connected with all 52 caittas. The five vijñānas of sensation are only connected with 34

caittas which consist of 5 universal caittas, 5 particular caittas, 11 meritorious caittas and 13 non-meritorious caittas. Mana is associated with 18 caittas: the universal ones, the last of the particular ones which is comprehension, and 12 non-meritorious caittas: cupidity, avidya, pride, erroneous view, lack of faith, negligence, lazyness, forgetfulness, confusion, agitation, indolence and erroneous judgment. Ālaya is only associated with the 5 universal ones, because its function is only a pure form of intuition.

The five universal caittas are considered as the process of all kinds of cognition; that is why they are universal to all vijñanas. However, their nature can only be known perfectly in the case of Manovijñāna. The nature of these caittas varies according to the form of cognition which is concerned.

1. mental excitation 作意, manaskāra: this is the cause for the occurrence of any kind of cognition. If the cognitive element has not yet occurred, it causes it to occur; if it has occurred already, it causes it to direct itself to the object.

2. sensation 觸, sparsā: the effect of the contact between the organ and its object.

3. impression produced by sensation 受, vedanā: the admission of the image given by sensation.

4. imagination 想, saṃjñā: the action of the mental on the image which is obtained - the formation of the concept.

5. volition 思 cetanā: the reflection which gives rise to other mental phenomena, such as desire, agitation, comprehension, etc.

If the object of the mental properties is particular, the object of the vijñanas is universal. Each caittas has its particular object. Desire is desire of something, confusion is confusion about something. The succession of these particular objects forms the universal object of the vijñāna. The duration of a caittas is very brief. Suppose I am looking at an elephant. I can look at the elephant as long as I like, and it seems that my sensation, perception and awareness of the existence of the elephant may last as long as the duration of my looking at the beast. But in reality there is an entire series of sensations and perceptions and awarenesses. One sensation, for instance, in its lapse of time, has its own subject and object, the latter being the image of the elephant transmitted by the organ of sight. As soon as it becomes object of sensation, it falls into Ālaya as a seed and re-actualizes itself immediately to serve as the background of reminiscence for the comprehension (prajñā, 慧心所) the last of the five particular caittas) of the next image transmitted by the organ of sight. There are a multitude of images, a multitude of objects and subjects, thus a multitude of consecutive sensations and perceptions. Vijñāna, to repeat once more, is not a permanent mental entity but a stream of mental properties (citta-caittas).

Concerning the parts of each vijñāna and caittas, the

doctors of the school do not agree with each other. But it seems that the majority of the Buddhists today are inclined to accept the theory of three parts as held by Dharmapāla. One part would be too simple, two parts too phenomenological, and four parts would become too complicated. Sthiramati held the theory of one part, Nanda of two parts, and the others three parts. Let us examine the theory of Dharmapala.

We have seen the first two parts: the darśanabhāga 見分 identified with vijñapti and ākāra, and the nimittabhāga 相分, identified with ālambana 所緣. The third part is called part of inner witness, or svaśamvittibhāga 自證分. This is also called part of inner nature or svābhāvikabhāga 自体分. The latter is preferred among the Buddhists today. Each caittas and vijñāna consists of these three parts, the first two parts are phenomenal, the third is ontological. This is, of course, an attempt to approach the idea of an unseparated tathatā 不離真如. The third part is the spontaneous nature of illumination 覺性 which is non-discursive and non-discriminative. It is similar to the "neutral monism" of Bertrand Russell, being neither mental nor material. There are neither subject nor object within it. It is, on the contrary, the ground of both subject and object. It can not be named. To call it "inner witnesses" is only to suggest an idea about the ontological ground of cognition.

The fourth part which is called "witnesses to the witnesses" svasamvittisamvittibhāga 證自證分 is thus

not important.

We have so far dealt with the notion of individual and collective manifestations of Karma. These manifestations however are the role not only of Ālaya but also of all vijñānas and caittas. All of them are share in Karmas and in retributions: the individual and collective manifestations of Karmas follow the definite law of interdependent origins, and the latter are extremely complicated.

Ālaya is the store house of the seeds of all dharmas, including images, experiences, actions, thoughts and speeches. They are stored in it by the way of perfumage and are waiting for convenient occasions in order to actualize themselves. Ālaya maintains the seeds and the continuation of the existence of the being and of the actual dharmas. The power of impregnating (vāsana) the dharmas into seeds and of reproducing them into actual dharmas is the power of the individual and collective manifestation: this must be seen in the principle of causes and effects.

All vijñānas have their seeds in Ālaya. These seeds are the main cause, hetu, which with the help of other conditions, pratyayas (body, organs, objects of organs) manifest themselves as actual vijñānas. The occurrence of the vijñānas is therefore actualization, not production, because they already have their seeds in Ālaya. The cause is the seed, and the effect is the actual phenomenon. However, a seed can be considered as an effect (phala) because it is itself a dharma, though not actual. Seeds are the fruits of the perfumage of

actual dharmas. Causes and effects are therefore classified in four categories:

1. Seeds producing seeds
2. Seeds producing actual dharmas
3. Actual dharmas producing seeds
4. Actual dharmas producing actual dharmas .

That is the system of inter-production and inter-origination of all dharmas in the universe, according to the vijñānavāda doctrine of the Bijas.

The theory of Mencius 孟子 that the human nature is good (人之初 性本善) is therefore not in accordance with the Vijñānavāda doctrine. Mencius says that evil occurs only because of the impregnation of the neighbouring evil. But it is hard to explain how can the evil be impregnated if everybody in the society is good and if man is perfectly good by his very nature.

According to the Vijñānavāda, the nature (vedanā 性) of Alaya is neither good nor evil. It is neutral (avyākṛta 無記). So it admits the impregnation (vāsana) of both the good and the evil.

Suppose we meet a man who has never heard of the doctrine of Vijñānavāda. He has no seed of the doctrine of Vijñānavāda in his Ālaya. Now suppose we teach him Vijñānavāda: for the first time in his life, a bija of Vijñānavāda comes into existence in his Ālaya. This kind of "perfumation" is called perfumation to produce 薰生 . If our man

continues to learn and to practice Vijñānavāda, he will develop, by way of further perfumages, his knowledge on Vijñānavāda. These further perfumages are called perfumages to increase 薰長 .

The new-born seeds are usually weak and may not be actualized in an easy way, although there may be conditions suitable for such actualizations. They need further perfumations in order to become strong. Such is the case of the school-boy learning his lesson by repeating it several times. The doctrines of Zen and Amidism are also based on this concept of bija and perfumation. A Koan cannot be solved if the meditation on it is not sufficient to break it. The satori is the work of Ālaya rather than the work of Manovijñāna. If the seed of the enigma is not strong enough to dominate Ālaya, subconscious concentration on it is impossible. Therefore concentration and discipline of the body and of the mind are necessary to isolate Ālaya, to keep it from being diverted by too many kinds of worries and problems and preoccupations. When the enigma is mature it will be broken and the solution will emerge on the surface of Manovijñāna. The doctrine of the Pure Land which consists in repeating the name (持名) of the Buddha Amitabha and in reminding oneself of an image or a quality of this Buddha in order to concentrate on him, favors the impregnation of the seeds of Amitabha in one's Ālaya and chases away the influence of evil thoughts. Ālaya being impregnated with the good seeds, becomes pure: this is the condition to be reborn in the Pure Land of the West which

has Amitabha as teacher. The rebirth will be accomplished according to the Karmic law of manifestation and participation of Ālaya in the new environment which is the Pure Land: the Amidists are working for the same collective Karma.

There are two kinds of Bījas: pure bījas (anasravā) and impure bījas (Sāsrava). The former favor enlightenment and happiness, the latter saṃsāra and suffering. The method of Vijñānavāda consists therefore in destroying the impure bījas by preventing them from actualization and impregnation. If they cannot be actualized, they cannot be impregnated again in order to become stronger. They will become weaker and weaker as time goes on until finally they are destroyed or assimilated or transformed by the good bījas. Ālaya in this way is protected from the increase of impurities, and becomes gradually pure as the good bījas continue to develop themselves by way of actualization and impregnation. The bījas may subsist or change or be destroyed. They actualize themselves and then impregnate themselves again to produce new bījas and new actual dharmas. They are always changing and transforming, and since Ālaya is the totality of the Bījas, it is always changing and transforming, like the flow of a river. The stretch of water looks always the same but the innumerable drops of water in which it consists are always changing and moving. Ālaya is not identical with itself in two consecutive moments. The concepts of continuation 恒 and Transformation 轉 are the most basic concepts concerning Ālayavijñana.

It is possible to destroy a bīja by way of impregnating the bījas of the opposite nature. This is like bringing in a lamp in order to chase away darkness. The new bījas of the opposite nature, if strong enough, can destroy the old ones. This is the way to liberate Ālaya from pollution, to fill it with pure and good bījas, to bring it to a stage of actualization where only the good seeds manifest themselves and participate in a good collective Karma. This is also the way for Ālaya to transform itself into the Wisdom of the Great Mirror and to detach itself from saṃsāra and suffering.

The Karmas are either good or bad or indefinite. From the point of view of the individual, these Karmas are of an individual nature, but from the point of view of a group of individuals, they have a social or collective nature. If someone achieves a good Karma, the credit will be his; however, this good Karma is related to the group in which he lives and has influence on the group. There is a close relationship between the individual Karma and the Karma of the group.

The chief role in creating Karma is held by Manovijñāna. The latter is powerful; it can dominate other vijñānas, it can create and transform the nature of the individual life. In the present existence, the individual receives the fruits of the Karmas which he has achieved early in this life (現業) or which have their seeds in previous existences (夙業). The vijñānas, in this life, are creating new Karmas which will result in a coming life. The dynamics of

retribution is thus Karma. If the individual can estimate the Karmabījas he is causing during this life, he will be able to predict the Karmaphalas which are coming in his coming existence.

The Past Karma (夙業) is the essence of this life: is it like the élan of an arrow shot in a previous existence. When the élan is ended, the arrow falls. The previous Karmas have their limits: when all retribution is finished the existence ends. The present Karma (現業) will in its turn resume its strength, and a new "shot" will be the cause of another phase of existence. The old Karmas being ended, the body, the organs and the environment of the being cease to exist. All return to Ālaya as bījas. The new Karmas are now working toward ripeness, and when the time comes, a new phase of manifestation begins -- another life. Since the individual Karmas are interwoven with the collective Karmas, the manifestation occurs as a participation in a collective retribution. The doctrine of Vijñānavada admits a free will which is the necessary condition for all transformation or liberation. This is the free will of acting on the bījas. Before reaching the core of the Vijñānavada theory of knowledge, we have to go through the notion of the twelve interdependent origins (十二因緣 ; dvādaśāṅga pratityasamutpāda) which aim at explaining the secret of Karma and rebirth.

These twelve origins are: ignorance or unenlightenment (avidyā), volition (saṃskāra), consciousness (vijñāna) name and form (nāmarūpa) sense organs (ṣaḍāyatana), contact (sparsa),

sensation (vedanā), thirst (trṣṇā), attachment (upādāna), existence (bhava), birth (jāti) old age and death (jara marana).

Let us begin with the last: old age and death. This is the symbol of suffering. But why does man have to be old, and finally die? This is because he was born (birth). He was born because he has his Karma to be paid. And this Karma to be paid is the essence of existence. There will be no birth if there is no Karma, no existence.

Existence has attachment as its cause, because if man is not attached to anything or to any desire which is to be fulfilled, he will create no Karma, hence, no existence. And that is because by his thirst for desires, he is attached to his desire. There is desire because there arise sensations. If there were no sensations, no desire could arise. Sensations come from contact between organs and their objects, which are mental and physical. Name and form is the name for all mental and physical phenomena which consist in five aggregates manifested from the bijas contained in Ālaya.¹ Ālaya, or consciousness, is thus the origins of name and form. Ālaya is the impure aspect of Tathata, the ultimate ontological entity in Buddhism, as the waves are the moving aspect of the water. Consciousness here must be understood as Alaya, not as the other vijñānas. The power transforming Tathata into Alaya is called volition. And this has avidya for cause: all

¹Name is the mental, form is the physical. The latter is the first among five aggregates (skandhas) and the former consists in the other four. Five skandhas: rūpa (form, matter), vedana (sensation) sañjña (conception), samskāra (volition) and vijñāna (consciousness).

troubles come from the lack of knowledge.

The above presentation of the pratyayas is, however, an oversimplification. It would be wrong to consider each pratyayas as having an independent nature. Causation does not operate in chain but in combination. Avidya, for instance, is not something separated or different from Volition or Consciousness or Attachment. Avidya is Volition, Consciousness and Attachment themselves. Avidya is a cause, it is true, but not the first cause. The notion of a first cause is heretical, in all forms of Buddhism. A cause must be at the same time an effect, this is the essence of the principle of interdependent origins.

In the present life (which begins by Birth and ends by Death), Consciousness, Name and Form, Sense Organs, Contact and Sensations are the cause of Further Avidya, and they themselves are Avidya. Thirst, Attachment and Existence are the causes of Volition, and are Volition itself. Avidya of the coming life has its cause in Consciousness, Name and Form, Sense Organs, Contact and Sensation of this life. The present life (Birth - Death) is the effect of Avidya and Volition from the previous life and is producing Avidya and Volition as cause of the life to come. Thus we have:




Fig. II.

The terms "reincarnation" and "transmigration" misinterpret the notion of saṃsāra in Buddhism. They suggest the idea of a "soul" which abandons the physical body when the individual dies and which comes into the body of a new-born being. There is nothing of this kind of "transmigration" in Vijñānavāda. Ālaya is not a soul; it does not dwell within,

the body, it does not come and go; it has no size, no volume, no limit. It cannot be located in space. The body and its environment are the manifestation of Ālaya. Saṃsāra is effected every minute, in every Kṣana, not simply and necessarily after a phase of existence. Everything is changing; existence (body, consciousness, material environment) is a series of productions and destructions. The impermanence of all things is the nature of saṃsāra itself. The Vijñānavādins distinguish two kinds of impermanence 無常:

1. impermanence in every kṣana 刹那無常
2. impermanence in a cycle of existence 一期無常

The former is seen in the permanent change of all actual dharmas, the latter at the end of a phase of existence, namely, a life. There is no ego, no permanent entity. The present existence is neither the same and the previous existence, nor different. Even in the different stages of an existence, the individual is not identical to "himself". He is not even the same individual in two consecutive Kṣana. But this does not mean that there are two different beings in two consecutive Kṣana. He is neither the same nor different 三昧 - 三昧 異 on this life, or in a series of existences. There is no self, no ego, no permanent "soul". There are only streams of productions-destructions, ever changing and transforming. This is the essence of the doctrine of anatman as expressed in Vijñānavāda .

Having in hand the necessary data, let us come now to the core of the theory of knowledge in the doctrine of Vijñānavada. The contention that everything exists as Vijñāna is expressed in the Karika 17 of the Trīmśika:

VIJÑĀNAPARINĀMO 'YAM VIKALPO YAD VIKALPYATE/
TENA TAN NĀSTI TENEDAM SARVAM VIJÑAPTIMĀTRAKAM//.

"The transportation of the Vijñāna consists in [subject of] cognition and object of cognition. Therefore, it does not exist. It is simply Vijñāna"¹

The word tad here denotes the object of manifestation. (ātma and Dharmas) which is believed to be existing from the point of view of common sense. "It does not exist" here does not mean that subject and object of cognition are simply illusions, simply no-thingness. It means they do not really exist in that way - in the way we believe they do. They are the products of the manifestation of vijñāna. They are vijñāna itself. This is the meaning of the expression vijñapti-mātra 唯言識, "vijñāna only".

However, Dharma and Ātma as object of cognition can not be said to be created by the subject of cognition. The darśanabhāga (subject 見分) and the nimittabhāga (object 相分) have each other as support for their existence. They appear simultaneously and each is the raison d'être of the other. The darśanabhāga does not create the nimittabhāga; it cannot do that. They are the necessary two parts (分) of vijñāna,

¹Vasubandhu. Trīmśikavijñaptikarikā, verse 17.

and can not exist apart from each other. Subject and object are all manifested from vijñāna, as vijñāna. To say that everything is vijñāna does not mean that everything as object of cognition is the creation of the "subjective mind". This is a very important point in the doctrine of Vijñānavāda.

The Karika has a very clear statement about that: "the transformation of vijñāna into subject of cognition and object of cognition". Both subject and object are objects of the manifestation of vijñāna. The term vijñāna here should be understood as the ground of all manifestations and can be considered as denoting the third part 第三分 : svābhāvika bhāga, the part of the inner nature 自体分 . This part is the ontological ground of both subject and object. It is not the same as the other two parts, but it is not a different part either. Its nature is ontological rather than phenomenological. The term part should not be understood in the practical sense. The parts of a vijñāna are not like the parts of a table, for instance, which can be detached from each other. Parts here means aspect. The term is supposed to give us a notion of distinction between different aspects of the same thing, not to cut the thing in different and distinctive parts. In this sense, a dime can be said to have three parts: the right side, the left side and the metal which is the "matter" of the dime. These three parts cannot be really understood as existing separately from each other.

Every vijñāna and caittas has three parts. It follows that every vijñāna and caittas has its own ontological ground.

This ontological ground is a conception we may have in our mind about the ultimate reality of things. This concept of an ontological ground, however, is not the ultimate reality itself. It is only a concept. But it may help, if one knows how to deconceptualize it and grasp it by Wisdom. But since it is now none the less a concept, it may be thought to be one or to be many. We have the svābhāvikabhāga of Ālaya, we also have that of Mana, and that of the other six vijñānas. We also have the svābhāvikabhāga of every caittas. Are these svābhāvikabhāgas "one" or "many"? At first, they seem to be many, but the very notion of ontological ground absorbs them into one. Ālaya is the ground of all vijñānas and caittas, namely, all subjects and objects as seen in vijñānas and caittas. So the ontological ground of all Vijñānas and caittas is identical with the ontological ground of Ālaya. And what is the ontological ground of Ālaya? It is the tathatā, suchness, the absolute reality, the real nature of vijñāptimatra.

The Karika reads:

DHARMĀNĀM PARAMĀRTHAŚ CA SA YATAS TATHATĀPI SAḤ./
SARVAKĀLAṀ TATHĀBHĀVĀT SAIVA VIJÑAPTIMĀTRATĀ//

"The ultimate reality of [all] dharmas is tathatā, because it is always as itself, and it is indeed vijñāpti-
mātra".¹

¹Vasūbandhu, Trimśikavijñāpti Karikā, verse 25.

To realize this ontological ground means to look into the very nature of things, to see the ultimate reality. This ultimate reality can be seen in each phenomenon, each vijñāna, each caittas, if one ceases to use one's discriminative mind and if one develops one's non-discriminative wisdom. The Ocean is large, but one need not drink all the water in the Ocean in order to know that it is salted. One drop of the water in the Ocean can reveal that. The same with tathatā: a look into the nature of a simple caittas is sufficient for one to see the ultimate reality, the paramārtha of all Dharmas 諸法勝義 .

The Key for the Vijñānavāda theory of Knowledge is the notion of three natures (svabhāva), of things or of cognition. The first nature is the nature of imagination, the parikalpitasvabhāva 徧計所執自性 . Things do not exist in the way we think they do: this is the meaning of parikalpitasvabhāva. The word imagination used to translate it has a special meaning here, we should not take it in the usual sense. To "imagine" here does not mean exactly to create and believe as existing something which does not really exist. It means to think of things as existing in a certain way while they are really not and to ascribe to things attributes and predicates which do not really belong to them. The word vikalpa used in the Karika means discrimination or imagination. Is interpreted by Hiuan Tsang in his Siddhi as parikalpita (徧計所執 , the wrong view obtained by universal discrimination). The nature of vijñāna (not prajña)

is vikalpa, because vijñāna consists of subject-discriminator (parikalpayati) and object-discriminated (vikalpyate). The Karika 20 of the Trimsika reads:

YENA YENA VIKALPENA YAD YAD VASTU VIKALPYATE/
PARIKALPITA EVĀSAU SVABHĀVO NA SA VIDYATE//

"Such and such objects- discriminated are imagined by such and such subjects-discriminator: this nature of discrimination-imagination (parakalpita) does not exist"¹

It is clear that the vijñānas do not see things as they are. They simply discriminate and imagine, therefore they cannot see the ultimate reality. The world as we conceive it is just objects and subjects of discrimination-imagination.

The second nature is the nature of the existence of things by interdependent origins, the paratantrasvabhāva 依他起自性 . The term paratantra is almost synonymous to pratityasamutpanna. This "nature" is nearer to the ultimate reality and is supposed to correct the error of the nature of discrimination-imagination.

All wrong views and all evil Karmas have their origin in avidya, the inability to look into the real nature of reality. This inability to look into the real nature of things, in other word, this false understanding of things, is vikalpayati (the imaginer); the object of this false understanding is vikalpyate (the imagined). The subject being false, the object cannot be correct. Reality cannot reveal itself to vikalpa. The objects of our discrimination are nothing but

¹Vasubandhu. Trimsikavijñapti Karika, verse 20.

the distorted images of reality which we believe to be real and existing.

A man is walking on the street of a village, in the dark, his mind is worrying about things that may happen to him. Suddenly he sees a snake on his way and becomes frightened. He screams. People from the village rush to him with torches and weapons. In the light of the torches, the man realizes now that it is not a snake; it is only a rope. "Reality" here is not the snake. Snake is an imagination, while rope really exists. The snake, as object of the man's mind, is a false image of the rope coming from the rope itself through the man's erroneous perception. This erroneous perception is imaginative. It is comparable to vikalpa. The light of the torches symbolizes the nature of paratantra which helps man to discover the real nature of things.

The external world as conceived by out vikalpa is like the snake in the man's imagination. This snake will soon disappear if we can look into the nature of paratantra in order to discover the real "rope".

The word used in the Siddhi to translate paratantra is 依他起, "being produced by other (causes)". The meaning of paratantra is that nothing can exist independently from other things. Everything exists as a function of other things. (This mathematical term is a very good term to describe the principle of interdependent origins.) Everything exists by the law of conditions or pratyayas 緣起 .

There are four categories of pratyayas.¹

1. hetupratyaya
2. samanantarapratyaya
3. ālambanapratyaya
4. adhipatipratyaya

Hetupratyaya is the "main" cause, the seed (bija) of an actual dharma. A plant of corn, for instance, is an actual dharma. The seed of corn that is the cause of the existence of the plant of corn is hetupratyaya, condition as "main cause". But the seed of corn, while being a necessary condition, is not the sufficient condition. There must be soil, water, sunlight and many other conditions. These conditions are called samanantarapratyaya. There are two kinds of samanantaras: the ones which favor the growth and development and the existence of the actual dharmas (順增上緣) and the ones which harm, threaten and destroy them (逆增上緣).

The third pratyaya is ālambanapratyaya, condition as object of cognition 所緣緣. The subject of cognition cannot exist without the object of cognition, as we have seen. This third condition is exactly the second part of vijñāna: the nimittabhāga. There cannot be any darśanabhāga without nimittabhāga. This object of cognition is the support of the subject of cognition. But this condition, being the object of vijñāna, is called immediate object-condition (sāksādālam-banapratyaya). There are dharmas which, although not being

¹Hiuan Tsang, 成唯識論

the object of vijñāna, serve as the support on which the object of vijñāna is engendered. These dharmas are called remote object-condition (初所縁縁).

Finally there is the adhipatipratyaya, condition in the capacity of "rector" or "condition in general". The Siddhi of Hiuan-Tsang defines adhipatipratyaya as all real and energetic dharmas (saddharma, conditioned or unconditioned, as opposed to imaginary dharmas which are parikalpita) which are capable of favoring or counteract an "other dharma" 他.¹ In this sense, the dharmas which are hetu, ālambana and samanantara are also adhipatipratyaya. The difference, however, is that in the latter category of pratiyayas are implied only the external conditions. That is to indicate different modes of causality. The three other categories of pratyayas are of an internal activity.

The theory of pratyaya is complicated and we cannot now go into details. But the most important point of the doctrine of pratyaya which is necessary for our analysis is that which points out the fact that nothing exists by itself: everything exists in dependence on several other things. The production and existence of a dharma depends on those of other dharmas, thus, the nature of all dharmas is paratantra-svābhāva.

If we can look at things in their nature of paratantra, we shall be able to get rid of several wrong views. First of

¹See Louis de la Vallee Poussin, La Siddhi de Hiuan Tsang, p. 448.

all, is the belief in the permanence and identity of the dharma. All dharmas are impermanent, but in our mind, we only have the concepts of permanent dharmas, each of them is represented by a name or a label. Let us take the term "my bicycle" for an example. The term is used to call a dharma which was produced at a certain time and which will perish at a certain time. First of all, I see that the term "my bicycle" brings to my mind a concept of the bicycle I bought several years ago in Saigon and which is now very old. The term, as well as the concept, has a determined frame. But reality - the bicycle - has not. It is changing, it is becoming. It has undergone innumerable changes. I have even replaced several old parts of the bicycle by the new ones. It is not always identical to itself, not only because of the substitution of new parts for the old ones but also because of the fact that nothing can be identical to itself in two consecutive Kṣanas. Yet I still call it my bicycle. The concept is static, while reality is dynamic. The image I have in my mind is not the bicycle itself. What I have in my mind is the concept of the bicycle and not the bicycle. And this concept is only a static image of the bicycle, a single image and not a series of images.

The worst thing is that I am used to cut reality in small portions by way of conceptualization. I cut a piece of reality, call it a dharma, detach it from the whole, locate it in time and space, frame it in a concept and finally label it. But reality cannot stand a frame, or a label, which is

determined and finite. It seeks to escape from concepts, labels and frames. There are no dharmas. There is only reality, streams of reality, so to speak. There are no permanent and identical and determined phenomena which can be distinguished from each other; there are only streams of phenomena which are inter-produced by each other, inter-related to each other and implied in each other. The vikalpa way of looking at reality is to separate these streams distinctly from each other, cut reality in small portions, frame them, conceptualize them, label them and compare them to each others. All metaphysical errors come from the fact that we cut out reality into small portions while reality cannot be cut by way of conceptualization. Reality is moving, living, vivid, unlimited and undiscriminated, while our concepts are unmoving and limited. To re-create reality, to build up reality by way of comparing and arranging concepts is to distort and destroy reality. The conceptual world is not reality. It is the dry corpse of reality. What I call reality has nothing to do with the true nature of reality. The notions of impermanence and non-ego are the result of the meditation on the nature of paratantra. Impermanence and non-ego are practically the same. Ego means something always identical to itself; but since everything is impermanent, nothing can be an ego. Non-ego does not mean the non-existence of a soul, or atman, or mind. Non-ego means the impossibility of existence of any permanent entity, whether it be called soul, or atman, or mind. If we understand soul or atma as a stream

of psychological or mental phenomena whose existence is related to other physical and physiological phenomena, it follows that soul or atma must be accepted as existing in Buddhism.

All knowledge of reality must be based on the principle of impermanence and non-ego if one is to see reality at all, if one does not want to turn one's back against reality. Revealing the nature of paratantra, the Buddha wants to shake off wrong views which gather around the belief in the existence of a permanent ego and dharmas, to provide his disciples with a way of knowledge higher than that of conceptualization and the arrangement of distorted images, namely, the way of vikalpa. The doctrine of vijñānavāda is supposed to point out the errors of the discriminative way of cognition and to help man to look at things from a new point of view. While the doctrine of Śūnyatā aims at reducing all concepts to absurdity in order to help man reach a higher form of intuitive cognition, and while the doctrine of Tathatāgarbha preaches the doctrine of innumerable originations (重重緣起) in order to show that all are in one and one is all (一切卽一 卽一切), the doctrine of Vijñānavada tries to help man to look into the nature of reality from a phenomenological point of view. All these three great doctrines of Mahāyāna have the same aim: to prevent the disciple from cutting living reality into small pieces, to help him to free himself from the conceptual world and look directly into the real nature of things, without the medium of Kalpa. The

principle of paratantra is seen in the following passage of the Anguttara-Nikaya 增一阿含經 :

" 若此有則彼有 若此生則彼生
若此無則彼無 若此滅則彼滅 " 1

"This exists because that exists, this is produced because that is produced. This ceases to exist because that ceases to exist. This is destroyed because that is destroyed..."

The Trimsika says:

paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpah pratyayodbhavaḥ/

"The nature of paratantra is known from the analysis (distinction) of the pratyayas"²

It is interesting to remark that, in the above karika, the paratantrasvabhāva itself is considered as a vikalpa.

The paratantrasvabhāva, although being called the real nature of reality, is none the less a concept. If reality cannot be conceptualized, to call it impermanence or non-ego is just another way to conceptualize it. Impermanence and non-ego are themselves concepts, like any other concept; we have avoided all other concepts but now we fall into the concept of impermanence and non-ego. The paratantrasvabhāva, however, is the last vikalpa. It serves as the destroyer of all wrong views we may have concerning reality. It plays exactly the same role which that Emptiness does in the doctrine of Prajñāparamita. It has to be destroyed in its turn in

¹Pali: Amasmim sati idaṃ hoti imaṣ'uppāda idaṃ uppajjati imasaṇim arati idaṃ na hoti imassa nirodha idaṃ nirvijjhati..

²Vasubandhu, Trimsikavijnapti Karika, verse 21.

order to let the real nature of reality be revealed. It is a benefactor. Without it, the real nature of things cannot reveal itself. That is why the Trimsika insists that the nature of nispanna (nispannasvabhāva 圓成實自性) the last of the three natures, is nothing but the paratantra itself. We cannot see the nispanna if we cannot see the paratantra:

NISPAÑNAS TASYA PÜRVENA SADĀRAHITATĀ TU YĀ/
ATA EVA SA NAIVĀNYO NĀNANYAH PARATANTRATAH/
ANITYATĀDIVAD VĀCYO NĀDRṢṬE¹ SMIÑ SA DRŚYATE/

"The nispanna is the perpetual privation of the Parikalpita from the previous one (Paratantra). Therefore it is neither the same as the paratantra nor different. It is like the distinction between impermanent things and the nature of impermanence itself: we cannot see this if we cannot see that."²,

It is clear that, although the paratantra is a concept, it is a necessary last concept; it is the concept that sweeps away all concepts. But in the end, it must be destroyed. That is why the doctrine of Vijñānavada, after having established the notion of three natures (trisvabhāvas) proclaims the truth of three non-natures (trinisvabhāvatas).

There we can see that the Vijñāptimātra is nothing but another way of expressing what the Prajñāpāramitā has attempted to do with the doctrine of Emptiness. If in the

¹Vasubandhu, Trimsikavijñapti Karikā, verse 21.

²Vasubandhu, Trimsikavijñapti Karikā, verse 22.

Prajñāparamitā, we have the notion of non-emptiness (aśūnyatā) beside the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā), we have here the notion of three non-natures beside the notion of three natures. The nihsvabhāvatā is exactly the aśūnyatā. The danger and the risk of conceptualizing the absolute are realized by both the Prajñāpāramitā and the Vijñānavāda. The notion of three non-natures is expressed in the Karikas 23 and 24 of the Trimsika; it is not necessary to treat these Karikas here.

The real nature of reality is called the paramārtha of all dharmas, or the tathatā, suchness, or the vijñaptimatrā, the real nature of vijñāna. Since the holy doctrine must at any rate be communicated by teachings, i.e. by words and concepts, it can not describe reality. It uses words and concepts in order to shake off words and concepts. The doctrine must be considered by a means and not an end. It points to something beyond itself. "Reality is the moon, the doctrine is the finger pointing to the moon; do not take the finger to be the moon", this famous formula is the core of Buddhist methodology. We are supposed to destroy our wrong views in order to see reality. But the principles of impermanence and non-ego which help us to destroy wrong views are themselves concepts. Thus we still have concepts about reality. And since conceptualization means discriminating, cutting and labeling, reality now is escaping from us again. The concepts of pratyaya, of impermanence and of non-ego must destroy all concepts, and in the end, must destroy themselves. Concepts and words, in this case, exclude each other, shake

each other, destroy each other in order to make room for the non-conceptual non-discriminative wisdom. Reality is reality as such, it is neither vikalpa nor non-vikalpa, neither paratantra nor non-paratantra, neither parinispanna nor non-parinispanna. Because it is not parinispanna, it is really parinispanna: this is the zenith of the buddhistic theory of knowledge, as seen in the dialectical method of the Diamond Sutra and in the doctrine of non-nature of the Trimsika.

All philosophical attempts at systematizing the data provided by vikalpa, for this reason, turn out to be ineffective and meaningless. Philosophical systems cannot reflect reality. Reality in its whole cannot be discriminated. All mental categories such as production, destruction, existence, non-existence, beginning, end... are mere creations of vikalpa. They can not contain reality; they can not grasp reality, as we cannot tie up the wind. Trying to frame reality in these categories is like trying to hold the water of the Ocean with our hands. The water always seeks to escape from our fingers: no reality can be contained in concepts.

Epistemologically speaking, Nirvana is the extinction of all vikalpa. Nirvana is reality in itself. Nirvana is *tat-hatā*, the *paramārtha* of all dharmas.

The principle of the *Vijñānavāda* method of enlightenment is to destroy the root of the two subject-object attachments (gra-has gr-hya) which are the cause of all vikalpa. They are the wrong views concerning the existence of dharmas and *ātmas*. These wrong views function as actual dharmas, but they have

their roots deep in the Ālayvijñāna. By functioning, they continue their perfumation into Ālaya; their roots, as the result of this perfumation, become stronger and stronger.

The disciple must, at the first stage, meditate on the paratantrasvabhāva of all dharmas and ātmas in order to stop the working of these grahas. He arrives at a stage where his conscious belief in the false existence of dharmas and atmas is destroyed. The action of the grahas is now stopped; they can not have any further perfumation in Ālaya. But their roots in Ālaya still subsist. The unconscious belief in ātmas and dharmas still subsists. The disciple must now prevent these bījas from reactualization into actual dharmas; at the same time he must work hard to destroy them as long as they remain in Ālaya as potentialities for further possible grahas. These potentialities are called anuśaya 隨眠 .

The anuśayas being destroyed, he may see in his experience of meditation something wonderful which he believes to be the nature of Vijñaptimatra. But since this something is conceived as an object of his attainment 所行得 , he has not really rested in the true nature of Vijñaptimatra. In the true nature of Vijñaptimātra, nothing is subject, nothing is object; there is neither the attainer nor the attained. If the disciple sees something and thinks of it as the object of his attainment, he is still hindered by the obstacle of objectification. The supramundane Wisdom (nirvikalpakajñāna or lokottara, 出世間智) can be "obtained" only when there is no distinction of subject and object of attainment.

This wisdom is without object of attainment" (anupalambha) and non-comprehensible to reason (acintya). It is the result of the complete destruction of the grāhas. The disciple now attains the fruit of āśrayaparāvṛtti (轉依). The term is a dvandva compound of āśraya (support, 依) and parāvṛiti (transformation, 轉). The latter implies destruction of all impurities or acquisition^{The} of all purities. The former, in this context means the paratantra, the principle of production based on interdependent originations. Based on the paratantra, the disciple destroys the parikalpita, acquires the purity of the paranispāna which is not separated from the paratantra i.e. which has the paratantra as support. What is the meaning of āśrayaparāvṛitti, the ultimate end of the vijñānavāda doctrine. This is treated in the Karikas 26, 27 and 28 of the Trimsika.

"The aim of the Doctrine of Vijñānavāda is to help beings obtain the fruits of the āśrayaparāvṛitti," says Hiuan Tsang in his Siddhi. To obtain the āśrayaparāvṛitti is to liberate the vijñānas from vikalpa. The actual dharmas are "impure", because their bījas are impure. The liberation of Ālaya means its transformation from impurity into purity. The term parāvṛiti (轉) means to transform, not to destroy or to reject. If all bījas become pure, Ālaya will be transformed into the Wisdom of the Great Mirror 大圓鏡智, the same with tathatā. On the way to Enlightenment, Ālaya is bound to Mana. Only when it arrives at the eighth bhūmi (acalabhūmi) can it cease to be the object of Mana. But it is

still called vijñāna of retribution, because the bad Karmas are still not entirely eliminated. It has to reach the Diamond Way (金剛道) in order to cease to be vijñāna of retribution. Here, it becomes free from the two obstacles (avaranas, 障) the Kleśāvarana 煩惱障 and the jñeyāvarana 所知障. The latter is known as an obstacle of knowledge. The obstacle of knowledge is knowledge (jñāna) itself. If one is attached to a certain knowledge and believes it to be the ultimate truth, one cannot advance any more on the way of knowledge. Therefore, knowledge itself is an obstacle for knowledge. This is the most characteristic feature of the concept of knowledge in the doctrine of vijñānavāda.

Manovijñāna plays the most important role on the way toward Enlightenment. It has to progress from one bhūmi to another until it reaches the last bhūmi, the Dharmamegha where it transforms itself into the Wisdom of Marvellous Inspection 妙觀察智. The power of this wisdom is the ability of looking into the mind of all beings, of understanding their needs, their problems, their difficulties, and of knowing which dharmas to teach order to help them on their way to liberation. It is also the capability of performing miracles.

When it arrives at the first bhūmi, the Pramuditā bhūmi 極喜地, Manovijñāna is able to meditate on the emptiness of atmas and dharmas, and to prevent the four Kleśas from being actualized and associated with Mana. These four

Kleśas are the mistakes conceiving Atma: atmadrṣṭi (wrong view of the self) atmamāna (pride of the self) atmasneha (love of the self) and atmamoha (illusion concerning the self). The effect is that Manas gradually loses its power and thus its impurities. But until it reaches the seventh bhūmi (duramgamābhūmi 遠行地), Manovijñāna does not dwell permanently in the awareness of this emptiness of atmas and dharmas (二空真如); that is why the discernment between self and non-self is not yet completely abolished. When manovijnana reaches the seventh bhumi, Mana detaches itself from Alaya; that means it ceases to take Ālaya as its object. The unconscious wrong view concerning the existence of the self is now completely destroyed. But it has to wait until it reaches the Acalābhūmi 不動地 in order to be able to destroy the wrong view concerning the existence of the dharmas. When Alaya is transformed into the Wisdom of the Great Mirror, and Manovijnana into the Wisdom of the Marvellous Inspection, Mana is transformed into the Wisdom of the Nature of Equality 平等性智. The power of this wisdom is the ability to see unity and equality in the diversity of dharmas, in order to manifest itself at will in human existence to help beings in their efforts toward salvation.

But what will become of the five vijñānas of sensation? They are transformed into the Wisdom of marvellous realizations 成所作智. Their power is unlimited: they function as miracles. They help the bodhisattva, the enlightened being, in his work to free all beings from bondage

and suffering.

Perhaps the last thing to be said is that these wisdoms are seen only in the realm of manifestation in will. The enlightened Bodhisattvas live in the world, but are free from all karmas and bondage. Their raison d'être in the world is to help and to save beings. Therefore, in their personalities which are the effects of a marvellous manifestation from the paramārtha, the wisdoms function as miracles: they are not vijñānas any more. But they can, in the purpose of helping beings, function as vijñānas. Looking at a flower, a bodhisattva knows as anybody else that it is a flower; but the difference is that his flower is not the product of vikalpa.

Although it deals with tathatā, the notion of an ontological ground of existence, and although its notion of vipaka is an attempt to clarify the doctrine of rebirth, the doctrine of Vijñānavāda aims primarily at pointing out the phenomenological aspect of cognition. Its nature is much more psychological rather than metaphysical. In the Western tradition, such a combination of psychology and metaphysics in an almost perfect consistency is not usually known. Western systems of philosophy are more of a logico-metaphysical system rather than a psycho-metaphysical system. Psychology in the Western tradition has never been closely associated with metaphysics in the way they are in the doctrine of Vijñānavāda.

Āsanga and Vasubandhu are not the fathers of the doc-

trine of Vijñānavada. They only systematized the Vijñaptimātratā thoughts into a clear and specific doctrine. This systematization had been a need, the need of a re-organization of the Vijñaptimātratā works prior to Vasubandhu. The sūtras like the Samdhinirmocana 解深密經 and the Abhidharmanāma-Mahāyāna 大乘阿毘達摩經 were representative of these works. They witnessed to the tendency of syncretization of the conclusions reached by the Sarvāstivāda and the Madhyamika schools of thoughts. The doctrine of Vijñānavada therefore had these conclusions as its point de depart and reached its full self-realization in the works of Vasubandhu.

The theory of knowledge in the Vijñānavada is based strongly on the knowledge of psychology provided by divers Buddhist traditions, specially the Sarvāstivāda. The assimilation of this psychology in the doctrine of Sūnyatā is perhaps the most admirable thing on the history of Buddhist thought which is characterized not only by the tendency of the detachment from the whole for fuller developments, but also by the tendency of coming back for syncretization.

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