SAṂVEGA AND UPANISĀS AS RESOLUTION OF PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA: WITH PHENOMENOLOGY AS FRAMEWORK

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I hereby declare that this dissertation has not been submitted

as an exercise for a degree at any other institution,

and that it is entirely my own work.

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For many years early Buddhism was the ever-elusive promise like distant rolling thunder. It was in Dr. William Chu's seminars that claps of clarifying thunder breached the hills. I entered as an empiricist and exited as a phenomenologist. It was in AccessToInsight.org and Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's writings where I read the word *saṃvega* for the first time; I found remarkable kinship as especially in the treatment and re-emphasis on saṃvega. Further, it was for Dr. Chu's examination in the field of Buddhist philosophy that I first learned of the upanisās. My debts are obvious.

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May my mother know my gratefulness for all her sacrifices. May she and my father thrive in the Dhamma to reach the further shore. I dedicate this present study to my dearest parents. Also to my precious wife and newborn son who deserve much more than my strength to give, so I will find an effort beyond my strength.

Abstract

SAṂVEGA AND UPANISĀS AS RESOLUTION OF PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA: WITH PHENOMENOLOGY AS FRAMEWORK

By

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This dissertation argues that a more complete interpretation of *paṭiccasamuppāda* (dependent co-arising)—which is consistently limited to the *anuloma* (forward causality) twelve mundane *nidanas* (conditioning factors)—must interactively include *saṃvega* (the shock empathetic of loss) and the *paṭiloma* (reverse causality) twelve transcendent *upanisās* (prerequisites). My thesis is that saṃvega is a phenomenological *looking at* (versus looking through) the aging-&-death nidana for its 1) occurrences of life, loss, aging, and death, 2) attributes of grief and despair, and 3) theme of dukkha and unworthiness. Within the phenomenological reduction, this insight of saṃvega counterpoises from the mundane passion-centric nidanic frames to the transcendent dispassion-centric upanisic frames. Buddhism's encounter with Western modernity has led to the discourse on scientific Buddhism which includes the imputation of Buddhism as empirical. As part of my emphasis on the transcendent aspect of saṃvega and the upanisās, I argue against paṭiccasamuppāda's characterization as secular, natural, and empirical. I disabuse the empirical Buddhists' interpretation of early Buddhist epistemology in part explaining the empirical demarcation, the agnostic, and the empirico-propositional flaws.

I contend that empiricism and phenomenology have sometimes been conflated because of their shared ground in *saḷāyatana* (six sense media) with empiricism claiming it for verification, and phenomenology and early Buddhism both claiming it as the entire horizon of experience. Although empiricism and phenomenology are grounded in saḷāyatana, they diverge in the direction of their reducing—empiricism's is outward toward physical absolutes and Husserlian transcendental constitutive phenomenology's is inward toward non-physical absolutes.

I explore classical Husserlian phenomenology and early Buddhism's insistence and establishment in subjective experience comparing intentionality to Buddhist consciousness classified by requisite condition. However, this Buddhist classification connects to *saṅkhāra* (fabrication), paṭiccasamuppāda, then soteriology thus differentiating itself.

Relying on the primacy of mind for pivot and counterpoise, I use the conceptual tool of the frames of reference divided into the egocentric mind/body, first *centroidal* (ego-projection), second centroidal, and absolute frames to clarify reduction in the spectrum from pure subjectivity to pure objectivity. Within the mind/body frame, I use Ray Jackendoff's *Representational Modularity of Mind* hypothesis to support consciousness modularity and interface as aspects of intentionality and paṭiccasamuppāda.

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Objective and Rationale for the Study

The genesis of this study started in inchoate form decades ago over my befuddlement and dissatisfaction regarding both the traditional and modern academic explanation of the Buddhist concept *dukkha* (suffering, stress, pain) that all Buddhists are eminently aware of. It was and is not that these expositions are inaccurate or inadequate; rather, I had a sense—an intuition—that the Buddha was exhorting dukkha 1) as a crucial insight and 2) as the insight that unified all of his doctrines and practices. This is supported by his declaration: "Both formerly & now, it is only dukkha that I describe, and the cessation of dukkha."[1] Indeed in his Awakening, the Buddha specifies his awakening to the Four Noble Truths which was proclaimed during his first sermon and which are all commonly denominated in dukkha. It might be helpful to visualize the Four Noble Truths as the valence around dukkha. Here valence means the "relative capacity to unite, react, or interact" and "the degree of attractiveness an individual, activity, or thing possesses as a behavioral goal."[2] By this, I mean that the Four Noble Truths are dynamic, purposive and constituted by four required elements that not only bonds the entire teachings but (like an atomic valence) can repel disparate teachings. Its uniqueness is attested by its qualification: "Vision arose, insight arose, discernment arose, knowledge arose, illumination arose within me with regard to *things never heard before* [emphasis added]."[3] Its panoptic and subsumptive range compared to the elephant's footprint:

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[1] "Dukkha," Access To Insight 2005, accessed October 12, 2018, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/dhamma/sacca/sacca1/dukkha.html.

[2] Merriam Webster, "Valence," Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed February 14, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/valence. Valence has a psychological meaning of emotional attractiveness or repulsion which is consistent with my usage, but the investigation of this concept is beyond the scope of this study.

[3] "Four Noble Truths: Cattari Ariya Saccani," 2005, Access To Insight, accessed November 12, 2018, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/dhamma/sacca/index.html.

"Friends, just as the footprints of all legged animals are encompassed by the footprint of the elephant, and the elephant's footprint is reckoned the foremost among them in terms of size; in the same way, all skillful qualities are gathered under the four noble truths."[4] Its gravitas and tectonic significance are found in his assertion: "Bhikkhus, it is through not realizing, through not penetrating the Four Noble Truths that this long course of birth and death has been passed through and undergone by me as well as by you."[5] Based on these alone we can stipulate dukkha as the basis[6] of doctrine and practice.

Dukkha as suffering and pain is wedged in between an obvious observation of life and an inaccurate overstatement of the normal conditions of the world which include pleasure and happiness. So is dukkha chosen as an infrangible premise of a philosophy based on an unassailably apparent and obvious condition of life? But the Buddha claimed it was not apparent (i.e., never heard of before). Also, this would be seemingly in the reverse because a premise initiates the philosophy and the logic, whereas realizing dukkha is seemingly the end goal (i.e., realizing dukkha ends rebirth and re-death). If dukkha is penultimate or ultimate to the path then what "properly"[7] initiates and compels a human being toward Buddhist identity, doctrine, and practice? Officially taking refuge in the Triple Gem is the formal initiation; however, something else usually precedes it. And in this way and to the extent that it is an insight, this antecedent is the insight that de facto originates the path whether had before, during or years after taking formal refuge.

In regards to my befuddlement and dissatisfaction over dukkha, the following

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[4] "Four Noble Truths: Cattari Ariya Saccani."
[5] "Four Noble Truths: Cattari Ariya Saccani."
[6] Basis here means "something on which something else is established," "an underlying condition or state of affairs," "a fixed pattern or system." See Basis. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/basis
[7] By "properly" I mean as intended by the suttas and which I will discuss.

admission reveals 1) my previous relative lack of immersion into the suttas and 2) my overreliance on secondary scholarly material. It was in my dissertation chair's, Dr. William Chu, seminar on Buddhist meditation that I read and was introduced to Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's concise but incisive writings on *saṃvega*—the trembling emotion facing loss and death. Without any overstatement, the instant I read the word "saṃvega" and its meaning, I had the resolution to *my* befuddlement and dissatisfaction related to the Buddha's intention with the dukkha doctrine. In my mind, no other single concept offers a more singular, potent, and clarifying explanation of dukkha, then of course of the Four Noble Truths, and then through to the rest of the teachings as discussed in this paper. Could it be the needle that threads and sutures the teachings more effectively and cohesively? This intuitive glimpse was that dukkha could not be properly understood without saṃvega; in other words, there exists a deficit in the overall penetration of dukkha without saṃvega.

Paṭiccasamuppāda is sometimes defined as interdependence. A student of the suttas can get the impression that the concepts from a particular sutta are "dependent" or made intelligible or clearer by concepts in other suttas—this interdependence suggesting the difficulty to pin down a structure. That one concept so intimately connects to other concepts—what I conceive of as *degrees of separation*—posed a problem to the (setting of) limitations of this study which—even after reading the abstract—might still be present to the reader who could justifiably wonder for instance why I cover such seemingly disparate topics as superempirical virtues, the irreducible mind, and intentionality. Having said this about the suttas and my paper, the Buddha did provide form and structure; the most obvious and seemingly fundamental are the Four Noble

Truths. I believe I am contributing more structure by reintroducing saṃvega and the upanisās to the understanding of the Four Noble Truths and paṭiccasamuppāda. Although already alluded to, it might be helpful here to lay out my conception in a simple scheme from 1) paṭiccasamuppāda to 2) nidanas to 3) saṃvega to 4) the Four Noble Truths to 5) the upanisās back to 6) paṭiccasamuppāda. In this way I conceive of 1) paṭiccasamuppāda as a teaching incompletely understood and this lacuna needing resolution, 2) nidanas as the common and consistent understanding of paṭiccasamuppāda, 3) saṃvega as the skillful perception of the nidanas and partial resolution of paṭiccasamuppāda, 4) the Four Noble Truths as realities when saṃvega is skillfully applied, 5) the arising of the upanisās with the arising of the Four Noble Truths, and returning to 6) the more complete understanding of paṭiccasamuppāda as congruent elaboration of the Four Noble Truths. This scheme in part reveals the phenomenological or microworld dimension of saṃvega. Another scheme is to conceive of paṭiccasamuppāda as a system with two subsystems: 1) mundane and 2) transcendent or 1) mundane nidanic subsystem and 2) transcendent upanisic subsystem. This scheme in part reveals the soteriological or macroworld dimension of saṃvega. The entire dissertation is intended to demonstrate my thesis "that saṃvega is a phenomenological *looking at* (versus looking through) the aging-&-death nidana for its 1) occurrences of life, loss, aging, and death, 2) attributes of grief and despair, and 3) theme of dukkha and unworthiness. Within the phenomenological reduction, this insight of saṃvega counterpoises from the mundane passion-centric nidanic frames to the transcendent dispassion-centric upanisic frames" by applying both these schemes. The lacunae of saṃvega and the upanisās are the problems this study proposes to address.

However, our analysis of the saṃvegic, anulomic and paṭilomic perception and understanding of all the nidanas—especially the aging-and-death nidana— is inadequate without pursuing the *character* of this perception and understanding which is entailed in the realization and penetration referred to in our above sutta quote: "Bhikkhus, it is through not realizing, through not penetrating the Four Noble Truths that this long course of birth and death has been passed through and undergone by me as well as by you." The general character of this realization and penetration has been epistemologically claimed divergently by empirical Buddhists and some Buddhists writers suggesting a phenomenological lens. Logically this character extends to paṭiccasamuppāda as well. Demonstrating the role of saṃvega and the upanisās would perhaps only be half complete without demonstrating their phenomenological method or character. This is the reason why—in the subtitle of this dissertation—I claim that phenomenology frames saṃvega and the upanisās in the resolving of paṭiccasamuppāda. This resolution is both etic for the Buddhist studies academic and emic for Buddhist practitioners. That is to say, I claim 1) with the propositions in this paper that academics might be persuaded by my arguments and evidence that paṭiccasamuppāda and early Buddhism are more cohesive, nuanced and complete and hence more "resolved," and 2) that the Buddha in part was teaching that saṃvega and the upanisās resolve the mundane entrapping dimension of paṭiccasamuppāda by bridging the practitioner to the transcendent liberating dimension of paṭiccasamuppāda.

The study and discipline of phenomenology are broad and deep. My focus will be on the classical Husserlian constitutive transcendental phenomenology and its intentionality. Husserl's background concern for certainty, absolutes, and the

"transcendental" informs the understanding of phenomenology that both parallels the position of the suttas and *particularly* contrasts with physicalism and empiricism. In this way, a discussion of empiricism and briefly physicalism contributes contrast to any shared position by early Buddhism and Husserlian phenomenology. However, the distinction between any phenomenology, and empiricism has often been blurred and misunderstood. My literature review on this distinction revealed a paucity of this topic. This resulted in my investigation of the frames of reference as a conceptual tool and framework into which phenomenology, empiricism, and early Buddhist meditation could be pegged, cross-referenced, distinguished and clarified. An important frame among the frames of reference is the mind/body frame emphasized by all three disciplines. Because my development of the frames of reference is designed to lead to the direction among the frames toward the mind/body frame, a suitable model to ground the wider frames of reference model was found in Ray Jackendoff's *Architecture of the Linguistic-Spatial Interface* and *Representational Modularity* of the mind/body (frame). His model's discussion of interface and modularity parallels some aspects of intentionality and early Buddhist *Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition* thus providing further evidence of the similarities between phenomenology and early Buddhism.

The implicit consequence of this study is the initial discussion and development of an architecture—that is the planning, design, and construction—of the concepts and components of the early suttas, and of phenomena 1) as treated by the instructions within the suttas and 2) as sufficiently encapsulated in paṭiccasamuppāda.

Methodology

Because in part I view paṭiccasamuppāda as the broadest scheme or system

perhaps only behind the concept of *dhamma* (law, cosmos, teachings, phenomena), my approach is to it treat as a system. I treat this system's method (e.g., phenomenological versus empirical), presuppositions and worldview (e.g., transcendental mentalism versus natural physicalism), and structure (e.g., the frames of reference and architecture of linguistic and spatial interface and modularity). The method is philosophical not so much that it is rigorously logical with formal premises, syllogisms, and conclusions but that it uses broad arguments from a variety of disciplines (e.g., philosophy of mind, perceptual and veridical studies on spatial coordination, the philosophy of motion pictures, and empirical studies in the irreducibility of mind). In this way, it resembles systematic philosophy which establishes the broadest framework in which subsequent discussions might follow. A philosophical framework can offer a methodology with clearly demarcated and ultimate constituents. I have attempted to show paṭiccasamuppāda's several methods (e.g., the macrolevel of transcendent worldview, mesolevel of phenomenological reduction, and microlevel of intentionality). This paper engages in establishing new philosophical positions (e.g., the super-scientific virtues) and pointing out the flaws in other philosophical arguments (e.g., the agnostic and empirico-propositional flaws). It is also philosophical in its coverage of reality (i.e., metaphysics) of for example space and time. It avoids the historical and philological discussions of paṭiccasamuppāda and the component nidanas. In this way this paper's methodology is philosophical.

This paper secondarily engages in textual analysis in support of its philosophical arguments. The sources of the cited Pali texts are mainly from *Access to Insight: Readings in Theravāda Buddhism* (accesstoinsight.org) a majority of which were

authored by Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu and Bhikkhu Bodhi. Only rarely do I seek a richer historical Pali understanding of concepts myself, but rather rely on the translation and scholarship of these two and other Pali scholars.

Literature Review

My literature review will follow a chronology but not one correlated to a calendar of years but to the evolution of my thinking and development of arguments and concepts. This follows the pattern of the Objectives and Rationale for the Study. This literature review is sectioned into saṃvega, upanisās, paṭiccasamuppāda, nidanas, empiricism, phenomenology and the frames of reference.

Saṃvega

As already mentioned, saṃvega is a teaching not much written about. The particular perspective of saṃvega to be directly applied to the twelfth aging-and-death nidana was completely absent. The closest coverage came from Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu various writings. The following covers the most significant works covering saṃvega but did not offer support or even counter-arguments to my main thesis.

Torkel Brekke's (2002) book *Religious Motivation and the Origins of Buddhism: A Social-Psychological Exploration of the Origins of a World Religion* offered valuable and supportive thoughts to my conception of saṃvega. He writes that "the Buddha wants to bring about *saṃvega*, emotional disturbance that leads to religious motivation, in the

ascetic to convert him to Buddhism."[8] He cites Buddhaghosa who connects birth, aging, and sickness thus: "These four – birth (*jāti*), ageing (*jarā*), sickness (*vyādhi*), death (*maraṇa*) – are all causes of *saṃvega* (*saṃvegavatthu*)."[9] He cites E. H. Johnston thus: "Samvega as a religious term denotes the first step towards conversion, when the perturbation of mind is produced by something and leads to consideration of the inherent rottenness of the world and so to the adoption of the religious life."[10] However, as indicated in the subtitle, Brekke's focus is on the socio-psychological aspect of motivation of religions of which saṃvega was one example. Indeed saṃvega is motivation but this analysis of saṃvega does not touch upon the fuller and more profound role as a phenomenological *looking at*, as link from mundane to transcendent and so forth.

Lajos Brons's (2016) article *Facing Death from a Safe Distance: Samvega and Moral Psychology* offers an understanding of saṃvega consistent with Brekke and my own. He suggests two systems which parallel Jackendoff's two modules of conceptual structure (comparable to system 2) and spatial representation (comparable to system 1). In the abstract, he writes: "According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two "systems": the experiential, automatic system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's

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[8] Torkel Brekke, *Religious Motivation and the Origins of Buddhism: A Social-Psychological Exploration of the Origins of a World Religion* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), http://public.ebookcentral.proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=242061. 30

[9] Brekke, 53

[10] Brekke, 61-2

mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering …"[11] Likewise it lacks what Brekke's work lacks for my needs.

Liz Wilson's (1996) *Charming Cadavers: Horrific Figurations of the Feminine in Indian Buddhist Hagiographic Literature* covers in classic and great detail the practice of meditating on charnel grounds and hence on death. This is the explicit cultivation of saṃvega even though "saṃvega" is hardly mentioned.

George Bond's (1980) journal article *Theravada Buddhism's Meditation on Death and the Symbolism of Initiatory Death* explicitly covers saṃvega but interprets it differently from both Lajos and Brekke and from me. Bond claims that saṃvega and the role of death are crucial; however, he believes that meditations on death enable Buddhists to confront the reality of death and, through it, to understand existence, to reach enlightenment. My understanding is that the saṃvegic insight must be applied to all phenomena, especially the nidanas with the aging-and-death nidana being most susceptible to the saṃvegic penetration.

Maria Heim's (2003) *The Aesthetics of Excess* explores feelings, moral choice, and motivations. Saṃvega here is explained mainly as a tool of the Buddha to motivate his audience and part of "moral naturalism" which is not my focus.[12]

Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's (1997) *Affirming the Truths of the Heart: The Buddhist Teachings on Samvega & Pasada* offers more depth which I was able to connect to

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[11] Lajos Brons, "Facing Death from a Safe Distance: Saṃvega and Moral Psychology," *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* 23 (2016): 83–128. 83-4

[12] Maria Heim, "The Aesthetics of Excess," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 71, no. 3 (September 2003): 531–54.

phenomenology. He writes, "Samvega was what the young Prince Siddhartha felt on his first exposure to aging, illness, and death. It's a hard word to translate because it covers such a complex range—at least three clusters of feelings at once: the oppressive sense of shock, dismay, and alienation that comes with realizing the futility and meaninglessness of life as it's normally lived; a chastening sense of our own complicity, complacency, and foolishness in having let ourselves live so blindly; and an anxious sense of urgency in trying to find a way out of the meaningless cycle."[13] This is the most comprehensive definition of saṃvega I have found. It covers motivation from several perspectives. He continues stating, "Buddhist recognition of the reality of suffering—so important that suffering is honored as the first noble truth—is a gift. It confirms our most sensitive and direct experience of things, an experience that many other traditions try to deny. From there, the early teachings ask us to become even more sensitive, until we see that the true cause of suffering is not *out there*—in society or some outside being—but *in here*, in the craving present in each individual mind."[14] His writings were more consequential than others' because I read his writing first which led me to research saṃvega and read others' writings, it was more nuanced, it directly connected to dukkha, it suggested phenomenology (*in here* not *out there*), and elsewhere he suggests early Buddhism overlaps with phenomenology. Furthermore, some mainstream modern Buddhism teaches an optimism that is far from what is found in the teachings on saṃvega. This spurred my investigation of the efforts by some modern Buddhists to ally early Buddhism with the "optimism" associated with science and empiricism. All this gave me hints how saṃvega

[13] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Affirming the Truths of the Heart The Buddhist Teachings on Samvega & Pasada," Access To Insight, accessed March 12, 2019, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/affirming.html.
[14] Ṭhānissaro.

fitted into the entire scheme of the teachings. It was not until I studied for my qualifying examination—with Dr. William Chu as my reader—on a segment of the upanisic scheme did I see it as the link between the nidanas and the upanisās.

Upanisās

I could find only one dedicated study of the upanisās. This is evidence of its undervalue and lacuna in the larger study of paṭiccasamuppāda because the upanisās are explicitly the component parts, prerequisites, conditioning factors, or modules of the scheme of paṭiccasamuppāda. Their characteristics and function do not merely inform that of paṭiccasamuppāda, they *are* that of paṭiccasamuppāda. Given the importance of paṭiccasamuppāda itself, every morsel of textual evidence that might shed light on the recondite paṭiccasamuppāda ought to gain the attention of at least paṭiccasamuppāda scholars. Bhikkhu Bodhi says as much in his 1980 The Wheel Publication No: 277/278 entitled *Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta* writing: "Despite the great importance of the Upanisa Sutta, traditional commentators have hardly given the text the special attention it would seem to deserve."[15] It is not just the traditional commentators because nearly forty years have elapsed and no modern scholarship has given the text the attention it seems to deserve. I relied heavily on this 31-page work for my mundane-transcendent understanding of the upanisās and thus of paṭiccasamuppāda. Of note to my investigation of the application of saṃvega to the upanisās, he comments, "The change—the *substitution* [emphasis added] of "suffering" for "ageing-and-death" as the last member of the series—becomes the lead

[15] Bhikkhu Bodhi, "Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta," The Wheel Publication 277–278, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society., 1980, 3

for the second application of dependent arising. This application, occurring only sporadically in the Pali Canon, shows the same principle of conditionality to structure the path leading to deliverance from suffering." I believe he certainly saw the transition from mundane (first application of dependent arising) to transcendent (second application of dependent arising) occurs when the last aging-and-death nidana is changed or substituted for suffering which would now be the first of the transcendent upanisās. My insight as I mentioned earlier came from reading Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's work on saṃvega which I applied to dukkha. My insight here—reading the Upanisā Sutta and preparing for Dr. Chu's qualifying examination whose question pointed me in the right direction—was to apply saṃvega to dukkha to nidanas to upanisās to paṭiccasamuppāda. My thesis can be seen effectively as the elaboration of Bhikkhu Bodhi's "substitution" with phenomenology as a framework. I used Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's translation of the *Upanisā Sutta*—while consulting Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation—for consistency of English translation since I generally use his translations—which I generally find more illuminating— throughout this dissertation. It is interesting to note that when I first investigated the *Upanisā Sutta* it was not mentioned in body of the Wikipedia entry for Pratītyasamutpāda[16] but has since been included which is acknowledgment of the upanisās' significance in understanding paṭiccasamuppāda.

Paṭiccasamuppāda

Paṭiccasamuppāda is a daunting teaching which I neither had the courage nor the

[16] "Pratītyasamutpāda," in *Wikipedia,* Wikimedia Foundation, November 2, 2018, accessed November 1, 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Pratītyasamutpāda. Pratītyasamutpāda is Sanskrit for paṭiccasamuppāda.

time to tackle to a standard I would feel comfortable making claims in writing. The depth of paṭiccasamuppāda was indicated in the discourse between the Buddha and Ananda in the *Maha-nidana Sutta: The Great Causes Discourse* thus: ""It's amazing, lord, it's astounding, how deep this dependent co-arising is, and how deep its appearance, and yet to me it seems as clear as clear can be." [The Buddha:] "Don't say that, Ananda. Don't say that. Deep is this dependent co-arising, and deep its appearance. It's because of not understanding and not penetrating this Dhamma that this generation is like a tangled skein, a knotted ball of string, like matted rushes and reeds, and does not go beyond transmigration, beyond the planes of deprivation, woe, and bad destinations."[17] And yet I entitle this paper a resolution of paṭiccasamuppāda. As I alluded to in the Objective and Rationale for the Study section and will explicate in this paper, the Buddha explicitly and directly connected the nidanas (and obviously paṭiccasamuppāda) to the upanisās in the *Upanisā Sutta* and implicitly required saṃvega to be their transcendent catalyst and propulsion. In this way, I was drawn into resolving (my initial interest in) saṃvega via the upanisās and then via paṭiccasamuppāda. Since they all anywise resolve each other in the organizing Buddhist mind, the title stands better as it is. This should settle for the reader my selective coverage of paṭiccasamuppāda: my choice to dedicate a chapter to its mundane-transcendent character where saṃvega bisects paṭiccasamuppāda into the anuloma mundane and paṭiloma transcendent and my choice to contrast the Buddha's mundane with our contemporary understanding. Thus my literature review covered only the more recent works and those discussing anuloma and paṭiloma.

[17] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Maha-Nidana Sutta: The Great Causes Discourse," accessed January 6, 2019, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.15.0.than.html.

Chapter One: The Frames of Reference

It may be that the conceptual tool of the frames of reference can add clarity, specificity, and boundaries into interpreting paṭiccasamuppāda and early Buddhism. It lends itself to comparisons, observations, points of view, method, dimension, referents and so on. I contend that the doctrines and instructions of the Pali canon, as exemplified in paṭiccasamuppāda, can be weaved together more cohesively and coherently by way of the frames of reference with the mind as referee, the world as referent, and the relationship as reference. Its value is in its relative simplicity in yielding both the universals and the scaffolding that are the meaning, message, and instructions of early Buddhism. I am both using this conceptual tool to explain my topic of study and claiming that the Buddha insisted, using the cultural concepts and terminology of his time, that systems and systems of reference are both our most urgent and fundamental existential and phenomenological problem, and its sole solution. With mind as subjectively fixed in systems and systems of reference, the Buddha proclaims the primacy of mind. To borrow from the terminology of the rectangular Cartesian coordinates, consciousness is the "origin," not in terms of first cause but in terms of being a "fixed," pivoting, and ubiquitous referee in "all worlds" as conceived by the Buddha.

Albert Einstein, building on the Lorentz transformation[18], was able to advance beyond the status quo Galilean understanding of physics in which time and space were absolutes with variances amidst them by demonstrating 1) the invariance of physical

[18] Albert Einstein, *Relativity: The General and Special Theory*, trans. Robert Lawson (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1921), http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924011804774#page/n159/mode/2up., 36-41, 139-145

causality[19] and the maximal velocity of electromagnetic radiation, and 2) (instead) the variance of space and time. In the relationship between space and time, there is a reciprocity between them in which the subject reduces the dimension of time with an increase in the velocity in space with regard to other frames of reference[20]. In more Buddhist terminology, the pace of time and of the extension of space are *conditioned* and consequently subject to change; therefore, their presumed constancy is an erroneous view. It should be made clear that religion's and, then later, philosophy's search and debate over absolutes were and are mankind's profound instinct for the surest and absolute welfare possible, which was usually linked to its duration and constancy. The analogy applied to Buddhism is that a similar error had taken place in terms of what could be confirmed for their constancy and absolute, transcendent, and definitive safety. Subjectivity, or an unequivocal sense of being the subject, endears itself to itself as entrenched intuition. It is that which is framed by the frames of reference; it is that upon which the frames of reference pivots. In large measure pivoting conditions subjectivity and generally by subjectivity. As is the case with the dominant theistic religious worldview then and now, this intuition of subjectivity manifests as atta (soul or Self) as something believed and hoped to be the invariant and absolute as is its rewarded world of Brahma-loka (an equivalent to heaven). This Brahma-loka's security is assured by its transcendence (guaranteeing a qualitative salvation from the mundane) and everlastingness (guaranteeing a quantitative salvation from the mundane). It will be noted

[19] I will offer suggestions on a few possible overlaps with early Buddhist causality below
[20] Einstein, *Relativity: The General and Special Theory*, 21-24

that the Buddha conceived of transcendence differently because he conceived of the mundane differently.

1.1 The Architecture of the Linguistic-Spatial Interface and Representational Modularity

The frames of reference bridge us to epistemology to the extent that the relationship to referents demands knowledge of them and of the relationship itself. This is consequential to some Western philosophical traditions, philosophers of mental representation, and perceptual scientists as well as to the Buddha. A key to explaining the frames of reference common to the different schools of thought (e.g., phenomenology, empiricism and early Buddhism) examined in this study is the architecture of the linguistic-spatial interface as conceived by Ray Jackendoff.[21] This interface architecture is a proposed solution of the broader Representational Modularity, the theory that consciousness is a system composed of flexible and versatile[22] sub-systems or modules of representation (of the world(s)). On the ubiquity and applicability of modularity, Baldwin and Clark write that:

> Modularity is a concept that has proved useful in a large number of fields that deal with *complex systems* [emphasis added]. Two subsidiary ideas are subsumed in the general concept. The first is the idea of *interdependence within and independence across modules. A module is a unit whose structural elements are powerfully connected among themselves and relatively weakly connected to elements in other units. Clearly there are degrees of connection, thus there are gradations of modularity*. In other words, modules are units in a larger system that are structurally independent of one another, but work together. The system as a whole must therefore provide a framework—an architecture—that allows for both independence of structure and integration of function. The second idea is captured by three terms: *abstraction*, *information hiding*, and *interface*: *A complex system can be managed by dividing it up into smaller pieces and looking at each one*

[21] See Ray Jackendoff, *The Architecture of the Language Faculty*, Linguistic Inquiry Monographs 28 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997).
[22] Merriam Webster, "Modular," Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modular.

> *separately. When the complexity of one of the elements crosses a certain threshold, that complexity can be isolated by defining a separate* abstraction *that has a simple* interface*. The abstraction* hides *the complexity of the element; the* interface *indicates how the element interacts with the larger system*.[23]

The concept of modularity has also been employed by theoretical linguists and theorists of mind to explain the architecture of consciousness that is also consistent with Baldwin and Clark's definition of its functions. We are reminded of Baldwin and Clark's claim that modularity is integral to systems. If this is the case, then it can be hypothesized that consciousness is a system. Then we would be at the threshold of hypothesizing that the *scheme* of paṭiccasamuppāda is actually the system of paṭiccasamuppāda. A scheme is "a systematic or organized configuration"[24] or a "large-scale systematic plan or arrangement for attaining some particular object or putting a particular idea into effect." A system is "1. a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or an interconnecting network … 2. a set of principles or procedures according to which something is done; an organized scheme or method."[25]

Part of my study is to clarify 1. the extent that paṭiccasamuppāda itself is modular, 2. that it is a teaching of the modularity of consciousness, and 3. consciousness's role, participation, and/or engagement in systems. Interface will be shown to be as elemental to paṭiccasamuppāda's modularity as it is to any modularity. The need for interface

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[23] Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark, *Design Rules: The Power of Modularity* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000), 63-64

[24] Merriam Webster, "Scheme," Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scheme.

[25] Oxford Living Dictionary, "System," in *Oxford Living Dictionary,* Oxford University Press, accessed March 3, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/system.

modules and its position in module systems in general and in the specific form whose broad features I will highlight is explained as follows:

> Representational Modularity—the idea that the mind is divided into modules on the basis of the representational format that a cognitive system uses. For example, phonology, syntax, and semantics will comprise three separate representational modules, because the structures they manipulate require different formal primitives and combinatorial principles. Because representational modules cannot communicate directly with each other (since, by definition, they don't understand each other's "language"), Jackendoff further proposes the existence of specialized components of the mind that translate between relevant aspects of two or more cognitive subsystems. Only the outputs of the representational modules are accessible to the interface module that translates between them. The characterization of the interface module within the linguistic faculty, rather than the representational modules themselves, is the focus of Jackendoff's [architecture of the linguistic-spatial interface.][26]



Figure 1.1 Ray Jackendoff's course sketch of the relation between language and vision

[27]

Referring to his sketch of the relation between language and vision in figure 1.1 above, Jackendoff explains his ideas on the modularity of mind as follows:

> The overall hypothesis under which I will elaborate figure 1.1 might be termed *Representational Modularity* …. The idea is that the mind/brain encodes information in many distinct formats or "languages of the mind." There is a module of mind/brain responsible for each of these formats. For example, phonological structure and syntactic structure are distinct levels of encoding, with

[26] Suzanne Stevenson, "Book Review of The Architecture of the Language Faculty," *Computational Linguistics* 24, no. 4 (n.d.): 652–55.
[27] Ray Jackendoff, "The Architecture of the Linguistic-Spatial Interface," in *Language and Space* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, 1996), 1–30., 2

> distinct and only partly commensurate primitives and principles of combination. Representational Modularity therefore posits that the architecture of the mind/brain devotes separate modules to these two encodings. Each of these modules is domain-specific (phonology and syntax, respectively); and … each is "informationally encapsulated" in Fodor's (1983) sense. Representational modules differ from Fodorian modules in that they are *individuated by the representations they process* [emphasis added] rather than by their function as faculties for input or output; that is, they are at the scale of individual levels of representation, rather than being entire faculties such as language perception.[28]

From this, we can recognize a similar early Buddhist model of the input of visual information from the eye that informs/conditions the linguistic/conceptual modules (i.e., classifications of consciousness) that in turn (reciprocate) inform/condition visual information. In other words, the *individuation* of modules by the representations they process is comparable to early Buddhist *classification* of consciousness known as "Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition" a classical textual example of which is: "Consciousness, monks, is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. … Just as fire is classified simply by whatever requisite condition in dependence on which it burns — a fire that burns in dependence on wood is classified simply as a wood-fire … in the same way, consciousness is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness."[29] This formula applies to the ear, nose, tongue, body and intellect/ideas as well. To the extent that Consciousness Classification by Requisite Conditions is equivalent to

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[28] Jackendoff, 1-2

[29] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Mulapariyaya Sutta: The Root Sequence," Access To Insight, accessed February 2, 2019, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.001.than.html.

salayatana (the fifth nidana) then the above connection is already one important piece of the puzzle fitting paṭiccasamuppāda into modularity and complex systems[30]; the most important puzzle piece being the puzzle box picture of Dhamma to which paṭiccasamuppāda is exalted.

Representational modularity offers more than just the representation and the modularity; as quoted above, it proposes a solution to the incommunicability of modules via interface modules. These interface modules foreshadow the discussion of the transcendental ego in this paper.



Figure 1.2 Ray Jackendoff's slightly less course sketch of the relation between language and vision

[31]

[30] This dissertation was written to include complex systems as one of the purviews of paṭiccasamuppāda, but alas there was not enough time. Even after removing that claim, there are remnants of this throughout the paper. I elected to remove that aspect from the bibliography.

[31] Jackendoff, "The Architecture of the Linguistic-Spatial Interface", 3

1.2 The Conceptual Structure and Spatial Representation within Representational Modularity

This architecture accounts for the retinotopic (eye), general-purpose audition/auditory (ear), smell (nose), haptic, motor (body), and emotion, syntax (intellect/ideas)[32], which, except for taste not explicitly listed, fulfills the entire salayatana — the six internal sense media of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and intellect.[33] The Buddha's use of "intellect/ideas" as a mental organ of mind instead of "brain" as a biological organ presages the Buddha's bifurcation of worldviews—between ignorance and knowledge or respectively and more specifically between annihilationism/eternalism and paṭiccasamuppāda—in which he firmly took a position. Although this theoretical interface architecture is still in its infancy[34] and its finer details may or may not accord with my arguments, it crucially connects linguistic *conceptualization* and the *spatial* frames of reference. Jackendoff reminds the reader that, "The crucial interface for our purposes here is that between the most central levels of the linguistic and visual faculties, conceptual structure and spatial representation",[35] then proceeds to discriminate the two:

> Let us now turn to the crucial modules for the connection of language and spatial cognition: conceptual structure (CS) and spatial representation (SR). … CS encodes "propositional" representations, and SR is the locus of "image schema" or "mental model" representations. Conceptual structure, as developed in Jackendoff (1983, 1990) is an encoding of linguistic meaning that is independent of a particular language whose meaning it encodes. It is an "algebraic" representation, in the sense that conceptual structures are built up out of discrete primitive features and functions. Although CS supports formal rules of inference, it is not "propositional" in the standard logical sense, in that (1) propositional truth and falsity are not the only issue it is designed to address, and (2) unlike

[32] Ṭhānissaro, "Mulapariyaya Sutta: The Root Sequence."
[33] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, *The Shape of Suffering: A Study of Dependent Co-Arising,* Valley Center, CA: Metta Forest Monastery, 2008, 4
[34] Jackendoff, "The Architecture of the Linguistic-Spatial Interface", 24
[35] Jackendoff, 3

> propositions of standard truth-conditional logic, its expressions refer not to the real world or to possible worlds, but rather to the world *as we conceptualize it.* …SR contrasts with CS in that it is geometric (or even quasi-topological) in character, rather than algebraic. But on the other hand, it is not "imagistic"— it is not to be thought of as encoding "statues in the head." An image is restricted to a particular point of view, whereas SR is not. An image is restricted to a particular instance of a category (recall Berkeley's objection to images as the vehicle of thought: how can an image of a particular triangle stand for all possible triangles?), whereas SR is not. An image cannot represent the unseen parts of an object—its back and inside, and the parts of it occluded from the observer's view by other objects—whereas SR does. An image is restricted to the visual modality, whereas SR can equally well encode information received haptically or through proprioception. Nevertheless, even though SRs are not themselves imagistic, it makes sense to think of them as encoding *image schemas*: abstract representations from which a variety of images can be generated.[36]

Before parsing the relevance of this distinction between the conceptual structure and the spatial representation to the claims of this paper, it is better to clarify the concept of imagery and the imagistic within the field of mental representation. Dave Pitt,[37] phenomenologist and philosopher of mind and language, writes:

> Though imagery has played an important role in the history of philosophy of mind, the important contemporary literature on it is primarily psychological. … In a series of psychological experiments done in the 1970s …, subjects' response time in tasks involving mental manipulation and examination of presented figures was found to vary in proportion to the spatial properties (size, orientation, etc.) of the figures presented. The question of how these experimental results are to be explained kindled a lively debate on the nature of imagery and imagination. Kosslyn (1980) claims that the results suggest that the tasks were accomplished via the examination and manipulation of mental representations that themselves have *spatial properties* [emphasis added] — i.e., *pictorial* representations, or *images*. … The idea that pictorial representations are literally *pictures* in the head is not taken seriously by proponents of the pictorial view of imagery …. The claim is, rather, that mental images represent in a way that is relevantly *like* the way pictures represent. (Attention has been focused on *visual* imagery — hence

[36] Jackendoff, 5, 9
[37] "David Pitt," February 3, 2019.

> the designation 'pictorial'; though of course there may be imagery in other modalities — auditory, olfactory, etc.[38]

This separation and discrimination of the conceptual structure and the spatial representation, and clarification of the imagistic character of spatial representation are the required staging to establish 1) the erroneous conflation of comprehensive conceptualization with comprehensive space / comprehensive spatial representation (i.e., a restriction only to the naturalistic, empirical worldview and the absolute space to be discussed below), 2) that spatial representation encodes image-schemas via abstraction in which various "fixed" images, points of view, and categories are created, 3) that 'image' includes the five sense media, but truly encompasses the entire spectrum of human bodily senses, 4) that any point of view whenever synonymous with image must still be grounded in one or more of the bodily senses and in subjectivity, 5) that 'image' by virtue of imagination and abstraction includes the sixth sense media of intellect/idea, 6) that image-schemas are in the spatial domain (if not exclusively then at least initially), 7) that the act of encoding image-schemas, which for instance permits the viewing of occluded parts of an object, is inherently a phenomenological act,[39] 8) that Jackendoff's claim that "the propositions in the conceptual structure do not express the 'real world' or even 'possible worlds,' but rather the world as we conceptualize it" is effectively the same as the claim "the *objective* (i.e., universally applicable) logic, rules, and propositions in and of the internal and subjective domain (of consciousness) are expressions within the

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[38] David Pitt, "Mental Representation," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Palo Alto: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Winter 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mental-representation, 12-13

[39] Even though Pitt says that the literature on imagery is primarily psychological, I intend to take it more into the phenomenological.

purview of the conceptual or internal/subjective domain/world," and 9) that spatial representation—being the locus of the image-schema and mental-model representation—is the pivot location or pivot point between the two main spaces, that of the egocentric and the allocentric/absolute spaces.

The nature of, on the one hand, imagery, the imagistic, and the spatial compared to, on the other hand, that of the conceptual, discursive, propositional, is, as already delineated by Jackendoff, further distinguished in terms of analog and digital representation by Pitt:

> The distinction between pictorial and discursive representation can be characterized in terms of the distinction between analog and digital representation …. This distinction has itself been variously understood … , though a widely accepted construal is that analog representation is continuous (i.e., in virtue of continuously variable properties of the representation), while digital representation is discrete (i.e., in virtue of properties a representation either has or doesn't have) …. On this understanding of the analog/digital distinction, imagistic representations, which represent in virtue of properties that may vary continuously (such as being more or less bright, loud, vivid, etc.), would be analog, while conceptual representations, whose properties do not vary continuously (a thought cannot be more or less about Elvis: either it is or it is not) would be digital.[40]

Collectively from Pitt and Jackendoff with regard to analogicity and digitality, we gather that the conceptual structure is algebraic in that it is discrete, digital, and noncontinuous in virtue of a conceptual representation either having or not having a property (e.g., does the person have a Self or not?; do objects have essence or not?). The spatial representation is geometric in that it is graded (i.e., gradual in level), analog and continuous in virtue of the representation having continuously variable and graded

[40] Stanford, "Underdetermination of Scientific Theory", 13

properties of the representation. There are two popular and parallel expressions of mind that might effectively and primarily incorporate the conceptual structure, its architecture, and its properties, and of spatial representation and its properties; namely: head and heart.[41] On the surface of this proposal, it is reasonable to associate the head with the syntactical, propositional, discursive, formulaic, thinking, and ideological (i.e., of ideas) aspects of mind. It is also fair to associate the heart with the sensory, bodily, spatial, imagistic, graded aspects of mind. This association with heart is less obvious than for that of head but this will be somewhat developed below. The concepts of head and heart is not a high priority in this study, but are meant to indicate domains. Figure 1.3 below is my adaptation of Figure 1.2, given the above discussion.



Figure 1.3 The Mind-Body Frame's Two Main Modules

[41] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, *Head and Heart Together: Essays on the Buddhist Path,* Valley Center, CA: Metta Forest Monastery, 2010, 37-49

The spatial representation up to this point has been explained in terms of contrast to and as the crucial module that interfaces with the conceptual structure module. Spatial representation in its role as bodily and mental sensation act as the interface between 1) the external world outside of mind and body, and 2) the internal world of the mind and body and their internal senses. This necessitates that spatial representation is also the medium between the external world and the internal conceptual structure of consciousness. To be clear, both the conceptual structure and spatial representation are definitively in the subjective and internal sphere. This is both assumed and obvious in part because both are mental functions and structures of the subjective mind and body and its sense organs also that of the subject. For the purposes of this study, the concept of "the frames of reference" is the most generic and versatile of all the spatial reference or coordinate systems so it subsumes the spatial representation and all spatial coding and coordinate systems. Hence it is still under "the frames of reference" that a bridge from the internal realm of the spatial representation is connected to any spatial coding system of the external.



Collectively Figure 1.4 The Egocentric and Allocentric Frames taken from The Harvard Mental Imagery and Human-Computer Interaction Lab. Refer to citation 41

1.3 The Egocentric and Allocentric Spatial Frames

The two most primitive spatial coding or coordinate systems relevant to this study are the egocentric space and allocentric space. Harvard's Mental Imagery and Human-Computer Interaction Lab states that the "egocentric (self-to-object) [space] represents the location of objects in space relative to the body axes of the self (left-right, front-back, up-down)," and that the "allocentric (object-to-object) [space] encodes information about the location of one object or its parts with respect to other objects. The location of one object is defined relative to the location of other objects."[42]

It is crucial to note 1) that in the allocentric space, since all reference is object-to-object, even the subject (i.e., the self, the ego) is viewed and treated as object so that consummate objectivity is achieved, and 2) that a more expansive definition of the egocentric space would permit self-to-self, self-to-'aspects of self,' 'aspects of self'-to-'aspects of self' references, and so forth. Aspects of self here is equal to modules within

[42] The Harvard Mental Imagery and Human-Computer Interaction Lab, "Allocentric vs. Egocentric Spatial Processing," Harvard Edu, January 24, 2019, http://www.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/mkozhevnlab/?page_id=308.

conceptualization and consciousness. The egocentric space, for all intents and purposes, is the subjective space or subjectivity. The allocentric space is the objective space or objectivity. Of the several similar, yet distinct, spatial frames of references existing among the literature of philosophy, brain science, linguistics, developmental and behavioral psychology and so on, philosopher of language and cognition, Stephen Levinson,[43] also acknowledges the:

> "egocentric" versus "allocentric." The distinction is of course between coordinate systems with origins within the *subjective body frame of the organism, versus coordinate systems centered elsewhere (often unspecified)* [emphasis added]. The distinction is often invoked in the brain sciences, where there is a large literature concerning frames of reference … This emphasizes the plethora of different egocentric coordinate systems required to drive all the different motor systems from saccades to arm movements … or the control of the head as a platform for our inertial guidance and visual systems … In addition, there is a general acceptance … of the need for a distinction … between egocentric and allocentric systems. O' Keefe and Nadel's demonstration that something like Tolman's mental maps are to be found in the hippocampal cells is well known. O' Keefe's recent (1993) work is an attempt to relate a particular mapping system to the neuronal structures and processes. The claim is that the rat can *use egocentric measurements of distance and direction toward a set of landmarks to compute a non-egocentric abstract central origo (the "centroid")* [emphasis added] and a fixed angle or "slope." Then it can keep track of its position in terms of distance from centroid and direction from slope. *This is a "mental map" constructed through the rat's exploration of the environment* [emphasis added], which gives it fixed bearings (the slope), but just for this environment."[44]

He subclassifies the egocentric versus allocentric "opposition" into "a. Body-centered versus environment-centered (Note many ego centers: retina, shoulders, etc.)" and "b. Subjective (subject-centered) versus objective."[45] Levinson's subclassification to the

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[43] "Stephen C. Levinson," February 6, 2019, https://www.mpi.nl/people/levinson-stephen.
[44] Stephen C. Levinson, "Frames of Reference and Molyneux's Question: Crosslinguistic Evidence," in *Language and Space* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, 1996), 109–70, 129.
[45] Levinson, 127

classification "egocentric versus allocentric" being "subjective versus objective" supports my own conclusion above. Although he is simply listing the subclassification "body-centered versus environment-centered" directly under the classification "egocentric versus allocentric" as a report of how they are used in the literature of psychology and brain science, in this paper "body-centered versus environment-centered" is deemed a subclass of "subjective versus objective," for the purpose of demarcating phenomenology, empiricism, and paṭiccasamuppāda. Since intuitively the subjective encompasses the entirety of Figure 1.3, the question per the "subjective versus objective" opposition is whether everything external to it is the objective. This is not the case. Before the exploration of the external via the "body-centered versus environment-centered," it is better to clarify and develop the concept of the centroid.

1.4 The Centroid

The concept of the centroid is borrowed from physics and geometry. In physics, it is a relatively recent coinage replacing "center of gravity"[46] which is the "center of mass" and "the point at which the entire weight of a body may be considered as concentrated so that if supported at this point the body would remain in equilibrium in any position."[47] In geometry, it is the "midpoint" within a polygon or 3D shell.[48] There is a dearth of literature on the use of "centroid" in spatial representation and frames of reference studies. It is likely that Levinson is a pioneer in this regard. As above, the centroid is

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[46] Nathan Altshiller Court, "Notes on the Centroid," *The Mathematics Teacher* 53, no. 1 (1960): 33–35., 33
[47] Merriam Webster, "Center of Gravity," in *Merriam-Webster Dictionary,* Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed March 4, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/center%20of%20gravity.
[48] Paul Bourke, "Polygons and Meshes; Surface (Polygonal) Simplification," PaulBourke.net, July 1997, http://paulbourke.net/geometry/polygonmesh/.

synonym for "a non-egocentric abstract central origo." Here he is borrowing from pragmatics and deictic systems of contextually dependent linguistic references of relationships, location/space and time (e.g., "we" "here" "now") in which "origio" is some aspect of the reference point or current speaker.[49] It is "abstract" because it is both projection and representation. It is "non-egocentric" because its coordinates are external. In distinguishing the egocentric from the allocentric, Levinson effectively compares the external environment (of the subject/rat) to the mass, polygon, and/or 3D shell within which the centroid is the mental projection of body/mind/self as midpoint or center. The suffix "-oid" means to resemble so, "centroid" means to resemble the center (location of experience of the actual physical body) or the mental extrapolation of the self/mind/body into a space outside the egocentric. By "egocentric measurements" he means subject-to-object coordinates or mental mapping of an extended self or awareness using distance, angles/slopes, and landmarks to a point/object/location/frame. Levinson's "mental mapping" is the same as Jackendoff's mental model representation. Each map is unique to its environment, distances, slopes, landmarks, objects, and frames. Each map and frame has its unique centroid. The maps and frames are objective (object-to-object) to the *degree* and extent that they are more non-egocentric or more allocentric (as Levinson suggests and as I agree with). In other words, the rat and we use our mental mapping capabilities to locate objects and compute complicated relationships about the objects that reside in the "real," external, and objective world. The centroid is not only useful, but it is also indispensable in that awareness or attention—even without a sense of self or body—is required to explore the allocentric space (or any space for that matter.) This thought

[49] John Lyons, "Deixis, Space and Time," in *Semantics*, vol. 2, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 636–724.

anticipates the remarkable and mirror-like claims for a "transcendental" objectivity found 1) in the perfection of the theoretical, scientific allocentric space which is liberated from/"transcends" self/subjectivity and 2) in the perfection of the phenomenological, meditative egocentric space in which the self is counterpoised with, for example, craving as is among the insights of paṭiccasamuppāda.

1.5 Freely Switching between Centroidal Frames of Reference

It is now obvious that any discussion of spaces, spatial coordinates, or frames of references external to the subjective body frame is more connected and unified when employing the concept of the centroid. What is less obvious is the status of the centroid as it approaches the limits of the poles of pure subjectivity and objectivity. The next step is to examine some concepts related to mental maps, the environment, and participation. Jackendoff states that "people freely switch frames of reference in visuomotor tasks. For example, we normally adopt an egocentric (or observer) frame for reaching but an environmental frame for navigating; in the latter, we see ourselves moving through a stationary environment, not an environment rushing past."[50] By "reaching" he means extending the body's arm to match with the goal-oriented, abstracted, projected centroid's arm. It appears odd initially that it is considered an observer's frame since the agent is participating (engaging physically) with the environment albeit in a limited way. The "reaching" frame is one in which the subjective body frame (i.e., the physical body) is within the immediate and direct sensible environmental range, i.e., the agent can directly see the doorknob being reached for. The mental map spatial size is small;

[50] Jackendoff, "The Architecture of the Linguistic-Spatial Interface", 21-2

nevertheless, it is a mental model with a projected centroid.[51] His "navigating the environment" frame is beyond—or effectively beyond—the range of the body's senses; the coordinates are in physical space but require the centroid to extend beyond the senses. There are two analogies that will clarify why Jackendoff considers the "reaching" frame to be observational: that of driving an automobile and that of watching a motion picture. These analogies will also demarcate my proposed three *centroidal frames of reference*.

The act of driving a car is in the same frame as reaching for a knob in that the physical car is an extension of the person's physical body (obeying the agent's command), and the person/car is directed to match with the goal-oriented, abstracted, projected "person/car"-centroid's position further along the driving lane. Driving is within the immediate and direct sensible environmental range, i.e., the agent can directly see the road and terrain the person/car is directed towards. Since this is the centroid closest to the mind/body of figure 1.3, let us call that which frames this centroid the *first centroidal frame*.

1.6 Participation versus Engagement in the Frames of Reference

In a motion picture watching experience, it can be appreciated that a moviegoer can "observe" the movie while still reaching for his elbow to scratch it in the meanwhile. So is the moviegoer passive or active? Jackendoff's demarcation is between observation (environment rushing past us; the environment is active, the agent is passive) and participation/engagement (we moving through a stationary environment; we navigating; the environment is "passive" and the agent is active). An important point strongly

[51] Jackendoff does not employ the concept of the centroid in his major writings.

suggested here by him is that there are varied frames among which we freely switch between and some are *more* observational and some *more* participatory/engaged in by the agent. Frames are graded by degrees of observation and degrees of participation/engagement and in this way, they are analog—graded by value, quality and intensity. We should take note of these two important qualitative categories of frames: observer vs participant/engager.

Continuing with the moviegoing analogy, let us look at participation or lack thereof in the experience of movie watching. Carl Plantinga,[52] philosopher of movies and emotion, writes, "Richard J. Gerrig and Deborah A. Prentice, similarly, claim that the film viewer is like a side-participant in a conversation, and that what they call "*as if* responses," that is, responses to the fictional events as opposed to responses to the film as an artifact, "approximate the types of responses viewers would have were they really participating in the film's events. Thus, in relation to our film of Jack, Jane, and the bear, the viewer might respond with calls such as "Watch out for the bear!" or "Your pistol isn't going to help you, Jane!""[53] He takes exception to this as sufficient to rise to the level of participation and so counters:

> First, the film viewer, unlike an actual participant, is obviously unable to influence the fictional events in any way. That is, there is a radical and ineluctable physical separation between the viewer and what he or she sees on the screen. While an actual participant might be inclined to intercede and otherwise physically respond, the film viewer is wholly freed from the responsibilities of—and indeed, is denied the possibility of—physical response. This creates a serious difference between the responses of a witness of or participant in a real event, and those of a spectator of a fiction film. … This leads me to a second point. The fiction film spectator, unlike a witness or observer of actual events, knows that

[52] "Carl Plantinga," accessed April 8, 2019, https://calvin.edu/directory/people/carl-plantinga.
[53] Carl R. Plantinga, *Moving Viewers: American Film and the Spectator's Experience,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009, 63

> what she or he sees is fictional. The world of the narrative is neither physically present nor a representation of actual events, and the audience knows it full well.[54]

In short, participation is not the mode of interaction between agent/watcher and film. The accurate mode is engagement,[55] defined as the act of drawing favorable attention, interest, commitment, and/or emotional involvement.[56] Due to the creative production value of films, the movie-watching experience is a heightened engagement. Here a distinction is made that agents can only participate in the physical frames of reference, i.e., in which the body participates. The agent, however, can and almost always engage whatever frame the mind is in. As we connect back to early Buddhism and the teachings of paṭiccasamuppāda, it will become more evident that observation and engagement are not only crucial themes but that the role of observation as cultivated in the subjective body frame is for spotlighting the oftentimes stealthy and entrenched engagement.[57] We can safely presume that the experiencing and engaging in a motion picture is the "we moving through a stationary environment" so, as suggested by Jackendoff, the agent/moviegoer is, comparatively at least, the active navigator in a mental map outside the body. The agent can either engage with and navigate through the movie or with the elbow's itch, not both simultaneously. Put another way, he can either 1) engage with the movie and unconsciously (non-engagedly) scratch his elbow; or 2) engage with scratching and having a very distracted experience of the sights and sounds (i.e., noise) of the movie. Let us call that which frames this awareness and mental mapping that is outside the range of

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[54] Plantinga, 63-4
[55] Plantinga, 6
[56] Merriam Webster, "Engagement," Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engagement.
[57] I credit Dr. William Chu's Buddhist meditation and philosophy lectures for insights into the mind's engagement.

the body the *second centroidal frame*. Figure 1.4 shows the mind/body of figure 1.3 interacting with the external via centroidal frames.



Figure 1.5 The Four Frames of Reference

The frames are demarcated by relative degrees of navigation-to-stationariness, and movement-to-staticity as variables of observation. By stationary is meant not transported, and by static is meant lack of movement. The concept of movement will help clarify the distinction. In the watching of a film, the agent is normally in the second centroidal frame in the act of navigating and engaging while stationary in his seat and significantly unaware of the itch or reaching to scratch the itch. Even if his seat rotated 360 degrees around a cylindrical screen or is a more immersive motion-based dark ride through sights, sounds, heat and cold, flowing air, moisture, scent, G-forces, and so forth, the agent is nonetheless relatively observationally stationary. Hence stationariness is not defined with coordinates exclusively in the physical space, it is defined with

representational coordinates per the mind/body frame, the first centroidal frame, and the second centroidal frame. Stationariness and fixity are in opposition to navigation, participation, and engagement. To elaborate on this relativity, let us see why Jackendoff considers the "reaching" frame to be also the observer's frame. He is only comparing two frames; therefore, the frame not navigating is the observer's frame. The meaning he implies is that the more stationary the frame the more observational it is which is consistent with the position of this paper. By extension, since there are more than two frames, the more "stationary" the more observational. In this way, the stationary observer (not moving through the environment) can still make relatively stationary movements by scratching his elbow. For him to be fully aware of this scratching *as an observer*, he needs to reframe to the more static mind/body frame.

1.7 Reduction is Directional Reframing

The agent can *reduce* his frame of reference from engaged watching to an engaged scratching; that is to say, he can snap out of or awaken from engaging with the movie's bear, reframe himself as physically in his theater seat, address his itch and wittingly scratch it. "Reduction" here is meant a reframing/pivoting to less representational movement by way of control or suspension in exchange for more keen observation. Based on the frames discussed, it is reducing *from* those egocentric (subject-to-object, where object is representational) frames that are beyond the body and its subjective observing (e.g., fictitious bear is in representational coordinates beyond the physical coordinates detectable by the bodily senses) *to* those egocentric (subject-to-object, where object is directly detectable) frames closer to the body and its subjective observing (e.g., the elbow itch or doorknob). Reduction is directional pivoting or

switching among the frames. Usually, this reduction is of the kind that occurs at the conclusion of a film when engagement with the magic of the narrative falls back to the *immediate* reality of the theater seat and the smell of the popcorn. This is reducing from the second centroidal to first centroidal frame. Further, there is reducing from the first centroidal frame to the mind/body frame where awareness is *in* and *of* the mind and body. This and even more fundamental reductions will be explored in this paper.

1.8 Worldview and Directional/Reductional Framing

Let us take a common, daily occurrence in which the mind's awareness and attention are neither of and in the subjective body frame nor in the first centroidal frame. It is prancing about, scattered, and freely skipping and switching between different scenarios/frames, but all under the second centroidal frame. This is commonly known as daydreaming and in Buddhism as the monkey mind. Our conditioned and default awareness is in the second centroidal frame. If the target is the mind/body frame, our default frame is two away. When the mind breaks from a reverie, it will, without reverse conditioning, almost always "wake" within the first centroidal frame and not within the mind/body frame. To enter the subjective body frame usually requires a proactive phenomenological intention.

The egocentric is not the preferred space of the modern world; the allocentric space is the favored one. Philosopher of psychology and mental causation, John Campbell begins his analysis of the frames of reference as follows:

> There is a distinction that philosophers and psychologists have tried to draw between different ways of thinking about space, about particular spatial regions. It is sometimes called, and I will call it, the distinction between *absolute* and *egocentric* space. But it is *not a distinction between different types of regions. It is a difference between ways of representing*, [emphasis added] or thinking about, a

> particular region. The distinction is at best very indirectly related to the classifications physicists make of theories of space-time as relativistic or absolute. For that reason the word "absolute" is unfortunate. But it is what the literature uses, and I hope the reader will be able to set the echoes aside. Intuitively, the *distinction is between thinking about space as a participant, as someone plunged into its center, as someone with things to do in that space*, [emphasis added] on the one hand, and, on the other hand, *thinking about the space as a disengaged theorist* [emphasis added]. Any animal that has the relations between perception and behavior needed to direct action at particular places, to reach for things it can see, must be capable of this egocentric spatial thinking. But the more detached absolute conception is not so easily available. This distinction is between the way of thinking of the space one is in that one uses when sitting at a dinner table, moving and acting in that space, and the way of thinking of the space used subsequently by the detective who tries to reconstruct the scene and to establish who did what. It is the distinction between thinking about the space from a particular point of view, as a subject at the center of one's world, and thinking about the space independently of any particular viewpoint on it, in an impersonal or absolute way.[58]

Campbell also offers a representational and spatial understanding of subjectivity and objectivity.[59] His equating subjectivity to the egocentric space poses no issues while his equating objectivity exclusively to the absolute space[60] reveals a fundamental difference in worldview between transcendentalists and naturalists (which is one of the main themes of this paper) that are demarcated and explored using the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. I will prefigure this exploration by claiming that the pivot for the transcendentalist toward the frames of references pointing to or leading to transcendental absolutes (whether religiously as mind/Self or phenomenologically as the transcendental ego) is located squarely and exclusively in the body of the subject and properly investigated via phenomenological methods. As a corollary, I claim that the pivot for the

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[58] John Campbell, *Past, Space, and Self*, Representation and Mind, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994, 5-6
[59] See Paul Bloom, ed., *Language and Space: Papers Presented at a Conference of the Same Name Which Was Held Mar. 16-19, 1994, Tucson, Ariz.*, Language, Speech and Communication, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999. for a fuller discussion of space, frames and reference, subjectivity and objectivity.
[60] Campbell, *Past, Space, and Self*, 8.

naturalist toward the frames of references pointing to or leading to natural absolutes (the laws about and the priority of the physical world that then, by physicalist logic, subsumes the private world) is located virtually exclusively outside the body of the subject. The adverbs “virtually exclusively” foreshadow my brief discussion of the naturalist’s encroachment into the transcendentalist’s claims.

In the quote, Campbell distances the psychological/philosophical absolute frames of references from the theoretical physicists’ absolute frames of reference on space-time with good reason, but I will later draw a few shared insights offered by the latter’s and the early Buddhists’. At the end of Campbell’s quote, a common and idealized definition of the absolute frame of reference (“frame of reference” is a technical term for a point of view) is given as one without any point of view or personal contamination. The ideal of the absolute, objective, or absolute objective frame plays a role in empiricism, naturalism, physicalism and scientific realism whose methods and views lead away from the personal. Very broadly these frames are the basis for theorists and detectives as Campbell depicts. Absolute space is attained via an absolute allocentric (object-to-object) reference; absolute reference is attained via the absence/suspension of self. The centroid reaches a state of perfected, professional, unbiased theorizing with the *hypothetical imperative* to discover absolutes in the absolute realm which subsumes all via objective and physical categories. This is the direction or priority for the theoretician and scientist which is the reductionism. Reducing is bidirectional. For the naturalist, reducing is toward and expressed via the mathematical and physical. For some transcendentalists, reducing is toward and expressed via the mental, affective, and corporeal. This is the priority for the early Buddhists especially as exhibited in paṭiccasamuppāda. We now arrive at the nexus

of my various arguments and chapters, that of the centering of pivoting and the pivoting among the subjective frames of reference toward pure absolutes. It is safe to stipulate that virtually all disputants in the myriad domains of knowledge seek these absolutes sans the arbitrariness, fickleness, variability, and unreliability of being "subjective" (here used as a pejorative akin to "biased," "idiosyncratic").

1.9 An Alternative Away from Objective Absolutes

To continue with Jackendoff's implied demarcation between observation and participation/engagement, this opposition is of the zero-sum kind; this is by virtue of the accumulated personal and scientific experience[61] that the more personally engaged the agent is, the less clear, reliable, and objective (i.e., verifiable and unbiased) the observation and experiment. As any student of science knows well, observation is only a necessary precursor to the essential experiment in the process of comprehension of particular phenomena. If observation is to have a teleological aspect certainly it better served with experimentation. An important question is whether observing and experimenting are allied in the same frame in opposition to phenomena in another frame. This is the same as asking whether experimenting is more like observing or more like participating. The exogenous teleology of observation and experimentation is to arrive at absolutes and universals, demonstrations of which are the accompaniment and attainment of control. This principle is succinctly and pithily described by philosopher of science, Karl Popper, that "all life is problem solving."[62] This principle is comprehensive in its total coverage of all biological life from the amoeba to Einstein. It is practical in its

[61] Double-blind experiment is a prime example.
[62] Karl Raimund Popper, *All Life Is Problem Solving*, trans. Patrick Camiller, London: Routledge, 2001.

simplicity in pinpointing the essential and unifying concern of all life or all agents. His claim is a useful launching point because neither transcendentalist nor naturalist would contest it and because his concise explanation of science will be employed in the discussions of empiricism and phenomenology below.

If as I am claiming the movement of frames of references toward pure objectivity is in the service of empirical science and its goal of discovering universal laws and of solving problems, then in what service does phenomenological reduction do for the early Buddhist? What domain does it claim? What problems does it propose to solve? The different answers to these inquiries are stark and consequential because its modern association or equivalence to proto-science or proto-empiricism will relegate it from an actual soteriological and transcendental phenomenology to, in the words of neuroscientist and religion critic, Sam Harris, a "failed science."[63] The disagreements of the transcendentalist versus naturalist, phenomenologist versus empiricist, idealist versus realist, religionist versus scientist, and mentalist versus physicalist are traceable and reducible to the axiology of the frames of reference with regard to the dichotomies of subjectivity and mentalism versus objectivity and physicalism.

1.10 A Hypothesis that Directional Framing Distinguishes Phenomenological Meditation from Objective Empiricism

If reduction permits frames of reference to approach ever closer to immediate, unmediated, non-representational subjective observing/awareness, then has reducing from the second centroidal frame to the first centroidal frame achieved this awareness?

[63] See http://www.themindvoyager.com/sam-harris-religions-failed-sciences/ and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vQgI4bHpAlA

The phenomenologist's answer is no. Phenomenological reduction is reducing from the first centroidal frame (or any other frame) to the phenomenological frame or bodily egocentric (subject-to-object, where object is consciousness, its structure, and components) frame. In this way, reducing is a method to bring awareness, participation, engagement, and so forth, out from the representational, environmental, distant coordinates (second centroidal frames) and out from even the direct sensible coordinates (first centroidal frames) (because even these data are imagistic representations as discussed above regarding spatial representation) and back within the fold of direct, non-representational consciousness for its unmediated access. This brief account of reduction captures the insistence by both the early Buddhist meditative techniques and the Husserlian transcendental phenomenological reduction of a critical method and inflection to the private world and of the potential universals it offers to reveal. It is sufficient to claim broadly at this time that both traditions insist that the direction of the frames should pivot internally toward inner meditation. Phenomenologist John Cogan writes "The phenomenological reduction is a radical, rigorous, and transformative meditative technique."[64] There is a consensus that phenomenology is the study and the exploration of consciousness from within consciousness[65], of subjectivity from the subjective body frame, and of the egocentric space (subject-to-object, where objects are mental experiences entirely within the mind/body) from within the egocentric frame. Chapter four will explore the nature and context of phenomenology. If the *direction* of reduction

[64] John Cogan, "The Phenomenological Reduction," in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed February 14, 2019, https://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-red/.
[65] David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Stanford, Calif: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology.

leads to a “pure” subjectivity, then one could aptly anticipate that the reverse direction develops the frames toward a “pure” objectivity, (object-to-object, where even subject, consciousness, mind are subsumed under object), or an idealized allocentric frame of reference. I will explore the mistaken notion that empiricism is the endeavor, practice, and embodiment of this pure objectivity, that empiricism is synonymous with science, and the misguided efforts to associate early Buddhism with scientific realism by way of empiricism.

1.11 Chapter Conclusion

History should reveal bifurcated paths the best thinkers of the world have taken. This is the quintessential divergence in the history of thought, that between the transcendentalist and the naturalist. The valence around each of these polar opposites repulses the other. One way to thread the history of Western thought is by tracing the dynamics between the two. In concrete terms this is historically tracing the early intuition of the “soul,” that developed into “mind,” and that then developed into “consciousness.” This historical background enriches the context of the two state-of-the-art categories (phenomenology and empiricism-as-natural-science) that have been attributed to be the appropriate and justified modern paradigms for early Buddhism especially as expressed in paṭiccasamuppāda. Empiricism – the current apex, paragon, and champion of “evidence” and “confirmation” embedded between objectivity and naturalism—is defined as the “doctrine that all knowledge is either (i) directly derived from observation, or (ii) derived from observation in accordance with inference-rules of whose validity observation has apprised one. … In this context, the word “observation” refers to sensory observation – sight, audition, touch, etc. – and also to non-sensory, but direct experience,

such as one has of one's pains, tickles, and conscious mental images."[66] Transcendental constitutive phenomenology—perhaps the only modern philosophy insisting on "transcendence"[67] and unavoidable subjectivity—is defined as the practice and study of "how objects are constituted in pure or transcendental consciousness, setting aside questions of any relation to the natural world around us."[68] In chapter two I discuss the mundane and transcendent scope of paṭiccasamuppāda. The mundane aspect leaves open the possibility that paṭiccasamuppāda is a form of empiricism or could be understood by empirical methods. However, I hope to make the case that the transcendent aspect of paṭiccasamuppāda closes off both an empirical understanding of it and it being an empirical method. This exclusion of empiricism covers both its form as epistemological contrast against rationalism and as a philosophy of science contrasted against scientific realism.[69] For the sake of structure, I categorize the mundane and transcendent scope of paṭiccasamuppāda as my first sub-thesis. Paṭiccasamuppāda's transcendent dimension's exclusion or suspension of all the frames directed toward the allocentric including empiricism is my second sub-thesis. The contrast between paṭiccasamuppāda and the cluster of allied "isms" around empiricism provides clearer context to present arguments that early Buddhism insisted on a transcendental phenomenology as especially evidenced by paṭiccasamuppāda. It would seem that my success in these arguments would mean the denigration of objectivity as a cost for championing or salvaging the supramundane and

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[66] John-Michael Kuczynski, *Empiricism and the Foundations of Psychology*, Advances in Consciousness Research, 1381-589X, v. 87 (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins North America, 2012), 3.
[67] I place this word in quotes because the word had lost its religious aspect by the time used by Edmund Husserl. I explore this meaning to Husserl in the chapter on phenomenology.
[68] Smith, "Phenomenology," 15 (in PDF version)
[69] Elliott Sober, "Empiricism," *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science*, ed. Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos, Second Edition, Routledge Philosophy Companions, London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014, 160. This distinction is made here as preparation for their treatment later.

the phenomenological transcendence. On the contrary, I will argue that a form of objectivity is preserved albeit with paradigm shifts. I will pursue and preserve the frame of objectivity into the egocentric space. I will claim below that there is no Dhamma without kamma[70] and rebirth. In other words, there is no coherence in understanding early Buddhism's essential teachings without the phenomenal categories of kamma and rebirth and their cessation/transcendence. This topic of rebirth has been taboo in academia, which only highlights the biased scientism that claims both the absolute and egocentric spaces. I will only briefly explore how the avenues for objective research of rebirth could bring it into the naturalistic absolute space. This is my third sub-thesis. Then I address the heart of the early Buddhist teachings—paṭiccasamuppāda — mainly in its own terms. I will resurrect a much-neglected teaching on the upanisās, which the suttas clearly teach as the continuation and completion of the nidanas, for a fully contextualized interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda. I present evidence that the teaching on saṃvega is that decisive inner transformation linking the mundane to the transcendent. This is my fifth sub-thesis. These five sub-theses may appear scattered, but with them (and not necessarily in the order given above) I will be using the most expansive contexts conceivable to explain paṭiccasamuppāda as the irreducible mind's conditioned and entrapped mundane journey as embodied consciousness through ever arising and disappearance of complex systems and that strictly and only through the egocentric space can it achieve the final collapse of itself as a complex system which is the absolute of final release known as nibbana.

[70] Dhamma is Dharma or the teachings and law. Kamma is karma or intentions that conditions the nidanas in paṭiccasamuppāda.

Chapter Two: The Mundane-Transcendent Purview of Paṭiccasamuppāda – Extended and Internal Spaces

2.1 Paṭiccasamuppāda: The Complete Udāna List Covers the Nidanas

For reference I attach the Pali Canon's Udāna version of paṭiccasamuppāda:

I have heard that on one occasion, when the Blessed One was newly Awakened—staying at Uruvela by the banks of the Nerañjarā River in the shade of the Bodhi tree, the tree of Awakening—he sat in the shade of the Bodhi tree for seven days in one session, sensitive to the bliss of release. At the end of seven days, after emerging from that concentration, in the third watch of the night, he gave close attention to dependent co-arising in forward and reverse order, thus:

When this is, that is.
From the arising of this comes the arising of that.
When this isn't, that isn't.
From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that.

In other words:
From *ignorance* as a requisite condition come fabrications.
From *fabrications* as a requisite condition comes consciousness.
From *consciousness* as a requisite condition comes name-&-form.
From *name-and-form* as a requisite condition come the six sense media.
From *the six sense* media as a requisite condition comes contact.
From *contact* as a requisite condition comes feeling.
From *feeling* as a requisite condition comes craving.
From *craving* as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance.
From *clinging/sustenance* as a requisite condition comes becoming.
From *becoming* as a requisite condition comes birth.
From *birth* as a requisite condition, then *aging-&-death*, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering.

Now from the remainderless fading and cessation of that very ignorance comes the cessation of fabrications. From the cessation of fabrications comes the cessation of consciousness. From the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of name-&-form. From the cessation of name-and-form comes the cessation of the six sense media. From the cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of contact. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling. From the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving. From the cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the

> cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the cessation of birth, then aging-&-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair all cease. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of stress & suffering.[71]

The nidanas are the twelve key factors italicized above for easy reference. The concise abstract form "When this is, that is … From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that" has been referred by Caroline Rhys Davids as the "formula of causation in general" or "the abstract statement."[72] I refer to it as *paṭiccasamuppāda's abstract formula*. She refers to the remainder of the list as the "Chain of Causation" or "the concrete application."[73] Paṭiccasamuppāda itself has been referred to and classified as "teaching,"[74] "theory,"[75] "series; chain,"[76] "notion; process,"[77] "formula,"[78] "doctrine,"[79] "law"[80] and so forth. Other than theory[81], I find all these references appropriate. I style it a *scheme*. A scheme is "a systematic or organized configuration"[82] or a "large-scale systematic plan or arrangement for attaining some particular object or putting a particular

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[71] Ṭhānissaro, *The Shape of Suffering: A Study of Dependent Co-Arising*., 9. I have italicized the classic twelve nidanas.
[72] Kulatissa Nanda Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, Buddhist Tradition Series, v. 29, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1963, 456.
[73] Jayatilleke, 456.
[74] Pratītyasamutpāda. Robert E. Buswell and Donald S. Lopez, eds., *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, 669.
[75] Pratītyasamutpāda. Robert E. Buswell, Jr., ed., *Encyclopedia of Buddhism,* New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004., 669.
[76] Bhikkhu Anālayo, *From Grasping to Emptiness – Excursions into the Thought-World of the Pali Discourses (2),* New York: Buddhist Association of the United States, 2010, 13
[77] Paul Fuller, *The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View*, RoutledgeCurzon Critical Studies in Buddhism, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005, 61, 90
[78] Sue Hamilton, *Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism,* London: Luzac Oriental, 2001, 67
[79] Peter Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices*, Second Edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 65
[80] Kañukurunde Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda, *The Law of Dependent Arising: The Secret of Bondage and Release* Sri Lanka: Pothgulgala Dharmagrantha Dharmasravana Mādhya Bhāraya, 2015, www.seeingthroughthenet.net.
[81] My discussion on theory and empiricism will clarify this point.
[82] Webster, "Scheme."

idea into effect."[83] I will refer to the Udāna version of paṭiccasamuppāda (Rhys Davids' "Chain of Causation") as *paṭiccasamuppāda's nidanic scheme* or simply the *nidanic scheme* (in contradistinction from paṭiccasamuppāda's upanisic scheme).

2.2 Paṭiccasamuppāda: The Upanisā Sutta Completes the Nidanas

Because of the upanisās' central relevance to my clarification of paṭiccasamuppāda, the entire *Upanisā Sutta* is given here:

> Dwelling at Savatthi... "Monks, the ending of the effluents is for one who knows & sees, I tell you, not for one who does not know & does not see. For one who knows what & sees what is there the ending of effluents? 'Such is form, such its origination, such its disappearance. Such is feeling, such its origination, such its disappearance. Such is perception, such its origination, such its disappearance. Such are fabrications, such their origination, such their disappearance. Such is consciousness, such its origination, such its disappearance.' The ending of the effluents is for one who knows in this way & sees in this way.
>
> The *knowledge of ending* in the presence of ending has its prerequisite, I tell you. It is not without a prerequisite. And what is the prerequisite for the knowledge of ending? Release, it should be said. *Release* has its prerequisite, I tell you. It is not without a prerequisite. And what is its prerequisite? *Dispassion... Disenchantment... Knowledge & vision of things as they actually are present... Concentration... Pleasure... Serenity... Rapture... Joy... Conviction... Stress... Birth... Becoming... Clinging... Craving... Feeling... Contact... The six sense media... Name-&-form... Consciousness... Fabrications...* Fabrications have their prerequisite, I tell you. They are not without a prerequisite. And what is their prerequisite? *Ignorance*, it should be said.
>
> Thus fabrications have ignorance as their prerequisite, consciousness has fabrications as its prerequisite, name-&-form has consciousness as its prerequisite, the six sense media have name-&-form as their prerequisite, contact has the six sense media as its prerequisite, feeling has contact as its prerequisite, craving has feeling as its prerequisite, clinging has craving as its prerequisite, becoming has clinging as its prerequisite, birth has becoming as its prerequisite, stress & suffering have birth as their prerequisite, conviction has stress & suffering as its prerequisite, joy has conviction as its prerequisite, rapture has joy as its prerequisite, serenity has rapture as its prerequisite, pleasure has serenity as its prerequisite, concentration has pleasure as its prerequisite, knowledge & vision of things as they actually are present has concentration as its prerequisite,

[83] Oxford Living Dictionary, "Scheme," *Oxford Living Dictionary,* Oxford University Press, accessed March 3, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/scheme.

> disenchantment has knowledge & vision of things as they actually are present as its prerequisite, dispassion has disenchantment as its prerequisite, release has dispassion as its prerequisite, knowledge of ending has release as its prerequisite.
>
> Just as when the gods pour rain in heavy drops & crash thunder on the upper mountains: The water, flowing down along the slopes, fills the mountain clefts & rifts & gullies. When the mountain clefts & rifts & gullies are full, they fill the little ponds. When the little ponds are full, they fill the big lakes. When the big lakes are full, they fill the little rivers. When the little rivers are full, they fill the big rivers. When the big rivers are full, they fill the great ocean. In the same way:
>
> Fabrications have ignorance as their prerequisite, consciousness has fabrications as its prerequisite, name-&-form has consciousness as their prerequisite, the six sense media have name-&-form as their prerequisite, contact has the six sense media as its prerequisite, feeling has contact as its prerequisite, craving has feeling as its prerequisite, clinging has craving as its prerequisite, becoming has clinging as its prerequisite, birth has becoming as its prerequisite, stress & suffering have birth as their prerequisite, conviction has stress & suffering as its prerequisite, joy has conviction as its prerequisite, rapture has joy as its prerequisite, serenity has rapture as its prerequisite, pleasure has serenity as its prerequisite, concentration has pleasure as its prerequisite, knowledge & vision of things as they actually are present has concentration as its prerequisite, disenchantment has knowledge & vision of things as they actually are present as its prerequisite, dispassion has disenchantment as its prerequisite, release has dispassion as its prerequisite, knowledge of ending has release as its prerequisite.[84]

2.3 The Four Noble Truths as True Realities to Be Directly Experienced

A prolegomenon to paṭiccasamuppāda with *cattāri ariyasaccāni* or the Four Noble Truths is consistent with the Buddha's own approach. Among the lay and even among scholars not long ago, the Four Noble Truths are thought to be truth propositions or truth claims. Peter Harvey makes a strong case that they are not propositions. Because

[84] "Upanisa Sutta: Prerequisites," translated from the Pali by Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu. Access To Insight (BCBS Edition), accessed 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.023.than.html. I have added italics in the second paragraph to highlight the nidanas and upanisās as a complete list.

paṭiccasamuppāda is a congruent elaboration of the Four Noble Truths,[85] determining the dimensional category (conceptual statements versus direct experience in this instance) of the Four Noble Truths should directly determine the dimensional category of paṭiccasamuppāda. He writes:

> The *ariya-saccas* are subjects of an advanced teaching intended for those who have, *by the 'step-by-step' discourse ..., been spiritually prepared to have them pointed out* [emphasis added]. If the mind is not calm and receptive, talk of dukkha … may be too disturbing, leading to states such as depression, denial and self-distracting tactics. The Buddha's own discovery of the ariya-saccas was from … a state of profound meditative calm. … there are three reasons why it cannot here mean 'truth'. First, it is said that the second ariya-sacca is to be abandoned …: surely, one would not want to abandon a 'truth', but one might well want to abandon a problematic 'reality'. Secondly, it is said that the Buddha understood, '"This is the dukkha ariya-sacca"', not 'The ariya-sacca "This is dukkha"', which would be the case if sacca here meant a truth whose content was expressed in words in quote marks. Thirdly, in some Suttas …, the first ariya-sacca is explained by identifying it with a kind of existent (the five bundles of grasping-fuel…), not by asserting a form of words that could be seen as a 'truth'. In normal English usage, the only things that can be 'truths' are propositions, that is, something that is expressed in words (spoken, written, thought). Something said about dukkha, even just 'this is dukkha', can be a 'truth', but dukkha itself can only be a true, genuine reality. Hence 'true reality' is here best for sacca, which still keeps a clear connection to 'truth' as the other meaning of sacca. … [Ariya would then mean] the 'spiritually ennobled' … a person who has been uplifted and purified by deep insight into reality.[86]

This demonstrates that the Four Noble Truths, or True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled, or simply, realities for the noble ones are not in the propositional domain or category to be actualized or comprehended using words, language, discursive thinking, and analysis. By this, we might establish that the ideal, goal-orienting, and loftiest states

[85] That paṭiccasamuppāda is a congruent elaboration of the Four Noble Truths connects saṃvega, the nidanas, and the upanisās to the Four Noble Truths. This claim is developed incidental to my development of my main thesis.

[86] Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism*., 51

of reality of early Buddhism are in terms and of a kind incompatible with the conceptual structure. Obviously the suttas are replete with words so it is better and accurate to formulate that the dependence on the conceptual structure is inverse to the adept's proximity to the true realities. Building upon this establishment, we can summarize the mode of attainment[87] and hypothetical imperative of each of the Noble Truths. The first is the reality of dukkha (pain, stress, and suffering) which is to be understood with the attendant desire and complacency of ordinary life and mundane samsaric existence) to follow a path toward ease, peace, happiness and safety beyond samsara. Saṃvega is best conceived as the source of momentum/impulse/fuel of the upanisic scheme, while craving is best conceived as the source of momentum/impulse/fuel of the nidanic scheme. We can surmise tentatively here that saṃvega and craving are zero-sum. There is evidence that it is saṃvega[88] that is analogized in the *Upanisā Sutta* to rain that must superabound to energize and make ocean-bound the flow of mountain-high prerequisites to estuarial prerequisites entering the ocean of nibbana. The second is the reality of samudaya (origination) of dukkha, namely craving, which is to be abandoned with the accompanied desire and intention to cease clinging/fuel, renewed becoming, renewed birth, and renewed death—which are the subsequent nidanas. Craving is the direct source of fuel for renewed and incessant becoming/identity, life, and death. The third is the reality of nirodha (cessation) of dukkha achieved by the cessation of craving which is to be *directly experienced* with the intention to manifest renunciation, relinquishment, and unbinding/release/nibbana—which are the subsequent upanisās Nirodha is simultaneously the inertia of the nidanic scheme and the momentum of the upanisic

[87] I paraphrase Harvey., 52
[88] Saṃvega, water, streams, vortices, and stream-entry will be treated below.

scheme. The fourth is the reality of magga (path) as presented in the Eightfold Path that leads to cessation which is to be fully cultivated with the intention to link and propel—via the momentum of saṃvega—the mind from 1) abandonment-vulnerable dukkha with its origins in the nidanas through to 2) "direct experience"-requisite cessation with its prerequisites in the upanisās. In the nomenclature of the frames of reference, the four realities of the noble ones settle the mind to directly and unmediatedly experience phenomena in spatial representation and outside the perceptual labeling of the relationship between experience and phenomena that occurs in the conceptual structure.[89] The noble ones observe purely with the hypothetical imperative to induce dispassion without participating or engaging.

2.4 Mundane versus Transcendent

In this chapter, I present a few differing claims and interpretations of paṭiccasamuppāda and of Dhamma[90] over its purview, domains, and spaces. The intention is to determine and categorize paṭiccasamuppāda's limit of authority and range of vision as posited by the secularist who insists on a strict demarcation to the mundane or naturalist sphere and by the transcendentalist who professes a sphere(s) dimensionally beyond.[91] I claim, with my third sub-thesis, that paṭiccasamuppāda explicitly insists that access to the absolute nibbāna must be via not only the egocentric space, via not only its reduction into mind/body but via the further reduced conceptual structure space and the

[89] The Mulapariyaya Sutta: The Root Sequence distinguishes between the ignorant who perceives and engages phenomena and the monk on the path who directly knows phenomena in their nakedness with the exception of arising, cessation, allure, drawback and escape. See www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.001.than.html

[90] Dhamma and paṭiccasamuppāda are somewhat interchangeable given that the latter is an effective and sufficient summary of the former.

[91] The path to the transcendental absolute is not the same for all transcendentalists.

spatial representation space. By contrast, other religionists may claim that access to their transcendence can be attained by way of other spaces. In the cosmology of the Buddha in tandem with the paṭiccasamuppāda scheme, that which constitutes the supramundane (*lokuttara*) is not the supernatural reincarnation that many[92] mistakenly assume. The survival of a single or any iteration of death is definitively not the transcendent; it is the release from the endless iterations of deaths that is transcendence. The samsaric cycle of life and death is defined as clearly within the mundane (*lokiya*).

2.4.1 The Lacunae of the Upanisās

The most extensive study on the upanisās is Bhikkhu Bodhi's 30-page *Transcendental Dependent Arising A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta* published in 1980 remains the definitive coverage on the upanisās from the early Buddhist perspective. Perhaps the next best study is by Bhikkhu Kañukurunde Ñāṇananda's *The Law of Dependent Arising: The Secret of Bondage and Release* published in 2015. The Upanisā Sutta and the upanisic list, in light of its subsuming of the nidanas, is among the most underappreciated and ignored in the Pali Canon. Bhikkhu Bodhi writes, "Despite the great importance of the Upanisā Sutta, traditional commentators have hardly given the text the special attention it would seem to deserve."[93] It is not only with traditional commentators; current scholars are nearly entirely silent on the upanisās when discussing paṭiccasamuppāda, nidanas, or causality. In spite of the justifiable cardinal importance bestowed to paṭiccasamuppāda and the nidanas, it is puzzling why almost forty years after Bhikkhu Bodhi's work scholars have not incorporated the vital upanisās into

[92] See Robert Wright's quote below.
[93] Bodhi, "Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta." 3

paṭiccasamuppāda/nidana research. He speculates, "Perhaps the reason for this is that its line of approach being peculiar to itself and a few related texts scattered through the Canon, it has been overshadowed by the many other suttas giving the more usual presentation of doctrine."[94]

The word *upanisā* means "cause, means" [95] whose synonym is *paccaya* meaning "resting on, falling back on, foundation; cause, motive."[96] None of these definitions quite captures the intention of upanisā being taught. Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's translation as "prerequisite" is the aptest as the reader will gather by the end of the presentation of this chapter. Bhikkhu Bodhi writes, "By linking the two series into a single sequence, the sutta reveals the entire course of man's faring in the world as well as his treading of the path to its transcendence. It shows, moreover, that these two dimensions of human experience, the mundane and the transcendental, the dimensions of world involvement and world disengagement, are both governed by a single structural principle, that of dependent arising. Recognising this broader range of the principle, the *Nettipakaraṇa*, a Pali exegetical treatise, has called the second application "transcendental dependent arising" (lokuttara-paṭiccasamuppāda)."[97] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu calls the upanisās "the unraveling of the causes of dukkha."[98] Although within the suttas, the word *lokuttara* (transcendent) is not directly attributed to the upanisās, there can be no doubt that they

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[94] Bodhi., 3
[95] "Upanisā", Thomas William Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., "The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary," in *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary* (London: The Pali Text Society/Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher, 1921)., 144
[96] Thomas William Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., "Paccaya," in *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary* (London: The Pali Text Society, 1921), 384
[97] Bodhi, "Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta." 3
[98] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "The Third Noble Truth," 2005, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/dhamma/sacca/sacca3/index.html.

are. The list progresses ever closer to the sublime states penultimate to nibbana and includes nibbana itself. I include figure 2.1 below to show how the nidanas relate to the upanisās.



Figure 2.1 The Nidanas and the Upanisās. Note: the nidanas are staggered to make presentation space

To avoid confusion, it should be made clear that whatever state/factor/link is listed in the Upanisā Sutta is technically an upanisā. Because the standard twelve nidanas are listed in the Upanisā Sutta, they are either nidanas or upanisās depending on the context. In figure 1.1. I place the nidanas horizontally and the "transcendent" segment of the upanisās vertically. This is to help visualize that the horizontal is in the mundane realm and vertical is in or potentially in the transcendent realm. The entire vertical list is nominally transcendent, while only certain advanced vertical ones are truly transcendent. An observation that is sometimes overlooked is that the twelfth nidana being formally called *jarāmaraṇa* meaning aging-&death is really: aging-&-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain,

distress, and despair. Sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress are strong synonyms for dukkha. This is apparent. But the potential opaqueness here is whether the experience of aging-&-death is *apparently* the experience of dukkha. Said another way, does a person's experience of sorrow, lamentation, pain, and distress in the face of aging and death—whether in others or himself—of a quality and degree to have a breakthrough that the ordinary mundane existence is substantially unfulfilling and perilous in the cosmological long term. "Apparent" here refers to the transparency of aging and death. The Buddha claims that it is inapparent to most people in that they are not appalled enough to resist. Whether a person experiences aging and death in other people or the impending of aging and death to himself, the key is to shock himself out of complacency. The greater the shock the more apparent that aging-&-death is dukkha. This appearance to the heart and head of the person is saṃvega or the saṃvegic insight. The PTS Pali-English Dictionary defines saṃvega as "Saŋvega [fr. saŋ+vij] agitation, fear, anxiety; thrill, religious emotion (caused by contemplation of the miseries of this world)"[99] with base *vega* meaning "quick motion, impulse, force; speed, velocity" derived from the root vij meaning "to tremble."[100] Saŋ or saṃ are intensifiers. Vega as motion, impulse, force and speed if highly relevant to my analysis of the upanisās and to water analogies in both paṭiccasamuppāda and complex systems. When a Buddhist has this saṃvegic insight then the twelfth nidana *aging-&-death* is apparently one and the same. Saṃvega authentically links nidanas to upanisās; saṃvega transforms the complacent to the ardent seeker; saṃvega transforms the nominal mundane to the nominal transcendent; saṃvega initiates

[99] Thomas William Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., "Saŋvega," in *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary* (London: The Pali Text Society/Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher, 1921), 658
[100] Thomas William Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., "Vega," in *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary* (London: The Pali Text Society/Billing and Sons Ltd., Guildford and Esher, 1921), 646

reversing the mundane chain. Mature and developed saṃvega transforms mundane to authentic transcendent, a claim I propose to demonstrate throughout this paper. I believe this is the reason why in the upanisā list there are not twenty-four links but only twenty-three; the adherent now sees the most prone-to-insight nidana as itself dukkha. All the nidanas and all the upanisās together make up the links that are more complete to the scheme of paṭiccasamuppāda. I include figure 2.2 below to update the upanisā list as the causal scheme of paṭiccasamuppāda.



Figure 2.2 The Causal Scheme of Paṭiccasamuppāda

The aging-&-death nidana is not the only nidana to be equated with dukkha. It is only the most apparent of all the nidanas. The direct order nidana list ends with: Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering. This taken to mean both 1) the

summation or emergence of all the direct order nidanas to be the origination of dukkha and 2) any nidana is itself dukkha. We are permitted to investigate any angle of the nidanas to instill the perception of saṃvega. For graphical purposes, the vertical upanisās can branch from any or all of the horizontal nidanas. Below I investigate the axiology and teleology of the upanisās, its synoptic representative character, its transcendent watershed moment, and its relationship with causality.

2.4.2 The Axiology of the Upanisās

An important example of the "few related texts scattered through the Canon" is the *Kimattha Sutta: What is the Purpose?* The entire sutta is presented here:

> I have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was staying near Savatthi in Jeta's Grove, Anathapindika's monastery. Then Ven. Ananda went to the Blessed One and on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there he said to the Blessed One: "What is the purpose of skillful virtues? What is their *reward*? [emphasis added]"
>
> "Skillful virtues have freedom from remorse as their purpose, Ananda, and freedom from remorse as their reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of freedom from remorse? What is its reward?"
>
> "Freedom from remorse has joy as its purpose, joy as its reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of joy? What is its reward?"
>
> "Joy has rapture as its purpose, rapture as its reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of rapture? What is its reward?"
>
> "Rapture has serenity as its purpose, serenity as its reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of serenity? What is its reward?"
>
> "Serenity has pleasure as its purpose, pleasure as its reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of pleasure? What is its reward?"
>
> "Pleasure has concentration as its purpose, concentration as its reward."

> "And what is the purpose of concentration? What is its reward?"
>
> "Concentration has knowledge & vision of things as they actually are as its purpose, knowledge & vision of things as they actually are as its reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of knowledge & vision of things as they actually are? What is its reward?"
>
> "Knowledge & vision of things as they actually are has disenchantment as its purpose, disenchantment as its reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of disenchantment? What is its reward"
>
> "Disenchantment has dispassion as its purpose, dispassion as its reward."
>
> "And what is the purpose of dispassion? What is its reward?"
>
> "Dispassion has knowledge & vision of release as its purpose, knowledge & vision of release as its reward.
>
> "Thus in this way, Ananda, *skillful virtues* [emphasis added] have freedom from remorse as their purpose, *freedom from remorse* [emphasis added] as their reward. Freedom from remorse has joy as its purpose, *joy* [emphasis added] as its reward. Joy has rapture as its purpose, *rapture* [emphasis added] as its reward. Rapture has serenity as its purpose, *serenity* [emphasis added] as its reward. Serenity has pleasure as its purpose, *pleasure* [emphasis added] as its reward. Pleasure has *concentration* [emphasis added] as its purpose, concentration as its reward. Concentration has knowledge & vision of things as they actually are as its purpose, *knowledge & vision of things as they actually are* [emphasis added] as its reward. Knowledge & vision of things as they actually are has disenchantment as its purpose, *disenchantment* [emphasis added] as its reward. Disenchantment has dispassion as its purpose, *dispassion* [emphasis added] as its reward. Dispassion has knowledge & vision of release as its purpose, *knowledge & vision of release* [emphasis added] as its reward.
>
> "In this way, Ananda, skillful virtues lead *step-by-step* [emphasis added] to the *consummation of arahantship*. [emphasis added]"[101]

The ordered list of the twelve stages or states in this *kimattha* discourse is: 1) skillful virtues 2) freedom from remorse 3) joy 4) rapture 5) serenity 6) pleasure 7) concentration 8) knowledge & vision of things as they actually are 9) disenchantment 10) dispassion

[101] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, trans., "Kimattha Sutta: What Is the Purpose?," Access To Insight 1997, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an11/an11.001.than.html.

11) knowledge & vision of release 12) consummation of arahantship. We note here the list is comprised of twelve. The kimattha list is very similar to the latter portion of the upanisā list. I set them side by side in the below figure 2.3:



Figure 2.3 The Upanisās compared to the Kimatthas

The similarities and dissimilarities between the upanisās and the kimatthas reveal the different context in which the Buddha was teaching. In the Kimattha the Buddha is replying to Venerable Ananda's question on the purpose and reward of skillful virtue. As is his common practice, the Buddha connects the answer to a contextually digestible segment of the very extensive and comprehensive Dhamma. Segments or pieces of the puzzle (i.e., the big picture of Dhamma) are distributed throughout the Pali Canon; the largest and most complete that I am aware of is the upanisās. All roads (segments) lead to nidanas, all nidanas lead to upanisās, all upanisās lead to paṭiccasamuppāda where paṭiccasamuppāda is tantamount to Dhamma itself. This is the reason Sariputta quotes the Buddha as saying: "He who sees dependent arising sees the Dhamma; he who sees the Dhamma sees dependent arising." In this way, the dissimilarities between the upanisā and kimattha lists pose no concerns. It merely indicates that another more contextually relevant segment was applied. This opens the discussion that the Upanisā Sutta does not fully list all the stages/states/factors in the Dhamma; that is the job of task of the Canon. The Upanisā Sutta is comprehensive in principle; it is synoptic and representative in character. Comparing the list in figure 1.3, we can infer 1) that conviction/faith are either approximations of skillful virtues and freedom from remorse, and/or 2) conviction/faith and freedom from remorse are slightly different paths to joy. There is an easy explanation for the makeup of the transcendental segment of the upanisās: it is composed of the Noble Eightfold Path: Right View, Right Resolve, Right Speech, Right Action, Right

Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, Right Concentration.[102] The Noble Eightfold Path is divided into three divisions of the path: virtue/morality (sila), concentration/jhana/serenity (samadhi), and discernment/wisdom/insight (panna/sampajañña). In the *Culavedalla Sutta: The Shorter Set of Questions-and-Answer* the Buddha teaches, "The three aggregates are not included under the noble eightfold path, friend Visakha, but the noble eightfold path is included under the three aggregates. Right speech, right action, & right livelihood come under the aggregate of virtue. Right effort, right mindfulness, & right concentration come under the aggregate of concentration. Right view & right resolve come under the aggregate of discernment."[103] Bhikkhu Anālayo comments on the common practice to list virtue first, then concentration, then discernment/wisdom last, writing, "the Cūḷavedalla-sutta places right view among the aggregate of wisdom (MN I 301). This is remarkable, since in this way the sequence of the noble eightfold path has wisdom first, followed by morality and concentration. In other contexts, such as descriptions of the gradual path, one regularly finds the sequence morality, concentration, wisdom instead. The noble eightfold path's departure from the more common sequence highlights the function of right view in providing the all-important directional input for the practice of the path. Without the guiding principle provided by right view and expressed by right intention, the training in the path will not be able to issue in deliverance."[104] The common virtue-concentration-

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[102] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta: Setting the Wheel of Dhamma in Motion," Access To Insight 1993, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.than.html.
[103] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Culavedalla Sutta: The Shorter Set of Questions-and-Answers," Access To Insight 1998, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.044.than.html#agg3.
[104] Anālayo, *From Grasping to Emptiness – Excursions into the Thought-World of the Pali Discourses (2).*, 31

discernment order applies to the transcendental upanisā list. As any student of Buddhism knows well, each division is extensively taught and therefore covers many states/stages. The point is that the twelve upanisās, or equivalents in a quasi exchangeable list like the kimattha, should be divisible into virtue-meditation-discernment. On this division of the upanisās, Bhikkhu Bodhi writes, "This is the sequence utilised by the present sutta, the stages from "rapture" through "concentration" covering the systematic development of serenity; the two following stages, the development of insight."[105] There is agreement that rapture through concentration is the practice of jhana characterized by serenity as Bodhi suggests. However, there is disagreement on whether insight within jhanas mutually supporting or supported by serenity or whether insight is a distinct form outside of jhana and only supported residually by serenity.[106] Nonetheless, based on this we divide the transcendent upanisā list as follows: *Virtue*: conviction/faith and joy; *Concentration/Serenity*: rapture, serenity, pleasure/happiness, concentration; and *Discernment/Insight*: knowledge and vision of things as they actually are, disenchantment, dispassion, release, knowledge of the ending of the effluents. The division for the kimattha list is as follows: *Virtue*: skillful virtues, freedom from remorse, joy; *Concentration/Serenity*: rapture, serenity, pleasure/happiness, concentration; and *Discernment/Insight*: knowledge and vision of things as they actually are, disenchantment, dispassion, knowledge and vision of release, consummation of arahantship.

[105] Bodhi, "Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta." 16
[106] Bhikkhu Bodhi defends the latter, while I defend the former.

Before graphically clarifying the above, I would like to combine the themes of the Upanisā and Kimattha Suttas. For the kimattha, the operative words are *purpose*, *reward*, and *step-by-step*. Purpose takes us into the overall teleology of the upanisās, paṭiccasamuppāda, and Dhamma, and reward takes us into axiology and the hypothetical imperative of each upanisā. Philosophical teleology is "[t]he explanation of phenomena in terms of the purpose they serve rather than of the cause by which they arise" as opposed to theological teleology which is "[t]he doctrine of design and purpose in the material world."[107] Certainly the purpose the suttas are referring to regard only phenomena. This is a fascinating aspect of an exhortation to regard phenomena not in terms of causes but of purposes. Long has the Buddhist world been captivated with causes (the "push") at the expense of purposes (the "pull"). To be clear, knowledge of causes is not to be abandoned. One way to view purpose is by way of the most encompassing and distal goal—nibbana. Less broad and less distal is the goal of cessation of craving and conditioned phenomena. These are the distant ocean-sized targets and rewards; they are both nebulous and profoundly promising. But the path of training is a step-by-step discourse. In order to prevent misstep to misstep, the upanisās guide the adept from one stage to the next stage in development and maturation. This is the role of the hypothetical imperative. Unlike the categorical imperative whose "validity or claim …does not depend on any ulterior motive or end," the hypothetical imperative is

[107] Oxford Living Dictionary, "Teleology," *Oxford Living Dictionary,* Oxford University Press, accessed March 14, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/teleology.

"associated with desire."[108] That desire is directed toward the reward. The adept is instructed to regard the next appointed stage as a reward. For example, freedom from remorse is the proximate goal or hypothetical imperative of skillful virtues. The Buddha does not—nor should the adept—regard his authority as the hypothetical imperative or epistemological motivation or diktat to develop one stage/state or another. The adept must experience the particular phenomenon directly for himself with the scheme as a guide. This is the phenomenology which I develop below. In the language of the frames of reference, nibbana framed by samsaric cosmology is the most panoramic frame. Nibbana as the highest safety and peace in the entire Dhammic axiology is the end purpose. A youngster wishing to become an astronaut would never reach the moon (by simple strong desire and knowing the moon was the goal) without a step-by-step, purposeful, and successful course through school and mental and physical preparation as prescribed guidance. The adept's work is to develop one frame (in isolation of distraction from other frames) firm enough to proceed to the next. Step-by-step, one step must be firmly planted to ensure the firm planting of the following step. The reward of the next stage is both a conceptual reward in knowing that the scheme is proven correct again and the imagistic bodily reward (e.g., joy, rapture, serenity) that serves as fuel/energy to develop further. Bhikkhu Bodhi describes the upanisās as follows:

> This expansion and enrichment is made possible by the structure of the gradual training, which is not so much a succession of discrete steps one following the other, as a locking together of overlapping components in a union at once augmentative, consummative, and projective. Each pair of stages intertwines in a mutually vitalizing bond wherein the lower, antecedent member nurtures its

[108] Editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica, "Categorical Imperative," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Online, accessed March 5, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/categorical-imperative#ref29485.

> successor by serving as its generative base, and the higher, consequent member completes its predecessor by absorbing its energies and directing them on to the next phase in the series. Each link thus performs a double function: while rewarding the efforts expended in the accomplishment of the antecedent stage, it provides the incentive for the commencement of the consequent stage. In this way the graduated training unfolds organically in a fluid progression in which, as the Buddha says, "stage flows over into stage, stage fulfils stage, for crossing over from the hither shore to the beyond."[109]

We are in agreement on the role of energy being fluid-like filling one stage, then another, with each successive stage holding ever more momentum or kinetic energy; this is the main imagery of the *Upanisā Sutta*. Bodhi appears at first reading to disagree with the step-by-step (i.e., discrete step-by-discrete step) course and that each stage is developed in isolation (the mind inclines more toward focus and concentration of the current stage than exposed to noise from the stage before or after). I believe he is describing the natural relationship between each stage (the laws within Dhamma): one receiving the flow from the previous, the next to receive the flow from the current. If not how would the analogy of each stage needing to be full (i.e., in isolation from the next stage) before even one drop enters the next stage? We take from Bodhi's explanation the incentives that manifest in stages and serve as fuel for head and heart's travail to the next milestone.

So far I have labeled the post-nidanic segment of the upanisās as the nominal transcendent but technically there exists a watershed moment or stage wherein the adept can only progress, never to regress. Bhikkhu Bodhi explains:

> This transformation, signified by viraga or dispassion, is the first strictly supramundane (lokuttara) stage in the progression of transcendental dependent arising. The earlier links in the sequence leading up to dispassion are all

[109] Bodhi, "Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta." 9

> technically classified as mundane (lokiya). Though loosely called "transcendental" in the sense that they are directed to the unconditioned, they are still mundane in terms of their scope since they operate entirely within range of the conditioned world. Their objects of concern are still the five aggregates, or things derivative upon them. But with the attainment of dispassion consciousness passes clear beyond the mundane level, and for a fleeting moment realises as its object the unconditioned state, nibbana. The shift in standpoint comes about as the immediate consequence of the preceding stages of development. Through insight into the three marks the basic distortions covering over the true nature of phenomena were exposed; with the uncovering of their true nature there set in a disengagement from phenomena. This disengagement led to an attitude of relinquishment and a fading out of desire. Now, having released its grip on the conditioned, the mind turns to the unconditioned, the deathless element (amata dhātu), focusing upon it as the only state fully adequate to itself.[110]

Below is figure 2.4 as an update of the discussion.

[110] Bodhi., 26



Figure 2.4 Details for the Causal Scheme of Paṭiccasamuppāda

2.4.3 The Axiology of Saṃvega

The Buddha's first religious inkling was his saṃvegic insight[111] (often symbolically attributed to the four sights of illness, old age, death, and a mendicant) that lead him to seek liberation.[112] He recounts how in his youth he saw young people

[111] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Sukhamala Sutta: Refinement," Access To Insight 1997, accessed February 6, 2049, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an03/an03.038.than.html.
[112] Ṭhānissaro, "Affirming the Truths of the Heart The Buddhist Teachings on Samvega & Pasada."

horrified and disgusted with aging in others, healthy people horrified and disgusted with illness in others, and people filled with life horrified and disgusted with the dead. Yet these same young, healthy, and life-filled people could not identify and empathize—to an appreciable, action-spurring threshold—that aging, illness, and death were their inevitable fate. He himself instead was deeply and thoroughly affected when he projected himself into aging, illness, and death. These people's complacency horrified and disgusted him in turn. This saṃvegic insight event was the proper seminal moment in his life which led to searching and deliverance. I contend that saṃvega must properly be the seminal moment likewise for early Buddhist adherents. The Buddha compared this complacency toward the terror of death to intoxications. These intoxications of youth, health and life were impediments to a theoretical but "scientifically real"[113] (because the Buddha had not yet attained/confirmed it) highest safety as found in nibbana. This is very instructive because once again why would the Buddha effectively renounce the value in youth, health and life which comprise nearly everything dear and worthy in a secular, one-life perspective unless such a renouncement had a hypothetical imperative in the deathless—a prize beyond both the one-life position (i.e., annihilationism) and beyond the mundane level right view of rebirth/re-death.

2.4.4 Naturalism, Physicalism and Time

To properly place the meaning of mundane (*lokiya*) and transcendent/

[113] I use this concept analogistically in this paper. I will briefly apply it to my treatment of empiricism and phenomenology.

supramundane (*lokuttara*), immediately below, and later empiricism and phenomenology, into context, it is best to discuss naturalism, physicalism, secularism, eternality, and timelessness briefly. To start we should clarify the technical and crucial difference between eternality and timelessness. "Eternal" is defined as having infinite duration; infinite time; endless or immeasurable time; valid or existing at all times; timeless, perpetual.[114] As can be seen, "timeless" can be taken to mean eternal. For the technical purposes of Buddhism, timeless (akāliko)[115] means outside of and having escaped the condition of time. This point is made clear by Harvey:

> It is notable that the 'early Suttas' do not actually say that *nibbāna* is 'eternal' (*sassata*) for it cannot be seen as lasting in forever *time*. Rather, it is 'timeless (akāliko)' (A.I.l58), and, as later texts say, neither past, present nor future (Dhs.1416, Miln.270). While, from the outside, someone's attainment of it is an event in time, from within, it is beyond the flow of changing temporal events. If nibbāna is to be called 'eternal', as it is at Kvu.121, this must be because it is *beyond* time. The Arahat's full experience of nibbāna, as a state in which the personality-factors temporarily stop, might be seen as his 'participating in' this timeless reality. … nibbāna during life is a *transcendent, timeless experience.*[116]

The transcendent stands in contradistinction from the natural. The transcendent is "surpassing, exceeding or lying beyond the limits of ordinary experience …the universe or material existence."[117] This straightforward definition is apropos to the intent of the suttas wherein the nibbānic state is of a dimension radically different from that which it is

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[114] Merriam Webster, "Eternal," Merriam Webster, Inc., accessed March 9, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eternal

[115] "akāliko," Access To Insight, accessed August 9, 2019, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/glossary.html. Defined as: Timeless; unconditioned by time or season.

[116] Peter Harvey, *The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvāṇa in Early Buddhism,* London: Routledge, 1995, 192, 197

[117] Merriam Webster, "Transcendent," Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed March 9, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transcendent.

released. One of those dimensions is time; the nibbānic state is transcendent in part because it is beyond all conditioning including that of time. The entirety (or sabba[118]) of the world as conceived in the suttas is encompassed by and delimited to the mundane (obviously meaning "world")—all that exists in space and time. One of the key suttas contributing evidence for my claim is *The Rohitassa: To Rohitassa* in which the relevant parts of the conversation between the Buddha and the interlocutor, Rohitassa, is as follows:

> … "Is it possible, lord, by traveling, to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away or reappear?"
>
> "I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear."
>
> "It is amazing, lord, and awesome, how well that has been said by the Blessed One: 'I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear.' Once I was a seer named Rohitassa, a student of Bhoja, a powerful sky-walker. My speed was as fast as that of a strong archer — well-trained, a practiced hand, a practiced sharp-shooter — shooting a light arrow across the shadow of a palm tree. My stride stretched as far as the east sea is from the west. To me, endowed with such speed, such a stride, there came the desire: '*I will go traveling to the end of the cosmos.*[emphasis added]' I — with a one-hundred year life, a one-hundred year span — *spent one hundred years traveling* [emphasis added] … but without reaching the end of the cosmos I died along the way. So it is amazing, lord, and awesome, how well that has been said by the Blessed One: 'I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear.'"
>
> [When this was said, the Blessed One responded:] "I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear. But at the same time, I tell you that there is no making an end of suffering & stress without reaching the end of the cosmos. Yet it is just within this *fathom-long body, with its perception & intellect* [emphasis added], that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination

[118] Sabba means all or entirety. I will examine the Sabba Sutta later.

> of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos."
>
> It's not to be reached by traveling, the end of the cosmos — regardless. And it's not without reaching the end of the cosmos that there is release from suffering & stress.
>
> So, truly, the wise one, an expert with regard to the cosmos, a knower of the end of the cosmos, having fulfilled the holy life, calmed, knowing the cosmos' end, doesn't long for this cosmos or for any other.[119]

Here the Buddha clearly demarcates between 1) the first cosmos of space (traveling) and time (one hundred years of futile traveling) (i.e., space/time cosmos) which *does not access* the "end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear" (i.e., nibbāna), 2) the second cosmos of "this fathom-long body, with its perception & intellect …that … is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos" (i.e., mind/body cosmos), and 3) the transcendent cessation of both the first and second cosmos, i.e., nibbāna, mind released). There are several important implications here: 1) since the suttas are explicit that there is nothing more than the mundane and the supramundane[120], the mundane must include the first space/time cosmos and all of the second mind/body cosmos not yet released by mind, 2) the implication that nibbana is a state outside of space and time, and 3) that the second mind/body (fathom-long body with perception and intellect) cosmos or frame is at once the phenomenological (world) and the sole location for the four realities for the spiritually ennobled (i.e., cosmos, the

[119] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Rohitassa Sutta: To Rohitassa," Access To Insight 1997, accessed July 29, 2018, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.045.than.html.
[120] As explained in the Sabba Sutta, which I address below.

origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos) as set out in paṭiccasamuppāda. This contradistinction the Buddha uses between the spatio-temporal world and the subjective frame is the same I have attempted to develop between the mind/body, first centroidal, second centroidal, and absolute/allocentric frames.

2.4.5 Vision of Death and Loss as Threshold to the Transcendent

There is another sutta that connects 1) the sorrow of the death of loved ones and oneself, loss of all things we hold dear, and exposure to horrible experiences with 2) rebirth with 3) eternity to elicit the shock, dread and motivating insight of saṃvega. I present the relevant portions of the *Assu Sutta: Tears* here:

> At Savatthi. There the Blessed One said: "From an inconstruable beginning comes transmigration. A beginning point is not evident, though beings hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving are transmigrating & wandering on. What do you think, monks: Which is greater, the tears you have shed while transmigrating & wandering this long, long time — crying & weeping from being joined with what is displeasing, being separated from what is pleasing — or the water in the four great oceans?"
>
> “As we understand the Dhamma taught to us by the Blessed One, this is the greater: the tears we have shed while transmigrating & wandering this long, long time … not the water in the four great oceans.”
>
> “… It is excellent that you thus understand the Dhamma taught by me. …
>
> “Long have you (repeatedly) experienced the death of a mother. … of a father... the death of a brother... the death of a sister... the death of a son... the death of a daughter... loss with regard to relatives... loss with regard to wealth... loss with regard to disease. The tears you have shed over loss with regard to disease while transmigrating & wandering this long, long time — crying & weeping from being joined with what is displeasing, being separated from what is pleasing — are greater than the water in the four great oceans.

> "Why is that? From an inconstruable beginning comes transmigration. A beginning point is not evident, though beings hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving are transmigrating & wandering on. Long have you thus experienced stress, experienced pain, experienced loss, swelling the cemeteries — enough to become disenchanted with all fabricated things, enough to become dispassionate, enough to be released."[121]

We can distill from this that 1) death of oneself and loved one; proximity to the displeasing; distance from the pleasing; experiencing stress, pain, loss, and swelling the cemeteries more fully completes the twelfth nidana of aging-&-death; 2) beings hindered and fettered by two nidanas to be transformed (ignorance and craving) are being reborn (transmigrating) in samsara (wandering on); 3) that dukkha as encompassing the nidanas, the transmigrating, and the wandering on (in the cosmos) is a suffering expanding beyond a single lifespan; 4) that death, meant by the Buddha, is not figurative or symbolic (as evidenced by: 'long have we swelled the cemeteries'); 5) the duration (temporal domain) of this suffering is cosmological, infinite, everlasting, eternal (our tears are more than the oceans'); 6) knowledge and vision of 1-5 is the threshold (enough) for the transcendent (disenchantment, dispassion, release) and 6) saṃvega is the inchoate phase of threshold of knowledge and vision.

[121] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Assu Sutta: Tears," Access To Insight 1997, accessed September 5, 2018, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn15/sn15.003.than.html.

2.4.6 The Western Dominant Worldview

Next, I apply philosopher of mind and of physicalism, D. Gene Witmer's,[122] analysis of naturalism and physicalism to the Buddha's conception of mundane. In his book section *Two influential "Ism"s,* he writes, "Over the last several decades a great deal of work in metaphysics has been motivated by an *allegiance* [emphasis added] to views most commonly known by the labels "naturalism" and "physicalism" (sometimes "materialism"). The influence of these commitments is most easily seen in work in the philosophy of mind, but both doctrines aim to have more general import, constraining one's overall view of the world. … Just how should the metaphysical thesis be understood? "Naturalism" … is plainly meant to rule out the existence of *certain unwelcome entities* [emphasis added]—those characterized as the "supernatural" or the "non-natural."[123] He continues by generating increasingly sophisticated propositions imputed for naturalism based on the prevailing literature, which I paraphrase here:

> 1) Every entity is a natural entity
>
> 2) Every entity is located in a single spatiotemporal system
>
> 3) Every entity is of a kind such that things of that kind can, in principle, be successfully investigated by science
>
> 4) Every entity is of a kind such that things of that kind can, in principle, be successfully investigated using the techniques specific to the natural sciences,
>
> 5) Every entity can be fully described using the theories developed in the natural sciences,

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[122] "D. Gene Witmer," February 6, 2019, http://users.clas.ufl.edu/gwitmer/.

[123] D. Gene Witmer, "Two Influential 'Ism's," in *The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics*, ed. Neil A. Manson and Robert W. Barnard, Continuum Companions, London: Continuum, 2012, 90, 93

6) The "Human Interest Phenomena"[124] is not fundamentally different from the non- "Human Interest Phenomena,"

7) Every property is identical with a properly physical property[125]

A very significant thread through the evolution of these propositions as suggested by Witmer is that its hypothetical imperative is to exclude "certain unwelcome entities"—those supernatural entities such as ghosts, entelechies, God, spiritual entities, immaterial and immortal minds, souls, deities and so forth. This is supported by Flanigan: "Naturalism comes in many varieties …, but the entry-level union card—David Hume is our hero—expresses solidarity with this motto: "Just say no to the supernatural." Rebirths, heavens, hells, creator gods, teams of gods, village demons, miracles, divine retributions in the form of plagues, earthquakes, tsunamis are things naturalists don't believe in."[126] In this way we can hypothesize that the Buddha, as a transcendentalist, was radically partial to mind—with its human and phenomenological interests—but did not deny the external physical world, while the naturalist is radically partial, not so much initially to physicalism, but to an antisupernaturalism[127] that necessitates a rejection of the immaterial via physicalism. The secular Buddhist's allegiance with scientific naturalism is the reason for the rejection/skepticism of rebirth even while being true to (all) other Buddhist doctrines. Based on the preceding it is safe to surmise that the Buddha conceived the entirety of the cosmos (i.e., his conceived purview of the natural) as

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[124] Human Interest Phenomena are humans/agents those concerns of humans/agents as "potentially set apart from nature". See Witmer, 97-98

[125] Witmer, "Two Influential 'Ism's," 93-105

[126] Owen J. Flanagan, *The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized,* Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011, 2

[127] Witmer, "Two Influential 'Ism's," 93

lokiya/mundane and comprising *both* spatio-temporal (i.e., the cosmos is *physical* because matter extends in space) *and* consciousness/body (i.e., the cosmos is *mental* because consciousness could survive death in the afterlife and so can exist undefined by and independent of the physical brain);[128] whereas nibbāna is *not* another cosmos, but a state beyond extension and time. Within this above-described metaphysics, the naturalist conceives the entirety of the cosmos as only physico-temporal, vigorously excluding the unwelcome immaterial.

2.4.7 The Buddha's Naturalism Excludes Physicalism and Linear Cosmology

But the Buddha also had unwelcome entities: materialism/annihilationism (uccheda) and eternalism (sassata). Materialism is but an older jargon for physicalism so in this study they are considered the same. Harvey crystalizes the Buddha's position on the physicalist as follows:

> The Materialists' aim was to lead an abstemious, balanced life which enjoyed simple pleasures and the satisfaction of human relationships. They denied any kind of self other than one which could be directly perceived, and held that this was annihilated at death. They therefore denied the idea of rebirth, and also those of karma and niyati. Each act was seen as a spontaneous event without karmic effects, and spiritual progression was not seen as possible. The Buddha characterized the Materialists' theory as the extreme view of 'annihilationism', and saw most other views of the day as some form of the opposite extreme, 'eternalism', which says that what survives death is some eternal Self or Life-principle. … [T]he teaching on the True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled is an 'elevated' one, or one 'particular' to Buddhas, which is given after a two-stage progressive teaching on more preparatory matters. The teachings of the 'step-by-step discourse' and the four True Realities correspond, respectively, to two levels of 'right view', or 'right understanding' of reality (M.iii.72). The first is belief that: giving is worthwhile; what one does matters and has an effect on one's future; this world is not unreal, and *one goes on to another world after death*

[128] This point is doubted by the secular Buddhist and addressed below.

> [emphasis added]; it is good to respect parents, who establish one in this world; some of the worlds one can be reborn in (e.g. some heavens) are populated by beings that come into existence spontaneously, without parents; spiritual development is a real possibility, actualized by some people, and it can lead, in deep meditation, to memory of past rebirths in a variety of worlds, and awareness of how others are reborn in such worlds. This is the precise opposite of the view ascribed to the materialist Ajita Kesakambali (D.i.55).[129]

The view ascribed to the materialist Ajita Kesakambali appears very much like the current standard naturalistic, physicalist, secularist worldview. Contrary to some modern interpretation of Buddhism as refraining from any worldview which is not supported by empirical and scientific evidence, the Buddha emphatically taught right view. On this Harvey writes, "The second level of right view is wisdom and insight which directly perceives the True Realities. As it leads beyond suffering and rebirth in any world, it is seen as transcendent (lokuttara, Skt lokottara) and truly Noble (ariya). The first type is seen as ordinary (lokiya, Skt laukika), as it supports actions leading to good rebirths. Practice based on ordinary right view is seen as creating a good basis for the additional development of wisdom." So right view is right worldview which in the preparatory requires the acceptance of rebirth requisite for the revulsion at rebirth and what it entails which takes the Buddhist into the second level of right view. The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines lokiya as: [from loka: world, usual]; covering the whole world; worldly, mundane, when opposed to lokuttara. And defines lokuttara as the highest of the world, best, sublime (like lokagga, etc.),

[129] Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism*, 13, 48-49

often applied to Arahantship; (in later canonical literature) beyond these worlds, supramundane, transcendental, spiritual. In this meaning, it is applied to the group of *nava lokuttarā dhammā* (viz. the 4 stages of the Path: sotāpatti etc., with the 4 phala's, and the addition of nibbāna.[130] Materialism was the (both ordinary and entire) naturalism for Ajita; the world was entirely and ordinarily physical with no except. The Buddha's ordinary and entire world was both mental and physical (i.e., mind/body frame) but this ordinary included karmic results and rebirth in between lives. In other words, the Buddha rejected the physicalist naturalism for a nidanic/samsaric naturalism, only sotāpatti (stream-entry) through arahantship being the rare exception. This naturalism did not place the arahant into eternalism which posits a Self perduring in conditioned and conditioning space/time existence.

2.5 Paṭiccasamuppāda in Direct Order, Reverse Order, and Both Order Together

As comprehensive and consummate as the total coverage of the absolute and egocentric spaces ostensibly are, paṭiccasamuppāda clarifies and extends the egocentric space. The modern, default worldview currently demarcates the entirety of the world as hermetically and uncontestably governed by, explained by and equal to naturalistic physicalism; the supernatural and the transcendent do not exist because they either are subsumed by nature or contrary to physicalism. As a teaching leading to the transcendent, paṭiccasamuppāda first pivots reductively the frames of reference from the 2nd centroidal frame to the 1st

[130] Thomas William Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., "Lokiya," in *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary,* London: The Pali Text Society, 1921, 588

centroidal frame, then to the mind/body frame for the staging of knowing, shaping and freeing the mind.[131] Within the mind/body frame, other frames can be pivoted to. One way of thinking about this is with subjective consciousness as entry into the nidanas, the mind/body frame—as effectively consciousness and salayatana—is the entry into the nidanic frames or space. In the early Buddhist meditation tradition, these have their own name. I treat this later under the phenomenological purview. But the nidanic segment of the entire paṭiccasamuppāda chain are but special frames of reference about samsara and designated specifically for their causal appreciation, reversal, unraveling, and cessation. The nidanic space is a unique scaffolded egocentric space where the ego at the center is revealed in causal and emergent relations and terms. This nidanic space wherein the ego can be causally explained and fulfilled by any and all of the nidana factors is a tactical and interim space designed for work towards the transcendent. I will develop this more below. The common explanation and limitation of paṭiccasamuppāda to the quoted Udāna passage above is effectively a fragment the explanation and a fragment of its true scope. For instance Harvey writes, "A doctrine strongly related to the teaching on the four True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled, *particularly the second* [emphasis added], is that of 'Conditioned Arising'."[132] Ian Charles Harris citing support from Étienne Lamotte maintained that only the second and third truths have their operation expressed in the principle of dependent origination while the first and the fourth truths are mere statements. Harris states:

[131] Portions of these insights are credited to Dr. William Chu.
[132] Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism*, 65

> Now it may be noted that the two sequences of *pratītyasamutpāda* do not come into the range of the first and fourth Noble Truths and it may be objected that the doctrines are not fully compatible. If we look at these two particular truths, however we shall see that there is no real problem. The former is nothing more than a bold assertion of a fact, i.e. that everything is conditioned by suffering. The first truth then does not have the force of an explanatory statement. … The fourth on the other hand is an elaboration of this fact [the operation of the third truth] with particular reference to the field of soteriology, for practicing the path.[133]

Roderick Bucknell concludes the same but adds the reverse order, writing:

> This series of twelve items, linked by the pattern "X-paccayā Y" (conditioned by X [is/are] Y), purports to explain the origin of suffering (dukkha). In effect, it is an elaboration of the second noble truth, tracing the chain of causal dependence back beyond craving (taṇhā) to its ultimate origin in ignorance (avijja) … Identity with the second noble truth is made explicit at AN 1:177.5-14." He continues with the reverse order, writing, "Often the series is presented in reverse, the causal chain being traced backward from aging-and-death to birth, from birth to becoming, and so on to ignorance. Again, the series, whether in forward order or in reverse, is often stated in negative form: through the ceasing of ignorance, activities cease; and so on down to the ceasing of aging-and-death and of "this entire mass of suffering. … Negative formulation identified with third noble truth at AN 1:177.15-26. In such cases, the description amounts to an elaboration of the third noble truth.[134]

Since "Conditioned Arising" is exactly paṭiccasamuppāda, Harvey has given paṭiccasamuppāda more weight to mean the second reality of the cause of dukkha, namely craving and the nidanas. Bucknell has linked the forward order with the Second Noble Truth and the reverse order with the Third Noble Truth.[135] As discussed above, a complete version of paṭiccasamuppāda that are the nidanas and the upanisās linked by

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[133] Ian Charles Harris, *The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Brill's Indological Library, v. 6 (Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1991)., 137-8

[134] Roderick S. Bucknell, "Conditioned Arising Evolves: Variation and Change in Textual Accounts of the Paticca-Samuppada Doctrine," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 22, no. 2 (1999): 311–42., 312

[135] Harvey and Bucknell may have elsewhere connected paṭiccasamuppāda to the entire Four Noble Truths.

saṃvega are the elaborated entirety of the four realities *equally*. The direct order listed above—known as *anulomaṁ*—is the scheme of *sahetudhammaṁ*[136] or causal law or law of dependent arising.[137] However, overemphasis on this as *the* quintessential required insight can be problematic. Bhikkhu Kañukurunde Ñāṇananda reminds us that, "During the first watch of the night, the Buddha attended on the Law of Dependent Arising in the direct order and during the second or the middle watch in reverse order. During the last watch, he combined both ways of attending and attended in both direct and reverse order."[138] The reverse order—known as paṭilomaṁ—is the scheme of the extinction of conditions or cessation of conditions for arising.[139] Anuloma means "with the hair or grain;" natural, regular, direct, and forward order; fitting and adaptable.[140] Paṭiloma means "against the hair;" opposite, contrary, backward, and reverse order; usually combined with anuloma to convey forward and backward.[141] The third way of grasping causality is simultaneously with and against the law. The investigation of this simultaneity may yield insights into our understanding of spaces.

Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda refers to the Udāna - Bodhivagga for help deciphering sahetudhammaṁ. The relevant verses are:

> When phenomena manifest themselves
> To the ardently meditating Brahmin
> Then all his doubts get dispelled

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[136] Sahetu is having a cause or together with a cause. See Rhys Davids and Stede, "The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary." 701
[137] Ñāṇananda, *The Law of Dependent Arising: The Secret of Bondage and Release*. 6
[138] Ñāṇananda., 3-4
[139] Ñāṇananda., 1, 10
[140] Rhys Davids and Stede, "The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary." 42
[141] Rhys Davids and Stede., 398

Since he knows the Causal Law

When phenomena manifest themselves
To the ardently meditating Brahmin
Then all his doubts get dispelled
Since he knows the extinction of conditions

When phenomena manifest themselves
To the ardently meditating Brahmins
Dispelling hosts of Māra he stands
Like the sun illumining the firmament.[142]

Here the noble one's/arahant's different grasp of sahetudhammaṁ are the very same insights during the three watches of the night in which sahetudhammaṁ is attended to. Here the knowing of sahetudhammaṁ in forward order leads to the doubtless. That segment of paṭiccasamuppāda's abstract formula is: "When this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that." Separately, the extinction of conditions of sahetudhammaṁ by way of the reversal of the order leads to the doubtless. That segment of paṭiccasamuppāda's abstract formula is: "When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that." Separately still, it is implied, that grasping of both and hence of sahetudhammaṁ *consummately* leads to the deathless. Paṭiccasamuppāda's abstract formula—in total—is: "When this is, that is. From the arising of this comes the arising of that. When this isn't, that isn't. From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that." As will be made clearer with the upanisās, the doubtless is only penultimate to the deathless and thus not yet complete. If simultaneity is crucial the question is whether

, [142] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, trans. "Dvayatānupassanā Sutta," Access To Insight, accessed March , https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.3.12.than.html

this simultaneity is a matter of an additive, linear[143] completion of the grasping of sahetudhammaṁ or more a synergistic, complex completion of the grasping of sahetudhammaṁ. There are evidence and arguments to think it is the latter.

2.6 Some Confusion about Paṭiccasamuppāda with Regard to Direct Order, Reverse Order, and Both Order Together

It is true that a separate space—the paṭiloma space—is "inherent" in the nidanic or anuloma space. This is by virtue of paṭiloma depending on the knowledge of anuloma, sequentially succeeding it, and dimensionally converse of it. When the suttas make clear that "from the remainderless fading and cessation of" the first nidana factor of ignorance and concatenated to the remainderless fading and cessation of the last factor of aging, death and suffering is achieving—by definition—the transcendent goal, it is simply shorthand for anuloma, paṭiloma, and both at once. This is the first common confusion—the fixation between paṭiccasamuppāda and sahetudhammaṁ; paṭiccasamuppāda's true purview is arising, cessation and both at once, while sahetudhammaṁ's purview is arising. The second is to suppose that anuloma is the *proposition* of the problem and that paṭiloma is the *proposition* of the solution to the problem. The confusion put another way is that paṭiloma is nothing or not much more than the solution *by virtue of* it logically stating the opposite of the problem: "if x is the entirety of the problem then by definition –(x) is the entirety of the solution." This is to suppose that anuloma and paṭiloma function

[143] Merriam Webster, "Linear," *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated), accessed March 3, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/linear. Having or being a response or output that is directly proportional to the input.

in the logical sphere of conceptual structure. Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda would disagree, writing:

> The Buddha, soon after his enlightenment, reflected on the depth of the Dhamma he had realized. He saw two points in this Dhamma that transcends logic (*atakkāvacara*), which it is difficult for the worldlings immersed in defilements to see. One is the Law of Dependent Arising (*Paṭicca Samuppāda*) or conditionality (*idappaccayatā).* The other is *Nibbāna* – the stilling of all Preparations (*sabba-saṅkhāra-samatha).* … Here too we find the question of linguistic conventions coming in. As we have already mentioned the knotty problem of Samsara can be traced to linguistic conventions which we ourselves have created. Language and logic are transcended in this Dhamma. That is why it is called 'atakkavacara' ('not moving within the sphere of logic'). It grasps neither the two extremes nor the middle. … Logic wants us to say 'yes' or 'no' to the question of existence."[144]

Bhikkhu Analayo concurs with him in this regard when he speaks of vitakka—as thought—being functional in the development of the "Buddhist path, [but it is] a path that eventually leads to what is beyond thought, atakkavacara (e.g. MN I 167)."[145] The third confusion is to suppose that anuloma is linear, that paṭiloma is linear, and that simultaneity is linear. This is not claiming that magga is totally independent of the conceptual structure; it is claiming that the transcendent leg of the path does not crave nor cling to the conceptual.

2.7 The Imputations That Paṭiccasamuppāda Is Secular and Empirical

One of the most recent mention is in Linda Blanchard's *Dependent Arising in Context*. As part of a secular description of dependent arising, she writes:

> The models that assume that what is being described is literal cycles of rebirth find no support in the suttas, where the twelve links in the cycle chain never go

[144] Ñāṇananda, *The Law of Dependent Arising: The Secret of Bondage and Release*. viii., 10, 133. See also M.1.167.
[145] Anālayo, *From Grasping to Emptiness – Excursions into the Thought-World of the Pali Discourses (2).*, 55

> around again from the last link to the first. "Aging and death" is never described as the forerunner of "ignorance". Although dependent arising is often shown as part of the Buddhist Wheel of Life" imagery, paṭicca samuppāda is not described as a wheel or a cycle in any text. If it describes cycles of rebirth, it is odd that it never gets portrayed as a cycle; instead it goes from link one to twelve and stops.[146]

In the footnote to this, she acknowledges "However, there is the extended liberative formula (found in the Upanisā Sutta SN 12.23 [pts S ii 30]) in which the last step is named *dukkha*, and that *dukkha* is shown as the inspiration to practice the Buddha's methods and break the chain[147]; the step following *dukkha* is *saddha* (faith) and then the following steps describe the course of practice." Shortly after she continues, "For explanations of dependent arising to be satisfying, they need to describe what is *readily visible to us when it is pointed out* [emphasis added], since the Buddha suggests … that we can *see it for ourselves* [emphasis added], and his explanation is designed to help us see what goes wrong and why, to give us the power to fix the problem of *dukkha*. This is another problem with the models that see *paṭicca samuppāda* as describing cycles of rebirth: past and future lives related by *karma* are not *actually visible to us* [emphasis added], yet we should be able to *see for ourselves* [emphasis added] what these twelve steps are modeling. (This paper does not argue that the Buddha didn't teach rebirth, though it does argue that rebirth was not the lesson the Buddha was conveying by teaching dependent arising.)"[148] It is peculiar that she claims that the last nidana (Aging-

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[146] Linda S Blanchard, *Dependent Arising in Context: The Buddha's Core Lesson in the Context of His Times and Ours* (Milwaukee, WI: Nārada Publications, 2012)., 6

[147] See Bhikkhu Khantipalo, "The Wheel of Birth and Death," Access To Insight 1995, accessed January 9, 2019, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/khantipalo/wheel147.html#rim. Blanchard is correct that the suttas do not compare paṭiccasamuppāda to a circle/cycle. The analogy of a circle is too linear which does not mean that the "chain," as she puts, it does not repeat.

[148] Blanchard, *Dependent Arising in Context*., 7

Death) *stops* and does not directly link back to the first nidana (Ignorance) (which is true), but then immediately claims in her footnote that Aging-Death, as explained in the upanisās, is *named* dukkha which starts a series of steps to "break the chain." The longer definition of the last nidana is "aging-&-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering." I believe both Bhikkhu Bodhi and Bhikkhu Kañukurunde Ñāṇananda may have also missed the saṃvegic significance between the twelfth nidana and the first upanisā. Bhikkhu Bodhi writes, "The change—the substitution of "suffering" for "ageing-and-death" as the last member of the series—becomes the lead for the second application of dependent arising. … It begins with faith, emerging out of the suffering with which the first series ended, and continues through to the retrospective knowledge of liberation, which confirms the destruction of the binding defilements."[149] Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda discusses the connection between nidanas and upanisās in this way: "'[U]panisā' conveys the idea of 'relying on' or 'in association with'. Two possible results are seen in association with the experience of suffering. One is delusion. The other is search. The positive results of the search have already been mentioned. It is an upward path of purification where suffering (dukkha) leads to confidence (saddha)."[150] It is true that without the saṃvegic insight the experience of suffering could lead to a series of confounding emotions under the rubric "delusion." It is also true that the saṃvegic

[149] Bodhi, "Transcendental Dependent Arising: A Translation and Exposition of the Upanisa Sutta." 3. I am unaware of coverage of saṃvega in his other writings, but have not actively researched this.
[150] Ñāṇananda, *The Law of Dependent Arising: The Secret of Bondage and Release*. 57. I am unaware of coverage of saṃvega in his other writings, but have not actively researched this.

insight does lead to resolute conviction, confidence, and faith to pursue a resolution of suffering. But saṃvega is not a nebulous or incidental concept or emotion and so must be mentioned, addressed and properly aligned with the other teachings. The last nidana is unique in that it 1) is distinct as aging-&-death, 2) indicates the *apparent* identity of aging-&-death to dukkha, 3) simultaneously indicates the *inapparent* identity of aging-&-death to dukkha, and 4) indicates the *inapparent* identity of dukkha to all the nidanas. In short, saṃvega is the insight that reveals and makes apparent that all the nidanas are dukkha. This is a crucial insight. To have identified that the upanisās continue the nidanas, that the first upanisā is dukkha, and claim that the first upanisā simply *renames* the last nidana is to miss the mark. If the intention is to break the chain and the chain explicitly includes aging and death, what is the purpose of breaking the chain? The secular Buddhist answer is cessation of dukkha but demarcated within a single life. The transcendental Buddhist answer is cessation of dukkha which includes literal birth, rebirth, aging, re-aging, death, and re-death. Although she does not explicitly claim that the suttas either taught against rebirth (here meant literally as metempsychosis) or that the suttas are bereft of any affirmation of rebirth, the entirety of her understanding is a secular (i.e., naturalist) one as expressed by her chapter entitled "A Secular Understanding of Dependent Arising" and her surmise that the Buddha felt obligated to accept the status quo of rebirth (without necessarily believing in it) in exchange for his audience giving his true, deeper, and effectively secular message a chance. Arguing and presenting evidence for the likelihood of the Buddha's disingenuousness with regard to his teaching on rebirth, she partially summarizes, "For these reasons, the meme of "the

Buddha taught literal rebirth" has much greater visibility than does his deepest teachings about letting go of certainty and working only with what we can see for ourselves."[151] The citation of Blanchard's modern[152] interpretation brings to the foreground the evaded quasi-taboo elephant in the room of Buddhist studies, that of literal rebirth or reincarnation, which would force the addressing of transcendent contra natural, egocentric space contra absolute space, phenomenological contra empirical, and mental contra physical. With regard to phenomenological contra empirical—directly covered by the first and second sub-theses—she, as is consistent with a secular worldview, interprets "readily visible to us when it is pointed out," "actually visible to us," and "see it for ourselves," in an unmistakable empirical frame of reference. The issues now in the foreground if properly appreciated presents a struggle for the paramount meaning and consequences of early Buddhism. Referring to her modern interpretation, she notes:

> It seems improbable on the surface, which is why many traditional Buddhists see the "metaphorical rebirth" view as a much-distorted reinterpretation of the Buddha's teaching. Yet all that it reinterprets, really, is the traditional understanding—it is an effort at restoring what was there in the original texts, but has gone unnoticed for millennia. The structure of dependent arising, in the context of his times, makes sense of how it could be that he was speaking metaphorically yet the texts don't explicitly say so, and we can also see why the traditions might have come to fail to understand this one small but very significant aspect of the teaching.[153]

This worldview is expressed both in academic and popular Buddhist literature. Steve Hagen writes in his book *Buddhism is Not What You Think: Finding Freedom Beyond*

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[151] Blanchard, *Dependent Arising in Context*., xx

[152] As exemplified by her book's subtitle: The central teaching of the Buddha, drawn from the context of the society he lived in, and explained in terms of *modern* life.

[153] Blanchard, *Dependent Arising in Context*., xii-xiii

Beliefs, "One common understanding of Buddhism is that it involves reincarnation. But if we go back to the original insights of the Buddha, we don't find this teaching. What the Buddha taught was rebirth, not reincarnation. Though they are often confused, they are not the same at all."[154] Science and religion journalist, Robert Wright, recently wrote a book with a daring title: *Why Buddhism is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment*. Within two sentences he limits the purview of the "truth of Buddhism" to the mundane space, saying "I'm not talking about the "supernatural" or more exotically metaphysical parts of Buddhism—reincarnation, for example—but rather about the naturalistic parts: ideas that fall squarely within modern psychology and philosophy."[155]

A much more influential book is by agnostic Buddhist academic Stephen Batchelor entitled *Buddhism Without Beliefs: A Contemporary Guide to Awakening*. His position overlaps Blanchard's in the defense of the interpretation of an implied empiricism or empirical psychology taught by the Buddha as supposedly exemplified in the Kalama Sutta. Echoing the sentiments of this sutta, he offers, "These kinds of speculations lead us far from the Buddha's agnostic and pragmatic perspective and into a consideration of metaphysical views that cannot be *demonstrated or refuted, proven or disproven*. [emphasis added] …It is often claimed that you cannot be a Buddhist if you do not accept the doctrine of rebirth. From a traditional point of view, it is indeed

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[154] Steve Hagen, *Buddhism Is Not What You Think: Finding Freedom Beyond Beliefs* (San Francisco: PerfectBound, 2003)., 42

[155] Robert Wright, *Why Buddhism Is True: The Science and Philosophy of Meditation and Enlightenment*, First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017)., xi

problematic to suspend belief in the idea of rebirth, since many basic notions then have to be rethought. But if we follow the Buddha's injunction not to accept things *blindly* [emphasis added], then orthodoxy should not stand in the way of forming our own understanding."[156] The examination of these points made about rebirth, evidence, and views are very much reducible to the transcendentalist contra naturalist positions and the empiricist position. But there exists historical and textual evidence to counter the secular Buddhist position as well.

In explaining the essential separation between religious Buddhism and secular Buddhism, Batchelor writes, "The idea of rebirth is meaningful in religious Buddhism only insofar as it provides a vehicle for the key Indian metaphysical doctrine of actions and their results known as "karma." While the Buddha accepted the idea of karma as he accepted that of rebirth, when questioned on the issue he tended to emphasize its psychological rather than its cosmological implications."[157] Batchelor broaches the issue of incompatibility of domains, that of the seeming "microworld" of the "psyche" in psychology and the "macroworld" of cosmology. It might be helpful to tentatively label here for later discussion any overlap between the microworld and macroworld, the "micro-macroworld interface." That the Buddha's insight into karma's role as bondage (samsara) was both cosmological and psychological/phenomenological (as opposed to being physical as with the Jains, for instance) is taken by Batchelor as essentially a contrivance to bridge a status quo belief in rebirth toward what he authentically cared

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[156] Stephen Batchelor, *Buddhism Without Beliefs: A Contemporary Guide to Awakening* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1997)., 36
[157] Batchelor., 37

about—the psychologization of religion. Not only is this not so, it actually is an ingenious insight by the Buddha that prevents blind spots because frames of references are the "[o]verall context in which a problem or situation is placed, viewed, or interpreted. A too-narrow frame may leave out critical factors, whereas a too-broad frame may include many irrelevant distractions."[158] The very essence of human freewill—karma—is placed in the narrow and focused frame of microworld of intentionality and in the broad and panoramic frame of the microworld of cosmology.

The domains of psychology and cosmology are part of the very spaces introduced above and to be elaborated upon below. When he asserts of rebirth and karma that "All this has nothing to do, however, with the compatibility (or otherwise) of Buddhism and modern science. It is odd that a practice concerned with anguish and the ending of anguish should be obliged to adopt ancient Indian metaphysical theories and thus accept as an article of faith that consciousness cannot be explained in terms of *brain function* [emphasis added]. Dharma practice can never be in contradiction with science: not because it provides some mystical validation of scientific findings but because it simply is not concerned with either validating or invalidating them. Its concern lies *entirely with the nature of existential experience* [emphasis added],"[159] he is essentially claiming that Buddhism is a physicalist or natural phenomenology[160] wherein the start and end of dukkha indeed occurs in phenomenological consciousness, but that this consciousness is,

[158] "Frame of Reference," in *Business Dictionary*, Web Finance Inc, n.d., Accessed March 3, 2019.
[159] Batchelor, *Buddhism without Beliefs*., 37
[160] Smith, "Phenomenology." Smith writes "materialism was argued anew, urging that mental states are identical with states of the central nervous system."

at best, emergent from the nervous system. The traditionalist holds a position well described by Tillman Vetter: "The Buddhist doctrine of salvation ... seems firmly bound to the concept that one must continuously be reborn and die. If there is no rebirth, then one needs no path to salvation, because an end to suffering comes at death."[161] These views exemplify the traditionalist versus the modernist/secularist divergence and when logically reasoned through point toward the transcendental versus natural polarities. It takes a secularist to broach the perhaps delicate matter of the core belief of rebirth as the survival of bodily death and its accompanying religious cosmology. By this, I mean that the average traditionalist is convinced (by intuition, anecdote, or doctrine) of the core beliefs, but is confounded to speak up in light of the dominant naturalistic worldview. Batchelor and Blanchard attempt to salvage Buddhism from incompatibility with science and empiricism and hence from potential eventual irrelevance. The textual evidence, however, is aplenty that early Buddhism 1) is not "entirely" a phenomenology, 2) by way of paṭiccasamuppāda, bridges the phenomenological microworld (the system of the mind) to the cosmological macroworld (which is indistinguishable from survival of the body/brain to extra-naturalistic worlds), and 3) claims there to "exist" a transcendence of the mind beyond the/a consciousness emergent from brain matter and beyond consciousness emergent from any conditioning cosmological complex system. Put another way paṭiccasamuppāda is at least a phenomenology, a nonmetaphorical cosmology, and a soteriology beyond cosmology. Additionally, as will be relevant to my

[161] Quoted in Johannes Bronkhorst, "Did the Buddha Believe in Karma and Rebirth?," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 21, no. 1 (1998): 1–19. 3

sub-theses on phenomenology versus psychology, he seems to have conflated phenomenology and psychology.

2.8 The Upanisās as Paṭiloma and Paṭiloma as Scheme of Spatial Representation

Here I will point out that all the upanisās are essentially a gradual neutralizing of craving. Craving *is* the constant or constant theme in the entire scheme of the (mundane) upanisās and cessation of craving is the function of the upanisā design. The upanisās are the reversal of the arising of craving forward order—anuloma; therefore, the upanisās are paṭiloma. This is evident in at least a line found in the *Mulapariyaya Sutta: The Root Sequence*: "Therefore, with the total ending, fading away, cessation, letting go, relinquishment *of craving* [emphasis added], the Tathagata has totally awakened to the unexcelled right self-awakening, I tell you."[162] This is cardinally instructive to see cessation not mainly or only as an upanisā stage in the progression of the upanisā (which it is), but to see cessation stage as the perfecting or strengthening of weaker or lesser forms of cessation. Seen in this way #22 dispassion (viraga, which also means fading away) is for the sake of fading away *of craving*, #21 disenchantment is for the sake of breaking the magic spell *of craving* and so forth. This informs how we should consider #20 knowledge and vision of things as they are (yathābhūta-ñāna-dassana). By this scheme, if the cessation of craving leads to nibbana as the goal, then the meditator should see phenomena with an angle toward the cessation of craving. To have knowledge and vision of things as they are means that no phenomena whatsoever is worthy of craving.

[162] Ṭhānissaro, "Mulapariyaya Sutta: The Root Sequence."

"As they are" means the unrepresented, unmediated phenomena to the mind first within the mind/body frame and further reduced within the spatial representation away from the labeling of the conceptual structure. Once reduced to the analogicity of spatial representation, the task of the upanisic scheme is to gradually neutralize craving. "Neutralize" is an operative word in that it means "render (something) ineffective or harmless by applying an opposite force or effect."[163] This opposing force as we have discussed is saṃvega. More accurately saṃvega is the motivation impelling forms of disgust that more directly neutralize craving. The upanisās leading up to dispassion (viraga) are preparatory work to stage the watershed moment of irreversible stream-entry.

[163] Oxford Living Dictionary, "Neutralize," in *Oxford Living Dictionary* (Oxford University Press, March 3, 2019), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/neutralize.

Chapter Three: The Mistaken Empirical Purview of Paṭiccasamuppāda

"With reductionism comes the conviction that a court proceeding to try a man for murder is "really" nothing but the movement of atoms, electrons, and other particles in space, quantum, and classical events, and ultimately to be explained by, say, string theory."
Stuart Kauffman (2006)[164]

Chapter two is a natural continuation of chapter one's claim of a transcendental purview for paṭiccasamuppāda. This chapter could have easily been entitled "The Mistaken Natural Purview" or "The Mistaken Physicalist Purview." It will touch on these categories and reductionism to the extent that they shed light on distinguishing empiricism from phenomenology and demonstrating a misunderstanding that early Buddhism is a form of empiricism. Empiricism was chosen over naturalism and physicalism because empiricism and phenomenology are two sides of the same coin: experience, observation, and verification based initially on sense information. Further, it is perhaps meant to address any audience who are not yet convinced of physicalism in openness to the possibility of a complex and mysterious universe. Why focus on undermining a naturalism based on physicalism when they already have reasonable doubts? Physicalism seems a dogmatic conclusion many arguments away from the more reliable method of evidentiary knowledge as supposedly found in empiricism which has brought us smartphones, GPS and millions of other science-based conveniences. If empiricism is the entrenched epistemology of the scientific method and the Buddhist world claims alliance to it for the status of being the religion of the future. This chapter is

[164] Quoted in Vinod Wadhawan, *Complexity Science: Tackling the Difficult Questions We Ask About Ourselves and About Our Universe* (Saarbrucken, Deutschland: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing AG & Co. KG, 2010)., 243

understandably short because it serves as a segue to what I claim early Buddhism actually is—phenomenology. Based on my findings on the transcendental scope of paṭiccasamuppāda, reason should insist that if empiricism is allied closely with naturalism, then there is fault in imputing that early Buddhism is a form of empiricism. Unless perhaps empiricism is not so wedded to the current naturalism as we are led to believe. I wish to make only a few points on the weakness of this alliance generally and specifically empiricism's foundation for naturalistic psychology—the mainstream psychology Buddhism often seeks legitimacy in. I will start with some general conceptions about empiricism before arguing that empiricism as an epistemology is predisposed to metaphysics which is saying that empiricism is a method of knowing that is reliant on a worldview. I return to my contention that worldviews heavily influences method; specifically that we have not escaped from general commitments to monism—either mentalism or physicalism. Not surprisingly Buddhism's interaction with the west involved interactions with modernism leading to both competition and assimilation. The assimilation process has been thorough enough that Owen Flanagan believes Buddhism may already be naturalized. One of the sources in the assimilation struggle is Kulatissa Nanda Jayatilleke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (1963), a classic work establishing empiricism as early Buddhism's epistemology. This work was largely supported by his pupil David J. Kalupahana. There are some flaws in their assessments. In short, I contend that neither physicalism, naturalism, empiricism, nor psychology is the proper purview of paṭiccasamuppāda.

Because the theme of this chapter is the mistaken empirical purview of

paṭiccasamuppāda it might be confusing why so much is discussed on its limitations instead of just comparing empiricism and early Buddhism side by side. The answer is that I need to connect empiricism to phenomenology, then to paṭiccasamuppāda via subjectivity and the frames of reference. This chapter is best conceived as performing two main tasks: 1) showing what empiricism is by showing its task—determine theory for a set of evidence—and how it is actually exercised and applied by a) showing that in its performance of determining, it faces many plausible theories explaining the set of evidence, b) showing that there is subjectivity in selecting among the plausible theories, c) showing that plausible mentalist theories available in the philosophy of mind, d) showing that a physicalist worldview biases subjectivity to select only physicalist ones among the plausible theories, e) showing that there are strong plausible mentalist theories ignored by mainstream theorists of mind, and 2) showing what empiricism does in is not what Buddhism does by tracing some history and ideas leading to the identification of the two and then deconstructing it mainly by the frames of reference as segue to showing that Buddhism is actually a phenomenology.

3.1 The Prevalent Understanding of Empiricism

Elliott Sober claims that empiricism is mainly two separate "isms." The first is as a philosophical system opposing rationalism. R. S. Woolhouse traced this historical aspect of empiricism as well writing, "According to Bertrand Russell, 'one of the great historic controversies in philosophy' is that between empiricists—'best represented by the British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume'--and rationalists—'represented by the Continental philosophers of the seventeenth century, especially Descartes and

Leibniz'. The controversy, as Russell describes it, concerns the relation of our knowledge, ideas, and thought in general, to experience on the one hand, and reason on the other; each school seeing more, or less, importance in the one or the other of these possible sources of knowledge and ideas."[165] I believe it is important to show the historical vestige affecting our contemporary understanding and application of this "ism." Woolhouse continues his historical account stating:

> The fact is that the systematic use of the labels 'empiricist' and 'rationalist' is a product of nineteenth-century histories of philosophy, which saw seventeenth- (and eighteenth-) century philosophy in idealized terms … In these idealized terms, an empiricist will seek to relate the contents of our minds, our knowledge and beliefs, and their acquisition, to sense-based experience and observation. He will hold that experience is the touchstone of truth and meaning, and that we cannot know, or even sensibly speak of, things which go beyond our experience. A rationalist, on the other hand, holds that pure reason can be a source of knowledge and ideas; what we can meaningfully think about can transcend, and is not limited by, what we have been given in experience.[166]

3.2 Empiricism as Opposition to Scientific Realism

This version of the roots of empiricism is not wrong but rather divorced from our contemporary understanding and application. Sober echoes Woolhouse but with correction saying, "In accounts of the history of philosophy, empiricism is often contrasted with rationalism, though serious historians frequently look with jaundiced eye at this way of telling the story."[167] He reports that the current true opposition of

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[165] R. S. Woolhouse, *The Empiricists*, A History of Western Philosophy 5 (Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988)., 1
[166] Woolhouse., 2
[167] Sober, "Empiricism." 160

empiricism is scientific realism. Scientific realism is a worldview over the "very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important *metaphysical and semantic dimensions* [emphasis added], and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science."[168] This takes us quickly to the contestation via the philosophy of science over the metaphysical and semantic dimensions of the literal reality of the content of scientific knowledge. This metaphysical dimension is what I refer to as worldview, the most fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the universe and also at the same time the most panoramic frame of reference in the sense that it encompasses all lesser, smaller frames. This is the point I claimed in chapter one that the Buddha made about first level right view guiding religious practice. The bias modernity has in favor of science over religion is the bias in the supposed objective consensus in the foundations of science over the fickle subjectivity of religion. The certainty or reality of certain areas of scientific knowledge is however much contested. Anjan Chakravartty speaks of this writing, "It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that scientific realism is characterized differently by every author who discusses it."[169] One of the arguments against scientific realism is

[168] Anjan Chakravartty, "Scientific Realism," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Stanford, Calif: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University, June 12, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/.
[169] Chakravartty.

underdetermination which I will treat below. The opposition between empiricism and scientific realism is best summed by Sober as follows:

> A different kind of empiricism has been central to philosophy of science. Here empiricism contrasts with scientific realism, not with rationalism. When Galileo found himself in conflict with the Church, the philosophical issue concerned how heliocentrism should be interpreted. Galileo's interrogator, Cardinal Bellarmine, did not object to Galileo's using the hypothesis that the earth goes round the sun as a device for making predictions. His objection was to Galileo's assertion that heliocentrism is true. As a first approximation, realism maintains that well-confirmed scientific theories should be regarded as true, while empiricism maintains that they should be regarded as *empirically adequate* [emphasis added]– as capturing what is true about observable phenomena. Empiricists deny that it is ever rationally obligatory to believe that theories provide true descriptions of an unobservable reality. *It isn't that empiricists deny that quarks or genes exist; rather, they regard such realist affirmations as going beyond what the evidence demands*. *Empiricism is to realism as agnosticism is to theism* [emphasis added].[170]

Here we establish firstly that empiricism is quite another type than is scientific realism. The common person and even perhaps a number of scientists would have simply conflated the legitimizing evidentiary power of empiricism with scientific findings resulting from hypotheses, experimenting and so forth. This is not necessarily the case as an *explanation* to confirm certainty nor reality. The empiricists do not deny the reality of certain phenomena but only cannot commit as real that which does not fulfill the requirements of evidence. This anticipates the discussion of Buddhist phenomena such as Self and existents. The analogy between empiricism to realism as agnosticism to atheism

[170] Sober, "Empiricism." 160

is consistent with Buddhist "doubting" realist claims for theism based on the same grounds.[171]

3.3 Underdetermination and Superempirical Virtues

The philosophy of science's questioning of empiricism as the basis of scientific realism is best found in two closely related arguments: underdetermination and superempirical virtues. The idea behind underdetermination is that if evidence determines theory then a given set of evidence may be inadequate to determine or underdetermines the best among competing theories (also known as empirical equivalents). Kyle Stanford offers this explanation:

> At the heart of the underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence is the simple idea that the evidence available to us at a given time may be insufficient to determine what beliefs we should hold in response to it. In a textbook example, if all I know is that you spent $10 on apples and oranges and that apples cost $1 while oranges cost $2, then I know that you did not buy six oranges, but I do not know whether you bought one orange and eight apples, two oranges and six apples, and so on. A simple scientific example can be found in the rationale behind the sensible methodological adage that "correlation does not imply causation". … So a *high correlation* [emphasis added] between cartoon viewing and violent playground behavior *is evidence that (by itself) simply underdetermines what we should believe about the causal relationship* [emphasis added] between the two. But it turns out that this simple and familiar predicament only scratches the surface of the various ways in which problems of underdetermination can arise in the course of scientific investigation.[172]

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[171] See Thera Nyanaponika, "Buddhism and the God-Idea," 1996, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nyanaponika/godidea.html.
[172] Stanford, "Underdetermination of Scientific Theory."

This explanation of underdetermination not only undermines the ascertaining of scientific theory by empirical evidence, or, put differently, takes away certainty from often-changing and increasing available evidence and the explanations about them, it fortuitously touches upon the paṭiccasamuppāda's scope of causality. I prepare my concise treatment of causality later by claiming here that, even though I am trying to erode empiricism's support of what are essentially physicalist theories, empiricism pivoted or reduced toward the mind/body frame is the epistemological method for knowing causality. Stanford then explores the ramifications of underdetermination and citing literature that supports my proposition about epistemology being conditioned by a metaphysics or foundational worldview:

> Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend each suggested that because of underdetermination, the difference between empirically successful and unsuccessful theories or research programs is largely a function of the differences in talent, creativity, resolve, and resources of those who advocate them. And at least since the influential work of Thomas Kuhn, one important line of thinking about science has held that *it is ultimately the social and political interests (in a suitably broad sense) of scientists themselves which serve to determine their responses to disconfirming evidence* [emphasis added] and therefore the further empirical, methodological, and other commitments of any given scientist or scientific community.[173]

The supposed pristine objective method of empirically-based successful theories or non-empirically based unsuccessful theories still has its roots in the human being who holds a plethora of worldviews. But these insights from Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend are just

[173] Stanford.

more sophisticated and advanced assessments of what other intellectuals and common folks have long ago assumed or determined.

3.4 James's Temperament as Superempirical Virtue

William James scholar, Hunter Brown documented James's analysis on the role of temperament in all disciples the following way:

> Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that a great many convictions, especially those involved in religious, ethical and political belief systems, for example, are deeply indebted to the influence of 'fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, and circumpressure of our caste and set' as well as influences 'born of the intellectual climate.' Among the listeners in James's audience, he notes for instance, there are many who have strong convictions about the democratic system or about molecular physics. Their convictions are rooted not just in knowledge of political science or physics but in social consensus as well – 'the intellectual climate.' The personal willingness on the part of people to embrace certain prestigious conventions in these intellectual domains plays a formidable role in their beliefs.[174]

3.5 James's Living System as Worldview

This is my contention as well—that the intellectual climate of our time as largely influenced by our current prestigious caste of naturalist academics is biased in fear against supernaturalism and biased in hope of strengthening the physicalist paradigm. James himself wrote, "Temperaments with their cravings and refusals do determine men in their philosophies, and *always will* [emphasis added]. The details of systems may be reasoned out piecemeal, and when the student is working at a system, he may often forget

[174] Hunter Brown, *William James on Radical Empiricism and Religion* (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2000)., 47-48

the forest for the single tree. But when the labor is accomplished, the mind always performs its big summarizing act, and the *system forthwith stands over against one like a living thing* [emphasis added]."[175] It is clear to me that the forest is the worldview that we bracket away when it is convenient or limit as with the naturalist's purview disallowing any mentalism. The single tree is the minute argument and detail of evidence. The living system is one that seemingly has its own self-sustaining and defensive mechanisms. The life given to the (objective) system is sourced from the subjective and always will.

This subjectivity that lurks with the individual and his discipline also looms in the fortress of the scientific method. Sober in large measure disarms the high-mindedness of a perfect foundation of theory based objectively, solely, and directly on evidence. The subjectivity basically inherent in human-involved activities including theory selecting limits the goal of science, namely pure objectivity and a pure objective correlation between evidence and explanation. He summarizes his position citing a main form of empiricism as follows:

> [E]mpiricism … maintains that the goal of science is to bring observations to bear on the comparison of theories (Sober 1990). This goal is attainable; in fact, it has frequently been attained. I do not deny that scientists often want to discover which theories are true and often think they have done so. However, the humbling fact of the matter is that scientists are able to consider only those theories that have been formulated thus far. And, for the most part, there is no reason to think that the theories we have at hand exhaust the range of possible theories (Stanford 2006). The same point shows that what van Fraassen regards as the goal of science is often not attainable. Scientists may seek theories that are empirically adequate; however since the theories they consider are rarely exhaustive, they are often in

[175] William James, *William James: Writings 1902 1910. The Varieties of Religious Experience, Pragmatism, A Pluralistic Universe The Meaning of Truth, Some Problems of Philosophy, Essays*, ed. Bruce Kuklick, The Library of America 38 (New York, N.Y, 1987)., 501-2

> no position to say that the best of their theories is empirically adequate. It may be objected that finding true theories or theories that are empirically adequate must be among the goals of science, since scientists would be pleased if their pet theories had that status. My reply is that "the goals of science" in this context should be understood as the goals that scientific modes of inference are able to achieve; the hopes that scientists harbor for their theories are not at issue. The debate between realism and empiricism concerns the power of scientific inference, not the psychology of scientists.[176]

3.6 Worldview Stands Over Superempirical Virtues

The openness of options for scientists, in this case, to select among empirical equivalents to explain a set of data is not only freely acknowledged, but it also has a label: superempirical virtues. There is a flavor of the oxymoronic to say that explanations must be firmly fastened to data to be empirical; yet, the criterion (i.e., virtues) for selection among equal or near-equal competitors is beyond (i.e., super) the original criterion (i.e., empirical). It is, however, not an oxymoron because theories must be grounded in evidence; according to Sober, it is simply that at present no one can yet ground theory to evidence consummately.[177] But according to James, it never will. It is in reference to superempirical virtues that "Mary Hesse suggests that Quinean underdetermination showed why certain "non-logical" and "extra-empirical" considerations must play a role in theory choice, and claims that "it is only a short step from this philosophy of science to the suggestion that adoption of such criteria, that can be seen *to be different for different groups and at different periods* [emphasis added],

[176] Sober, "Empiricism." 167
[177] Sober., 168

should be explicable by social rather than logical factors."[178] This is a monumental and thoroughly consequential conclusion. To be clear, there are cases when the empirical evidence does *determine* the appropriate and precise theory; genuine empirical theories and facts do abound. Then there are cases of which we discussed. At the plebian level, certainly there are many who have voiced this but without the credentials of these philosophers of science whom I have cited.

3.7 The Three Main Worldviews in the Philosophy of Mind

Next, we turn to worldviews or what William James called living systems. It is appropriate to investigate the claims within the philosophy of mind not only because I am claiming mind to be the sine qua non of paṭiccasamuppāda but more immediately that the philosophy of mind is effectively the worldview for both the science of consciousness and for early Buddhists. This worldview will be the jury that adjudicates the available and plausible theories for consciousness worthy of the imprimatur of empiricism. William Jaworski writes, "Mind-body theories and mind-body problems form the core subject-matter of philosophy of mind. Mind-body theories offer different ways of understanding how mental and physical phenomena are related. They are divided into two broad categories: monistic theories and dualistic theories. Monistic theories claim that there is fundamentally one kind of thing. Physical monism or physicalism, as it is usually called, claims that everything is physical; everything can be exhaustively described and explained by physics. Mental monism, which is typically called 'idealism',

[178] Stanford, "Underdetermination of Scientific Theory."

claims that everything is mental – everything can be exhaustively described and explained using our prescientific psychological concepts."[179] These definitions help to keep the below discussion connected to fundamental conceptions of mind is and who we are. It is the unmistakable position of this paper that paṭiccasamuppāda is in opposition to physical monism and since the currently dominant scientific worldview is such then the question is whether it is mental monism or idealism. Scholars have indeed thought of early Buddhism and Yogācāra Buddhism in general as a form of idealism.[180] That serious scholars have thought early Buddhism as a form of idealism is already evidence of its diametrical position away from physicalism. There is something to be said for idealism, but given Jaworski's definition, I refrain from such imputation. There is a middle ground in dualism. He continues by stating, "dualistic theories deny that a single conceptual framework is sufficient to describe and explain everything. Rather, a complete description and explanation of everything require that we use both the mental and the physical conceptual frameworks."[181] The dynamics in dualism would take us closer to my conception of paṭiccasamuppāda as complex system, and it is clear dualism is not

[179] William Jaworski, *Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction* (Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011)., 1

[180] See G. P. Malalasekera, "Aspects of Reality," The Wheel Publication 127 (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1951). 3 and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*, 2., rev. ed (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975). It is worth noting that Chatterjee claims Yogācāra to be best classified as idealism and that Dan Lusthaus in Buddhist Phenomenology: a Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih lun claims Yogācāra to be best classified as phenomenology. Just based on this overlap we can gather that idealism and phenomenology should be significantly related. I will touch upon this briefly in the following chapter.

[181] Jaworski, *Philosophy of Mind*., 1

physicalism. So let us say that there are three main worldviews in the philosophy of mind.

Walter and Heckmann maintain:

> With regard to the philosophy of mind, the twentieth century has been the century of physicalism. … If judged only by head-counting, physicalism was undoubtedly the uncontested champion of twentieth century philosophy of mind. Yet, physicalism's hegemony comes at a price. Among the most serious obstacles for physicalism has been the problem to account for a chasm we experience in our daily lives, a chasm reminiscent of classical dualism's bifurcation between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*: on the one hand, we experience ourselves as autonomous agents with beliefs and desires that act the way they do because they have those beliefs and desires; on the other hand, we are, if physicalism is correct, no less part of the purely 'mechanistic' course of the physical world than any other physical system obeying the laws of nature, and thus in a certain sense mere 'automata.'[182]

Descartes's distinction between "res extensa" meaning extended, material and unthinking thing[183] and "res cogitans" meaning a thinking and unextended thing like mind and soul[184] are still relevant today and particular to my analysis of the mind, frames of reference, space and time.

3.8 The Plausible Irreducible-Mind Theories

In this section, I survey the latest empirical consciousness research sympathetic to what is being termed the *irreducible mind*. This positional conception in the philosophy of mind is referred to as the " irreducibility of conscious" or the "irreducibility of

[182] Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, eds., *Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action* (Exeter, UK ; Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2003)., v
[183] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res%20extensa
[184] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res%20cogitans

experiential conscious" by Thomas Nagel in his book *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False.*[185] However, this section relies mainly on Edward Kelly's et al. *Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century*. This is both an exercise in demonstrating the existence of empirical non-physicalist theories (coinciding as empirical support of a non-physicalist Buddhist view) and the poverty of empiricism as an objective foundation to certainty and reality. Nowhere in this 800 plus exhaustive research book is the new term *irreducible mind* defined.[186] The collective evidence and arguments presented is presumably the definition. We gather from the title that it is a psychological position to be significantly different from that of 20th-century psychology which is physicalist. More specifically I infer that it is a position in resistance against reductionism inherent in physicalism. The claim of the book "is that the science of the mind has reached a point where multiple lines of empirical evidence, drawn from a wide variety of sources, converge to produce a resolution of the mind-body problem along lines sharply divergent from the current mainstream view."[187] The term irreducible mind captures for me what I claim previously that mind is the sine qua non of paṭiccasamuppāda. Consciousness is reducible to modules and their individuated functions, but mind can transcend the reducible phenomena of consciousness. In this sense once mind attains transcendence, it can

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[185] Thomas Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012)., 68, 115

[186] In mentioned that mind is irreducible in a stronger sense than in David Chalmers's or John Searle's epiphenomenalism. This is an understatement because epiphenomenalism is a physicalist theory that acknowledges consciousness but not as independent or agentive; consciousness depends on body to arise as nerve signals loop through the brain and back as action.

[187] Edward F. Kelly et al., *Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century*, First paperback edition (Lanham Boulder New York Toronto Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2010)., 1

succinctly be thought of as irreducible mind.

To Kelly et al. mind is crucial, undismissible, and not prone to the main craft of physicalism—reducing. Kelly's position about reduction is as follows:

> Although facts have primacy, not all facts are of equal importance. The ones that should count the most, relative to a given problem, are obviously those that can contribute most to its solution. A useful principle that provides orientation and helps guide the search for such facts was stated as follows by Wind (1967): "It seems to be a lesson of history that the commonplace may be understood as a reduction of the exceptional, but the exceptional cannot be understood as an amplification of the commonplace" … This lesson has not penetrated contemporary cognitive science, which deals almost exclusively with the commonplace and yet presumes-extrapolating vastly beyond what in reality are very limited successes-that we are progressing inexorably toward a comprehensive understanding of mind and brain based on classical physicalist principles.[188]

This is a concise yet articulate "position statement" by the contributing empirical research scientists for the book on the scientism endemic in mainstream consciousness and psychological science which extrapolates indisputable physical facts upward to establish higher-order rules. Sometimes this extrapolation bears success, but clearly, it is bred by and breeds a chauvinism that biases the superempirical virtues. The "exceptional" is the label used in place of "supernatural." This is a delicate tactic not to place the presented evidence and theories by definition beyond acceptable laws of nature. The Buddha's naturalism is a set to him different from the physicalist's. The physicalist's is a set different from the non-physicalist's (defending an irreducible mind). It may be the

[188] Kelly et al., xxiv

authors' belief is to win the battle by inches; to move the demarcation of naturalism incrementally. With regard to the exceptional they write:

> Many critics also seem to presume that words like "paranormal" or "supernormal" are synonymous with "supernatural." That is not the case, however. Psi phenomena (and certain other unusual phenomena that we will discuss in this book) are in our view inconsistent only with the current materialistic synthesis, summarized by Broad (1962) in the form of *widely accepted* [emphasis added] "basic limiting principles." They do not obviously or necessarily conflict with more fundamental laws of nature, and indeed to claim such a conflict is to presume that we already know all the relevant laws, which hardly seems likely. The authors of this book emphatically do not believe in "miracles," conceived as breaches of natural law. Our attitude is that these *seemingly anomalous phenomena* [emphasis added] occur not in contradiction to nature itself, but only in contradiction to what is presently known to us of nature. The phenomena we catalog here are important precisely because they challenge so strongly the current scientific consensus; in accordance with Wind's principle, they not only invite but should command the attention of anyone seriously interested in the mind.[189]

3.9 Anomalous Phenomena as Unwelcome Entities

The "seemingly anomalous phenomena" are none other than the unwelcome entities dogmatically guarded against by scientism. The exhibition of physicalist chauvinism abounds in the scientific world at with detriment to the principle of science itself. Kelly makes this crucial point this way:

> We do, however, want to highlight here one particular critical strategy that has been very commonly and inappropriately employed. Most critics implicitly—and some, like Hansel (1966, p. 19), explicitly—take the view that psi phenomena are somehow known a priori to be impossible. In that case one is free to invent any scenario, no matter how far-fetched, to explain away ostensible evidence of psi. Because there are *no perfect laboratory experiments* [emphasis added]—nor, for

[189] Kelly et al., xxviii

> that matter, perfect "spontaneous" cases involving psi experiences occurring outside of a laboratory—any positive result whatever can be discredited in this way, and thus any potential accumulation of evidence aborted. … The extent to which many critics have been willing to pursue this strategy reveals the *depth of their emotional commitment* to *current scientific orthodoxy* [emphasis added], and is to us nothing short of amazing. Contrast this with the attitude expressed by James (1920): "I believe there is no source of deception in the investigation of nature which can compare with a fixed belief that certain kinds of phenomenon [i.e., evidence] are *impossible*" (p. 248). Can there be any doubt which is the scientifically more responsible attitude?[190]

3.10 The Poverty of Empiricism When Beholden to Superscientific Virtues

This scientistic position is not an allegiance to truth or the scientific principles, but to an orienting worldview. Surely it is not a commitment to the decree and command of empiricism. This is beyond superempirical virtues; it rises to "superscientific" virtues. Superempirical virtues refer to the proclivity of the assessor but nonetheless bounded by the requirement to assess all available submitted near-equal explanations or empirical equivalents. This is not the case as documented above. The acclivitous and pervasive battles that non-physicalist scientists engage in often has that unjust feel of a kangaroo court where the mainstream physicalists are judge, jury, and defense, and the non-physicalists are the claimants. The jury (mainstream scientists) are in partnership with the defense (the mainstream scientists from other physicalist science) dogmatically ignoring or dismissing the substantial evidence, and even worse, the judge is ignoring basic principles of law (the science). The claimant never gets a hearing and is sometimes ridiculed. In superscientific-virtue terms, the proclivity of the assessor rises to

[190] Kelly et al., xxvii-xxviii

precommitments so that in the assessing among 1) (the non-physicalist's) submitted theories for a set of non-physical phenomena and 2) (their own) pre-submitted "fact" or dogma that any submitted theories determining non-physical phenomena are null and void (i.e., impossible) there is a transgression of the empirical mandate *to determine*. The lesson from the scientific revolution should be something like a victory of the dispassionate method over the dogmatisms of the church, but instead, the lesson apparently learned as being panned out is that the struggle over the supernatural continues. This fixed mindset that science progresses in a zero-sum tug of war with supernaturalistic claims over the demarcation of naturalism is the same mindset it won victory over; "for when current scientific opinion hardens into dogma it becomes scientism, which is essentially a type of fundamentalism, a secular theology, and no longer science."[191] Empiricism as a foothold for truth is sometimes only a privilege for those in the status quo position to dictate and perpetuate the authoritative worldview. Empiricism is valid, proper, and required inspection, but history and the present situation tells us worldviews are the panoramic frames of reference in which all other frames (including the empirical and mind/body frames) are but subsets.

3.11 Science as Dispassionate Inquiry

The inclusion in the quote above on the scope and nature of (exceptional) phenomena in the universe being spontaneous and not necessarily patterned and regular to accommodate laboratory (and by implication the current measuring instruments of

[191] Kelly et al., xxiii-xxiv

science and technology) investigation is another barrier to impartial and *dispassionate* scientific inquiry. William James said of this that "science means, first of all, a certain dispassionate method. To suppose that it means a certain set of results that one should pin one's faith upon and hug forever is sadly to mistake its genius, and degrades the scientific body to the status of a sect."[192] This is justifiably called "methodolatry … the methodological face of scientism."[193] The germ theory of disease competed against the miasma theory of disease for centuries with germ theory being the target of disdain until tools were developed to falsify one or the other.[194] The lesson is to not dismiss theories as impossible but to insist that hypotheses are formulated to scientific standards—essentially meaning they should be falsifiable. The role of dispassion in Buddhist "objective" observation, inspection with the bracketing of entanglement in subjectivity (e.g., subjective "I" making and "mine" making) is most interestingly the genius of paṭiccasamuppāda. This is treated in my chapter on phenomenology.

3.12 A Sampling of Empirical Irreducible-Mind Evidence

So far in this chapter, I have referred repeatedly to exceptional empirical evidence. Kelly et al.'s book is not solely a philosophical and scientific apology for supernormal acceptance and further research, it delivers in quality and brute numbers hundreds if not thousands of empirically documented exceptional phenomena that

[192] As quoted in Kelly et al., xxiv
[193] Kelly et al., xxviii
[194] See Kelly et al., xxv-xxvi for more examples initial rejections of eventual prove science including plate tectonics and blood circulation.

challenge the status quo understanding in physiology, brain science, biology and so forth. I present two from the book.

The autonomic nervous system is a control system that functions principally outside consciousness and regulates bodily functions such as heart and respiratory rate, pupillary response, digestion, urination, defecation, and sexual response.[195] The first case of autonomic changes voluntarily induced by a yogi was documented thus:

> [Among the] more extreme case, observed and reported by Kothari, Bordia, and Gupta (1973a, 1973b), involved a yogi who was confined to a small underground pit for *eight days* [emphasis added], connected to an EKG with 12 leads "short enough not to allow any movement" (1973b, p. 1646). Almost immediately after the pit was sealed, a significant sinus tachycardia developed and progressed until it reached 250 beats per minute, but without any sign of ischemia. This tachycardia continued for 29 hours when, suddenly and with no prior slowing of the heart rate, "a straight-line had replaced the [EKG] tracing" (p. 1647; a reproduction of the tracings is in the report). The investigators wanted to terminate the experiment, understandably fearing that the yogi was dead, but his attendants insisted that it continue. The flat-line state persisted for five more days until, half an hour before the experiment was scheduled to end, sinus tachycardia again developed. This continued for two hours after the yogi was removed from the pit, when his heart rate finally returned to normal (98 beats per minute). The obvious explanation, that the EKG leads had been disconnected, was ruled out, first because the machine was immediately checked for any malfunctioning, but more importantly because no electrical disturbance ever appeared, such as would accompany the disconnection of the leads; subsequent attempts by the investigators to disconnect the leads always produced "gross and irregular electrical disturbance." Moreover, malfunction of the machine was highly unlikely, since "the [EKG] re-appeared spontaneously on the last day" (p. 1649), an "extraordinary coincidence" if it had been a malfunction of the machine (M. Murphy, 1992, p. 535). Having ruled out such explanations, the authors candidly admitted that they were "not prepared" to accept that the yogi had voluntarily

[195] A. Schmidt and G. Thews, "Autonomic Nervous System," in *Human Physiology*, ed. W. Janig, 2nd ed. (New York, N.Y: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg & Co. K, 1989), 333–370.

> stopped his heart for five days and survived; but they could "offer no satisfactory explanation for the [EKG] record before us" (p. 1649).[196]

This case summary is exceptional not only that a human being was able to survive eight days underground presumably with very little oxygen but that modern empirical instruments recorded in real-time the pace of his heart was flatlined for five days as is consistent with no oxygen intake. This empirically documented phenomenon does not necessarily abrogate the autonomy in the autonomous nervous system. It does demand that physiologists should formulate new hypotheses and perhaps adjust the bell curve on the functional range of the autonomous nervous system. More relevant to the philosophy of mind, the physicalists impugn mental agency which this case supports. In short, if an average human being can be demonstrated by the physical rules of physiology to survive underground for say one day with a statistical margin of say five then an exceptional nearly eightfold increase stands as supernormal. And this supernormalcy is not a result of a random human being surviving, but a yogi who claims by his agency, i.e., using his intention to manipulate his body, he can effectively stop his heart and suspend his oxygen intake many times beyond the marginal limits of physicalist physiology. The literature is replete with evidence of yogis and others who can change by volition their body or parts of their body temperature up to nearly 47 degrees Fahrenheit.[197]

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[196] Kelly et al., *Irreducible Mind*., 177-8.
[197] Kelly et al., 178-9.

According to the standard brain model sight as part of consciousness is also physically constituted. When the physical brain is functioning optimally consciousness is operating optimally as is with sight; there is at least a strong correlation between the two. Yet within the literature on Near-Death Experience (NDE) [198]—brought on by being nearly dead or clinically dead—people have profound and exceptional experiences when the standard model predicts the opposite. Kelly et al. write: "Ring and Cooper (1997, 1999) reported 31 cases of blind individuals, nearly half of them blind from birth, who experienced during their NDEs quasi-visual and sometimes veridical perceptions of objects and events. Many of these people, like other NDE experiencers, also said that they saw a bright light."[199] There are two exceptional distinct phenomena documented here; "new" vision and veridical perceptions when the brain is dying (physically decline). These should present superempirical virtues into play and they do.[200] Normally the physicalist mainstream presents a panoply of the usual tools to explain away the exception of the phenomenon instead of adjusting the model which is in keeping with science; when a hypothesis not endures but successfully predicts and subsumes exceptions it should be elevated to theory, but when a hypothesis is continually challenged by exceptions to its predictions the hypothesis must change. Veridical perceptions being a special case of space perception directly connects us to the frames of reference. The Encyclopaedia Britannica explains veridical perceptions as follows:

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[198] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/near-death%20experience and https://iands.org/ndes/about-ndes/what-is-an-nde.html

[199] Kelly et al., *Irreducible Mind*., 389.

[200] See What causes a near-death experience in https://iands.org/ndes/about-ndes/what-is-an-nde.html

> Space perception research also offers insight into ways that perceptual behaviour helps orient the individual to the environment. Specifically, orientation in space typically seems to reflect one's strivings (e.g., to seek food or to avoid injury). People could not orient themselves to their environments, however, unless the environmental information reaching them through the various sense organs offered a perception of space that corresponds to their physical "reality." Such perception is called veridical perception—the direct perception of stimuli as they exist. Without some degree of veridicality concerning physical space, one cannot seek food, flee from enemies, or even socialize.[201]

3.13 Brain-impaired Veridical Perception as Evidence for Reality of Mind Beyond Physicalism

According the International Association of Near Death Studies website: "One of the most fascinating aspects of NDEs is "veridical perception," in which the near-death experiencer reports seeing or hearing events during their NDEs that, given the condition and/or position of their physical bodies, should have been impossible to perceive but are nevertheless corroborated as accurate. Because this phenomenon should be an impossibility given our current understanding of how the brain functions, it has aroused intense controversy and interest. Because this phenomenon should be an impossibility given our current understanding of how the brain functions, it has aroused intense controversy and interest."[202] Kelly et al. document an example as follows: the near-death experiencer watched "the cardiac surgeon "flapping his arms as if trying to fly." The surgeon verified this detail by explaining that, after scrubbing and to keep his hands from

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[201] Louis Jolyon West, "Space Perception," in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, accessed January 28, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/science/space-perception#ref488146.

[202] https://iands.org/jupgrade/?catid=0&id=229 retrieved 03/18/2019

possibly becoming contaminated before beginning surgery, he had developed the idiosyncratic habit of flattening his hands against his chest, while rapidly giving instructions by pointing with his elbows."[203] Such veridical perceptions occur in out of body experiences also and during unconsciousness.[204] The entirety of the exceptional phenomena cataloged and explained in *The Irreducible Mind* give empirical credibility to the agency of mind and precedence and priority of mind over matter. It is the veridical perception without consciousness (i.e., active brain support) that should untether the frames of reference with mind as pivot away from the imperative of physicalism. The veridical perception is none other than the 1st and 2nd centroidal frames of reference. Not only does the mind/body frame have a reality beyond the physical, the 1st and 2nd centroidal frames have reality also.

3.14 Buddhists Jockey for Position

In this section, I rely heavily on David McMahan's book *The Making of Buddhist Modernism*. McMahan identifies Buddhist modernity by analyzing Buddhism's interaction with the three discourses of modern man as offered by Charles Taylor namely: 1) Christianity, 2) scientific naturalism, and 3) Romanticism. This section will only discuss these modern discourses as part of the dynamic forming and revealing what McMahan labels the *discourse of scientific Buddhism* and how empiricism and naturalism are becoming the new identity for Buddhism.

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[203] Kelly et al., *Irreducible Mind*., 390.
[204] Kelly et al., 399.

Currently, Buddhism has a generally positive image in America. McMahan maintains, "Most non-Asian Americans tend to see Buddhism as a religion whose most important elements are meditation, rigorous philosophical analysis, and an ethic of compassion combined with a *highly empirical psychological science that encourages reliance on individual experience* [emphasis added]. It discourages blindly following authority and dogma, has little place for superstition, magic, image worship, and gods, and is *largely compatible with the findings of modern science* [emphasis added] and liberal democratic values."[205] Donald S. Lopez Jr. has also analyzed "modern Buddhism" that has "the Buddha's original message as deeply compatible with modern conceptions of "*reason, empiricism, science*, [emphasis added] universalism, individualism, tolerance, freedom and the rejection of religious orthodoxy." [206] But this public image has not arisen naturally and passively. How does a religion—founded over 2,500 years ago—get to be regarded so? It involved active construction by many participants whose incentives are best explained by the negotiation of and navigating the three discourses leading sometimes to uncomfortable and contradictory positions. McMahan continues,

> Part of the appeal of Buddhism to the West, as well as its renewed prestige in Asia, has been the prospect that Buddhism could be understood as a "rational religion" uniquely compatible with modern science. This has been an important aspect of the construction of Buddhist modernism historically and remains an essential part of its claims to legitimacy today. Yet many Buddhists have been critical of scientific materialism, the technologies of warfare, the destruction of the environment, and the hope that technology can bring about well-being. Buddhist modernism has, therefore, maintained an ambivalent relationship with

[205] David L. McMahan, *The Making of Buddhist Modernism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)., 6
[206] McMahan., 8

> science, allying itself with its basic claims on the one hand while attempting to serve as its corrective on the other.[207]

Although in this paper I have defined empiricism in contrast to rationalism in my attempt to extract empiricism's technical meaning, the public—not incorrectly—clusters "science," "rational," "empirical," "modern," "critical" and so forth more or less together. So when the public is deemed to understand that Buddhism is a "rational" religion, they deem it as scientific, empirical, modern, and critical. McMahan documents the navigating for Buddhism's new modern identity so: "Buddhist modernism has not only been significantly influenced by these discourses but also has carved out a place for itself in the tensions between them. In short, it has aligned itself with scientific rationalism to make a case that it is a "rational religion" over against Christianity. Yet it has also been wary of the materialistic implications of science and has *drawn on the language of … psychology, with their emphasis on interior depths and internal realities, to counter these implications* [emphasis added].[208]

Buddhist modernists are justified in their wariness of the materialistic[209] implications of physicalist science. If they would follow the logic a few steps further they would know as we have discussed above that nearly the entirety of their scientists are physicalist and likely secular theologians whose naturalism precludes the literalness of

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[207] McMahan., 11
[208] McMahan., 23
[209] I understand that "materialism" here means more preoccupation with material over spiritual concerns and not the "scientific materialism" as used in this paper; however, the two overlap in their disregard for the spiritual.

their understanding of karma, rebirth, and the possibility of transcendence. The pervasiveness and historical success of science and technology seem an ineluctable force and a fast-moving proverbial boat not to be missed. But alliance with science is not simply fear of becoming obsolete; it is a chance to gain advantage over old religious rivals. McMahan cites a scholarly claim as follows:

> In the International Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, published in India, an anonymous essay entitled "Religion without Speculation" contrasts Buddhism to *"unscientific or speculative religion, the sort which is almost entirely the only kind known to the West"* [emphasis added] (Singh 1996: 18:45). Buddhism, it says, is intellectual enlightenment, supreme intuition. And it is this which differentiates it from all other religions or philosophical systems: it is nonspeculative, scientific. . . . What Gotama did was not to devise a law or formulate a system, but to discover a law, to perceive a system. His part may be compared to that of Copernicus or Galileo, Newton or Harvey, in physical science. . . . Buddhism extends the natural laws, the laws of causality to the mental or psychic domain, or, more exactly, perceives their operation in this sphere, and thereby *disposes of the idea of supernatural or transcendental* [emphasis added] agencies working independent of or in contravention to the natural laws of the universe.[210]

The word "dispose of" has a few meanings. Here "dispose of" means to get rid of. I return to my discussion of the Buddha's own conception of the purview of the mundane. He opens up the possibilities, horizon, and delimitation of what is natural; his naturalism includes our current mainstream naturalism *and* our current supernaturalism. But by contrast and somewhat ironically Buddhist modernists are claiming the opposite: that the Buddha's naturalism is our mainstream version without all the (in their eyes) embarrassing supernatural and transcendental elements. But since the Buddha did not

[210] McMahan, *The Making of Buddhist Modernism*., 89-90

discover the heliocentric theory as Copernicus did, nor demonstrate it as Galileo did, nor discover gravity as Newton did, his relevance, especially in causal terms, must be in the "psychic domain."

3.15 Trading Transcendence for Acceptance

This willingness to effectively throw out the baby with the bathwater is, as noted, rooted competition and adaptation. It occurs at the traditional, academic, and popular levels. McMahan points out that all religions and isms have to adjust to modernity but Buddhism is particularly outstanding. He notes, "In the last few decades, a steady stream of both popular and academic books has addressed the subject of Buddhism and the sciences …. The compatibility of Buddhism and modern science has become not only a staple of popular Buddhist literature but also a hypothesis in a number of quite sophisticated experimental studies. While all historical religious traditions in their encounters with modernity have had to reinterpret doctrines in light of science's dominance …and unsurpassed legitimacy … perhaps no major tradition has attempted to ally itself with scientific discourse more boldly than Buddhism."[211] With so much support and so little resistance, how far along is the naturalization of Buddhism? Owen Flanagan's answer is, ""Buddhism naturalized" is in the declarative mode, thus inviting being read as a moniker for a kind of Buddhism that already exists, and indeed I think it does."[212] I believe there are at least two aspects of Buddhism that have both contributed to Buddhists' bold embrace of the scientific discourse and the scientific discourse's

[211] McMahan., 90
[212] Flanagan, *The Bodhisattva's Brain*., 3

reembrace. The first is *upaya-kaushalya* meaning "skill in means" and often applied as meaning expedient means or adjusting the teachings to the language and customs of the location. By this argument this was how Buddhism was able to spread wide beyond its local origins. And adjusting the teachings of the Buddha to modern empirical science is not difficult when paṭiccasamuppāda is so easily misunderstood as teaching an empirical method which the modern world has established as the foundation of scientific inquiry. The second is the constellation of teachings that appear to ally with science such as the Kalama Sutta which covers authority and evidence and paṭiccasamuppāda which covers causality.

3.16 Buddhist Theologians Walk a Tightrope

Some of the most influential Buddhist theologians and apologists were originally from the Buddhist island of Sri Lanka. Their works were widely read by traditionalists, modernists, and academics. Among them McMahan cites three along with their positions in this way:

> In the mid–twentieth century, Nyanaponika Thera called Buddhist meditation a "science of mind," drawing from earlier spiritualist terminology, and presented the method of "bare attention" as essentially the same as that of the scientist: "unprejudiced receptivity" to things, reduction of the subjective element in judgment, and "deferring judgment until a careful examination of the facts has been made." This is the "genuine spirit of the research worker," though Buddhist meditation goes beyond "explanation of facts" and a "theoretical knowledge of the mind" to an attempt to shape the mind itself …. K. N. Jayatilleke and David Kalupahana and other scholars developed this line of thinking in detail, presenting Buddhism as a kind of "radical empiricism" akin to that of David Hume and William James ….[213]

[213] McMahan, *The Making of Buddhist Modernism*., 206

Nyanaponika's descriptions of Buddhist meditation and its aspects will be treated in my discussion on phenomenology. K. N. Jayatilleke's *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* has played an important role in legitimizing early Buddhism being compatible with the epistemological foundations of science. David Kalupahana, his former student, also advanced the notion that early Buddhism is a kind of radical empiricism.

3.17 The Imputed Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge

I title this section so because Jayatilleke's book title captures his position concisely. Published in 1963 its remains the most comprehensive and scholarly early Buddhism as empiricism treatise. Because my claim is that empiricism has been mistakenly attributed to early Buddhism I would be remiss not to address Jayatilleke's thesis. With the assistance of Frank Hoffman's critical journal article "The Buddhist Empiricism Thesis," I rebut several of his contentions and ultimately the thesis of the book.

Jayatilleke does not see the Buddha as the inventor of empiricism within Indian philosophy but as part of the Indian empiricist tradition. He writes, "The student of Indian philosophy should find here material pertaining to the 'prehistory' of systematic Indian logic and epistemology and the origins of the Indian empiricist tradition" and that "[t]he origins of the Indian empiricist tradition and its development in Early Buddhism are largely unknown to Western scholarship, despite the fact that T. W. Rhys Davids at a very early date compared Buddhism Comtism with and Radhakrishnan went so far as to say that 'Early Buddhism was positivist in its outlook and confined its attention to what

we perceive'."[214] I do believe his meticulously documented contention that some form of empiricism was practiced before and during the Buddha's milieu, including by the Materialists already discussed in this paper. Hoffman's thesis is "that early Buddhism is not a form of empiricism,"[215] directly rebutting Jayatilleke and Kalupahana's positions. In the same way as I have done connecting the thought process from empiricism to naturalism to antisupernaturalism, he notes, "Determining whether or not the Buddhist empiricism thesis is adequate is crucial for gaining understanding of particular doctrines such as kamma and *punabbhava* (action and rebirth), which are sometimes interpreted as part of an empirical theory of moral responsibility across lives."[216] He says that Jayatilleke and his former students David Kalupahana and Gunapala Dharmasiri "have interpreted early Buddhism as an *empirical viewpoint* [emphasis added]." Whether intended or not the term empirical viewpoint can be revealing. A viewpoint is but a frame of reference. And as I have claimed even the empirical viewpoint can be beholden to superempirical and superscientific virtues that are beholden to, loyal to, or pre-committed to worldviews. Is this the case? Hoffman says that "[a]ligning early Buddhism with empiricism may be seen from the point of view of Buddhist apologetics to offer advantages. Both the prestige of science and the popularity in the West of empiricism might be harnessed in support of an ancient way of life."[217] Once Jayatilleke supposedly established early Buddhism as an empirical theory of knowledge, "Kalupahana picks up

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[214] Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*., 9, 11
[215] Frank J. Hoffman, "The Buddhist Empiricism Thesis," *Religious Studies* 18, no. 2 (June 1982): 151–58. 151. Hoffman does not offer in his article a replacement for empiricism.
[216] Hoffman., 151
[217] Hoffman., 152

this line and applies it in order to contrast an empirical early Buddhism with a metaphysical Hinduism … Dharmasiri also picks up the Buddhist empiricism refrain, but uses it differently in order to contrast a rational, scientific, and empirical orientation in early Buddhism with an irrational, baseless one in Christianity."[218] This is consistent with McMahan's discourse on scientific Buddhism that Buddhism consociates with empirical science as a hedge against an old Hindu rival and a more recent Christian rival. If we consider, as we should, the Pali texts as available empirical evidence to determine the thesis "early Buddhism holds an empirical viewpoint" then Hoffman, McMahan and I agree that Jayatilleke et al. exhibit pre-commitments to gaining modern acceptance for early Buddhism. Of course this does not by itself negate their arguments or conclusion. The point made is that the empirical viewpoint is not as pristine and innocent as commonly assumed. It may explain some seemingly self-defeating claims Jayatilleke and Kalupahana propose. Hoffman pinpoints the key paragraph on which the empiricism thesis is based thusly:

> We have tried to show that perception (normal and paranormal) and inductive inference are considered the means of knowledge in the Pāli Nikāyas. The emphasis that 'knowing' (jānam) must be based on 'seeing' (passaṃ) or *direct perceptive experience* [emphasis added], makes Buddhism a form of Empiricism. We have, however, to modify the use of the term somewhat to mean not only that all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience but from extrasensory experience as well. This extension we believe is justified in the light of the reasons that we gave earlier (*v. supra*, 735). The definition of the term in Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy also allows us to use the term 'empiricism' to include the entire conscious content of the mind and not merely the data of the senses: 'That the sole source of knowledge is experience. . . . Experience may be understood as either all conscious content, data of the senses only or other

[218] Hoffman., 151

> designated content' (*s.v.*). Its empiricism is also seen in its attitude to the problems of substance (*v. supra*, 535), cause (*v. supra*, 778), the a priori (*v. supra*, 429, 436), perception (*v. supra*, 744), meaning (*v. supra*, 536 f.) and lastly metaphysics (*v. supra*, 377 ff.; infra, 816).[219]

I note here that Jayatilleke connects empiricism to *direct experience*. Hoffman distills the early Buddhism-as-empiricism thesis as founded on the expansion of the definition of empiricism and so relying on Runes' definition. This would entail: "first, that it is held that the data of intuitive experience may be *misinterpreted* and erroneous inferences drawn from it; secondly, that Buddhism makes no claim about mystical knowledge *derived* from an unaccountable, allegedly supernatural source, instead basing its knowledge claims on a view of the natural development of mind in accordance with causal processes; thirdly, that it does not regard the *content* of meditative experience as identical with ultimate reality; and fourthly, that it *does not reject normal perception* but uses it as did the Materialists as a basis for drawing many of its conclusions."[220] I believe this summary is accurate. I paraphrase his summary as follows: 1) Non-empirical data is intuitive, speculative and subject to error, 2) that although Buddhism makes mystical claims they are all grounded in verifiable natural causal mind processes that include extrasensory perception, 3) that the content of realization (i.e., the transcendent upanisās) are not themselves real but are propositional (i.e., determining veracity of hypotheses) as mandated by the empirical method, and 4) that extrasensory perception works in tandem

[219] Hoffman., 151-2
[220] Hoffman., 152

with the Materialist's normal sensory perception which is the same our mainstream empiricism's.

3.18 A Critique of the Empirical Buddhist's Thesis

3.18.1 The Prima Facie Demarcation Flaw

Hoffman's refutation is based on the perils of removing the empirical demarcation. The strength of empiricism is that it grounds knowledge in verification; this is its demarcation from non-empirical knowledge. Jayatilleke opens up the definition and hence mental space for what constitutes empirical knowledge and so unwittingly includes knowledge that are by definition not empirical such as mathematical knowledge. Hoffman distills the argument further writing:

> At the heart of Jayatilleke's conception of 'Buddhist empiricism' and that of his former students, Kalupahana and Dharmasiri, is the notion that it is a justifiable extension of the word 'empiricism' to have it cover the mind as a sixth sense where this concept of mind includes *abhiññā* [emphasis added]. The abhiññā are variously translated as 'psychic powers' and (less grammatically but more frequently as) 'higher knowledges', to indicate a range of abilities acquired through years of meditation. Some of these abilities, such as retrocognition of past lives, are thought to provide a basis for knowledge claims *kamma* and rebirth. Above Jayatilleke has observed that 'experience' may mean 'either all conscious content, data of the senses only or other designated content' (following Runes), so that it might seem open to anyone to accept a broad definition of empiricism on which 'experience' is understood as including 'all conscious content'. But empiricism cannot be understood this way, for then it would include e.g., mathematical truths and would not distinguish conceptual truths from empirical ones.[221]

[221] Hoffman., 152-3

The Buddhist empiricist's preoccupation with abhiññā—as representative of all the mental states especially supernormal states—is part of their tightrope act to be both religious and empirico-scientific. Abhiññā is interpreted as a gateway between science and Buddhist *propositional* truth claims such as karma and rebirth. In this way, their Buddhism-as-empiricism thesis is reliant on abhiññā becoming an accepted and sanctioned component of empiricism's canon of sense experience—those that are prima facie among all common people. Abhiññā has to be developed and in a particular Buddhist fashion, therefore, it is in no way prima facie. This is the first flaw of the empirical Buddhist's thesis. Hoffman's analysis is the same but from another angle; he argues that if standard empirical "experience" is extended to include all mind content then the demarcation between rational and empirical is lost. With this demarcation lost, then the intent of empiricism is also lost. If we put Hoffman's and my analyses together we might label this first flaw the prima facie demarcation flaw.

3.18.2 The Agnostic Flaw

I believe Hoffman's analysis is sufficient to refute Jayatilleke's enterprise because the enterprise hinges on Runes' overly broad definition and this definition, in turn, dissolves the crucial intent of the proper limits or demarcation of empiricism. He expounds further:

> Typically 'empiricism' is used in contrast to 'rationalism'. Empiricism is a theory of knowledge which holds that some (on a weak view) or all (on a strong view) knowledge or the materials of knowledge is either derived from sense experience or is dependent upon sense experience rather than on reason. On a rather crude interpretation, reasoning is thought of as taking place 'in' the mind,

> whereas the senses are thought of as quite different in kind from the mind and as the sources of knowledge. The clearest formulation of this unsophisticated version is perhaps in Locke's writings in which the mind is thought of as a blank slate which is written on by means of sense activity. Here there is a contrast of experience on the one side and mind on the other. But in early Buddhism the mind is not envisaged as different in kind from the senses but rather as one gateway *alongside* the five senses. Hence, Locke's view of 'sensory experience' would be one-sided and unacceptable to the early Buddhist view.[222]

What he is suggesting is that the difference between the enterprise of (Locke's) empiricism and the enterprise early Buddhism can be distinguished in the framing of the doubt and speculation they wish to overcome and the knowledge they wish to attain. For Locke the mind has certainty and knowledge of observables because they are direct and free of conceptual error; beyond the observables are the unobservables with which he has suspicion and doubt because they are subjects of conceptualization and speculation. He *minimizes* his doubt through the empirical enterprise to verify and determine truth *claims* about the unobservables as founded on *direct* evidence and observables. Let us refresh ourselves with Sober's definition given above: "realism maintains that well-confirmed scientific theories should be regarded as true, while empiricism maintains that they should be regarded as *empirically adequate* … Empiricists deny that it is ever rationally obligatory to believe that theories provide true descriptions of an unobservable reality. It isn't that empiricists deny that quarks or genes exist; rather, they regard such realist affirmations as going beyond what the evidence demands." All knowledge gained outside of direct experience is at best only empirically adequate and not certain. The alliance with

[222] Hoffman., 155

empiricism results in adequate knowledge and agnosticism, not the absolutes that the Buddha claimed to have realized. This is the second flaw of the empirical Buddhists. Let us label this the agnostic flaw. This is consistent with Hoffman's view that their thesis "does not regard the *content* of meditative experience as identical with ultimate reality."

3.18.3 The Empirico-Propositional Flaw

For the Buddha, there is both direct experience and certainty with each having the role of both skill/path and goal. I see three problems for the empirical Buddhist's thesis thus. How do the empirical Buddhists propose to arrive at certainty using direct experience? The first is, as I have mentioned already, they mistakenly employ an authentic Buddhist concept, abhiññā, as an empirical sense or perceptual tool to directly detect what is otherwise not detectable evidence (e.g., karma and rebirth). The essential function of direct experience is verification. Verification for Locke and for all (Western) empiricists is objective in that all people can verify it. The Buddhist empiricist's rejoinder is that abhiññā, karma, and rebirth *are* universally available and verifiable with some (meditative) practice. To be sure the fact that people have to develop a sixth and more powerful sense to access more powerful direct evidence is a genuine problem as already discussed, but it is not the crucial flaw of the claim. Abhiññā is rejected by the western empiricists but not by the traditional Buddhists. The crucial flaw lies with the empirical Buddhists believing or at least presenting that the essential problems of Buddhism—as spelled out in the Four Noble Truths and paṭiccasamuppāda—are propositional/conceptual only and that their solution is also (proactively) conceptual. In

other words and concisely the Four Noble Truths are truth propositions and not phenomenological experiences. To gain acceptance of rigorous western analytical philosophy and the methods of empirical science, one must fit the paradigm which is essentially propositional: formulate, hypothesize, empirically test, analyze. Propositions and conceptualizations, of course, commence in the mind in the conceptual structure, but all of them must leave the mind into the public sphere (as spoken words, lectures, written formulae, books, and so forth) because the endeavor and practice of empirical science are objective and public verification. Therefore closely related to the first flaw, the third flaw is the propositionalization of subjective experience in order to determine and verify them empirically. In concrete terms the proposition is "knowledge of karma and rebirth," the sense gateway is abhiññā and the evidence is the content within retrocognition of past lives. All of these are subjective experiences. This is the reason why the western world labeled Buddhism rationalism upon first encounter; there was a rigorous system entirely in the mind. The empirical flaw of abhiññā is that it is trapped in subjectivity and the "knowledge of karma and rebirth via abhiññā" is also trapped in subjectivity. We are not saying that abhiññā itself and 'knowledge of karma and rebirth via abhiññā' cannot be propositionalized, hypothesized and tested in the standard empirico-scientific method. In fact, as supernormal phenomena they qualify for possible eventual scrutiny by the likes of Kelly, et al. We are saying that once these private experiential matters are propositionalized sufficient for conceptual understanding in the public it is no longer, in its publicly manifested form, a private experiential matter; in this way they are trapped in subjectivity. In the language of the frames of reference, we have thoughts in the

conceptual structure and direct experiences in the spatial representation. These thoughts and direct experiences—as they are in the mind—remain private even when they are revealed, communicated or scanned with fMRI. This is because now we have a private version and a public version of them. That the public version is never the same as the private version is the difference between phenomenology and empiricism. The mind can be in any frame of reference without affecting this.

3.18.4 The Buddhico-Propositional Flaw

It must be acknowledged at the outset that propositionalizing of mind content is a fundamental human activity; all humans have thoughts in this manner. The early Buddhist position—especially as expressed in paṭiccasamuppāda—involves the suspension of such conceptualizing and propositionalizing. The point is to suspend the module of conceptual structure not for its own sake but in favor of developing within the spatial representation module. Because the conceptual structure module and the spatial representation module comprise the entirety of the mind/body, for the Buddhist these decisive tasks are done within the mind/body frame. The Buddhist adept is to suspend conceptual thinking because as part of the paṭiccasamuppāda scheme, conceptual identification is causal to clinging.[223] In this way, conceptual identification is a barrier or a flaw of a tethered mind per the early Buddhist understanding. The Buddhico-propositional or Buddhico-conceptual flaw occurs in the mind/body frame without

[223] Refer to Ṭhānissaro's No-self or Not-self? (https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notself2.html) and the Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta: The Greater Craving-Destruction Discourse

needing to become public for it to become a flaw. In this way, the empirico-propositional flaw is a two-tiered flaw. Hoffman seems to make this very point as he compares diṭṭhi to theory:

> Diṭṭhi, which literally means 'view' and very often 'speculative view', was condemned by Buddha, the idea being that his message is not one view among others, not a theory to be argued about but a way of life to be practiced. But empiricism on the other hand *is* a theory, a theory of knowledge which is opposed to others, especially to rationalism. As such, empiricism is regarded as tenable by its proponents to the extent that it can be *argued for*. By contrast, the Buddha's procedure is to present his *dogma* on the basis of seeing things 'as they really are' yathā bhūtaṃ) through meditative experience.[224]

We have already touched upon diṭṭhi with the discussion of first level and second level right views. Here Hoffman is referring to the second level right view wherein speculative proposition making was condemned. Yes, the Buddha was clear that his doctrine was not another view among views because his own view insisted on first suspending then removing proposition and concept making. A theory is the most elite, ideal and formal proposition making available. It is appropriate to form theories about what early Buddhism and paṭiccasamuppāda are as what this dissertation is attempting, but it is mistaken to impute an empirical theory-making purview onto them.

3.19 The Purported Paṭiccasamuppāda–Empiricism Connection

So far there is no exact mention of paṭiccasamuppāda in connection to empiricism by Jayatilleke. Indeed he does not resort to paṭiccasamuppāda direct. It is Kalupahana who brings it up. Hoffman quotes him as follows: "All this may lead to the following

[224] Hoffman, "The Buddhist Empiricism Thesis," 153

conclusions. Rejecting an Absolute (such as the Brahman or Atman of the Upanishads) or a transempirical reality, the Buddha confined himself to what is empirically given. Following a method comparable to that adopted by the modern Logical Positivists, he sometimes resorted to linguistic analysis and appeal to experience to demonstrate the futility of metaphysics. As a result of his empiricism, he recognized causality as the reality and made it the essence of his teachings. Hence his statement: 'He who sees causality sees the *dhamma*'."[225] Here causality is paṭiccasamuppāda. Elsewhere he makes the connection between paṭiccasamuppāda via salayatana (the 5th nidana) to empiricism.

This aligns with my claim earlier that early Buddhism is prone to misinterpretation as being empirical based on the mistaken insistence that salayatana was taught as a demonstration of the authority of the sense gateway. In his article "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism" he writes the following: "Professor Jayatilleke has examined most of the statements in the Pali canon embodying empiricist ideas, but a very important discourse, which could have been usefully utilized to prove his point of view, appears to have eluded him. It is a discourse included in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, and is called the "Discourse on 'Everything'" (Sabbasutta)."[226] I do see his puzzlement on how Jayatilleke allowed the omission of this crucial sutta because in it the Buddha is definitive in his stance and the stance is quite literally about everything. This *Sabba Sutta – The All* is what first convinced me, in spite of Kalupahana's arguments in favor of empiricism, that salayatana insisted on being the all, the everything, or the entirety of the

[225] Hoffman, 154
[226] David J. Kalupahana, "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism," *Philosophy East and West* 19, no. 1 (January 1969): 65–67, 65

phenomenological world, which is mind/body, and of the phenomenological methods which, when redefined to early Buddhist phenomenological methods, is Dhamma. So to say, as Kalupahana has, that, "He who sees causality sees the *dhamma*" is not as accurate or complete as saying "He who sees paṭiccasamuppāda sees the *dhamma*." Although I will treat the Sabba Sutta further down in this paper it is more clarifying to quote it here in full:

> Thus have I heard. Once the Exalted One was living at Savatthi, in the monastery of Anāthapiṇḍika (situated) in Jeta's Grove. Then the Exalted One addressed the monks: "O monks!" They responded: "Yes, O Lord! and the Exalted One spoke thus: "Monks, I will preach to you 'everything'. Listen to it. What, monks, is 'everything'? Eye and material form, ear and sound, nose and odour, tongue and taste, body and tangibles, mind and concepts. These are called 'everything'. Monks, he who would say, "I will reject this *everything* and proclaim another *everything'*, he may certainly have a theory (of his own). But when questioned, he would not be able to answer and would, moreover, be subject to vexation. Why? Because it would not be within the range of experience."[227]

It is peculiar that Kalupahana does not call the six gateways by the name salayatana which would directly connect this Sabba Sutta to salayatana, to paṭiccasamuppāda, to causality, and then to empirical science. He opts to argue by way of worldviews or world *theory* as follows: "Once [Jāṇussoṇi] is represented as questioning the Buddha regarding the two extreme views, namely, the Eternalist theory that 'everything exists" (*sabbam atthi*), and the Materialist theory that "everything does not exist" (*sabbaṃ n'atthi*). It is therefore natural that this discourse, which purports to examine the basis of speculative theories, is presented as the Buddha's reply to a question raised by an interlocutor like

[227] Kalupahana, 66

Jāṇussoṇi. The importance of the above discourse as a *locus classicus* in any attempt to show the empiricist trends in early Buddhism should be very evident."[228] It should be noted here that Buddha's reply to his position on Eternalism and Materialism was always paṭiccasamuppāda or some fragment of it depending on the context. So it should not be deemed that Eternalism and Materialism are necessarily theories in all contexts. Taking them as theories, as in Kalupahana's assessment, the Buddha's position in the middle of the two would itself be a theory albeit an empirical one based on experiential evidence.

As I turn to my chapter on phenomenology it is a puzzle, assuming my assessment is accurate, why the Buddhist empiricists did not see early Buddhism as phenomenology. Husserl's phenomenological landmark *Logical Investigations, Vol. 1* was published in 1900 as a sensation, and the following year *Logical Investigations, Vol. 2* was issued. Jayatilleke's book *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* was published in 1963. Kalupahana claims that his mentor essentially surveyed all the major Western philosophies to compare early Buddhism to modern empiricism, writing:

> Since the time Western scholars came to be interested in the study of Buddhism, we find various views expressed on the nature of early Buddhist thought, especially in comparison with the different trends in Western philosophy. One of the pioneers in this field, Professor T. W. Rhys Davids, whose main studies on Buddhism were confined to the Theravada canon, especially the Pali Nikayas consisting of the discourses attributed to the Buddha himself, pointed out at a very early date the relationship between Buddhism and the positivistic thought of the French philosopher Auguste Comte, where the claims of science received a full recognition. Following this we find many scholars making random observations on the modernistic trends in Buddhism. … All of these appear to be cursory glances at the nature of early Buddhism. None of these themes were worked out in full until Professor K. N. Jayatilleke made an exhaustive study of almost all the

[228] Kalupahana, 67

> material, especially that embodied in the Pali Nikayas, to show that early Buddhism compares with modern Empiricism, with the exception that unlike modern Empiricism, Buddhism recognized the validity of the data of extrasensory perception and of the experiential content of mysticism.[229]

Hoffman and especially McMahan would point to a greater incentive, a precommitment, or a worldview that stands over the empirical evidence found in the Pali texts. This was perhaps the force behind the discourse of scientific Buddhism acting as the superempirical virtue in determining early Buddhism.

[229] Kalupahana, 65

Chapter Four: The Phenomenological Purview of Paṭiccasamuppāda

manō pubbaṅgamā dhammā
manō setthā manōmayā
all mental phenomena have mind as their forerunner;
they have mind as their chief; they are mind-made[230]

"I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness." Nobel Laureate Physicist Max Planck, father of quantum theory[231]

Overview

The introduction, establishment of the transcendental purview, and the rebuttal of the imputation of empiricism were preparation for this chapter's positive construction of a less obvious purview of paṭiccasamuppāda—that of phenomenology. As consistent with the salvaged traditional transcendental purview, this slightly more innovative thesis claims that the Pali texts as especially expressed in paṭiccasamuppāda provide consistent evidence of a transcendental phenomenology in contradistinction from natural empiricism. It begins with getting at understanding what phenomenologists intend with phenomenology generally and transcendental constitutive phenomenology. There is no religious transcendence in even transcendental constitutive phenomenology, but I argue there is enough to indicate inherent structures for a religious transcendental phenomenology. As a continuation of the discussion on empiricism I contrast

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[230] Ñāṇananda, *The Law of Dependent Arising: The Secret of Bondage and Release*. 43. Also see Dhammapada Verse 1 Cakkhupalatthera Vatthu https://www.tipitaka.net/tipitaka/dhp/verseload.php?verse=001 and https://puredhamma.net/dhammapada/manopubbangama-dhamma/

[231] Quoted in Dean Radin, *Real Magic: Ancient Wisdom, Modern Science, and a Guide to the Secret Power of the Universe*, First Edition (New York: Harmony Books, 2018), 183

transcendental phenomenology to the psychological sciences with the assistance of Jerry Jennings, and Peter Ashworth et al. With sufficient grasp of what is meant by transcendental phenomenology I trace broadly a few pioneers who have made the correct appellation to early Buddhism. This is partly to know what has been established and what lacunae remain in order that they might be filled. I rely on Christian Coseru's insistence on the inescapability of subjectivity as a segue to my arguments on the phenomenological purview of paṭiccasamuppāda starting with the *Sabba Sutta: The All* which most concisely also insists on the inescapability of the subjective world. I will argue that this insistence of phenomenology is included in the Buddha's argument that subjectivity via the six sense media and contact is inescapable and is The All. I will argue that The All is exactly the mind/body frame. The *Sabba Sutta: The All* insists that the fifth nidana (of the six sense media) along with the sixth nidana (of contact) was the entirety of the definition of the "natural" cosmos and that subjectivity is the only entry into fully understanding, abandoning, personally experiencing, and developing (i.e., the modes of experience per the Four Noble Truths) the different dimensional realities of the paṭiccasamuppāda scheme. I borrow from Venerable Dhammadharo/Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu the argument that satipatthana (the four foundations of mindfulness) are exactly four frames of references in order to tie early Buddhist meditation to my conceptual tool of the frames of reference and more precisely to compare mindfulness and appropriate attention to phenomenological bracketing or reduction. I will reinterpret the Kalama Sutta to show that it was establishing phenomenology as the Buddha's epistemology based on the phrases "known for himself" and "Dhamma is private" as meaning the direct,

unmediated, non-representational experience as found in spatial representation. Furthermore, I connect deixis and origio to the sutta phrase “here and now,” to phenomenology. I establish that satipatthana includes jhanas, samatha, and vipassana hence establishing that jhanas and vipassana are also frames of reference with assistance from Bhikkhu Analayo. This would establish that the entirety of the early Buddhist meditation project to be a form of phenomenology. I use Karen Arbel’s work to establish that jhanas occur in spatial representation for analog or “fading away” work and to establish that jhanas and vipassana are methods to understand and experience anuloma, paṭiloma, and both. I end the chapter using the *Sandiṭṭhika Sutta: Visible Here and Now* to redefine the word *sandiṭṭhika* (known to be defined as empiricism) to now mean phenomenology.

4.1 The Polysemy of “Experience”

Before we even cull from the best definitions on general phenomenology which themselves can add to the confusion, I believe using imagery and the frames of reference would give a strong basis for appreciating the various expert definitions. A crucial concept for the empiricists, the phenomenologist, the philosopher of mind, the cognitive scientist, and the early Buddhist is *experience*. We can imagine its different meanings and the differing contexts in which it is used. So many disciplines including the just listed ones indicate some priority of experience. The probable reason for the appellation of early Buddhism as empirical, other than the biased superempirical virtues discussed, is that paṭiccasamuppāda, the salayatana, abhiññā, and so forth are indeed rooted in

experience. Which experience, or rather which frame of reference being experienced, should be made clearer. Let us investigate the etymology of "empiricism" and "phenomenology" for possible answers. Of the several related meanings for the word "empirical" is "guided by mere *experience*."[232] Meanwhile, phenomenology "is the study of "phenomena": appearances of things, or things as they appear in our *experience*"[233] and is "a method, Husserl believed, which could ground our knowledge of the world in our lived *experience*."[234] Experiences of any kind—at some stage of it—must manifest or appear to the person or experiencer. The experiencer has the experiences in any of the several frames I suggested in the introduction.

4.2 The Life of the Empiric

However, the etymological history of the two words clarifies their different origins and intent. Merriam-Webster gives the etymology as: "When empirical first appeared as an adjective in English, it meant simply "in the manner of an empiric." *An empiric was a member of an ancient sect of doctors who practiced medicine based exclusively on experience* [emphasis added], as contrasted with those who relied on theory or philosophy. The name empiric derives from Latin empiricus, itself from Greek empeirikos ("experienced"). It ultimately traces back to the verb peiran, meaning "to try,

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[232] "Empirical," in *Online Etymology Dictionary*, Douglas Harper, Accessed August 8, 2018, https://www.etymonline.com/word/empirical.
[233] Smith, "Phenomenology," 2 in PDF version.
[234] Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall, eds., *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 35 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2006), 1

attempt, or experiment."[235] I revive for this paper the ancient meaning of empiric but now applied to a class beyond the original meaning of an individual or member (physician). The empiric (physician) was not one who armchaired philosophy or meditated upon his own mind, but who instead explored, navigated, participated, and engaged in the external, extended, physical, *natural world*. This natural world is the same as the one the vast majority of normal people participate in every day and thereby gain experience from this participation. From experiencing the pain caused by touching a hot stove, knowing not to repeat it, and teaching others; to going to Cancun for a relaxing experience; to doing field research as an epidemiologist to gain experience; we are all empirics as a class. Not all empirics are rigorous empirical scientists/theorist as can be inferred from the previous chapter. Note in the definition above that empirics are contrasted with theory and philosophy. This is because the empiric's world is framed only by the first and second centroidal frames of reference. The ideal of the empirical scientist/theorist as we noted in the introduction is the "perfection attained" in the allocentric/absolute frame. Subtracting this frame from the field research epidemiologist makes him just generally an empiric. In short the empiric lives in and derives (practical) experience from the natural world and thus has a natural view or *natural attitude* towards it.

4.3 The Life of the Phenomenic in the Mind/Body Frame

"Phenomenology" has a diametrically opposite meaning in that it is the practice of the armchair (phenomenological) philosopher and meditator. The first use of the word

[235] Merriam Webster, "Empirical," Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed February 14, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/empirical.

was in "1797, from German *Phänomenologie*, used as the title of the fourth part of the "Neues Organon" of German physicist Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728-1777)"[236] Lambert used the term phenomenology to distinguish between subjective and objective appearances to the mind. Throughout its history, it refers usually overtly to subjective first-person consciousness. Let us further distinguish the armchair phenomenologist from the early Buddhist meditator. They share staticity in their sitting. Oxford Dictionary defines "armchaired" as "Seated in an armchair … lacking or not involving *practical or direct experience*."[237] By this, it is meant the armchair philosopher is excluded from the first and second centroidal frames of exploratory practical experience and relegated to either the (objective) allocentric/absolute frame as an armchair phenomenologist or the theoretical philosopher or relegated to the (subjective) mind/body frame as an armchair "phenomenologist." I place the word phenomenologist in quotes because a phenomenologist is defined as a scholar who studies phenomenology as a philosophy and as a method, but this not does not necessarily mean that he practices the method.[238] For this perhaps the field needs a neologism. A practitioner of the method of phenomenology should be contrasted with the empiric. Empiricism can be contrasted with experientialism which is "any doctrine or theory that maintains that personal experience is the only or the

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[236] "Phenomenology," in *Online Etymology Dictionary*, Douglas Harper, accessed August 8, 2018, https://www.etymonline.com/word/phenomenology.

[237] Oxford Living Dictionary, "Armchaired," in *Oxford Living Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, accessed March 22, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/armchaired.

[238] See generally Smith, "Phenomenology." I am stretching the point here because it is reasonable to assume that phenomenologists must actively engage in the method at some point in order to know what they are writing about.

principal basis of knowledge."[239] So a possible option is an *experientialist* as contradistinct to an empiric. Even though an experientialist may be in contrast to an empiricist; it is too abstract and does not capture the imagery of the active empiric/physician engaged in the natural field spurning those who armchair. Furthermore, there are connotations with experientialism that we do not want to entangle ourselves in. The Buddhist adept is said to walk in dhamma. The *imagery* is that the Buddhist monastic walks on the path (i.e., dhamma) and the path proper is *entirely* constituted by phenomena (i.e., dhamma). To capture this imagery perhaps a counterpart to the empiric would be *the phenomenic*, where the empiric is the active participant in the empirical, and the phenomenic is the active participant in the phenomenal. Oxford Dictionary has phenomenic as "[o]f the nature of a phenomenon, phenomenal (as opposed to noumenal),"[240] which our use does not break with.

4.4 Both the Empiric and the Phenomenic Have Direct Experiences

So we distinguish that "direct experience," as should be expected of a definition offered by a standard (i.e., non-phenomenological) Oxford Dictionary, commonly means experience gain from direct engagement with the *external* world in the first and second centroidal frames. For the early Buddhist meditator, any direct experience must commence in the mind/body frame and remains phenomenologically bracketed or

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[239] Dictionary.com, "Experientialism," *Dictionary.com Unabridged Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary* (Dictionary.com, March 22, 2019), https://www.dictionary.com/browse/experientialist.

[240] Oxford Living Dictionary, "Phenomenology," in *Oxford Living Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, accessed March 22, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/phenomenology.

suspended from the natural world and its attendant attitude. Direct experience as defined to be located and processed in the mind/body frame formally can exist in both the conceptual structure and the spatial representation; however, direct experience is cultivated and developed in the spatial representation with its culmination in abhiññā and its related kinds. This is the abhiññā that was interpreted by the empirical Buddhists to be the empirical perceptual tool. If phenomenology is the true purview of paṭiccasamuppāda then abhiññā—as developed paṭiccasamuppāda and "trapped" in subjectivity—must be the exclusively private and internal. Conversely if abhiññā can be shown to be exclusively private and internal, then all the structures, methods and processes—as found in the paṭiccasamuppāda scheme—must be phenomenological. In other words the empiric lives in the first and second frames while the phenomenic lives in the mind/body frame with its reduced or subframes. The empirical Buddhists claim that abhiññā and the like belong to the empiric and is frameable with the first, second, and, ideally, the absolute frames. The phenomenological Buddhists do claim that abhiññā and the like belong to the phenomenic and must be framed in the mind/body while he strives for the four noble realities. With this preface we can better proceed with what the experts intend with phenomenology.

4.5 What Is Phenomenology and Which Phenomenology?

Here I compile the expert definitions.

- The *Oxford English Dictionary* writes that phenomenology "is the science of phenomena as distinct from being (ontology). b. the division of any science which

describes and classifies its phenomena."[241]

- Its online Oxford Living Dictionaries defines it as, "[t]he science of phenomena as distinct from that of the nature of being. An approach that concentrates on the study of consciousness and the objects of direct experience."[242]
- Robert Sokolowski captures it in one sentence: "Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience."[243]
- David Woodruff Smith writes, "Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy. The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of "phenomena": appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view."[244]
- Martin Heidegger summarizes it as, "[t]he fundamental insight into the *necessity of the return to consciousness* [emphasis added]; the radical and explicit determination of the path of, and the procedural rules for, this return; the

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[241] "Phenomenology", Oxford University Press, *Oxford English Dictionary: On CD-ROM.* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
[242] Oxford Living Dictionary, "Phenomenology."
[243] Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 2
[244] Smith, "Phenomenology," 2 in the PDF version.

principle-based determination and systematic exploration of the field that is to be disclosed in this return—this we designate as phenomenology."[245]

- Mark Thorsby says that it "is the study of that which *must necessarily be the case* [emphasis added] such that we experience phenomena as we do."[246]
- Hubert Dreyfus et al. contextualize it in history writing, "The term "phenomenology" has been in common use in philosophy since Hegel's monumental work, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (1807). During the nineteenth century, the word denoted a descriptive as *opposed to a hypothetical–theoretical or analytic approach* [emphasis added] to a problem. Phenomenology began as a discernible movement with Edmund Husserl's … demand that philosophy take as its primary task the description of the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness. This description was meant to be carried out on the basis of what the "things themselves" demanded, without assuming or adopting the theoretical frameworks, assumptions, or vocabularies developed in the study of other domains (such as *nature* [emphasis added])."[247]

As a starting point, we can synthesize the above. Phenomenology is best understood as two things: 1) a movement in the history of philosophy, and 2) a discipline and science from the first person point of view of inescapable experiential phenomena. As with most

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[245] Martin Heidegger, Theodore J. Kisiel, and Thomas Sheehan, *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927*, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 307

[246] Mark Thorsby, *01 Introduction to Phenomenology Part 1*, YouTube video, vol. 1, 25 vols., Phenomenology, 2016.

[247] Dreyfus and Wrathall, *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, 2

if not all thought systems, phenomenology is built upon and a reaction to prior thought systems. It is better to first explain the panoramic frames of the intellectual milieu and the motivation and intentions of its founder, Edmund Husserl, before proceeding with the more focused frames of what the insights of phenomenology are, which can often be subtle, nuanced and seemingly esoteric.

Understanding Husserl's worldviews helps us contextualize everything else he has to say on his new science. Dan Lusthaus's answer to his own question of why compare Buddhism to this "this target idiom" is "Phenomenology and Buddhism both take the whys and hows of *human experience* as their starting and concluding points. Both focus on similar epistemological issues, such as perception, sensation, cognition, noetic construction, embodied conditioning, and the overcoming of embodied ways of seeing the world. Both propose, through methodic investigation of the way we cognize, to resolve the most fundamental human dilemmas and problems."[248] Their shared emphasis on the phenomenic's experience is certainly a parallel, but, for my study, the parallel between early Buddhism and which phenomenology?

Phenomenology in a relatively short time has become polysemous. Smith has identified seven major forms of phenomenology, the first being the classical form developed by Husserl—transcendental constitutive phenomenology—a study of "how

[248] Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun*, Curzon Critical Studies in Buddhism Series (London: Routledge, 2003). Vii. Lusthaus's book's first title should indicate itself as a major source from which this dissertation should build, but my focus is on early Buddhism and his is on Yogācāra. Further, I believe the overlaps between even transcendental phenomenology and early Buddhism occur mainly in their insistence on the mind/body frame as the pivoting frame. They have many differences otherwise.

objects are constituted in pure or transcendental consciousness, setting aside questions of any relation to the natural world around us."[249] Here we are oriented to what I see as the kindred affiliation between transcendental constitutive phenomenology and early Buddhism: a transcendentalism that suspends the natural world and, as we will see, in opposition to naturalism. And the corollary to this is a search for a foundation more certain than can be provided by the hypothetical–theoretical or analytic approach.

4.6 The Background to Husserl's Concerns

One key question long concerning both East and West is whether appearances to the mind are real or not. I do not believe the early Buddhists belabored this issue but nonetheless had an implied position which I believe is consistent with Husserl. Smith explains starting with the term phenomenon as follows:

> In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: literally, appearances as opposed to reality. This ancient distinction launched philosophy as we emerged from Plato's cave. Yet the discipline of phenomenology did not blossom until the 20th century … How did philosophy move from a root concept of phenomena to the discipline of phenomenology? … Suppose we say phenomenology studies phenomena: what appears to us—and its appearing. How shall we understand phenomena? … In a strict empiricist vein, what appears before the mind are sensory data or qualia: either patterns of one's own sensations (seeing red here now, feeling this ticklish feeling, hearing that resonant bass tone) or sensible patterns of worldly things, say, the looks and smells of flowers (what John Locke called secondary qualities of things). In a strict rationalist vein, by contrast, what appears before the mind are ideas, rationally formed "clear and distinct ideas" (in René Descartes' ideal). In Immanuel Kant's theory of knowledge, fusing rationalist and empiricist aims, what appears to the mind are phenomena defined as things-as-they-appear or things-as-they-are-represented (in a synthesis of sensory and conceptual forms of objects-as-known). In Auguste

[249] Smith, "Phenomenology," 15 in PDF version.

> Comte's theory of science, phenomena (*phenomenes*) are the facts (*faits*, what occurs) that a given science would explain.[250]

What is meant by the strict empiricist vein that phenomena are "sensory data" is that from the empiric's point of view from the second frame of reference navigating using a hypothetical–theoretical or analytic approaches phenomena in his own mind as "sensory date." The phenomena have lost its personal life because it was objectified by virtue of starting off from the second frame of reference; it has objectified the subjective. The second and absolutes frames are imbued with analytical thinking.

What is meant by the strict rationalist vein that phenomena are "ideas, rationally formed "clear and distinct ideas"" is that from the "phenomenic"'s[251] point of view being effectively stuck in the mind frame (*not* the mind/body frame) which is further stuck in an unreliable, unfaithful body as interface with external reality. For Descartes, outer reality is a separate and distinct entity that can only be understood in rational terms through cognitive processes of deduction. Sense perception was thought to distort this process.

In this way, it better not to oppose phenomenology to empiricism as epistemologies. It is better to view empiricism and rationalism in opposition as epistemologies with phenomenology as a radically different discipline from epistemology. If epistemology studies how we know, then phenomenology studies how

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[250] Smith, 10-11. I include Auguste Comte's version for context because Kalupahana had aligned early Buddhism to it as part of his empirical Buddhism tract.
[251] Smith, 11. The rationalist is not a true phenomenic.

we experience. Smith allows us to visualize the arch of philosophical history in one succinct sentence: "Historically (it may be argued), Socrates and Plato put ethics first, then Aristotle put metaphysics or ontology first then Descartes put epistemology first, then Russell put logic first, and then Husserl (in his later transcendental phase) put phenomenology first." [252] Certainly, the scholarly literature in the last 300 years has imputed ethics, ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, and logic onto Buddhism generally and early Buddhism specifically. There can be no doubt that early Buddhism teaches ethics. It is also nearly doubtless that the other philosophical branches are dimensionally part of the vast teachings of early Buddhism. It is not that these other disciplines are not authentic purviews of early Buddhism, it is an issue of priority. In this case then priority of purview must go to phenomenology. So it is not enough to claim that phenomenology is one of the purviews of early Buddhism; it is more complete to demonstrate that phenomenology is its priority. This present paper will not attempt a comparison between phenomenology and these other branches as it has with empirical epistemology. The strong evidence below should be for the time being be sufficient to settle that early Buddhism is a phenomenology and with implications that the method of phenomenology brackets the other branches as it approaches ever closer to the goal. The proviso is that early Buddhism is not exactly Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenologists could list it eventually among the list of types of phenomenologies (many disciplines are candidates for this). Early Buddhism has other purviews including the transcendental as I have already claimed with the transcendental chapter, but the

[252] Smith, 24

proper range of early Buddhism—its proper demarcation—must be the phenomenic's experience.

4.7 Husserl's Mathematics and the Foundations of Knowledge

Husserl was deeply disaffected with the course of science in its trend toward naturalism and empiricism. His training in theoretical mathematics gave him insight into the weakness of the foundations of science or knowledge during his time. This weakness he deemed a crisis. Dermot Moran documents the thinking behind this as follows:

> One of the most exciting aspects of Husserl's contribution is his critical account of the emergence of scientific rationality in European thought. This theme found published expression quite late in his *Crisis of the European Sciences* (1936), but had been a preoccupation in his work since his essay *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* (1910/11). Husserl emphasizes the importance of understanding that original breakthrough to systematic science that occurred in ancient Greece with the discovery of the essential and universal, and in modern Europe, in Galileo and Descartes, with the development towards mathematical formalization that led to the transformation of European and Western culture. Unless the essential form of scientific thought can be understood, and its origin grasped and clarified, the nature of its current crises cannot be understood.[253]

This is where we can appreciate why even contemporary phenomenologists label phenomenology a science. Husserl was intent on setting the heritage of systematic science as given to the West from ancient Greece to back on its authentic course in his book *Crisis of the European Sciences* (*Krisis*). He says of this intention: "My mission is science alone" and "There is only one philosophy, one actual and genuine science … the

[253] Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology*, Key Contemporary Thinkers (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005), 8-9

all embracing science of transcendental subjectivity."[254] Transcendental subjectivity can be seen in the history of philosophy as a break from the Cartesian system which separated the outer real reality and the individual experience of reality. Moran continues with, "In *Krisis* he shows how it is possible to remain rigorously scientific while divesting oneself of the Cartesian dualist picture of the world that necessarily leads to a *reductive scientism* [emphasis added]." Reductive scientism is simply a term more descriptive of the method found in scientism, which is "the belief that science, especially natural science, is much the most valuable part of human learning—much the most valuable part because it is much the most authoritative, or serious, or beneficial."[255] Tom Sorell explains that "reductions are generally taken from physics, but … is intended to apply outside the natural sciences as well, e.g. in anthropology and sociology. In the German-speaking world at the turn of the century there was a widespread acceptance of a categorical difference between the human sciences and the natural sciences. Scientific empiricism denied that there was any such difference. There was supposed to be no ultimate dualism of natural and social science or of natural and human science."[256] Moran puts it this way: "The move towards naturalism in modern philosophy mirrors the scientific embrace of naturalism and objectivism, with a consequent loss of a way of understanding values and indeed a complete misunderstanding of the 'enigma of subjectivity.'"[257] Here Husserl, the

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[254] Moran, 1
[255] Tom Sorell, *Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science*, International Library of Philosophy (London ; New York: Routledge, 1991), 1
[256] Sorell, 5-6
[257] Dermot Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 6

Irreducible-Mind Theorists, the early Buddhists, and complex system proponents would be of one mindset in opposition against reductive scientism and its naturalism. Because reductive scientism developed as a result especially of the success and precision of physics and astronomy during the Scientific Revolution, Husserl intended the theme of the *Krisis* to be the intellectual reconstruction of the ancient motivation of science, which well preceded this phase in history. Moran cites a key excerpt from the *Krisis* thus: "In order to clarify the formation of Galileo's thought we must accordingly reconstruct (*rekonstruieren*) not only what consciously motivated him. It will also be instructive to bring to light what was implicitly included in his guiding model (*Leitbild*) of mathematics, even though, because of the direction of his interest, it was kept from his view: as a hidden, presupposed meaning it naturally had to enter into his physics along with everything else. (*Krisis* §9a, pp. 24-5; Hua 6: 21-2." We know here that Husserl considers the purity and certainty of mathematics as the underlying force of "everything else."

4.8 The Transcendental Life World as Source of Foundation

As noted above, the first, second and absolute frames of reference are considered by him to be cluttered with analytical theoretical thinking. Once in that mode, there is a scientistic trend to dismiss anything else as non-rigorous and non-scientific. These objective frames claimed complete purview, comprehensive frames of reference, and all of the horizons of the natural world with its concomitant scientistic natural attitude. Husserl countered claiming that there were another attitude and another world—the

transcendental life world. Moran speaks about this along these lines: "Husserl wants to recognize the primacy of our life-world (*Lebenswelt*) which founds all scientific inquiry. This notion of 'world' as the 'horizon of horizons' emerged in *Ideen I* [*Ideas I*, 1913] in connection with the consideration of life in the natural attitude. As conscious beings, we always inhabit - in a *pre-theoretical manner* [emphasis added]- an experiential world (3/1: 73), given in advance (*vorgegeben*), on hand (*vorhanden*), and always experienced as a unity. It is the universal framework of human endeavour, including our scientific endeavours. It is the general structure that enables objectivity …"[258] This life-world as a pre-theoretical experiential one is the innermost point of view or frame of reference or "horizon of horizons;" it is the transcendental view. As we have already suggested, this transcendental frame is the mind/body frame where freedom *from* the conceptual structure and freedom *in* the spatial representation are conditions for a pre-theoretical stance. Furthermore, as "the universal framework for human endeavor" it is the agency of consciousness as independent of physicalism. Moreover, as the "general structure that enables objectivity" it is the antithesis of the absolute theoretical frame of reference that subsumes subjectivity with objectivity. This is what Max Planck speaks of when he insists, "I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we regard as existing, postulates consciousness."[259] The objectification of consciousness is the attempt to "get behind consciousness." The physical reduction of

[258] Moran, *Edmund Husserl*, 9
[259] Radin, *Real Magic*, 183

mind is the attempt to get behind consciousness. In the language of the frames of reference, reductive scientism seeks to advance the allocentric object-to-object frame that has found overwhelming success in the natural realm (i.e., of physical nature) into the social and human realm (i.e., of agency, mind, consciousness) with the goal to consummate and graduate the allocentric frame to the absolute frame. From the point of view of the reductionist, the absolute frame is the elusive [subject-as-object]-to-[subject-as-object]; consciousness is not only gotten behind, it no longer is real. By contrast in the transcendental frame, it will always be subject-to-object or subject-to-subject.

Husserl was impressed by the mathematical work of the prominent mathematician Karl Weierstrass and his foundation for the "ethos for scientific striving." "His lectures on the theory of functions awoke Husserl's interest in the foundations of mathematics such that he would later write that he hoped to do for philosophy what Weierstrass had done for arithmetic: that is, set it on a single foundation,"[260] notes Moran. Husserl's interest in mathematics was enough to lead to a mathematical doctoral degree in 1882 with a dissertation on differential calculus.[261] At the same time he was profoundly impressed with Brentano's thinking that "no concept can be thought without a foundation (*Fundierung*) in a concrete intuition" so accordingly sought the "origin," "genesis," or "source" of mathematical concepts as fundamental as *multiplicity*, *unity*, *collective combination*, *more*, and *less*.[262] Not acknowledging, understanding and coming to terms with this crisis of foundational ignorance was not without consequences as he asserts

[260] Moran, *Edmund Husserl*, 16
[261] Moran, 16
[262] Moran, 59-60

saying, that "obscurity on questions of principle finally one day takes revenge."[263]

4.9 Husserl as Philosopher of Science

What crisis could there possibly be in the wake of unprecedented and nearly unmitigated accomplishments of science? This is a question symptomatic of the natural attitude. Moran maintains of Husserl that, "[he]e was aware of the stark contrast between the runaway success of the exact sciences and the confusion of competing theories supposedly underpinning them. As he wrote in *CM* [*Cartesian Meditations* 1931], the positive sciences 'after three centuries of brilliant development' were now hampered by 'obscurities in their foundations, in their fundamental concepts and methods' (CM §2, p. 4; 1: 45)."[264] Husserl elaborated on this in his 1929 *Formal and Transcendental Logic* writing, "The truth is that sciences that have paradoxes, that operate with fundamental concepts not produced by the work of originary clarification (*Ursprungsklärung*) and criticism, are not sciences at all, but, with all their ingenious performances, merely theoretical techniques."[265] As we can see he conceives of transcendental phenomenology not simply as, for example, opposition to empiricism or rationalism but as questioning the very meaning of science. We here should note the resemblance of his concern to those of the contemporary philosophers of science that informed our discussion of underdetermination and superempirical virtues. He is acting as philosopher of science when comments on science from the higher perch of attempting to determine whether

[263] Moran, 60
[264] Moran, 60
[265] Moran, 60

naturalistic science could be interpolated or calculated to ever produce actual knowing and hence truly be the foundation of knowing. This strongly resembles the current doubt whether science determines or indicates realities of the scientific realist kind or merely indicates what are empirically adequate. Husserl would maintain that empirical adequacy is inadequate to the ideals of ancient Greece and of the promise of mathematical certainty. This philosophy of meta-science is evidenced by his "quest for clarification [that] would expand into an entire 'critique of reason, a critique of logical and practical reason, of normative reason in general', as he put it in his Personal Notes of 1906 (EW, p. 493; 24: 445). Furthermore, it was not just the underlying rationale of the existing sciences that needed to be clarified, but also the very possibility or 'idea' of science. The *teleological guiding idea of science* [emphasis added] had to be clarified from the ground up, not taking any existing science for granted, not even mathematics: 'I must create my concepts anew in autonomous thinking through pure intuition' (Krisis, p. 303; 6: 281)."[266] His observation that accomplishments claimed by natural science are not sciences at all, but merely theoretical techniques (i.e., we have a multitude of successful technologies without a consistent foundation to accurately and precisely determine them) is paralleled in his observation in the even more fundamental field of mathematics. Moran documents this symmetry as follows:

> As Husserl records in *LU* [*Logical Investigations* 1900/1901], he was perplexed that mathematicians could achieve valid results while apparently employing different intuitions and theoretical accounts of how they arrived at these results. There appeared to be a yawning gulf between their actual mathematical methods and practice and the theoretical expression they assumed: The same thinkers who

[266] Moran, 60

> sustain marvellous mathematical methods with such incomparable mastery, and who add new methods to them, often show themselves incapable of accounting satisfactorily for their logical validity and for the limits of their right use. Though the sciences have grown great despite these defects, and have helped us to a formerly undreamt of mastery over nature they cannot satisfy us theoretically. They are, as theories, not crystal-clear: the function of all their concepts and propositions is not fully intelligible, not all of their presuppositions have been exactly analysed, they are not in their entirety raised above all theoretical doubt. (LIZ, Prol. §4 115-16; Hua 18: 2.[267]

Normally the natural attitude as a concept in phenomenology means "the focus we have when we are involved in our original, world-directed stance when we intend things, situations, facts, and any other kinds of objects. The natural attitude is, we might say, the default perspective, the one we start off from, the one we are in originally."[268] It is also "our routine *frame of mind* [emphasis added] in the 'taken-for granted world of everyday life' where we bracket out the critical attitude, suspending any philosophical doubts about reality. [It is] [s]ynonymous with 'common-sense thinking' and 'the attitude of everyday life'."[269] The adjective "natural" in natural attitude capture status quo, default, uncritical, world-directed stance. The world-directed stance is the first, second, and even the absolute frames of reference. It is the status quo, default, and uncritical stance that is our panoramic worldview. It is in this sense that the natural attitude includes naturalism. More specific to our current discussion, we should understand Husserl's transcendentalism and his transcendental turn in opposition to 1) the unreliability of the natural attitude as tantamount to the inadequate empirical method, and 2) the scientism of

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[267] Moran. 64

[268] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*. 42

[269] Oxford Reference, "Natural Attitude," in *Oxford Reference* (Oxford University Press, n.d.), http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100225205.

naturalism inherent in it.

4.10 What is Intentionality?

So far we have mainly discussed Husserl's background, the intellectual milieu of his time, and his general position. This prepares a discuss on his crucial insight into transcendental constitutive phenomenology. It appears that most, if not all, forms of phenomenology still retains Husserl's essential discovery of intentionality.[270] In his *Introduction to Phenomenology*, Robert Sokolowski concisely introduces it meaning thus:

> The term most closely associated with phenomenology is "intentionality." The core doctrine in phenomenology is the teaching that every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have, is intentional: it is essentially "consciousness of" or an "experience of" something or other. All our awareness is directed toward objects. If I see, I see some visual object, such as a tree or a lake; if I imagine, my imagining presents an imaginary object, such as a car that I visualize coming down a road; if I am involved in remembering, I remember a

[270] It is not the purpose of this dissertation to claim that early Buddhism is phenomenology partly because there are many forms of it. But I do wish to connect its method(s) to that of paṭiccasamuppāda's. It better to say that to the *extent* that intentionality is a common denominator of all forms of phenomenology, then to that *extent* paṭiccasamuppāda's method(s) are phenomenological. Other phenomenologists, writing generally on the discipline, appear to consider intentionality as fundamental to their discipline. For example, Smith writes as the opening lines for the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*'s Phenomenology entry, "Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object." Ihde, also referring to phenomenology generally, writes in *Experimental Phenomenology*, "For phenomenology, the central feature of experience is a structure called "intentionality," which correlates all things experienced with the mode of experience to which the experience is referred." 11 Further, Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard write in *The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology*, "Close attention is paid to the core topics in phenomenology such as intentionality, perception, subjectivity, the self, the body, being and phenomenological method." i Having said this, intentionality itself is broad and still contested. John Drummond writes, "Subsequent phenomenologists remain concerned with the problem of transcendence,
and all of them offer a theory of intentionality to respond to this problem, although almost none of them adopt the term "intentionality."" and "In its broadest sense the term "intentionality" designates the directedness of mind to its objects. While intentionality is often characterized as "aboutness" in the philosophical literature, this way of speaking is too broad." 125, 133

> past object; if I am engaged in judging, I intend a state of affairs or a fact. Every act of consciousness, every experience, is *correlated* [emphasis added] with an object. Every intending has its intended object.[271]

A sensible observation would be that phenomenology is focusing on karma in its cetanā / volitional intent meaning of intention. Khristos Nizamis clarifies that they are not one and the same writing:

> This quality of being *conscious-of*… is called 'intentionality'. The common sense of the word, 'intend', i.e., 'to have a purpose in mind, [52] is included within the wider and deeper phenomenological sense of 'intentionality', but only as one possible kind of 'intentional' mode or act. The essential sense of phenomenological 'intending', of intentionality as such, refers to the way in which consciousness is 'turned' or 'directed' towards what it is conscious-of; and, moreover, the way in which consciousness thereby gives 'sense' or 'meaning' (*Sinn*) to all that it is conscious-of, even purely through the act of being conscious-of it. … [note 52]: This is very close in meaning to ceteti, 'forms an idea in the mind; thinks about, is intent upon; has in mind (to); forms an intention (to); strives mentally for' (Cone 2010, p. 167.2); and hence to cetanā, which could be translated as 'volitional intent' (cf. also Cone 2010, p. 164.2, 1.(ii)).'"[272]

Sokolowski makes the same observation and conclusion writing, "We should note that this sense of "intend" or "intention" should not be confused with "intention" as the purpose we have in mind when we act … The phenomenological notion of intentionality applies primarily to the theory of knowledge, not to the theory of human action … the phenomenological use will almost always call up the sense of practical intending as an

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[271] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 8

[272] Khristos Nizamis, "The Mind's 'I' in Meditation: Early Pāḷi Buddhadhamma and Transcendental Phenomenology in Mutual Reflection" (Buddhist Philosophy and Meditation Practice: Academic Papers Presented at the 2nd International Association of Buddhist Universities Conference, Bangkok: Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University Press, 2012), 220

overtone."[273] Sokolowski's categorization of phenomenological intending as being a theory of knowledge goes against Smith's understanding. To claim this is to claim that phenomenology is a form epistemology and that (intellectual) *knowing* has priority over *experience* of (intellectual or non-intellectual) knowing. I believe Smith is clearly right. To claim that the common sense and Buddhist intending is a form of a theory of action is also to miss the point that it is a subset of phenomenological intending therefore also fundamentally experiential. Here forth the use of the word "intentionality" will mean the phenomenological kind unless otherwise stated.

4.11 The Egocentric Predicament Is a Problem Intentionality Will Solve

The first reaction for the non-Buddhist scholar at the banality of this intentionality would either be confusion or disappointment. Sokolowski acknowledges this admitting, "Now, when we are presented with this teaching, and when we are told that this doctrine is at the core of phenomenology, we might well react with a feeling of disappointment. What is so important about this idea? Why should phenomenology make such a fuss about intentionality?"[274] Phenomenologists accept it as a core insight because they believe it solves the *egocentric predicament*. This is the aptly named problem discussed in the section on The Background to Husserl's Concerns of the sequestering of the empiric into his objectively framed, but subjectivity-excluding world, and of the rational-phenomenic's sequestering into his entrapped rational-mind frame that is closed off from the object world. In that section I mainly set up Husserl's concern for this predicament

[273] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 8
[274] Sokolowski, 9

that the rationalist and the empiricists had created. Sokolowski explains the egocentric predicament as follows:

> In the Cartesian [rationalist], Hobbesian [material empiricist], and Lockean [empiricist] traditions, which dominate our culture, we are told that when we are conscious, we are primarily aware of ourselves or our own ideas. Consciousness is taken to be like a bubble or an enclosed cabinet; the mind comes in a box. Impressions and concepts occur in this enclosed space, in this circle of ideas and experiences, and our awareness is directed toward them, not directly toward the things "outside." We can try to get outside by making inferences: we may reason that our ideas must have been caused by something outside us, and we may construct hypotheses or models of what those things must be like, but we are not in any direct contact with them. We get to things only by reasoning from our mental impressions, not by having them presented to us. Our consciousness, first and foremost, is not "of" anything at all. Rather, we are caught in what has been called an "egocentric predicament"; all we can really be sure of at the start is our own conscious existence and the states of that consciousness. This understanding of human awareness is reinforced by what we know about the brain and nervous system. It seems unquestionable that everything cognitional must happen "inside the head," and that all we could possibly be in touch with directly are our own brain states. … These philosophical and scientific understandings of consciousness have become quite widespread in our culture, and the egocentric predicament they force us into causes us great unease. We know instinctively that we are not trapped in our own subjectivity, we are sure that we do go beyond our brains and our internal mental states, but we do not know how to justify this conviction. We do not know how to show that our contact with the "real world" is not an illusion, not a mere subjective projection. For the most part we have no idea how we ever get outside ourselves, and we probably treat this issue simply by ignoring it and hoping that no one will ask us about it. When we try to think about human consciousness, we start with the premise that we are entirely "inside," and we are greatly perplexed as to how we could ever get "outside.[275]

Sokolowski's presentation of the egocentric predicament captures the entrapment of both the empiric and the rational-phenomenic who cannot get outside mental representation.

[275] Sokolowski, 9-10

This is the same mental representation of Jackendoff, Fodor, Levinson, and Pitt from the introduction. John Drummond echoes Sokolowski writing, "The theory of intentionality is phenomenology's response to the problem of how mind transcends itself to grasp an objective reality."[276]

4.12 The Categorio-Centric Predicament as Consistent with the Frames of Reference

Sokolowski's egocentric space, however, does not accord with my development of the egocentric frame as the mind/body frame. Half of it accords and half of it does not. The rational-phenomenic's entrapment is in the conceptual structure not being able to verify beyond rationalizing the body's sense data. This accords in that he is entrapped in the egocentric space and has a predicament. Per my frame of reference scheme, the empiric is entrapped but not in the egocentric as mind/body frame; he is entrapped, as I have noted above already, in the first, second and allocentric frames. This empiric in his everyday natural attitude has no predicament to the reality of the outside world and behaves accordingly. It is as a scientific empiric that he has a predicament, namely underdetermination and the superempirical virtues. Even here as a scientific empiric, his predicament is not an egocentric one as he may think. As Husserl has claimed and as I have accordingly established, the natural attitude includes both the lay *and* the professional empiric and that this is their default attitude or frame of reference. The transcendental or phenomenological or transcendental phenomenological attitude corresponds with the mind/body frame (also known as the egocentric frame) exactly and

[276] Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology*, Routledge Philosophy Companions (London: Routledge, 2012), 125

the natural attitude corresponds with all the frames outside it. The true predicament of the empiric is that he cannot *access* the mind/body frame and its experience without first starting out *in* the mind/body frame in which case he is changing his name to phenomenic. In this case, he would be bracketing out the natural world and its empiric's attitude. Per my frame of reference scheme, the egocentric predicament would be labeled what Everett Hall labeled it: *categorio-centric predicament*. The *American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia* states, "philosophers cannot help but operate from within a categorial system, whether aware of it or not, leading to the conclusion that there is no neutral ground in philosophy. Indeed, since Hall contends that even ordinary experience and language are categorically committed, everyone is inextricably in the "categorio-centric predicament.""[277] In this way, everyone is trapped in whatever categorical frame he is committed to without it having to be the egocentric one.[278]

4.13 How Intentionality Solves the Predicament

Ultimately the proposed answer will be unsatisfying to many people because the explanation appears to be simplistic and unprovable. Of course, the phenomenologists have already anticipated this and stipulated that being in the natural attitude—being in the wrong frame—has already entrapped you and your committed reasoning tools for the solution. This has strong parallels to the proper framing of the Four Realities for the Spiritual Ennobled Ones; a natural attitude will hamper even understanding the Noble

[277] John Lachs and Robert Talisse, eds., *American Philosophy: An Encyclopedia* (Routledge, 2007). 355
[278] Sokolowski likely intended that egocentric meant whatever frame the mind was in was by definition the egocentric one.

Truth of Dukkha. Regardless, Sokolowski makes the case as follows:

> One of phenomenology's greatest contributions is to have broken out of the egocentric predicament, to have checkmated the Cartesian doctrine. Phenomenology shows that the mind is a *public thing* [emphasis added], that it acts and manifests itself out in the open, not just inside its own confines. … *The mind and the world are correlated with one another* [emphasis added]. Things do appear to us, things truly are disclosed, and we, on our part, do display, both to ourselves and to others, the way things are. … By discussing intentionality, phenomenology helps us reclaim a public sense of thinking, reasoning, and perception. It helps us reassume our human condition as *agents* [emphasis added] of truth. Besides drawing our attention to the intentionality of consciousness, phenomenology also discovers and describes many different structures in intentionality. When the mind is taken in the Cartesian or Lockean way, as an enclosed sphere with its circle of ideas, the term "consciousness" is usually considered to be simply univocal. There are no structural differences within consciousness; there is just awareness, pure and simple. We notice whatever impressions arise in us, and we then arrange them into judgments or propositions that take a stab at declaring what is "out there." But for phenomenology, intentionality is highly differentiated. There are different kinds of intending, correlated with different kinds of objects. For example, we carry out perceptual intentions when we see an ordinary material object, but we must intend pictorially when we see a photograph or a painting. We must change our intentionality; taking something as a picture is different from taking something as a simple object. Pictures are correlated with pictorial intending, perceptual objects are correlated with perceptual intending.[279]

Another way to understand why and how intentionality resolves the "en-bubblement" or sequestering of the mind from the world is that the mind was never sequestered in the first place because the body's faculties act as competent, true, faithful, and complex interface. This dependable interface correlates (inner) mind (with its body acting as a true and effective *window* to external reality) with (outer) world (via *physical communicatory attributes* acting out, expressing, and relaying the thoughts of the mind). This complex of

[279] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 12

reliable matching correlations is one of the keys to understanding the resolution of the categorio-centric predicament. Next is to understand that the resolution is observable and confirmed in the transcendental phenomenological attitude, within the mind/body frame. The resolution salvages agency as evidenced by the faithful and consistent interface with the external. In this way, the mind does not have a hidden aspect; when the outer world observes the body's expressions, they are seeing the mind at work and, to a significant extent, this makes it public. A finer point is to be made. Consciousness is not an undifferentiated awareness whose only role is to receive sense data passively. Consciousness has a rich and robust architecture with potential matching consciousness *puzzle pieces* that will correlate and fit with the corresponding manifestation of the external world.

4.14 Intentionality and the Transcendent Turn

In this section, I wish to connect intentionality to the transcendental turn, explain what is meant by phenomenological transcendence, and make associations with early Buddhism. The transcendental turn is turning away from natural attitude. This simple definition captures precisely what early Buddhist meditators do; they do not deny but rather suspend the natural attitude. When the meditator sits to meditate he transforms himself (or pivots frames) from empiric to phenomenic. The act of sitting is static so he only needs to suspend his wandering, exploratory, and engaging centroid. As a more difficult task the meditator can walk and still settle into the mind/body frame without the centroid engaging. He does not project the centroid; he simply is in the mind/body

walking. He either controls his centroid or he observes his centroid. As long as he does this he does not break from the mind/body frame and does not return to the first or second or allocentric centroidal frames of reference. In this way, meditation is meta-cognition, meta-awareness, and meta-centroid. For the early Buddhist, pivoting to the mind/body frame is a preliminary albeit an absolutely essential transition. The mind/body frame is the horizon in which the mind works towards transcendence. Penultimate and ultimate in this transcendence there is experiential non-propositional knowledge.

Smith introduces the transcendental turn in this way: "Husserl presented phenomenology with a transcendental turn. In part, this means that Husserl took on the Kantian idiom of "transcendental idealism", looking for conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or of consciousness generally, and arguably turning away from any reality beyond phenomena."[280] This is consistent with the early Buddhist adept's placing himself on a path constituted entirely of phenomena. The transcendental turn, phenomenological reduction, the turn to the phenomenological attitude and so forth all signify the same transition. Sokolowski provides an overview:

> The turn to the phenomenological attitude is called the *phenomenological reduction*, a term that signifies the "leading away" from the natural targets of our concern, "back" to what seems to be a more restricted viewpoint, one that simply targets the intentionalities themselves. Reduction, with the Latin root *re-ducere*, is a leading back, a withholding or a withdrawal. When we enter into this new viewpoint, we *suspend* the intentionalities we now contemplate. This suspension, this neutralization of our doxic modalities, is also called the *epoché*, a term taken from Greek skepticism, where it signifies the restraint the Skeptics said we should have toward our judgments about things; they said we should refrain from judging until the evidence is clear. Although phenomenology takes this term from Greek

[280] Smith, "Phenomenology," 17

> skepticism, the skeptical overtone of the term is not kept. The *epoché* in phenomenology is simply the neutralizing of natural intentions that must occur when we contemplate those intentions.[281]

The concept of doxic modalities and its suspension by the phenomenologist requires elaboration. The natural world connected with doxa brings forth the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt)*. Doxa as world belief is contrasted with epistēmē as scientific knowledge.[282] Epistēmē then is close to knowledge extracted in the allocentric space. One can say that epistēmē often propagates into doxa which occurs in the first and second frames. Or you can say doxa as worldview serves as hidden conditions for epistēmē. This has been my thematic contention throughout. Moran explains that "[u]nder the heading of the *Lebenswelt*, the world of common experience is rehabilitated by phenomenology as the reality from which all conceptions and constructions of other domains of existence start and to which these domains essentially refer."[283] Hans-Georg Gadamer echoes this saying, "So the word 'Lebenswelt' has reminded us of all the presuppositions that underlie all scientific knowledge."[284] This is not at all surprising given that Husserl's enterprise seeks absolutes. Phenomenologists will identify the relativism of epistēmē as being informed and conditioned by doxa. Doxa and the lifeworld as worldviews are the same as James' living system.

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[281] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 49
[282] Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 291
[283] Moran, 191-2
[284] As quoted in Moran, 178

4.15 Husserl's Transcendence

So far I have presented fundamental aspects of phenomenology that nearly all phenomenologist would agree with; transcendence is not one of those aspects. I already stated Husserl's classic and foundational version, known as transcendental constitutive phenomenology, is the only one among seven major forms that emphasizes transcendence. This is not surprising given the worldview creep toward naturalism. I believe enough has been presented to sense Husserl's anti-empirical, anti-rational, anti-reductional, anti-scientism, and anti-naturalism. The evidence paints a picture in which he is noncommittal in terms of the sharp divide I presented between the physicalist/materialist/annihilationist and the transcendentalist.

Let us inspect what transcendence is meant in the method. Sokolowski explains its meaning so:

> The word means "going beyond," based on its Latin root, *transcendere*, to climb over or go beyond, from *trans* and *scando*. Consciousness, even in the natural attitude, is transcendental because it reaches beyond itself to the identities and things that are given to it. The ego can be called transcendental insofar as it is involved, in cognition, in reaching out to things. The transcendental ego is the ego or the self as the agent of truth. The transcendental reduction is the *turn toward the ego as the agent of truth* [emphasis added], and the transcendental attitude is the stance we take up when we make this ego and its intentionalities thematic.[285]

Here we will define "ego" as a sense or position of self as usually found in philosophy and later psychology. He continues explaining that "[t]he doctrine of the transcendental reduction is especially important because it gives a new definition of how philosophy can

[285] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 58

be related to prephilosophical life and experience"[286] and "[t]hey reveal a transcendental ego, a responsible agent of intentionality and evidence."[287] The phenomenic's experience, agency, and responsibility is authenticated over and against the empiric's. The phenomenic is endowed with a transcendental ego versus the empiric being endowed with an empirical ego. He explains this dichotomy as follows:

> "I" am a material, organic, and psychological thing. If we were to take the self simply as one of the things in the world, we would be treating it as what can be called the *empirical ego*. On the other hand, this very same self can also be played off against the world: it is the center of disclosure to whom the world and everything in it manifest themselves. It is the agent of truth, the one responsible for judgments and verifications, the perceptual and cognitive "owner" of the world. When considered in this manner it is no longer simply a part of the world; it is what is called the *transcendental ego*. The empirical and the transcendental egos are not two entities; they are one and the same being, but considered in two ways. Moreover, it is not just our manner of considering the ego that introduces the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental; it is not just our adoption of an empirical or a transcendental stance that establishes the duality in the self. Rather, the ego exists in this double manner. We can consider it in this dual way only because it enjoys the kind of being that allows it to be so considered. We could not attribute a transcendental ego to a tree or a cat.[288]

This reading of Husserl's transcendence is consistent in the literature. It is a thorough going philosophical stance against a materialistic zombie-like empirical ego. In the above, cats are relegated to physicalistic zombie cats while humans are not because we have the capacity to know that we are not. Indeed Husserl was rigorous in establishing this transcendental ego. Moran records his establishing of the transcendental ego as unity

[286] Sokolowski, 62
[287] Sokolowski, 111
[288] Sokolowski, 112-3

of ground for intentionality as follows: "Recalling his philosophical development in the *Crisis*, Husserl claimed his philosophical breakthrough came in 1898 when he realized that there was a 'universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness' (C 166n.; K 169n.1). Anything that is – whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs – is 'an index of a subjective system of correlations' (C 165; K 168). Every object and every meaning must be understood not solely as it is 'in itself' but in relation to the subjective acts which disclose it."[289] When we say that it is a thoroughgoing philosophical stance, we mean it is not enough to be religious.

In this way, the Irreducible-Mind theorists are, on the spectrum between the supernatural transcendentalist of the Buddha's kind and the natural physicalists of the modern-day scientist's kind, closer to the Buddha's stance with their myriad compilation of unwelcome entities than to Husserl who remains within the confines of rigorous philosophy. Having said this, Husserl is on the cusp of religion; this is why transcendental constitutive phenomenology is amenable and conducive to comparisons with the religion of early Buddhism. After all transcendental constitutive phenomenology establishes an ego or self that is "constituted in pure or transcendental consciousness, setting aside questions of *any* relation to the natural world around us."[290] Further there is evidence Husserl had a strong religious worldview that affected and directed his philosophy albeit still within respectable philosophical boundaries. Moran documents his religiosity as follows:

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[289] Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 21
[290] Smith, "Phenomenology," 15

> Although his phenomenological approach was 'atheological' (*Briefwechsel*, 7: 237),[16] in that it bracketed the results of all positive sciences, including theology, nevertheless he was deeply religious, and even saw *phenomenology as progressing ultimately to theological questions and treating scientifically what had previously been symbolized in religion* [emphasis added]. A close confidante of his final years, Sr Adelgundis Jaegerschmidt records him as saying: 'In my phenomenological reduction I simply want to gather all philosophies and religions by means of a universally valid method of cognition.'[17] His aim was, as he put it, to reach 'God without God'. … His mature conception of the divine was expressed in terms of quasi-Hegelian 'absolute spirit', in the form of a 'community of monads' in a teleological project of absolute reason, or as an absolute ego that temporalizes itself, pluralizes itself in individual egos, and requires expression in the world (15: 381).[19][291]

4.16 Literature Connecting Phenomenology to Early Buddhism

This section will document voices either in the early Buddhist and/or phenomenological community who have seen parallels in the two thought systems. Phenomenologists themselves have only formalized their insight and method which they acknowledge has been practiced since ancient times. Smith maintains "When Hindu and Buddhist philosophers reflected on states of consciousness achieved in a variety of meditative states, they were practicing phenomenology."[292] Phenomenologist John Cogan writes "The phenomenological reduction is a radical, rigorous, and transformative meditative technique."[293] The earliest early Buddhist who made some broad connections was Bhikkhu Ñanajivako. He had already expressed his ideas from a 1971 essay[294] which was revised and enlarged for republication in *The Wheel Publication* in 2006. He writes

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[291] Moran, *Edmund Husserl*, 16-7
[292] Smith, "Phenomenology," 14
[293] Cogan, "The Phenomenological Reduction."
[294] Bhikkhu Ñanajivako, "Main Currents in Modern Thought," Vol. 27, No. 5, 1971

in part:

> In Husserl's interpretation, "things" are simply taken to mean "whatever is given," that which we "see" in consciousness, and this "given" is called phenomenal in the sense that it "appear" to our consciousness. The Greek word "phenomenon" does not necessarily indicate that there is an unknown thing behind phenomena (as in Kant's philosophy or in the Vedaanta [sic]), or a "back-stage" being, as Nietzsche ironically exposed it. From our standpoint, it is important to emphasize that Husserl's phenomenological method "is neither deductive nor empirical, but consists in *pointing* to what is given and *elucidating* it."[10] It claims, in other words, to be *yathaa-bhuutam* [sic], or "adequate to [actual] being." The analysis of the original meaning of the Greek term "phenomenon" has been performed in masterly fashion by Martin Heidegger.[11] The word "phenomenon' (from the verb *phainesthai*, "let see," which is similar to the Pali *ehi-passiko*) has two meanings relevant for philosophy. The first is "to show itself," the second, "to seem as." Contemporary phenomenological philosophy uses it in the first sense, as "merely letting something be seen, letting entities be perceived." The secondary meaning, indicating something which seems to "remain hidden, or which relapses or gets covered again, or shows itself only 'in disguise,'" points to the historical process of constructing theories and "view" (Greek *doxa*, Sanskrit dristi, Pali diṭṭhi) by which the primordially "uncovered" phenomena are rather concealed again, or kept in disguise.[295]

Ñanajivako's direct and unmistakable denial of early Buddhism as being deductive and empirical is his most important contribution. The remainder are initial connections made between the two thought systems. Sue Hamilton's *Early Buddhism: A New Approach: The I of the Beholder's*[296] main theme is that early Buddhism is best interpreted as a personal experience. However, she does not resort to phenomenology or conclude any

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[295] Bhikkhu Ñanajivako, "The Three Basic Facts of Existence," ed. Nyanaponika Thera, The Wheel Publication, 202/203/204 (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971), https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/various/wheel186.html.

[296] Sue Hamilton, *Early Buddhism: A New Approach: The I of the Beholder* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2000). See especially page 6.

association with phenomenology. Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu in his 1996 *The Wings of Awakening* wrote:

> there are two modern disciplines that I have drawn on to help explain some of the more formal aspects of the Buddha's mode of speech and his analysis of causal principles. The first discipline is phenomenology, the branch of philosophy that deals with phenomena as they are *directly experienced* [emphasis added], in and of themselves. There are many schools of modern phenomenology, and it is not my purpose to try to equate the Buddha's teachings with any one of them. However, the Buddha does recommend a mode of perception that he calls "entry into emptiness (*suññatā*)" [see MN 121], in which one simply notes the presence or absence of phenomena, without making further assumptions about them. This approach resembles what in modern philosophy could be called "radical phenomenology," a mode of perception that looks at experiences and processes simply as events, with no reference to the question of whether there are any 'things' lying behind those events, or of whether the events can be said really to exist [see passages §230 and §186]. Because of this resemblance, the word "phenomenology" is useful in helping to explain the source of the Buddha's descriptions of the workings of kamma and the process of dependent co-arising in particular. Once we know where he is coming from, it is easier to make sense of his statements and to use them in their proper context. … If you are unfamiliar with the terminology of phenomenology, chaos theory, holograms … read … on skillfulness, to find the doctrinal context in which these terms can be related to an immediate experience: the process of developing a skill. The approach of phenomenology relates to the fact that, on the night of his Awakening, the Buddha focused his attention directly on the mental process of developing skillful states in the mind, without referring to who or what was developing the skill, or to whether there was any sort of substratum underlying the process.[297]

This long quote is again to show that others believe that the direct experience found in the early suttas is a phenomenological one. The mundane-transcendent purview is more obvious while this phenomenological one was inspired by Ṭhānissaro's writings

[297] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, *The Wings to Awakening: An Anthology from the Pali Canon* (Barre Center for Buddhist Studies: Dhamma Dana Publications, 1996).

especially captured in *The Wings of Awakening*. He also makes this connection in a few of his other writings, but central connections are made here. For the present we take note that for Ṭhānissaro 1) phenomenology is direct experience in and of themselves, 2) it is best represented by the *suññatā* mode of perception which observes presence and absence without assumptions, and 3) its brackets out assumptions of eternalistic entities, and 4) it reveals the patterns in the empiric's world that lead the Buddha to have vision and knowledge of karma, rebirth and the Four Noble Truths. All of this is founded on the agency of skillful action (i.e., all actions directly or indirectly required by paṭiccasamuppāda).

More recently in 2015 philosopher of mind, Buddhism and phenomenology, Christian Coseru, wrote:

> As a distinctive feature of consciousness, intentionality thus discloses the world as a domain of experience rather than establishes a relationship between mind and a discrete, 'external' world. This world as experienced is what Husserl called the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*), and what the Buddhist canonical literature refers to as the "phenomenal world of experience" (*lokasaṃjñā*).[298]

Here Coseru understands intentionality as I have and draws the lifeworld to early Buddhist lokasaṃjñā. He proceeds to connect lokasaṃjñā to the paṭiccasamuppāda's fifth and sixth nidanas— saḷāyatana and phassa—as specifically found in the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta:

> The Buddhist view of this constantly changing world of phenomenal experience is well articulated in the canonical literature: In the world by which one is a

[298] Christian Coseru, "Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why Phenomenology Is Inescapable," *Philosophy East and West* 65, no. 1 (January 2015): 227–48, 228-9

> perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world — this is called the world of the Noble One's Discipline. And what . . . is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world? The eye is in that world by which one is a perceiver of the world. The ear . . . The nose . . . The tongue . . . The body . . . The mind is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world.[7] As this passage seems to suggest, in the transient world of sensory awareness entities are presented as aggregated phenomena of experience. But these entities are not simply the phenomenal counterparts of corresponding physical objects, for what lies outside the sphere of perception is always already constituted by the dynamic structures of our cognitive architecture. I perceive color because I am sensitive to light, but my sensitivity is also a disposition to affect light. The world as perceived is brought into existence through cognitive activity and goes out of existence with the cessation of cognitive activity. This is not an 'objective' world that exists over and above its intersubjective apprehension, for such a world, devoid of any reference to subjective experience, is not within the purview of empirical awareness. For the Buddhist, empirical awareness is an awareness of a specific domain (of visibles, tangibles, audibles) as disclosed by a specific cognitive modality (visual awareness, auditory awareness, and so on). The Buddhist, thus, appears to advocate the view that what we mean by world (loka) is the diversity and manifoldness of empirical phenomena that find their ultimate source in the activity of various modes of cognitive awareness. However, the notion of a world as experienced does not imply that the elements of existence and/or experience (*dharmā*) are not empirically real, only that their reality cannot be ascertained independently of any reference to their mode of givenness. From a first-person perspective, the body — as an aggregate of such elements of existence and/or experience — is both the medium of contact with the world and the world with which it comes into contact.[299]

Here Coseru clarifies that the early Buddhists do no deny the existence of the empirical world—nor have I; I only reject its claimed purview over paṭiccasamuppāda. He makes two points here, 1) that the disclosure of the experience of the world *arises* when intentionality as sourced from the transcendental index (i.e., disposition of perception and conception; e.g., conditioning) *together* with the attributes and themes (i.e., the mode of

[299] Coseru. 229. The Buddhist text he quotes is from Saṃyutta Nikāya IV, 96; translation per Bodhi 2000, p. 1190, the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta.

givenness; diversity and manifoldness; e.g., attractiveness, disgustingness) of natural, empirical phenomena, and 2) that, from strictly the first-person mind/body frame, the body has two modes: medium of contact with the world (i.e., faithful window to the world) and the world into which the body is located and comes into contact. Point two as explicating directly the fifth and sixth nidanas anticipates the discussion of the *Sabba Sutta: The All*. Point one is the insight that supports the suññatā, saṃvegic, anuloma and paṭiloma perceptions and insights. It stands as adequate first approximation of dependent co-arising—paṭiccasamuppāda.

4.17 The Nidanas Are Rooted in the Mind/Body Frame

This small section will only point out using the short definitions of each nidana that the nidanas are firmly rooted in and demarcated by the mind/body frame. This is meant to document that none of the nidanas are placed in the centroidal frames.[300] I borrow from Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's definition of each nidana as follows:

> 1) Ignorance: not seeing things in terms of the four noble truths of stress, its origination, its cessation, and the path to its cessation.
>
> 2) Fabrication: the process of intentionally shaping states of *body and mind* [emphasis added]. a) bodily fabrication: the in-and-out breath, b) verbal fabrication: directed thought and evaluation, and c) mental fabrication: feeling (feeling tones of pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain) and perception (the mental labels applied to the objects of the senses for the purpose of memory and recognition).
>
> 3) Consciousness at the six sense media: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and intellect.
>
> 4) Name-and-form: mental and physical phenomena. Mental phenomena include: a) feeling, b) perception, c) intention, d) contact, and e) attention. Physical

[300] The same applies to the upanisās, but the point is made only using the nidanas.

> phenomena include the four great elements—the properties constituting the kinetic sense of the body—and any physical phenomenon derived from them: f) earth (solidity), g) water (liquidity), h) wind (energy and motion), and i) fire (warmth).
>
> 5) The Six Internal Sense Media: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and intellect.
>
> 6) Contact at the six sense media. Contact happens when a sense organ meets with a sense object—for example, the eye meets with a form—conditioning an act of consciousness at that sense organ. The meeting of all three—the sense organ, the object, and the act of consciousness—counts as contact.
>
> 7) Feeling based on contact at the six sense media.
>
> 8) Craving for the objects of the six sense media. This craving can focus on any of the six sense media, and can take any of three forms: a) sensuality-craving (craving for sensual plans and resolves), b) becoming-craving (craving to assume an identity in a world of experience), and c) non-becoming-craving (craving for the end of an identity in a world of experience).
>
> 9) Clinging—passion and delight—focused on the five aggregates of form, feeling, perception, fabrication, and consciousness. This clinging can take any of four forms: a) sensuality-clinging, b) view-clinging, c) habit-and-practice-clinging, and d) doctrine-of-self-clinging.
>
> 10) Becoming on any of three levels: a) the level of sensuality, b) the level of form, and c) the level of formlessness.
>
> 11) Birth: the actual assumption of an identity on any of these three levels.
>
> 12) The Aging-and-Death of that identity, with its attendant sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair.[301]

Ignorance of the four truths as rooted in consciousness classification will be treated in a later section. Fabrication is limited to mind and body. This fabrication has its operation also in consciousness classification. Most of the remaining nidanas are *bounded* within the mind/body frame which is demarcated by the body's senses. The frame of the mind/body frame *is* the six internal sense media. In this section we will refer to

[301] Ṭhānissaro, *The Shape of Suffering: A Study of Dependent Co-Arising*, 3-4

salayatana as the frame of the mind/body. Consciousness is obviously the mind, but defined in terms of its frame. Name-and-Form are synonymous with mind/body. The fifth nidana is the frame. Contact is made at the frame. Feeling is based on contact made at the frame. Craving is for objects of the frame. Clinging is focused on the five aggregates of form, feeling, perception, fabrication, and consciousness all of which are nidanas themselves or subsumed by them. Becoming does not betray being the centroidal frames; it will be treated also with the classification of consciousness. Birth and death are actualizations and consequences of becoming and described in subjective terms.

4.18 The Authority of Experience for the Early Buddhists

Let us revisit the imagery that the Buddhist monastic walks on the path (i.e., dhamma) and this path proper is entirely constituted by phenomena (i.e., dhamma). Dhamma in the right context means the world of phenomena, purely mental phenomenon as distinguished from a psycho-physical phenomenon.[302] In the context of paṭiccasamuppāda and the mental culture (bhavana) that it entails, dhamma must be elaborated beyond merely and broadly "phenomena" to being "the phenomenic's experiential phenomena." In this way, the phenomenic's experience is all of phenomena. It is in *this* sense that we mean when we say "experience" going forward.

In book *The Authority of Experience: Essays on Buddhism and Psychology*, John Pickering writes,

[302] Thomas William Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., "Dhamma," in *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary* (London: The Pali Text Society, 1921), 339

> 'Authority' means both the power to convince and the power to compel. The latter sense takes us towards Hobbes' concerns with law, sanctions and obedience. However, it is the former sense that is of interest here. This takes us towards a concern with discourse where words like 'author', 'authoritative' and 'authentic' reflect their Sanskrit origin, meaning 'what is produced by your own actions is yours'. Here we find the more humane sense of authority; as when someone says, "I saw it with my own eyes". It is the conviction which arises when something is known through direct experience. It is this that confers authority in the sense of the right to be believed and the informed power to persuade.[303]

The elaboration of the nature and relationship between authority and experience will help us better appreciate the phenomenological purview of paṭiccasamuppāda. Let us start with what we can trace as more or less the irreducible or fundamental sources of early Buddhist teachings. Harvey maintains, "In a sense, Buddhism begins and ends with the Buddha's awakening experience, for this is the ultimate source of Buddhist teachings, and these are a guide towards moral and spiritual development culminating in an experience of a like nature. At his awakening, the Buddha gained *direct knowledge* [emphasis added] of rebirth, karma and the four 'True Realities for the Spiritually Ennobled'. All of the central teachings of early Buddhism can be arranged under one or other of these three heads."[304] Given this evidence and reasoning, Buddhists can and must for himself select authoritative dhamma among the Three Jewels—Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha. Dhamma (the instructions) points to Dhamma (the cosmic law) which says that dhamma (as phenomena) is authority. The experience of the Awakening of the Buddha is itself not the authority, but rather the guide or hypothetical imperative for the true

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[303] John Pickering, ed., *The Authority of Experience: Essays on Buddhism and Psychology*, Curzon Studies in Asian Philosophy (London: Curzon Press, 1997), vii

[304] Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism*, 32

authority of each experience of each adept on the path. The direct experience has authority in that it persuades via confirmation, purpose, and reward.

This authority is elaborated by the Buddha in the *Kalama Sutta*. This sutta is too long to include here so I will cite only the most relevant section here: "So, as I said, Kalamas: 'Don't go by reports, by legends, by traditions, by scripture, by logical conjecture, by inference, by analogies, by agreement through pondering views, by probability, or by the thought, "This contemplative is our teacher." When you *know for yourselves* [emphasis added] that, "These qualities are skillful; these qualities are blameless; these qualities are praised by the wise; these qualities, when adopted & carried out, lead to welfare & to happiness" — then you should enter & remain in them.' Thus was it said. And in reference to this was it said."[305] The Kalama Sutta has been interpreted in many ways including as a charter of free inquiry.[306] The better interpretation is that they are axiological entities guiding the hypothetical imperative for the upanisās. I repeat my earlier claims: The Buddha does not compel; he does not—nor should the adept—regard his "authority" as the hypothetical imperative to develop one upanisic stage/state or another. The adept must experience the particular phenomenon directly for himself with the scheme as guide.

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[305] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Kalama Sutta: To the Kalamas," trans. Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, 1994, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an04/an04.045.than.html.

[306] This interpretation seems to be part of the discourse of scientific Buddhism sometimes in support of secular Buddhism and sometimes against Christianity as authoritarian. See http://bschawaii.org/shindharmanet/critical/

4.19 The Privacy of Experience

The internal and private nature of the phenomenic's experience has been mentioned several times. This characteristic of experience is a valuable demarcation. The theme of privacy or inaccessibility as well as insight into how even modern psychologists have substantially misunderstood separation between psychology and phenomenology can be found in Jerry Jennings's 1986 valuable article "Husserl Revisited: The Forgotten Distinction between Psychology and Phenomenology." The work's relevant abstract is given in full here:

> As phenomenology attracts ever-growing attention in current psychology, it is increasingly important for psychologists to understand that phenomenology encompasses much more than a mere appreciation for subjective self-report data. The stimulating ideas of Husserl, the so-called founder of phenomenology, are reexamined to enlighten psychologists about phenomenology's contrasting approach to the study of consciousness: Whereas psychology studies actual subjective responses to actual environmental events (empirical data), phenomenology studies the essential character of consciousness in meaning-conferring acts (essential knowledge). At the turn of the century Husserl proposed phenomenology as a positive alternative to the experimental methods of "the new scientific psychology." Husserl believed phenomenology was needed to clarify the essential, but unanalyzed, preunderstandings of mental phenomena that guide psychology's experimental investigations.[307]

He emphasizes the erroneous conflating of psychology and phenomenology including the psychology's inappropriate subsumption of phenomenology. He writes, "in psychology today the term *phenomenological* is typically used as an interchangeable word for

[307] Jerry Jennings, "Husserl Revisited - Forgotten Distinction between Psychology & Phenomenology," *American Psychologist* 41, no. 11 (November 1986): 1231–40, https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.41.11.1231. 1231

subjective. Indeed, most psychologists conceive of phenomenology as the study of *private* [emphasis added] subjective responses to a given situation. However, phenomenology certainly encompasses much more than the simplistic notion of studying the individual's "unique point of view." … some psychologists use the term phenomenological in a distinctly pejorative sense, signifying the basic "unreliable" nature of subjective self-report data"[308] Mistaking phenomenology for empiricism (as discussed in chapter two) or for empirical psychology was Husserl's concern, which is justified based on continuing confusion. Jennings cites, "Actually, both William James and Edmund Husserl viewed the confusion between the domains of psychology and phenomenology as one of the central problems for "the new scientific psychology." In fact, as Giorgi (1981) has shown, "a confusion between the two disciplines still persists.""[309] Much of his arguments have already been covered in this paper. In short psychologists of today have fallen in line with naturalistic physicalist explanations of consciousness and are cornered into believing that consciousness is publicly accessible and understood by empirical experiments. Jennings's slightly different perspective and examples are worth noting and weave into the main point of privacy. He continues:

> Husserl recognized the enormous problems caused when naturalism relegates all possible phenomena in the world, including and especially human consciousness, to experimentally manipulable events of physical nature. Naturalism ignores the fact that consciousness, mathematical being, and other forms of essences, do not have the same kind of being as "the natural," and therefore they are not subject to the laws of time, space, and causality. For example, a mathematical axiom is not a material thing that is directly affected by physical events and it does not "exist" in a given time and place. Above all, Husserl realized the serious consequences of

[308] Jennings, 1231
[309] As quoted in Jennings, 1231

> naturalism for the budding scientific psychology of his time. For instance, Wilhelm Wundt and other early experimental psychologists conducted psychophysical experiments that sought to study consciousness experimentally by first *assuming a functional relation between intangible mental events and tangible, directly observable physical events* [emphasis added] (Boring, 1950). The occurrence of a subjective mental event was measured in terms of its effects in observable physical events Thus, for example, the person's mental experience of the color red was measured in terms of finger movement (reaction time) or introspective verbal report (paper-and-pencil responses). The point is that the *private mental event was relegated to the status of a "physical" thing* [emphasis added], which is in some way dependent on or related to physical events that *can* be manipulated and measured using the experimental method.[310]

Here Jennings attests Husserl's principal concerns about psychologizing consciousness leading a fixation on consciousness as reducible, experientable, correlatable in physical and public terms. This unacknowledged category error between the private non-physical consciousness and the public physical consciousness continues as a worldview blind spot. This blind spot allows empirical psychology to stay inside its bubble of thinking and method which ironically wants to subsume scientistically the irreducible mind. Jennings discusses the en-bubbled thinking and method more schematically as follows:

> the "naturalistic" researcher makes a series of assumptions about the "being" of consciousness. The experimental psychologist first assumes that consciousness is an event "in" nature. Second, the psychologist insists that consciousness must be studied using the experimental method because this is believed to be the only reliable way to gain knowledge of reality. Third, because the experimental method is based on the measurement and systematic manipulation of concretely observable events, the psychologist must assume that consciousness is in some way dependent on other existing physical events. Therefore, consciousness must be subject to the same causal laws as everything else that exists as physical material in space and time. Hence, if the psychologist assumes all this, then consciousness must have the same kind of "being" as physical being.[311]

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[310] Jennings, 1233
[311] Jennings, 1233

This centuries-long psychologism has led to—at best—methods incapable of accessing consciousness proper and—at worst—a present-day conflation between consciousness itself and its public expression. As Jennings provides concrete examples thus:

> in their avid determination to apply the experimental method, psychologists might equate the physical objective measure of rapid eye movements (REM) with the subjective mental experience of dreaming. Obviously, to claim that dreaming *is* REM is self-contradictory and absurd because it denies the very reality of the experience of dreaming, which provides the only possible assurance that REM "means" anything! Husserl himself (1912-1928/1952) offered a similar example of the error of "naturalizing consciousness": The phenomenon of "sound" can be explained by the theoretical concepts of "air vibration" and "stimulation of the auditory sense" (in DeBoer, 1978, p. 205). Such an explanation by itself is unobjectionable. But to maintain that the experience of sound is only air vibration is absurd.[312]

We can add the present-day example of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) seen as inching ever closer and closer to science's grasp of consciousness. We have already discussed in the previous chapter how the privacy or inaccessibility of the phenomenic's experience prevents the empiric's propositionalization of it in his attempt to verify it or demonstrate it. That was primarily a philosophical treatment. Here we have just seen from a parallel treatment of the phenomenic's experience by the empiric as something that could be correlated to the space/time coordinates of physicality. The empiric's endeavor here have ultimately the same results and for the same reason. The phenomenic's experience is private. Hoffman concluded the same in his parable of two monks (one a skeptic the other a believer) could compare between themselves the

[312] Jennings, 1235

veracity of their experiences, but these experiences remained private and unexaminable by outside tools and methods. He writes, "In my parable one sees the Buddhist path as misguided, and the other sees it as correct. But whether to describe the sceptic as a failure for not becoming a man of 'knowledge and vision' or to describe the doctrine as failed would be an issue between them, although it is not an issue which a tape-recorder and television camera could solve. This is what I mean in saying that the issue, though experiential, is not experimental."[313] In the language of the frames of reference, consciousness is forever inaccessible as inherent in mind and body frame. However, via the body, the authentic expressions of consciousness—its myriad behaviors—offer a verisimilar public version in the centroidal frames. But this public version is never exactly equal to the private version. We should clarify that the *public* aspect is dependent on leaving the mind/body frame and not dependent on whether other people are around. For example, a monastic could in *complete isolation* speak words of goodwill to the world and hence create in one instance 1) an inaccessible private version of this goodwill in his heart and mind (this dimension did not exit the mind/body frame), and 2) a public version in the air vibrations *and* in the sounds and meaning coming back to his ears and consciousness (this dimension exited the mind/body frame before returning to the mind/body frame). It is in the first sense that phenomenologists mean that consciousness is private.

[313] Hoffman, "The Buddhist Empiricism Thesis," 156

4.20 The Privacy of Paṭiccasamuppāda

There is a sutta that labels paṭiccasamuppāda as private knowledge. In the *Kosambi Sutta: At Kosambi (On Knowing Dependent Co-arising)* several monks engage in comparison or verification of just the kind imagined by Hoffman's parable. They are asking each other whether each has verified within the phenomenological attitude different segments of anuloma and paṭiloma. This sutta links the Kalama's delegation of authority to direct and personal experience, and it links direct and personal experience to anuloma and paṭiloma. I include the relevant portions of the Kosambi Sutta here:

> On one occasion Ven. Musila, Ven. Pavittha, Ven. Narada, and Ven. Ananda were staying in Kosambi at Ghosita's monastery.
>
> Then Ven. Pavittha said to Ven. Musila, "Musila, my friend, putting aside conviction, putting aside preference, putting aside tradition, putting aside reasoning through analogies, putting aside an agreement through pondering views: Do you have truly *personal knowledge* [emphasis added] that, 'From birth as a requisite condition come aging & death'?"
>
> "Yes, Pavittha my friend. Putting aside conviction... preference... tradition... reasoning through analogies... an agreement through pondering views, I do have truly personal knowledge that, 'From birth as a requisite condition come aging & death.'"
>
> (Similarly with 'From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth'... 'From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming'... "From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance'... 'From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving'... 'From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling'... 'From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact'... 'From name-&-form as a requisite condition come the six sense media'... 'From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form'... 'From fabrications as a requisite condition comes consciousness.')
>
> … [Ven. Musila asks of Ven. Pavittha the same and receives the same reply.]
>
> "Musila, my friend, putting aside conviction, putting aside preference, putting aside tradition, putting aside reasoning through analogies, putting aside an

> agreement through pondering views: Do you have truly personal knowledge that, 'From the cessation of birth comes the cessation of aging & death'?"
>
> "Yes, Pavittha my friend. Putting aside conviction... preference... tradition... reasoning through analogies... an agreement through pondering views, I do have truly personal knowledge that, 'From the cessation of birth comes the cessation of aging & death.'"
>
> (Similarly with 'From the cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth'... 'From the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming'... 'From the cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance'... 'From the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving'... 'From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling'... 'From the cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of contact'... 'From the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of the six sense media'... 'From the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of name-&-form'... 'From the cessation of fabrications comes the cessation of consciousness.')
>
> …
>
> "Musila, my friend, putting aside conviction, putting aside preference, putting aside tradition, putting aside reasoning through analogies, putting aside an agreement through pondering views: Do you have truly personal knowledge that, 'The cessation of becoming is Unbinding'?"
>
> "Yes, Pavittha my friend. Putting aside conviction... preference... tradition... reasoning through analogies... an agreement through pondering views, I do have truly personal knowledge that, 'The cessation of becoming is Unbinding.'"
>
> "Then, Ven. Musila, you are an arahant whose fermentations are ended."
>
> …[314]

The *Kosambi Sutta* offers evidence that all teachings, as Harvey maintains, leads back to kamma, rebirth, or the Four Noble Truths with paṭiccasamuppāda as a scheme accounting for them. The monks in this sutta are undoubtedly applying the Kalama standard, but it is not about a charter of free inquiry or abstract epistemology; they are applying the Kalama

[314] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Kosambi Sutta: At Kosambi (On Knowing Dependent Co-Arising)," accessed October 20, 2016, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.068.than.html.

standard as meaning the authority of experience as sanctioned by the direct knowledge/evidence found in the step-by-step results. Here the monks engage in what Jennings calls phenomenological subjective self-reports and what Hoffman paints with his parable. This is their communal public verification of otherwise private and inaccessible knowledge.[315]

4.21 Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition as Intentionality and as Modularity

Husserl had first learned how to see intentionally from Franz Brentano, but he later advanced his teacher's notions. Moran documents this advancement writing, "in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), Husserl claimed that Brentano had failed to recognize the true meaning of intentionality because he had not seen it as a 'complex of performances' that end up being layered in such a way as to make up the complex unity of the intentional object: 'Brentano's discovery of intentionality never led to seeing in it a complex of performances [*Zusammenhang von Leistungen*], which are included as sedimented history in the currently *constituted intentional unity* [emphasis added] and its current manners of givenness – a history that one can always uncover following a strict method'.[316] Here the "constituted intentional unity" is the unity of the modules of consciousness and the "manners of givenness" are the attributes of the natural object. In the nidanic scheme, consciousness's requisite condition is ignorance. Yet consciousness is also classified by requisite conditions. In the introduction we have already touched upon this as being the modularity of consciousness. It appears that classification *is*

[315] There are suttas in which the Buddha determined the noble status of monks.
[316] Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 20-1

modularization. It would also appear that since ignorance conditions consciousness then this classification is significantly related to ignorance. It is in the *Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta: The Greater Craving-Destruction Discourse* that Consciousness Classified by Requisite Conditions[317] is most fully elaborated. The *Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta* is too long to cite in full here. I provide the context for the Buddha's teaching on Consciousness Classified by Requisite Conditions before only quoting the relevant portion of the sutta.

> I have heard that on one occasion the Blessed One was staying in Sāvatthī, at Jeta's Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika's park. Now on that occasion this pernicious viewpoint (diṭṭhigata) had arisen in the monk Sāti the Fisherman's Son: "As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on [from birth to birth], not another." A large number of monks heard, "They say that this pernicious viewpoint has arisen in the monk Sāti the Fisherman's Son: 'As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on [from birth to birth], not another.'" …
>
> "As you say, friend," the monk Sāti the Fisherman's Son replied. Then he went to the Blessed One and, on arrival, having bowed down to him, sat to one side. As he was sitting there, the Blessed One said to him, "Is it true, Sāti, that this pernicious view has arisen in you — 'As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on, not another'?"
>
> "Exactly so, lord. As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is just this consciousness that runs and wanders on, not another."
>
> "Which consciousness, Sāti, is that?" [1]
>
> "This speaker, this knower, lord, that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & evil actions."
>
> "And to whom, worthless man, do you understand me to have taught the Dhamma like that? Haven't I, in many ways, said of *dependently co-arisen consciousness, 'Apart from a requisite condition, there is no coming-into-play of consciousness*

[317] Bhikkhus Nanamoli and Bodhi translate this as "Conditionality of Consciousness." See Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha Majjhima Nikaya* (Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2005). I believe Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's translation captures the modularity aspect better.

> [emphasis added]'? [2] But you, through your own poor grasp, not only slander us but also dig yourself up [by the root] and produce much demerit for yourself. That will lead to your long-term harm & suffering."[318]

It appears the issue the Buddha has with Sāti is that as a monk he should not conflate mundane right view with transcendent right view. Because indeed in mundane right view, there is a speaker and knower who is sensitive to the ripening of karma. Apparently, Sāti's insistence that consciousness wanders on through transmigration is in a manner too close to the Eternalist position, disregarding the crucial workings of paṭiccasamuppāda. In this sutta at least that crucial misunderstanding by Sāti is Consciousness Classified by Requisite Conditions. So Consciousness Classified by Requisite Conditions should be understood in the context of Sāti's slander of Dhamma and paṭiccasamuppāda. The sutta continues as follows:

> Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition
>
> "Consciousness, monks, is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness.
>
> "Just as fire is classified simply by whatever requisite condition in dependence on which it burns — a fire that burns in dependence on wood is classified simply as a wood-fire, a fire that burns in dependence on wood-chips is classified simply as a wood-chip-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on grass is classified simply as a

[318] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta: The Greater Craving-Destruction Discourse," 2011, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.038.than.html#fire-simile.

> grass-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on cow-dung is classified simply as a cow-dung-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on chaff is classified simply as a chaff-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on rubbish is classified simply as a rubbish-fire — in the same way, consciousness is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness.[319]

On this portion of the sutta, Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu comments, "Following the pattern of dependent co-arising, the Buddha first classifies consciousness in terms of the way it arises in dependence on the six sense-media. This analysis points to the way consciousness functions as a sub-factor under the factor of contact in dependent co-arising."[320] He is suggesting a circularity or feedback loop involved in consciousness; consciousness both *arises* in dependence on media sense and object which is (dependent on) contact and is a *sub-factor* for contact. In fact, he believes this feedback loop is even starker with consciousness being a nutrient onto itself. He believes the sutta then goes on to speak of "consciousness as dependent on four types of nutriment: physical food, contact, intellectual intention, and *consciousness itself* [emphasis added]."[321] Circularity and feedback loops appear to be inherent in paṭiccasamuppāda.

But this circularity within consciousness and between consciousness and contact

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[319] Ṭhānissaro.
[320] Ṭhānissaro. This is the most insightful commentary on Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition that I could find.
[321] Ṭhānissaro.

cannot occur without modularity of consciousness. Referring back to Sokolowski's quote above, modularity is the opposite of Locke and Descartes' mind as "an enclosed sphere with its circle of ideas, the term "consciousness" is usually considered to be simply univocal. There are no structural differences within consciousness; there is just awareness, pure and simple." Without structural differences, the Cartesian and Lockean mind is undifferentiated and non-modular. But according Sokolowski, phenomenology's greatest contribution is resolution of this egocentric predicament. Consciousness is bridged to the external world between a differentiated or modular part of consciousness matching or correlating experience of external objects. In other words the phenomenic's experience matches the empiric's experience. Modularity is the puzzle pieces of consciousness. My hypothesis is that early Buddhist consciousness classification is this phenomenological modularity. Furthermore, early Buddhist classified consciousness being conditionally arisen based on (correlated to) classified object is the correlation that is central to phenomenological intentionality or "consciousness of." The phenomenologist would interpret the following Buddhist version: "Consciousness, monks, is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Just as fire is classified simply by whatever requisite condition in dependence on which it burns — a fire that burns in dependence on wood is classified simply as a wood-fire" to mean "Consciousness is indexed, intended, and conscious of. Consciousness is indexed to, intended to, and conscious of objects. When I intend I direct my consciousness toward say fire, therefore my modular consciousness is directly of and

directly correlated to fire." It is worth repeating Sokolowski's characterization of intentionality here: "All our awareness is directed toward objects. If I see, I see some visual object, such as a tree or a lake; if I imagine, my imagining presents an imaginary object, such as a car that I visualize coming down a road; if I am involved in remembering, I remember a past object; if I am engaged in judging, I intend a state of affairs or a fact. Every act of consciousness, every experience, is *correlated* [emphasis added] with an object. Every intending has its intended object."

4.22 Early Buddhists' and Phenomenologists' Method and Hypothetical Imperative

If Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition is truly or adequately equivalent the intentionality of the phenomenologist, what was the Buddha's intention with it? Was the Buddha addressing the egocentric or categorio-centric predicament as does the phenomenologist with intentionality? In a sense, yes, and in another sense, no. Both the early Buddhist and the phenomenologist insist on the return to the egocentric frame as the first task. It is only within this mind/body frame that intentionality can directly be made aware. The methods and hypothetical imperative for being aware of intentionality differ for the two though. We will not get into any detailed comparison of the methods but only make broad observations. Ihde writes:

> learning the background and establishing the context is not only usual for learning a philosophical style, it is an essential element of a comprehensive grasp of the discipline. Nevertheless, without entering into the doing, the basic thrust and import of phenomenology is likely to be misunderstood at the least or missed at most. Phenomenology, in the first instance, is like an investigative science, an essential component of which is experiment. Phenomenology is experimental and its experiments are conducted according to a carefully worked out set of controls and methods. … The thought-experiments—or better, experience-experiments—

> that are worked out here are attempts to show the way in which phenomenological inquiry proceeds. … Husserl's teaching took place in a *step-by-step* [emphasis added] training in phenomenological "seeing" … phenomenology as a relatively new philosophical method claims to be a radical way of thought. Its founder, Edmund Husserl, claimed, "There is only one radical *self investigation* [emphasis added], and it is phenomenological. …Probing, too, must take on a phenomenological form. The probing activity of investigation is called *variational method*. Husserl's preferred tool was what he called "fantasy" variations. These variations were modeled on familiar logical and mathematical practices. Thus, to solve a problem the phenomenologist must go through all the variations that will lead to an adequate insight or solution. But, as later phenomenologists pointed out, investigations of regions of experience show that there are sometimes significant differences between the various dimensions of experience. Perceptual variations often contrast with imaginative or conceptual variations, though the activity of varying what is investigated is retained."[4].[322]

Early Buddhists would find this aligns with the general approach of its own meditation. Ihde then pinpoints the compendious character of phenomenology claiming, "Intentionality as transcendental is the condition of the possibility for all experience to be shaped in a certain way. … by anticipating what for phenomenology is *the* shape of experience, there can be gained a glimpse of overall direction. Intentionality summarizes all that has gone before in this initial framework. *Intentionality is the directional shape of experience* [emphasis added]."[323] This character of phenomenology is one of capacity to correlate, reveal, and directionally shape experience. This is remarkably similar to what Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu has observed in the dynamics of paṭiccasamuppāda in his book *The Shape of Suffering: A Study of Dependent Co-Arising* in which he comments on method and practice thus: "On the one hand, it shows how specific practices in the Buddhist path

[322] Don Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 4, 6, 23
[323] Ihde, 24

are meant to bring knowledge to bear on specific factors of dependent co-arising. On the other, it shows how specific factors in dependent co-arising—particularly, fabrication and name-&-form—can be *shaped* [emphasis added] into tools for use in the path to the end of suffering and stress. Once they have performed their functions as tools, these factors can be contemplated so as to abandon any remaining passion for them. … The word "stress" may be a noun, but the experience of stress is *shaped* [emphasis added] by your intentions. It's something you do."[324] Without exploring further the methods between the two disciplines—which would surely yield contrast—we here observe their common broad acknowledgment of the capacity of intending. However, Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's comment sets the early Buddhist path on a distinctly different directional shape of experience. We have already prepared for a discourse on this shaping with our discussion on the hypothetical imperatives of the Four Noble Truths. The purpose of phenomenology cannot be said to sympathetic to these imperatives. It appears that the imperative of phenomenology remains broad and closer to being a categorical imperative than being a hypothetical one as is consistent with Husserl's original intention to clarify the architecture of consciousness, and the mind's proper relationship to world via a science of intentionality—both for simply the *purpose of clarification*, a good in and of itself.

Before continuing comparing intentionality and Buddhist consciousness classification, let us examine how seeing is binary for the early Buddhist. Paul Fuller, in

[324] Ṭhānissaro, *The Shape of Suffering: A Study of Dependent Co-Arising*, 8, 12

his *The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View*, clarifies how early Buddhism presupposes views differently than the modern West does. The issue is on the coupling or decoupling of normativity and positivity in terms of knowledge; that is, is knowing simply about facts only (or values only)? He writes:

> In *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre has suggested that a dichotomy between 'is' and 'ought', between fact and value, is a modern phenomenon. Indeed, MacIntyre argues that, until modern times, the distinction between 'is' and 'ought' was not made.35 Western thought may then make a distinction between thought and action, between fact and value, that was not made in India. This point has been made by Paul Williams: In the Indian context it would have been axiomatic that liberation comes from discerning how things actually are, the true nature of things. That seeing things how they are has soteriological benefits would have been expected, and is just another way of articulating the 'is' and 'ought' dimension of Indian Dharma. The 'ought' (pragmatic benefit) is never cut adrift from the 'is' (cognitive factual truth). Otherwise it would follow that the Buddha might be able to benefit beings (and thus bring them to enlightenment) even without seeing things the way they really are at all. And that is not Buddhism.36 The uncoupling of the categories of 'is' and 'ought' is usually traced to Hume. Since Hume, it has been questioned whether we can derive statements of value from statements of fact.[325]

Here we identify another significant contrast between the early Buddhist and the empiricist—represented by Hume. The empirical Buddhists would have to remove normativity from Buddhist doctrine and methods if they wish to remain true to empiricism and Buddhism. As already discussed with the upanisās and supplemented below, "is' and 'ought" are not separable in the suttas. It is the requirement of the prescriptive ought that makes the four truths and paṭiccasamuppāda dimensionally

[325] Fuller, *The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism*, 9

different from say Einstein's theories which require only a cognitive penetration or grasp.

The last few lines of Paul Williams' comment are difficult to understand without knowing the context in which he made them. Whereas Fuller is emphasizing the modern West's underappreciation of value ought aspect in the act of knowing, Williams says that the simile of doctrine to a raft may have led to the overemphasis of doctrine being considered practical, prescriptive and normative. Williams claims on the contrary, "The teachings of the Buddha are held by the Buddhist tradition to work because they are factually true (not true because they work)."[326] In other words the raft (and the implied map) are factually accurate, thus effectively taking beings across. The raft and map work every single time because they are true and *not coincidental*. What he means when he says, "Otherwise it would follow that the Buddha might be able to benefit beings (and thus bring them to enlightenment) even without seeing things the way they really are at all" is that if doctrine provided results (awakening) for the Buddha and for his followers it would still remain happenstance if the doctrine did not factually and truthfully aligned with reality. This is highly reminiscent of the distinction between the adequate determination of the empiricists (method leading to successful and consistent results being explainable by coincidence but not true) and the reality of the scientific realists. In this way the early Buddhists view the reality and determination of nibbana as of the kind that scientific realists consider scientifically determined reality. Getting back to Williams point, since the Buddha did see things as they actually are then seeing must involve "is"

[326] Paul Williams, Anthony Tribe, and Alexander Wynne, *Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition*, 2nd ed (London ; New York: Routledge, 2012), 40

along with the purpose of "ought."

The broader and fundamental role of phenomenology and intentionality—seemingly empty of worldview—is evidenced by Smith and McIntyre when they write, "Intentionality, then, characterizes that aspect of a person that is called "consciousness" or "mind". And so the study of intentionality is a central part of the philosophy of mind. Specifically, it is a study of the unique way in which mind or consciousness relates to its objects and of the features of consciousness by virtue of which it has this relational character."[327] We are reminded of this bracketing of worldview or "reality belief" by Ihde when he maintains, "Phenomenology holds that reality belief must be suspended in order to allow the full range of appearances to show themselves."[328] There is an important point to be made here: this statement apparently is not consistent with his rejection of Husserl's transcendence not to mention the supernatural kind. He writes, "I had already rejected the transcendental version of phenomenology in the first edition [of the book]."[329] So we are reminded that of all seven of the phenomenologies Smith could identify, all were of the physicalist kind in the end. One could observe that this is the main break between early Buddhists and phenomenologists.

It might be more insightful to instead observe that the early Buddhist enters the mind/body frame and engages Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition *already* with a set of right views or right worldviews which informs the purpose and oughts of

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[327] David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language*, Pallas Paperbacks 24 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1984,. xiii
[328] Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities*, 21-2
[329] Ihde, xiv

each upanisā and only near the end of his path does he abandon for himself all views. He is told how to see, what to see, and the consequences of his seeing it thus. The phenomenologist's approach is approximately reverse: he brackets reality belief (or at least attempts to) in order to arrive at a universal and certain position or view on the reality of consciousness.[330]

4.23 The Notion of Diṭṭhi: The Point of View

This contrast between the early Buddhist and phenomenologists regarding reality or view belief needs elaboration not only to distinguish the two disciplines but more importantly to clarify the meaning of paṭiccasamuppāda. In this section, I will rely almost entirely on Paul Fuller's work *The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View*. His main thesis is that right-views especially as expressed in the *SammāDiṭṭhi-sutta* "are neither correct views in opposition to other views, nor the eradication of all views, but a form of insight which transcends all views."[331] He connects this thought to the relationship between paṭiccasamuppāda and the sutta in the following way:

> This is the first part of the process described in the *sutta*: right-view is knowledge of the four truths. The second explanation of right-view is that it is knowledge of dependent-origination. Of the sixteen views, twelve right-views entail seeing each factor of dependent-origination: its rise and fall. Other occurrences of this are found in the Nikāyas. We have already met a *micchā-diṭṭhi* from the *Mahātaṇhāsakhaya-sutta* (M I 256–71), attributed to Sāti, which stated that: 'As I understand the *dhamma* taught by the Blessed One, it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another'.124 The *sutta*, as we might expect, shows the Buddha arguing that consciousness is dependently

[330] See Ihde, 25 where he says, "It makes a universal claim, which moves phenomenology from a regional method and claim (descriptive psychology) to a philosophy."
[331] Fuller, *The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism*, 63

> arisen: without a condition there is no origination of consciousness.125 [332]

The takeaway is that all right views are covered entirely in the four truths and paṭiccasamuppāda. His seemingly simple thesis requires expanding as it segues to the Buddha's teaching on saṃvega and passion which I treat in the following section. Fuller presents two understandings—opposition and no-views—of samma-diṭṭhi in order to elucidate them. The first understanding is what he labels the *opposition understanding*. He writes,

> What are wrong and right-views? First, wrong-view is the denial of *kamma*, the denial that actions have consequences. Right-view is the affirmation of *kamma*, the affirmation that actions have consequences. Second, wrong-views are views about the self. The self is held either to exist eternally (*sassata-diṭṭhi*) or to be annihilated (*uccheda-diṭṭhi*). The right-view which corrects these wrong-views is either the knowledge of suffering, its arising, cessation, and the way to its cessation, i.e. knowledge of the four truths; or the knowledge of the arising and cessation of one or all of the twelve links of 'dependent-origination' (*paṭicca-samuppāda*), seeing the conditioned nature of all phenomena. There is a positive doctrinal statement here, a *sammā-diṭṭhi*. In the opposition understanding a right-view corrects a wrong-view.[333]

This is none other than mundane right view and the (mundane) nidanic scheme. He then presents the no-views understanding as follows:

> The no-views understanding, the strategy to negate all *diṭṭhi* even if, in theory, they express what is 'true', is found primarily in the *Aṭṭhākavagga* and the *Parayanavagga* of the *Sutta*-nipāta.3 Richard Gombrich has argued that to state that the Buddha 'has no viewpoint […] at all' is an 'extreme position', found only in the Aṭṭhākavagga and the Pārāyanavagga.4 The no-views understanding has been termed 'Proto-Madhyamika' by Luis Gómez.5 … The *Aṭṭhākavagga* itself strikes one as *practical* [emphasis added] in nature. In the *Aṭṭhākavagga* there are, apparently, no 'four truths', no 'eightfold path', *no 'dependent origination'*

[332] Fuller, 63
[333] Fuller, 2

> [emphasis added], the content of right-view, but constantly and persistently the practice of turning away from all ideas of wrong and right, pure or impure, higher or lower, is advised. A typical verse illustrates this: An involved person is indeed involved in dispute(s) in respect of doctrines (but) how, about what, could one dispute with one who is not involved? He has taken up or laid down nothing. He has shaken off all views in this world.7[334]

This is none other than transcendent right view and the transcendent portion of the upanisic scheme. Fuller observes that in transcendent right view, there is no four truths, no paṭiccasamuppāda. This simply indicates the step-by-step character of the upanisic scheme—meaning one does not enter the transcendent segment of with perfected transcendent right view, but rather with mundane right view with the purpose of gaining and perfecting transcendent right view. This is the exact sense intended by the analogy of the raft. The raft of mundane right view is meant for practical use to achieve a purpose of transcendent right view but must not be held on to—as meant by the purpose.

4.24 Samma-diṭṭhi as Counterpoise

The subtitle of Fuller's book is *The Point of View.* I have said that frame of reference is the technical version of point of view. So far the discussion has been on the mind/body frame versus the centroidal allocentric frames. Jackendoff's "freely switching" between frames takes us into phenomenology and into meditation, but simply switching or pivoting among the available frames is insufficient to reach the goal of the Buddhist path. Pivoting is rotating or selecting from a fixed pivot point. This pivot point is obviously the egocentric point or the point of the self. But one of the Buddha's insight

[334] Fuller, 3

was that we could pivot ingeniously forever and remain fixed to the point of the self. The only solution is to counterpoise or offset from this point. Offset here means: "displacement, an abrupt change in the dimension or profile of an object, something that serves to counterbalance or to compensate for something else."[335] Counterpoise here means: "a factor, force, or influence that balances or neutralizes another; a counterbalancing weight."[336] I include figure 4.1 below to graphically show the phenomenological turn, the mundane right view of paṭiccasamuppāda, and the counterpoise of saṃvega and dispassion away from craving.



Figure 4.1 Counterpoise from the Phenomenological Turn to Mundane Right View to Transcendent Right View

[335] Merriam Webster, "Offset," Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, accessed February 14, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offset.
[336] Oxford Living Dictionary, "Counterpoise," in *Oxford Living Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, accessed March 3, 2019, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/counterpoise.

The phenomenologist and the early Buddhist are strongly allied in their insistence on the return to the mind/body frame. As Fuller reminds us, right-view is 1) the confirmation of *kamma*, the confirmation that actions have consequences, and 2) views about the self as not being held either to exist eternally or to be annihilated. The first is about mundane right view that initiates the early Buddhist adherent into the nidanic scheme. This mundane right view does not merely pivot, it fundamentally offsets the egocentric/self-centric/being-centric locus to a craving-centric/passion-centric locus while confirming to some degree kamma, rebirth, and the four truths. Craving and passion are the equivalent of self or being in the nidanic scheme (as are the other nidanas to the extent that they condition the egocentric locus). As Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu notes, in the *Satta Sutta: A Being*, "the Buddha points out that the term "being" applies only where there is craving and passion."[337] The second aspect of right view does not merely pivot within the craving-centric nidanas, it counterpoises craving with cessation and counterbalances passion with dispassion. Transcendent right view is initiated and strengthened by saṃvega. It is about paṭiccasamuppāda as the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism which includes both mundane and transcendent right views. Transcendent right view along with the other seven parts of the path allow the adept to pivot among the upanisic frames.

This discussion of right view as counterpoise gives us tools to better consider Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition. In the *Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta* the

[337] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Khema Sutta: With Khema," trans. Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, 2004, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn44/sn44.001.than.html. See note #1

section on Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition is preceded by the section on Sati's commitment to an Eternalist vision of self and succeeded by the Buddha's question, ""Monks, do you see, 'This has come to be'?" The refrain "come to be" or "come into being" more than likely refers to the tenth nidana bhava (becoming). Bhava is preceded by clinging/sustenance and craving. In the *Bhutamidam Sutta: This Has Come Into Being*, this refrain is best explained. In this sutta the most relevant exchange between the Buddha and Sariputta is as follows:

> "Do you see, Sariputta, that 'this has come into being'?"
>
> "One sees with right discernment, lord, that 'this has come into being.' Seeing with right discernment that 'this has come into being,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of what has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment.' Seeing with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of the nutriment by which it has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation.' Seeing with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of what is subject to cessation.[338]

We can observe that the four truths are being applied where 'come into being' replaces dukkha, nutriment replaces origination, and dispassion replaces craving. The language here is more prescriptive: the adept must see with discernment in a way where he is able to become disenchanted and form dispassion toward that which has come into being or phenomena. With this we can be fairly certain that the Buddha was clarifying the

[338] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Bhutamidam Sutta: This Has Come Into Being," trans. Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, 1998, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.031.than.html.

common fallacy of Self (i.e., Sati's slander) with Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition, then onto clarifying being (or becoming or Self) in terms of the four truths which are the encapsulation of paṭiccasamuppāda.[339] So we can be confident the Buddha is identifying Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition dukkha and 'come into being.' This is further evidenced by a line in the *Khema Sutta: With Khema*. In this sutta, the Buddha is discussing the inexpressible nature of the Tathagata (the Buddha and arahants) after death. In one part he says, "Any consciousness by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. *Freed from the classification of consciousness* [emphasis added], great king, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the ocean."[340] So we know that the classification or at least classifying process of consciousness is binding. If we have correctly identified Consciousness Classified by Requisite Condition as intentionality then intentionality is fettering. Whereas for the phenomenologist intentionality is the zone for opening up the horizon of possibilities for consciousness and understanding consciousness, for the early Buddhists it is also the entire field of phenomena, but subject to the hypothetical imperatives found in the four truths and paṭiccasamuppāda. We can look at figure 3.1 to see that Sati did not counterpoise to the craving-centric right view and certainly not to the saṃvega-centric transcendental right view and therefore viewed mind/body as Eternal Self. We can also see that the physical

[339] Indeed further in the *Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta*, the Buddha resorts to paṭiccasamuppāda to rebut Sati's slander.
[340] Ṭhānissaro, "Khema Sutta: With Khema."

phenomenologists likewise have not offset to the passion-centric then onto the passionless-centric frames, and therefore view the mind/body in terms of the annihilationist brain/body.

4.25 Saṃvega: We Look at What We Normally Look Through

Sokolowski continues his explanation of the transcendental turn in terms of the characteristics of bracketing and intentionality:

> Finally, to complete this brief treatment of terminology, let us speak of the term *bracketing*. When we enter into the phenomenological attitude, we suspend our beliefs, and we bracket the world and all the things in the world. We put the world and the things in it "into brackets" or "into parentheses." When we so bracket the world or some particular object, we do not turn it into a mere appearance, an illusion, a mere idea, or any other sort of merely subjective impression. Rather, we now consider it *precisely as it is intended by an intentionality in the natural attitude* [emphasis added]. We consider it as correlated with whatever intentionality targets it. If it is a perceived object, we examine it as perceived; if it is a remembered object, we now examine it as remembered; if it is a mathematical entity, we consider it as correlated with a mathematical intention; if it is a merely possible object, or a verified one, we consider it as the object for an intentionality that intends something only possible, or an intentionality that intends something verified. Bracketing retains exactly the modality and the mode of manifestation that the object has for the subject in the natural attitude. Thus, when we enter into phenomenological reflection, we do not restrict our focus just to the subjective side of consciousness; we do not focus only on the intentionalities. We also focus on the objects that are given to us, but we focus on them as appearing to us in our natural attitude. In the natural attitude we head directly toward the object; we go right through the object's appearances to the object itself. From the philosophically reflective stance, we make the appearances *thematic* [emphasis added]. We look *at* what we normally look *through*.[341]

Here the student of early Buddhist meditation should recognize a remarkable similarity to

[341] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 50

their own system. I will contend that bracketing is one of the features of satipaṭṭhāna or mindfulness training in the section below; mindfulness also suspends the natural world. Sokolowski's explanation involves skipping between referrals to and involvement in the transcendental frame and natural frame. Using the frames of reference, the mind/body frame is the mind's scientific laboratory. The word "science" is used here in the tradition of Husserl who sought the conditions for the absolute and insight into transcendence. Science is James's passionless and pure investigation. As already said, the phenomenological turn is only preparatory; it is only entering the laboratory which has several conditions and characteristics: controlling variables, trial and error, hypotheses, passionless commitment to the endeavor. Entering the laboratory has fulfilled certain presuppositions itself, but most of the endeavor remains to be fulfilled. For the phenomenologist much of this endeavor entails an ideal understanding of his own intentionalities that should reveal a transcendental a priori unity from which it operates. Using the laboratory analogy, the laboratory technician does not remove so much from the field object that there is nothing or not enough left to examine and test. The lab tech removes just enough. What does the phenomenic lab tech do? He transitions to a passionless mode as he enters the lab, then he brings in the object as found in the natural world and examines it in his phenomenic's professional stance. He does not remove say the disgusting property or attribute from say a corpse and only sees the corpse devoid of complexity. He exercises and observes his own intentionality toward the disgusting corpse. But he does this from a higher perch. This is a meta-cognition and meta-intentionality. He is observing in the higher perch of the mind/body frame how he would

naturally and normally match an activation of a *consciousness* modular piece of puzzle with the corresponding modular piece of puzzle *attribute* or *theme* of an occurrence in the natural world. A theme would be a category of similar attributes.

The last two lines in Sokolowski's description of intentionality "From the philosophically reflective stance, we make the appearances thematic. We look *at* what we normally look *through*" deserve special elaboration not only because they concisely explain the work of intentionality, but more importantly they explain the enterprise that is exhorted in the First Noble Truth: "Now this, monks, is the Noble Truth of dukkha: Birth is dukkha, aging is dukkha, death is dukkha; sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair are dukkha; association with the unbeloved is dukkha; separation from the loved is dukkha; not getting what is wanted is dukkha. In short, the five clinging-aggregates are dukkha."[342] These items in the list including birth, aging, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair, association with the unbeloved, separation from the loved, not getting what is wanted are all found in the natural attitude; they are what the empiric encounters. But this is not precise enough for the phenomenologist. What is the occurrence and what is the attribute, and what is the theme? Birth, aging and death, and association with the unbeloved, separation from the loved, not getting what is wanted (as a symbolic list of all occurrences really) is part of the lifeworld because the empiric lives all these occurrences. Their attributes are sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. Their theme is dukkha. This compilation defining and explaining dukkha to this point is

[342] Ṭhānissaro, "Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta: Setting the Wheel of Dhamma in Motion."

entirely of the natural attitude. Then the compilation proceeds to the five clinging-aggregates which are part of the paṭiccasamuppāda scheme. The Buddha is exhorting us to take these occurrences, attributions, and themes from the natural attitude and transition via the transcendental turn so that the Buddhist empiric can look *at* the occurrences of "birth, aging and death, and association with the unbeloved, separation from the loved, not getting what is wanted" for the attributes "sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair." We are to look *at* these attributes for the dukkha theme. Because in the natural attitude we simply look through or pass the attribute and the theme. When the person is prone and sensitive to the stated attributes and to the dukkha theme, we say that he has sensitized himself to saṃvega. Saṃvega is the module of consciousness that will correlate with the attributes and of theme of dukkha taken from the lifeworld. It is only in the mind/body frame that this progresses and advances to all phenomena in the five clinging-aggregates which by the Buddha's definition is the entire world. In claiming that paṭiccasamuppāda is an elaboration of the Four Noble Truths, I identified the anuloma and nidana scheme with the Second Noble Truth of the cause of dukkha. I identified paṭiloma and the upanisā scheme with the Third Noble Truth of cessation. I identified the entirety paṭiccasamuppāda as the sufficient summary of Dhamma. Here I believe I have identified saṃvega as the true and correlative understanding of dukkha that the Buddha exhorted in the First Noble Truth.

4.26 Fabrication as Shaping Intentionality

The second nidana is fabrication (Pali saṅkhāra; Sanskrit saṃskāra). There is reason why fabrication lies in between ignorance and consciousness. Per anuloma, ignorance conditions fabrication which conditions consciousness. Fabrication has been regarded as the more abstract and difficult to understand among the nidanas.[343] As the conditioning of experience or consciousness, it is the possibility and horizon for suffering and at the same time the possibility and horizon for release from suffering, the former conditioned by ignorance and the later conditioned by knowledge of the four truths. This possibility and horizon are due to the volitional character of fabrication. If we see consciousness not as an entity but as processes, a "consciousness of," or a classification of consciousness, we can better appreciate the role of fabrication. I will limit my coverage of fabrication mainly to its dynamic with and elucidation of the themes of the previous sections, namely intentionality, counterpoise, and saṃvega. I hope to show that fabrication is the shaping of consciousness that we have just discussed and that this shaping is itself by default performed ignorantly or without the knowledge and guidance of the four truths and paṭiccasamuppāda.

In this section, I rely on Sue Hamilton's work *Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism*. Her main focus is the five clinging-aggregates, the fourth of which is the fabrication aggregate (saṅkhāra khandha). Richard Gombrich in his foreword writes of her interpretation of khandha or

[343] See Hamilton, *Identity and Experience*, 66 where she maintains, "The term saṃskāra occurs in many different contexts in the Nikayas, and has been notoriously difficult to explain and understand."

bundle: “She has found an exciting answer: they are bundles of experiences. On close scrutiny it turns out that the Buddha did not ask “What is a man?” but “How is man?”. For objects he substituted processes.”[344] Although she does not analyze the constitution of being (or human being) in phenomenological terms, she clearly understands the khandhas in the phenomenic’s experiential terms. She sees saṅkhāra’s unique importance as revealed in its involvement in tilakkhana, paṭiccasamuppāda, and the five clinging-aggregates.[345] She writes of its role in tilakkhaṇa thus:

> First, and fundamentally, the term appears in the *tilakkhaṇa* formula. I put this first, and say that it is fundamental, because the *tilakkhana* formula describes the nature of *samsaric* existence as a whole, insight into which is liberating knowledge according to the Buddha's teachings. Clarifying what it means in this formula also shows how different the meanings of *saṃkhāra* can be, since in this context its meaning is significantly different from the two which follow. In the passage in the *Aṅguttara Nikaya* where this formula is found,1 it is stated that the formula refers to ‘the fact that things are a certain way’ (dhammatthitata) and ‘the fact that there is a regularity of things’ (dhammaniyamata) which applies whether or not a *tathagata* (an epithet of the Buddha) appears in the world.2 The formula is: “all conditioned phenomena (*saṃkhāra*) are unsatisfactory, all conditioned phenomena (*saṃkhāra*) are impermanent, all phenomena (*dhammā*) are selfless.”3 In fact all the phenomena of *samsaric* experience, of whatever kind, are conditioned: this is precisely why they are impermanent and unsatisfactory. So all *samsaric* phenomena are *saṃkhāras* (or *saṃkhata* - conditioned; the two words are virtually interchangeable).[346]

Although tilakkhaṇa can apply to empirical phenomena (e.g., mountains are inconstant because even they wear away), Harvey reminds us that its application was meant to extend the emphasis on dukkha in the four truths to also include inconstancy and not-

[344] Hamilton, x
[345] Hamilton, 66
[346] Hamilton, 66-67

Self.[347] Earlier Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu was already quoted connecting fabrication with the shaping of our suffering experience. In fact, we are taught via tilakkhaṇa that fabrication is also the shaping of a false sense of constancy or safety in our experience. We also fabricate or shape a false sense of self in our experience. Tilakkhaṇa is right view of knowledge (a correction of ignorance) that correctly conditions fabrication which conditions consciousness. Because saṅkhāra is also understood as volition, this is the locus for pivoting, counterpoising, and transformation. Although Hamilton sees tilakkhaṇa as contextually different from paṭiccasamuppāda's and the khandhas', I see this as consistent with our discussion of intentionality, dispassion, and saṃvega. Tilakkhaṇa collates together a family of themes for the twelfth nidana's attributes. We have more tools to thematize. We can look *at* the occurrences of "birth, aging and death, and association with the unbeloved, separation from the loved, not getting what is wanted" for the attributes "life is short, death is near, time with loved ones is limited, possessions do not last." We are to look *at* these attributes for the anicca (inconstancy) theme. The same applies to the not-Self theme. Saṅkhāra's meaning is more manageable if we establish that it means both conditioned phenomena and conditioning of phenomena.[348] Saṅkhāra's role in tilakkhaṇa (mark or theme), then paṭiccasamuppāda (fabrication shaping consciousness), then khandha (being) is of the pattern: saṃskāra is *conditioned by* knowledge of the possible themes of experience (tilakkhaṇa), saṃskāra *conditions* the classification of consciousness. Saṃskāra shapes the classifying or

[347] Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism*, 57
[348] Robert E. Buswell, Jr., "Saṃskāra," in *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 758

intending in experience. It is also shaped by these experiences. Following the classification of consciousness, being arises as we have discussed with the *Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta*—following our shaping our suffering experience in intentionality then being comes into play. This makes sense that saṃskāra khandha then follows.

4.27 The Sabba Sutta Declares Paṭiccasamuppāda is Everything

This seemingly bold assertion after some examination should be regarded as not only reasonable but established.[349] There is one sutta that perhaps most succinctly binds together all of my sub-theses. The *Sabba Sutta: The All* just by its very titled claim deserves treatment and proper alignment with the rest of the teachings. I cite the entire sutta here:

> "Monks, I will teach you the All. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak."
>
> "As you say, lord," the monks responded.
>
> The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. [1] Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range."[350]

[349] There are online scholars who posit paṭiccasamuppāda as a theory of everything. See for example Jayarava, "Is Paṭicca-Samuppāda a Theory of Everything?," *Jayarava.Org/* (blog), December 3, 2018, http://www.jayarava.org/writing/paticca-samuppada-theory-of-everything.pdf.

[350] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Sabba Sutta: The All," 2001, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.023.than.html.

One of the most fascinating aspects of this sutta is the Buddha's willingness to designate demarcations where he sees them and to assert his position. One is hit by its concision and abruptness. Normally suttas have more context and introduction. It could be that the Buddha had used the concept All assuming that he was properly understood, so when it became evident this was not the case, he felt the need to explain. Since the All is literally everything it parallels our previous discussion on naturalism in this paper. If naturalism is "all" of nature what are the demarcations of that nature? What version of naturalism should be understood? What version of world (lokiya) should be inferred? We have already seen in the mundane-transcendent purview that the Buddha's categories are different and more encompassing.

The *Sabba Sutta* has a sister sutta that immediately follows it called *Pahanaya Sutta: To Be Abandoned*. Let us call them together as the pair. The Pahanaya provides more details and needed direct context so I cite it here so that the two suttas can be treated together:

> "Monks, I will teach you the All as a phenomenon to be abandoned. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak."
>
> "As you say, lord," the monks responded.
>
> The Blessed One said, "And which All is a phenomenon to be abandoned? The eye is to be abandoned. [1] Forms are to be abandoned. Consciousness at the eye is to be abandoned. Contact at the eye is to be abandoned. And whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the eye — experienced as pleasure, pain or neither-pleasure-nor-pain — that too is to be abandoned.
>
> "The ear is to be abandoned. Sounds are to be abandoned...
>
> "The nose is to be abandoned. Aromas are to be abandoned...

> "The tongue is to be abandoned. Flavors are to be abandoned...
>
> "The body is to be abandoned. Tactile sensations are to be abandoned...
>
> "The intellect is to be abandoned. Ideas are to be abandoned. Consciousness at the intellect is to be abandoned. Contact at the intellect is to be abandoned. And whatever there is that arises in dependence on contact at the intellect — experienced as pleasure, pain or neither-pleasure-nor-pain — that too is to be abandoned.
>
> "This is called the All as a phenomenon to be abandoned."[351]

The Pahanaya opens up, not the range, but the *role* of the All. So the pair crucially tells the Buddhist adept what is the baby and what is the bath water. If the All is too liberal perhaps the baby will be thrown out together with the bath water. If the All is too conservative then paṭiccasamuppāda's designated purview is so attenuated that nibbana cannot be attained.

Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's footnotes to the Sabba Sutta interprets the All. His interpretation will form the basis for my developed contention. He comments thus:

> The Commentary's treatment of this discourse is very peculiar. To begin with, it delineates three other "All's" in addition to the one defined here, one of them supposedly larger in scope than the one defined here: the Allness of the Buddha's omniscience (literally, All-knowingness). This, despite the fact that the discourse says that the description of such an all lies beyond the range of explanation. Secondly, the Commentary includes nibbana (unbinding) within the scope of the All described here — as a dhamma, or object of the intellect — even though there are many other discourses in the Canon specifically stating that nibbana lies beyond the range of the six senses and their objects. Sn 5.6, for instance, indicates that a person who has attained nibbana has gone beyond all phenomena (*sabbe dhamma*), and therefore cannot be described. MN 49 discusses a "consciousness without feature" (*viññanam anidassanam*) that does not partake of the "Allness of the All." Furthermore, the following discourse (SN 35.24) says that the "All" is to

[351] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Pahanaya Sutta: To Be Abandoned," 2001, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.024.than.html#fn-1.

> be abandoned. At no point does the Canon say that nibbana is to be abandoned. Nibbana follows on cessation (*nirodha*), which is to be realized. Once nibbana is realized, there are no further tasks to be done.[352]

His comment is careful to safeguard the integrity of what is effectively the Buddha's definition of naturalism. We have already seen what happens when secular Buddhists attempt to arrogate the mundane-transcendent purview. The secular Buddhists' effective understanding of the All is too conservative, therefore leaving too much bath water and keeping nibbana out of reach. Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, in short, demonstrates that the All does not include nibbana; there is no exception otherwise to the Buddha's conception of the world which is everything in space and time including any form of consciousness with object. The sutta evidence is clear: nibbana is the baby and all phenomena (*sabbe dhamma*) are to be abandoned. We have already discussed the secular interpretation as the physicalist, annihilationist view as precluding the transcendent. Ironically the eternalist view also precludes the transcendent because the eternal Self is caught in space and time. We established that knowing what constitutes the All is required to know the entire scope of what is to be abandoned in order that the transcendent is attained. In this way the All should be *categorized* as the proper naturalism in contradistinction from the naturalism of eternalism and of physicalism. It is in this way that the All is the middle way between the "extremes" of eternalism and annihilationism. But the All has never, to my knowledge, been directly labeled the middle way. Harvey documents paṭiccasamuppāda as the well-known early Buddhist position writing, "Conditioned

[352] Ṭhānissaro, "Sabba Sutta: The All." See footnotes.

Arising here provides a 'middle' way of understanding which avoids the extremes of 'eternalism' and 'annihilationism': the survival of an eternal Self, or the total annihilation of a person at death."[353] As we will see, the All defined as "simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas" is not a limiting of "the world" to a solipsism or even a Mind-Only idealism as has been claimed,[354] but rather opens the world up to include an agency as found in phenomenology and a horizon that includes transcendence as found in paṭiccasamuppāda.

4.28 Contact As Sufficient for the Arising of the Entire World

As is clear the All is citing salayatana (the six internal sense media: the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and intellect) and phassa (contact at the six sense media: the meeting of all three—the sense organ, the object, and the act of consciousness—counts as contact).[355] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu confirms this while reiterating its mundane scope in his footnote on the *Sabba Sutta* writing, "Thus it seems more this discourse's discussion of "All" is meant to limit the use of the word "all" throughout the Buddha's teachings to the six sense spheres and their objects. As the following discourse [*Pahanaya Sutta*] shows, this would also include the consciousness, contact, and feelings connected with the sense spheres and their objects. Nibbana would lie outside of the word, "all." This would fit in with another point made several times in the Canon: that dispassion is the highest of all dhammas (Iti 90), while the arahant has gone beyond even dispassion (Sn 4.6; Sn

[353] Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism*, 69
[354] See Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*.
[355] Ṭhānissaro, *The Shape of Suffering: A Study of Dependent Co-Arising*, 4

4.10).”[356] We do not have to splice suttas together to arrive at the assertation that contact is a condition for the arising of the world. In the *Loka Sutta: The World* the Buddha says so explicitly. I cite the relevant portion here: “The Blessed One said: “And what is the origination of the world? Dependent on the eye & forms there arises eye-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. This is the origination of the world.”[357] This is, of course, the nidanas in the anuloma order, commonly thought of as teaching mainly on *arising* which indeed it is. As established the nidanas are only a portion of paṭiccasamuppāda. It is evident that the All as concisely defined as “simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas” was meant as sufficient simple explanation for the context in which the *Sabba Sutta* was delivered and was, as fully consistent with the paṭiccasamuppāda scheme, elaborated as salayatana and contact in the *Pahanaya Sutta*. With *Loka Sutta* we know the All means at least the nidanas. This is obvious because the Pahanaya Sutta determined what is to be abandoned and this is the same list in the *Loka Sutta* as that which through cessation ends the world. I cite the relevant portion here:

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[356] See footnote 1 in Ṭhānissaro, “Sabba Sutta: The All.”
[357] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, “Loka Sutta: The World,” 1998, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.044.than.html.

> "And what is the ending of the world? Dependent on the eye & forms there arises eye-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. Now, from the remainderless cessation & fading away of that very craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the cessation of birth, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair all cease. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of stress & suffering. This is the ending of the world. …[358]

The question is whether the All is just the nidanas. The *Loka Sutta* connects the All to lokiya, the mundane world. Because mundane is distinctly separate from transcendent the question now is whether the All covers all the upanisās just up to the transcendental watershed moment of dispassion. The simple answer is no. The watershed moment only guarantees no regression back to the mundane; in this sense it is transcendent. The task is not yet fully completed. Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu maintains, "[t]o *abandon* [emphasis added] the eye, etc., here means to abandon passion and desire for these things"[359] with the *Pahanaya Sutta* implying that dispassion is the limit of the All. He clarifies "that dispassion is the highest of all dhammas (Iti 90), while the arahant has gone beyond even dispassion."[360] The sharpest demarcation for the All is between nibbana and itself. Because the scheme of paṭiccasamuppāda includes the arising of the All/the world and the cessation of the All/the world up to and including nibbana, paṭiccasamuppāda is the most exhaustive concept that covers everything in time and space and that beyond. In this

[358] Ṭhānissaro.
[359] See footnote 1 in Ṭhānissaro, "Pahanaya Sutta: To Be Abandoned."
[360] See footnote 1 in Ṭhānissaro, "Sabba Sutta: The All."

way, contact is the prerequisite or the possibility for paṭiccasamuppāda.

4.29 Contact as Phenomenological Arising

Contact takes us back to empiricism as well. It was contact that Kalupahana resorted to as demonstration of the empirical scope of early Buddhism.[361] For the empirical Buddhists, contact—as direct experience—validates the external world detected by the senses and connects the empirical method to paṭiccasamuppāda via the anuloma order (i.e., contact as requisite condition for feeling, etc.) and then to the entirety of Dhamma. I have presented evidence and arguments that this is not the case. The case is that contact is that interface between mind/body and the other centroidal frames, namely the empirical frames. The empiricist starts in the centroidal frames, and remains in the centroidal frames while examining the mind/consciousness/body. In this way his perspective of consciousness is always exterior. From the centroidal frames everything is objectified because it is subject-to-object framing. In its ideal theoretical pure form it strives to be an absolute allocentric framing.[362] This requires an object-to-object framing. The subjective stance in phenomenology as in early Buddhism is utterly removed by the empiricist. The mind, consciousness, and the possibility of agency and transcendence are made impossible. In the introduction we mentioned that the method of reduction was employed by both the phenomenologists and the scientific empiricists. How is this so?

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[361] See Kalupahana, "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism." He invokes The All which effectively includes contact.

[362] See Campbell, *Past, Space, and Self*, 5-8

Let us first inspect the origins of the concept. Galileo developed a scientific approach called:

> the Method of Resolution and Composition (MRC). The basic idea of the MRC is that, to understand a complex phenomenon, one first must break it down into its component parts. (This is the *resolutive* or *analytic* step.) Then one examines the properties of the parts and tries to derive the observed behavior of the larger system from the assumptions about the parts. (This is the *compositive* or *synthetic* step.) Explanation is completed when it is possible to derive all relevant features of the system you are trying to explain from properties of the parts. … This method … was revived in a slightly different form in the twentieth century by the Logical Positivists and Empiricists, who called the view 'reductionism' …[363]

What then is meant by the phenomenologist with reduction? Cogan rebuts this approach to reduction by the empiricists writing:

> There is an experience in which it is possible for us to come to the world with no knowledge or *preconceptions* [emphasis added] in hand; it is the experience of astonishment. The "knowing" we have in this experience stands in stark contrast to the "knowing" we have in our everyday lives, where we come to the world with theory and "knowledge" in hand, our minds already made up before we ever engage the world. However, in the experience of astonishment, our everyday "knowing," when compared to the "knowing" that we experience in astonishment, is shown up as a pale epistemological imposter and is reduced to mere opinion by comparison.
>
> The phenomenological reduction is at once a description and prescription of a technique that allows one to voluntarily sustain the awakening force of astonishment so that conceptual cognition can be carried throughout intentional analysis, thus bringing the "knowing" of astonishment into our everyday experience. It is by virtue of the "knowing" perspective generated by the proper performance of the phenomenological reduction that phenomenology claims to offer such a *radical standpoint* [emphasis added] on the world phenomenon; indeed, it claims to offer a perspective that is so radical, it becomes the standard

[363] Steven W. Horst, *Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science*, Philosophy of Mind (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

> of rigor whereby every other perspective is judged and by which they are grounded.[364]

It is the radical standpoint or frame in which the centroidal frames and worldview are suspended that makes the phenomenological mind/body frame radical. The new "knowing" (i.e., no preconceptions) perspective is the direct knowing of thinking and intentionality. Because it is a knowing of knowing, it is a meta-knowing. It is the diametrical opposite of the object-to-object perspective because it is the subject-to-subject perspective where any and all aspects of consciousness are subject. In this way, his perch is always interior. Sokolowski is briefer in his definition. He also focuses on intentionality when he writes: "*phenomenological reduction* … signifies the "leading away" from the natural targets of our concern, "back" to what seems to be a more restricted viewpoint, one that simply targets the intentionalities themselves. Reduction, with the Latin root *re-ducere*, is a leading back, a withholding or a withdrawal."[365] This leading occurs for both the transcendentalist and the physicalist but in opposite directions. For the transcendental early Buddhist it leads back to an unconditioned, released mind.[366] For the physical empiricist it leads back to biology, chemistry, and physics.[367] The pivotal landmark for both is contact. This is where consciousness makes interfaces with objects. For the empiricist, contact is direct evidence for determination of

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[364] Cogan, "The Phenomenological Reduction." See The Phenomenological Reduction prologue
[365] Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 49
[366] I intend to show early Buddhist reduction is meditation through the upanisās and towards an unconditioned mind.
[367] Terrance Brown and Leslie Smith, eds., *Reductionism and the Development of Knowledge*, The Jean Piaget Symposium Series (Mahwah, N.J: L. Erlbaum, 2003), viii

hypotheses, theories, and facts.[368] For the phenomenologist contact is primarily intentionality or "consciousness of."[369] For the early Buddhists it is phassa, the sixth nidana. There is no dispute that people are deeply conditioned or "trapped in" the *default* or *automatic* stance in the empirical, naturalistic, centroidal frames. James Morley asserts, "A qualitative method alone, without an accompanying approach offered by the phenomenological *epoché*, is continuously vulnerable to defaulting back into naturalistic thinking."[370] This is why it is called the transcendental *turn*[371], and the main reason behind the early Buddhist phrase *against the stream*.[372] [373] [374] This is why Don Ihde maintains: "*Without doing phenomenology, it may be practically impossible to understand phenomenology* …"[375] Being trapped in the default stance will never permit access to the actual execution of paṭiccasamuppāda. Contact is the requisite condition for the arising of phenomenology. Contact is requisite condition for the arising of feeling (the seventh nidana), and so forth. Contact is the requisite condition for the arising of

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[368] See Kuczynski, *Empiricism and the Foundations of Psychology*. 50 where he says "This is subject to the qualification that, for empiricism, all evidence is sensory evidence. (For some empiricists, introspective evidence is a kind of sensory evidence. For others it is not.) Logicians and philosophers speak of "logical" or "mathematical" or "conceptual" evidence; empiricists will have none of this."

[369] Cogan, "The Phenomenological Reduction." See section 3. The Epistemological Problem the Phenomenological Reduction Aims to Solve

[370] James Morley, "Phenomenological Psychology," in *The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology*, ed. Sebastian Luft and Søren Overgaard, Routledge Philosophy Companions (London: Routledge, 2012). 589

[371] Smith, "Phenomenology," 17

[372] See Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Itivuttaka: The Group of Fours," trans. Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, 2001, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/iti/iti.4.100-112.than.html#iti-109. See § 109 {Iti 4.10; Iti 114} where "Against the flow stands for renunciation."

[373] See Upasika Kee Nanayon, "Going Against the Flow," trans. Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, 1996, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/thai/kee/theflow.html. Section All Things Are Unworthy of Attachment where "To practice the Dhamma, then, is to go against the flow …"

[374] See Andrew Olendzki, "Culagopalika Sutta: The Shorter Discourse on the Cowherd (Excerpt)," trans. Andrew Olendzki, 2005, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.034x.olen.html. where the steam is called "Mara's stream" or the steam of death.

[375] Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities*, 3

paṭiccasamuppāda. When we apply saṃvega to intentionality and look at phenomena with dispassion we are practicing phenomenological Buddhism. We can say contact in the form of interface is a major source of conditioning.

4.30 Mind as Consciousness Without Surface

The boundaries of consciousness for the phenomenologist and early Buddhist are different. Let us start with a look at the physicalist. The conscious boundary for the physicalist is the nervous system without exception. For the phenomenologist, even including Husserl's "transcendental" phenomenology, it is the physicalist's boundaries exactly. Ihde comments on the function of phenomenology as "the ultimate hermeneutic rule by which phenomenology operates. It is the rule that specifies the horizon or boundary of phenomenology within which the totality of things may be dealt with. Intentionality *functions* as a correlational rule, and in his later works, Husserl sometimes spoke of intentionality as *correlation-apriori*. An *apriori* is the ground level that founds all other levels; it may also be considered the *limit beyond which phenomenology ceases to be itself* [emphasis added]."[376] So even though early Buddhists and phenomenologists are allied in their insistence on the subjective mind/body frame, the phenomenologist and the physicalists are allied in the boundaries of consciousness. But how are the boundaries conceived by the early Buddhist different from physicalist's?

In the upanisās the second nidana is consciousness, and the last upanisā is āsava-khaye-ñāna or the knowledge of the destruction of the cankers. Earlier I claimed that

[376] Ihde, 24

mind is the sine qua non of paṭiccasamuppāda. By this, I mean mind partakes in every upanisā, in anuloma and paṭiloma and simultaneity. As the mind enters into the stream, the concept of partake loses its literal meaning. If the goal of early Buddhism is the cessation and abandoning of the nidanic scheme then what is the outcome or status for consciousness—the second nidana? Nibbana is not to be abandoned and yet consciousness is to be ceased. How can consciousness be ceased without annihilation? This question is an age-old one with answers from varying angles. We are at a point where consciousness and mind should be differentiated. The second nidana—viññāṇa—is almost invariably translated as consciousness.[377] [378] [379] [380] Citta is often translated as mind, mentality, or thought.[381] [382] [383] When I contrast consciousness to mind, I am referring to viññāṇa and citta. In comparing consciousness to mind, the former is modular and reducible, the latter is neither. This is in line with my contention that early Buddhism views mind as irreducible. We have already in the introduction touched upon the classification of consciousness. Ven. Thich Nhat Tu concisely demarcates the two thus: "viññāṇa engages more in activities responsible for continual existence of beings in [the] process of rebirth (saṁsāra), while citta [is] designated for mental training leading to the

[377] Thich Nhat Tu, "Nature of Citta, Mano and Viññāṅa," accessed October 5, 2018, http://www.undv.org/vesak2012/iabudoc/10ThichNhatTuFINAL.pdf, 2
[378] David J. Kalupahana, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1987), 31
[379] Buswell and Lopez, *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*, 968
[380] Viññāṇa. Rhys Davids and Stede, "The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary." 619. "a mental quality as a constituent of individuality, the bearer of (individual) life, life -- force (as extending also over rebirths), principle of conscious life, general consciousness (as function of mind *and* matter)
[381] Buswell and Lopez, *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*, 194
[382] Kalupahana, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology*, 31
[383] Harvey, *An Introduction to Buddhism*, 57

realization of nibbāna."[384] Although there are exceptions, mind is often used in correlation with the …. Here the concept of contact offers insight.

For the phenomenologist, physicalist and annihilationist all suffering ceases at annihilation, or death, or precisely brain death. Daniel Breyer asks, "if the world is full of suffering, and the cessation of suffering is the only intrinsic good, then why not just destroy the entire world and end suffering permanently? This is the Null Bomb Objection to Negative Utilitarianism …"[385] The traditional short answer is that suffering is a symptom of existence in any form including in the present nervous system in this life, but re-becoming and re-birth ensures re-existence. I do not challenge this as a sufficient answer from a religion. (Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is intriguing idea that existence is conditioned by complexity with rules on contact/interface and modularity.) The persistence of consciousness after death is in large measure due to it having a *surface*. In this human form, the mind/body has its surface in the salayatana as contact and boundary. After death consciousness will lose the salayatana but while in mundane existence will always have surface; (unreleased) consciousness always has surface and it is this surface in which it is bound. It is the unbound mind that is consciousness without surface. Another way to view this is that the liberated mind has no surface or no surface phenomena that it has passion to perch upon.[386] At the conclusion of the *Kevatta (Kevaddha) Sutta: To Kevatta,* the Buddha proclaims, "Consciousness without feature [surface],[1] without end, luminous all around: Here water, earth, fire, & wind have no

[384] Tu, "Nature of Citta, Mano and Viññāṅa," 2
[385] Daniel Breyer, "The Cessation of Suffering and Buddhist Axiology," *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* 22 (2015).
[386] I gained much insight on this from Dr. Willian Chu.

footing. Here long & short coarse & fine fair & foul name & form are all brought to an end. With the cessation of [the activity of] consciousness each is here brought to an end."[387] This is one of the best distinctions between mind and consciousness. Mind is usually a term used in conjunction with liberation and consciousness used in conjunction with samsara. Mind would therefore be consciousness without surface or any contact, interface, or boundary in either human or any other form. Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu comments on consciousness without surface as: "Viññanam anidassanam. This term is nowhere explained in the Canon, although MN 49 mentions that it "does not partake in the allness of the All" — the "All" meaning the six internal and six external sense media (see SN 35.23). In this it differs from the consciousness factor in dependent co-arising, which is defined in terms of the six sense media. Lying outside of time and space, it would also not come under the consciousness-aggregate, which covers all consciousness near and far; past, present, and future."[388] The intention of this section is to distinguish early Buddhism from phenomenology by comparing the former's limit of surface to the latter's "limit beyond which phenomenology ceases to be itself."

4.31 Mindfulness as Bracketing

So far our coverage of the parallels between early Buddhism and phenomenology has been relatively abstract without yet introducing early Buddhist meditative categories. Indeed the *Sabba Sutta* is an unmistakable assertion of at least the need for the

[387] Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro, "Kevatta (Kevaddha) Sutta: To Kevatta," 1997, https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.11.0.than.html#fn-1.
[388] See note 1 in Ṭhānissaro.

phenomenological turn. This takes us precisely within the mind/body frame. We have already discussed bracketing as the method of suspension of the natural attitude. The broadest category of Buddhist meditation (bhavana) is satipaṭṭhāna commonly known as the Four Foundations of Mindfulness. This section only intends to show 1) that one of mindfulness's tasks behaves like bracketing, and 2) when seen as the largest framework of four sub-frames of mind/body the other early Buddhist meditative categories like jhana, vipassanā, and samatha are better thought of as techniques within satipaṭṭhāna than as alternative forms to it.[389]

Satipaṭṭhāna is the most well-known among the classifications of early Buddhist meditation. The *Satipatthana Sutta: Frames of Reference* is too long to cite here. We can make several useful comments about it relying on relevant sections of it. We should immediately note the unusual translation by Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu. He is no stranger to the traditional translation of "satipaṭṭhāna" as the Four Foundations of Mindfulness or the Four Establishments of Mindfulness.[390] He is only person who has labeled satipaṭṭhāna as "frames of reference" to my knowledge. There is a book by Ajaan Lee Dhammadharo entitled *Frames of Reference,* but it is translated by Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu. It is in Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu's *Right Mindfulness: Memory & Ardency on the Buddhist Path* that he offers the reason: "A note on translation: In some of my previous writings I have translated *satipaṭṭhāna* as *frame of reference*; in others, as *establishing of mindfulness*. In

[389] I benefited greatly from Dr. Willian Chu's original thoughts. Any misunderstanding of it is my own fault.

[390] Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu, *Right Mindfulness: Memory & Ardency on the Buddhist Path* (Valley Center, CA: Metta Forest Monastery, 2012), 145

this book I have adopted the latter translation, as it gives a better sense of satipaṭṭhāna as process, and I have used *frame of reference* to denote the topics that are kept in mind—body in and of itself, feelings in and of themselves, mind in and of itself, and mental qualities in and of themselves—as part of the process of establishing mindfulness."[391] It is in part due to his translation of satipaṭṭhāna as "frames of reference" that I investigated using the latter as the conceptual framework for this study. His reason for calling it as he does is to emphasize the process of keeping the meditative topic clearly in mind by a compartmentalizing or framing in order to do the work of mindfulness. This is also my notion of the frames of reference except I emphasize relationship, distinction, or context with allocentric centroidal frames.

Conclusion

Paṭiccasamuppāda is at once one of the most crucial teachings of the Buddha evidenced by his own assessment, one of the most conjunctive evidenced by its factors touching upon other teachings, and one of his most intractable and obscure evidenced by the relative inability of tradition and modern scholarship to explain it to a level sufficient for general consensus. Consistent with my claim that paṭiccasamuppāda is panoptic and subsumptive of the entirety of the Buddha's teachings, I had to be particularly selective of my coverage lest I meander. My interest was mainly philosophical and structural—focusing on its purviews. This meant bridging its macroscopic, cosmological soteriology and its microscopic, phenomenological dimension. I have tried here to locate and

[391] Ṭhānissaro, 11

reemphasize the macrocosmic and microcosmic teachings (which presumably bookends all the teachings) within the early texts that—when connected in the manner I believe the Buddha had intended—sets up an architecture or matrix consistent and reliable enough for other teachings to then be affixed. If I am not mistaken in my major claims about the nidanas, saṃvega, the upanisās, paṭiccasamuppāda, empiricism, phenomenology, and so on, then others can proceed to affix other teachings to this architecture.

Conclusions Drawn from Studies

In part because of the panoptic and subsumptive character of paṭiccasamuppāda, this study was broad and its conclusions several. I cite first the only conclusion that is incontrovertible: paṭiccasamuppāda is not simply just the nidanas; it must include the upanisās and the abstract formula. Taken together and now completely accounted for, paṭiccasamuppāda is the Buddha's entire scheme of the world and the path that transcends the world. The nidanas cover the mundane but include what modernity calls supernatural while the upanisās cover a course to transcend the nidanas. The conceived of The Entirety of Everything (within space-time) within the nidanic scheme and conceived of a nibbanic dimension outside of existence, non-existence, being/becoming, and non-being/non-becoming within the upanisic scheme. In this way, the upanisās resolve, clarify, and complete our understanding of paṭiccasamuppāda. Less certain is my claim that saṃvega is the required insight that transforms the last nidana (aging-and-death) into the first upanisā (dukkha). I believe the evidence do indicate saṃvega as a crucial emotional insight and one closely linked to aging-and-death. Admittedly, there is no

extant texts in which the Buddha directly places saṃvega between the nidanas and the upanisās.

More practical to modern Buddhist studies is my conclusion that early Buddhism and paṭiccasamuppāda specifically do not intend themselves to be an empirical epistemology. I say "more practical" because so much has been placed on the psychological application of Buddhism. I believe I have sufficiently disabused the Buddhist empiricists' core claims and by extension the notion that early Buddhism is an empirical psychology. This is not to say that early Buddhism cannot lend itself to psychology (a hammer is intended to impale and dislodge nails, but it can also break things and prop a door open) nor that the doctrines of Dhamma can never be verified empirically.

In place of psychology, I propose that early Buddhist paṭiccasamuppāda insists on a phenomenology that at minimum requires the examination and transformation of consciousness and its constituents within the mind-body, first-person, subjective frame of reference. I believe a clear demarcation between empirical psychology and (at least transcendental Husserlian) phenomenology is established by way of directional reduction among the frames of reference. More specific parallels between early Buddhism and Husserlian transcendental constitutive phenomenology are found to exist wherein transcendental constitutive intentionality share fundamental features with Buddhist consciousness classified by requisite condition.

I argued for a distinction between pivot and counterpoise wherein pivoting occurs around the center and counterpoise occurs when the center itself shifts. I make a distinction between the center (authentic only in the mind/body frame) and the centroids (manifesting outside the mind/body frame). Once and only in the mind/body frame, the center can counterpoise from the mind/body center to the mundane, nidanic, passion center. From there the center can then counterpoise to the transcendent, upanisic, passionless center.

The Importance of This Study and Possible Contributions

Most generally the aim of this study was to allow for a more complete understanding of paṭiccasamuppāda. If the presentation was cogent then any future discussion of paṭiccasamuppāda should include most certainly the upanisās and perhaps saṃvega. Further, paṭiccasamuppāda would be understood as encompassing both the mundane and the transcendent. Modern academics would be reminded that attempts to secularize early Buddhism is tantamount to squaring a circle. In line with this, the establishment of the demarcation between empiricism and phenomenology clarifies that empirical psychology should not and cannot subsume phenomenology. The establishment of early Buddhism as a phenomenology not only returns early Buddhism to its original role as religion, it inaugurates itself as a doctrine and discipline (“early Buddhist phenomenology”) among the many subcategories of phenomenologies to be rigorously explored.

The upanisās offer itself as an architecture that in part gives a chronology for practice (e.g., conviction/faith follows dukkha). Consistent with this, saṃvega as insight informs us that insight is not simply a product of practice but a factor for practice. Stated differently, saṃvega initiates the practice, propels the practice, and is made consummate (in disenchantment) in practice.

If I am approximately correct in my proposal of a saṃvegic intentional description of the First Noble Truth then the other three truths would also need descriptive refinement. The consequences for much of early Buddhism would be perhaps significant.

Recommendation for Future Research

As just stated, ideally *early Buddhist phenomenology* could be established as a distinct form or branch of phenomenology requiring attention from both Buddhologists, Buddhist meditators, phenomenologists, and eventually, specialist Buddhist phenomenologists. One of the goals would be to determine whether Husserl's intuition that an authentic, passionless, and objective science of consciousness within the subjective mind/body can be established and vindicated.

Canonical textual studies can elaborate the role of saṃvega and the full upanisās with respect to many other concepts. I am certain that the upanisā list is but a shorthand for a much bigger list as is the nidanic list. I had begun a fuller upanisā list inclusion of such was outside this paper's scope.

It is a curious matter why the Buddha did not provide a word or phrase approximating “phenomenology” if indeed he was indicating his method is crucially so as I propose. Let me offer up “sanditthiko” as the candidate word and the sutta that should fulfill this lacunae.

From another angle, this work was an attempt to use modern equivalents (e.g., empiricism, phenomenology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind) in clarifying an ancient system. I do not believe I had to bend either early Buddhism or the modern equivalents in my task, however, I was more cautious to stay true to the former. Of all the possible modern equivalents, it is *complex systems* that I regret I did not have time to treat here—that emergence, among several characteristics, is a tantalizing concept that may help explain the dynamics of both complex systems and paṭiccasamuppāda.

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